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Abstract 
The thesis is grounded in Heideggerian phenomenology. It examines the 
existentiale of meaning in Heidegger's ontology of Dasein of the 1920s and 
proposes that the concept of narrative can clarify our understanding of 
meaning in human life. Narrative theory in turn is critically examined 
and the importance of the difference between the spoken and written 
word is elucidated. It is demonstrated that the theoretical understanding 
of narrative has been distorted by the acceptance of literary narrative as 
paradigmatic. The primordial form of narrative is shown to be oral. 
A commentary on Heidegger's analysis of boredom is undertaken and it is 
shown that the essential structure of narrative is given by the ecstatic 
temporality of Dasein that is not bored. The event of non-boring oral 
storytelling is analysed in detail and shown to be a particular existentiell 
modification of Dasein as being-with. In this event Dasein is called to its 
own authenticity and transposed into the Da of the story. 
In the final chapter links are made to the theory and practice of 
psychotherapy and of performance. The existentiell transformation of 
Dasein in a well-told oral storytelling event is shown to be the therapeutic 
essence of psychotherapeutic dialogue. Insight on its own is not curative; 
psychotherapeutic change is dependent on the way in which a patient is 
able to tell their story. Only by taking up authentic possibilities is the 
client's authentic future freed. Similarly in public performances of theatre 
or storytelling the mysterious phenomena of audiences being transported, 
uplifted and unified are revealed to be instances of the same existentiell 
transformation. We conclude by indicating the significance of our 
findings for philosophy and narrative theory and highlighting the 
importance of the untranscribable meaning of oral discourse. 
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Abbreviations 
References to texts are by author and year, full details of publication are in 
the References and Bibliography. 
Frequently referenced texts are abbreviated as below: 
Heidegger, Martin, Being and Time, 
Tr. Macquarrie and Robinson, Basil 
Blackwell, Oxford, 1962 
Heidegger, Martin, The Basic Problems 
of Phenomenology, Indiana University 
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Concepts of Metaphysics, World, 
Finitude, Solitude, Tr. William McNeill 
and Nicholas Walker, Indiana University 
Press, Bloomington 1995 
Caputo, John D. Radical Hermeneutics, 
Indiana University Press, Bloomington. 1987 
Macintyre, Alasdair, After Virtue - a study 
in moral theory Duckworth, London 1981 
BT 
BP 
FC 
RH 
AV 
The term "well-told oral storytelling event" is abbreviated to WOSE in 
Chapters Five and Six. 
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Introduction 
1 MAN AND STORY 
This thesis proposes that Heidegger's ontology of Dasein can be clarified by 
understanding Dasein to have a story-like structure. The nature of story is 
in turn clarified by two means, firstly by reference to Dasein's temporal 
structure and secondly by the revelation that the primordial form of story 
is the well-told oral storytelling event. Narrative theory has been 
dominated by the idea that the essential form of narrative is a text. Indeed, 
philosophy as a whole has been dominated by a manner of thinking that 
was made possible by literacy and has for the most part occluded orality-
based thinking. Plato tells us that when Thoth invented writing he took it 
to Thamus, king of Egypt, to distribute to his subjects. Thamus said to 
Thoth, 
"Those who acquire [writing skills] will cease to exercise their 
memory and become forgetful; they will rely on writing to bring 
things to their rememberance by external signs instead of on their 
own internal resources. What you have discovered is a receipt for 
recollection, not for memory. And as for wisdom, your pupils will 
have the reputation for it without the reality: they will receive a 
quantity of information without proper instruction, and in 
consequence be thought very knowledgeable when they are for the 
most part quite ignorant. And because they are filled with the 
conceit of wisdom instead of real wisdom they will be a burden to 
society." (Phaedrus #274-5) 
We live in a society that has been affected by literacy for approximately two 
and a half thousand years, and in the last fifty years Western Europe and 
North America have moved to almost universal literacy. This move is 
generally applauded; it is not however entirely unproblematic.1 Pedagogy 
has been overwhelmed by literacy.2 It is frequently assumed that 
1 Fifty years ago, Shewring ("Uteracy" 1944, collected in Shewring 1959) adverted to what 
is lost by the imposition of universal literacy. Modem scholars (Montenyoh11993, Sobol 
1992 and Hymes 1975 and others) have pointed to the semantic and social significances of 
oral tradition and modes of communication which are occluded by textual practices. 
2 In two senses. Firstly text is the most common medium of transmission of information and 
secondly in higher education there is a relentless pressure to write, and amongst teachers in 
tertiary education, to publish. See Grayling 1997 
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whatever can be spoken can be written down, although in fact no system 
of writing can capture all the subtlety of the spoken word. Writing has 
also become the means by which knowledge is tested. In the mediaeval 
universities the M.A. was an oral examination and during instruction 
reading from notes and taking them was frowned upon.3 Many (though 
certainly not all) of the consequences of the move from orality to literacy 
are explored in this thesis. An irony which is not lost on the author, and 
should not be lost on the reader, is that in writing a thesis I am hampered 
by the limitations of literary communication and cannot use the resources 
of verbal communication to which I allude. Furthermore limitations of 
time and space as well as text preclude the full exploration of most of the 
ramifications of this thesis. 
I propose that there is a hugely important variable in oral communication, 
and above all in oral storytelling, that is of existential significance: that 
variable is boredom. I draw on Heidegger's analysis of boredom to 
demonstrate that boredom is an existentiell modification of Dasein's being 
and hence being bored is not a mere colouring of experience but a 
transformation of one's way of being.4 It follows that the significance of 
this thesis is not confined to philosophy. It has a bearing on our everyday 
life and on social organization as a whole. It is not possible to address all 
the areas wherein these findings may be significant; nevertheless in the 
examples throughout the text and in the last chapter links are made 
between the philosophical concepts developed and two practical areas of 
storytelling: psychotherapy and performance. 
The thesis is a centripedal work in a milieu of centrifugal forces and I draw 
on scholarship from a wide variety of academic disciplines.5 It is not a 
work of slavish Heideggerian orthodoxy but it does owe a huge debt to 
Heidegger. As Wood has remarked, "Heidegger's thinking about time and 
temporality in the twenties opened up paths not taken, and ... we might 
3 "University legislation over the centuries had had to repeat injunctions against young 
masters' "lecturing" by dictating to their classes from notes. Masters were supposed to be 
individually enterprising and the legislation had occasionally even gone so far as to forbid 
students to use pen and ink in the classroom, so that such dictation would be impoSSible: 
9ng 1958 p.22 
4 "Existentien" refers to the ontic manifestation of the ontological. See BP 279, BT 12 and 
BT 352ff. 
5 These disciplines are in part maintained in their separation by the textualization of 
academic discourse. One cannot help but overheard a conversation within earshot but it is 
extremely easy to leave books unread. A man may write a thesis which is never read, but 
he cannot have a conversation without an interlocutor. As Phillpotts remarks -Printing so 
obviously makes knowledge accessible to all that we are inclined to forget that it also 
makes knowledge very easy to avoid: Quoted in Goody and Watt 1968, p.60 
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come to find these paths compelling. "6 I have followed one of these paths, 
but I also hope I have followed Gadamer's advice; "do not imitate 
Heidegger, but let yourself be inspired by him! "7 
2 OUTLINE 
The thesis is grounded in phenomenology. There is a logical progression 
in the development of ideas in the text but the thesis cannot be reduced to 
logical argument. As Heidegger said of a later work, "the point is not to 
listen to a series of propositions, but rather to follow the movement of 
showing."s Much more is revealed by the juxtaposition and development 
of ideas and scholarship than could be followed up in detail here, but it all 
allows one to think more clearly the nature of the well-told oral 
storytelling event. The latter cannot be summed up in words so I must 
refer the reader beyond what is captured on the page to their own 
experience of engagement in oral storytelling. As a phenomenological 
treatise this work starts not from axioms but from observation and as it 
proceeds it invites readers to recognize in their own experience what has 
been covered over by the theoretical consideration of meaning, narrative 
and human being.9 
In Chapter One I layout a reading of Being and Time. The two main 
source texts for the thesis are Being and Time and The Fundamental 
Concepts of Metaphysics. Both date from the 1920s, and the ontology of 
Dasein laid out in the former still underpins Heidegger's thinking in the 
latter. The exposition of being-in-the-world, the existentialia and 
temporality of Dasein establish the understanding of Dasein that is the 
basis of the ensuing research. The emphasis in my reading is not to 
pursue all the possibilities of critically challenging Heidegger but to 
explicate the fundamental structures upon which this research is 
grounded. 
In Chapter Two I turn to the specific issue of meaning in Being and Time. 
It was the fact that Heidegger ascribed to meaning an ontological 
6 Wood 1993, p.137 
7 Gadamer quoted in Grieder 1995 p.l22 
S Heidegger 1972, pol 
9 In this thesis, as Caputo says of Being tmd ｔｩｾＬ＠ "everything comes down to our capacity 
to recognize ourselves in the finished account, in the 'story' of human existence which is 
recounted there." Caputo 1987, (hereafter RH) p.SO 
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significance that first drew my attention to the importance of his ontology 
of Dasein for my research. Three main results emerge from this close 
analysis of the existentiale of meaning. Firstly it is not entirely clear 
exactly what Heidegger means by meaning. It certainly overlaps with 
worldhood as both are equated to "das Woraufhin"10 and with 
significance which is called an "existential state of Dasein".l1 Ultimately 
his exposition is not entirely explicable. Either he establishes an 
unnecessary distinction between meaning and worldhood and 
significance, or his use of the term is not entirely consistent. Secondly 
Heidegger draws attention to the sort of meaning that entities within-the-
world have when they are "discovered along with the Being of Dasein".t2 
This ontic event involves an existentiell modification of Dasein, which in 
revealing its Being reveals also to some extent its meaning. The third 
result to emerge is that Heidegger abandons the term meaning as he 
presses the temporal analysis of Dasein and he seems to do so because 
meaning is supplanted by the concept of the unity of the temporal 
horizons of Dasein.13 On the basis of the development of meaning into a 
temporal phenomenon it is proposed that we can understand Dasein's 
existential meaning in terms of narrative, and at the same time 
understand the essence of narrative by reference to Dasein's temporality. 
Therefore in Chapter Three we turn to Heidegger's concept of historizing 
(Geschehen) under which name he considers the connectedness which 
holds together Dasein's life (and, it will transpire, any narrative).t4 Next 
we review major theories of narrative; in particular Ricoeur as the most 
influential thinker in the field in the last thirty years, and MacIntyre 
whose characterisation of humanity as shaped by stories has been widely 
influential. 15 We review other thinkers on narrative and Kerby's 
overview which links the notions of self and narrative and note that in all 
these thinkers the idea of narrative is dominated by textual narrative. 
Telling a story is thus held to be a process of conscious creation of a plot 
10 BT 119 and BT 193 
11 BT 121 
12 BT 192 
13 BT416 
14BT425 
15 Especially amongst psychotherapists: "Macintyre ... (is] generally regarded as the 
philosopher who has provided the most compelling account of the narrative nature of 
human reality." Mcleod 1996 p.178 
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which is delivered to the reader, normally through words.16 There is 
widespread agreement that narrative is essentially a textual phenomenon 
but there is little agreement on much else.17 This thesis proposes, contrary 
to this widespread though unspoken agreement, that narrative is 
primarily a form of oral discourse and that its structure is given by 
Dasein's way of being. It is proposed that a textual narrative is a derivative 
form, ultimately dependent on Dasein's lived engagement to be actualized 
as narrative. 
In Chapter Four we turn to the orality I literacy debate to elucidate the 
nature of orality and substantiate this understanding of narrative. It 
becomes clear that a society characterised by primary orality18 has a 
different way of being from a literate society.19 Having established the 
significance of orality we turn to the oralists' views on narrative. It is clear 
that narrative is significant in a primary oral culture as a means of 
preservation and transmission of knowledge, but the oralists do not, any 
more than the philosophers, pin down the essence of narrative. It is clear 
however that that the telling of a tale in an oral culture is an event in 
which there is greater communication and participation than occurs in the 
reading of a text in a literary culture. I focus on the eventhood of 
storytelling and in particular one variable in that event - the degree to 
which the story is well-told or boring. To elucidate the existential 
dimension of boredom I turn to Heidegger's analysis in The Fundamental 
Concepts. Boredom, like meaning, is interpreted in terms of Dasein's 
temporality. Profound boredom is shown to be the uttermost reduction of 
Dasein's meaning. As the thesis shows that we can understand the 
existentiale of meaning by means of narrative and the nature of narrative 
by reference to Dasein's temporal structure it is clear that boredom is not 
just a contingent variable but strikes at the very essence of Dasein. 
In Chapter Five it is demonstrated that the primordial form of story is 
non-boring and is grounded in Dasein's authentic temporality. The 
essential elements of the primordial form of story are spelled out in detail 
16 "narration can be conceived as the telling (in whatever medium, though especially in 
language> of a series of temporal events so that a meaningful sequence is portrayed - the 
story or plot of the narrative." Kerby 1991, p.39 
17 "There is no single theory of [narrative] ... acceptable to a majority of those who have 
addressed it, and the unresolved differences among the critics cannot be either easily 
adjudicated or cavalierly dismissed." Martin 1986 p.30 
18 The term is Walter Ong's: "I style the orality of a culture totally untouched by any 
knowledge of writing or print, 'primary orality· ... Ong 1982, p.ll 
19 See Goody and Watt 1968 
12 
in relation to the equiprimordial existentialia of Dasein and the event of 
telling of a story shown to be an existentiell modification of the being of 
Dasein. The analysis of the well-told oral storytelling event emphasises 
that it is an interpersonal event, a meeting. In this sense it illuminates the 
temporal existential structure of moments of revelation and engagement 
which Heidegger in more mystical language later approached in his 
writing on poetry. 20 
In the final chapter some of the most important implications of this 
analysis of Dasein and narrative are considered in general and with special 
reference to psychotherapy and performance. Throughout the thesis 
examples are drawn from these two fields, and this thesis provides a 
phenomenological grounding for practical work in psychotherapy and 
performance. The phenomenology of the primordial event of storytelling 
reveals an event of being which cannot be tidily analysed under the 
auspices of a single academic discipline.21 In fact, the revelation of the 
hegemony of textualized thinking raises questions about the effect of the 
accepted boundaries of discourse in academia as a whole and boundaries 
between disciplines and topics within academia. In the light of the 
definition offered of the well-told oral storytelling event the distinctions 
between drama and narrative, between poetry and prose, and between fact 
and fiction can be seen to be trivial and peripheral to the true distinction 
between the event in which the being of Dasein is revealed and the 
dessicated language of boring texts or recitations.22 
3 AIMS 
In the field of philosophy this thesis aims to contribute to post-
Heideggerian scholarship on human being, to develop further our 
understanding of the nature of human being. It also brings into focus the 
importance of orality. It is not a meditation in the orthodox Heideggerian 
20 For a succinct summary of Heidegger's later thinking on poetry see introduction to 
Heidegger 1971 (a) by Hofstadter. 
21 Indeed it cannot be fully understood in tenns of mere intellectual discourse at all. "(a) 
philosophy (of culture] attains merely the setting-ollt (Dar-stellung) of man, but never his 
Dadn." PC 76 
22 Cf. Buber: "the real boundary, albeit one that floats and fluctuates, runs not between 
experience and non-experience, nor between the given and the not-given, nor between the 
world of being and the world of value, but across all the regions between You and It: between 
presence and object." Buber 1970, p.63 
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manner on Language in general, nor on the concept of language.23 It is 
rather a phenomenology of a specific mode of telling which reveals. This 
mode of telling is of considerable importance in teaching, thinking and 
expressing truths of human existence. If philosophy, or any other field, 
confines itself to language which is theoretical and avoids the significance 
of the primordial form of storytelling it will always be cut off from an 
essential experience and knowledge of humanity. 
The thesis also contributes to narrative studies. The essence of narrative is 
not plot, sequence or characterisation but the temporality of Dasein. A 
story is a way of showing Dasein's being, and we recognise a story without 
necessarily hearing the beginning of it, and without following it all the 
way to its conclusion. We know what a story is because it is a particular 
way of telling which offers a particular way of engagement to the listener. 
It is clear that in modem times the particular way of being of Dasein which 
is participating fully in a well-told oral storytelling event is rare. This 
rarity is both a reflection and a cause of huge social change. The 
community that was created by listening together to a story now scarely 
exists, and the resulting social atomisation is an unprecedented 
phenomenon.24 
This thesis brings to psychotherapy an understanding of human being 
grounded in phenomenology. Three problems have bedevilled 
psychotherapy since its beginning. Firstly the question of the sort of being 
that a human being is has not been settled. Secondly practitioners and 
theorists have generated theories and models of psychotherapy at an 
exponential rate as the field and practice have expanded. This 
proliferation of descriptions causes confusion and tends to divert attention 
from the phenomena themselves. Thirdly its discourse is incoherent, 
divided between theory and practice and as one practitioner has observed, 
"I have not found the findings of academic research of much help in my 
work as a clinician."2S Theory is not necessarily of practical help, 
especially if it is mere hypothesis.26 Historically, psychotherapy is built on 
23 Neither in Poetry lAnguage and Thought, nor in On the Way to lAnguage does Heidegger 
explicitly confront the effect of writing on language and thinking. Perhaps the difference 
was hidden from him because he himself was such a prolific writer. The as yet unfinished 
publication of the Gesam tausgabe already runs to sixty nine volumes. He does remark (in 
1935) that ''There is a difference between the spoken and the written word" Heidegger 1959 
p.xi, but does not expand on his observation. 
24 See Putnam 1996. 
25 Polkinghorne 1988 p.ix 
26 "The essential way of thinking of the specialist in literate culture is fundamentally at 
odds with that of daily life and common experience" Goody and Watt 1968, p.60 
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foundations of sand. Freud simply posited hypothetical intra-psychic 
entities with no ontological argument, and ever since his successors and 
detractors have tended to do the same.27 
Boss persuaded Heidegger to give seminars to psychotherapists and began 
a psychotherapy based on a serious investigation of human ontology.28 
This thesis continues that tradition of bringing to psychotherapy the fruits 
of phenomenological research. In particular it addresses the issue of 
meaning which is raised again and again in psychotherapy. It is proposed 
that the fundamental structure of what is meaningful in psychotherapy is 
narrative.29 It is further proposed that the most important element in the 
myriad stories told in psychotherapy is not their content but the manner 
of their telling including the nature of the involvement of the listener. 
This is why every nuance of communication in the psychotherapeutic 
hour is significant. 
In the field of performance the analysis of the well-told oral storytelling 
event is offered as the paradigm for involvement in 'artistic' events such 
as theatre, dance, mime, storytelling and so on. All these now separate 
fields of performance are variations which have sprung from pre-literate 
man's telling of stories. The designation 'artistic' and its separation from 
mere entertainment and from religion is a result of literate modernity. 
The well-told oral storytelling event is the historical and ontological 
source of these modern variations and derivative forms. In the event of 
oral storytelling can be seen a fundamental mode of engagement with the 
experience of the other. The sensational distractions of sophisticated, 
modern, narrative art forms often simply cover over the fact that we are 
not gripped by the story. By analysing the well-told oral storytelling event 
we see Dasein's essential involvement in narrative. The analysis shows 
why, at bottom, personal authenticity is essential for successful 
storytelling. Equally, successful storytelling is a route to personal 
authenticity. 
27 Freud's writing contains both admissions of his hypothesizing, (e.g. "What follows is 
speculation, often far-fetched speculation" Freud 1922 p.27) and dogmatic assertions ("the 
thoughts contained in [The Ego and the ld] are synthetic rather than speculative in 
character" Freud 1927 p.7). He appears to convert speculation to dogma mainly by dint of 
sheer repetition although he claims his results justify his assumptions (Freud 1964 p.t44). 
See also Freud 1962, pp.103-116. 
28 See Boss 1988 and 1994 
29 "narrative (is] the primary form by which human experience is made meaningful" 
Polkinghome 1988, p.l 
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1 HFlDEGCER'S ONTOLOGY OF DASEIN 
Chapter One 
Heidegger's Ontology of Dasein 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Some preliminary remarks about the methodology and structure of Being 
and Time are required. Being and Time is a notoriously difficult text in 
which Heidegger raises the question of Being. He begins to answer the 
question by investigating the being of human beings, or to use the term he 
preferred, Dasein. Being and Time was published in 1927 because the 
German Government requested published evidence of Heidegger's 
scholarship before they would agree to his appointment to the Chair of 
Philosophy at Freiburg. The treatment of the question of Being sketched 
out in the introduction is not completed in the book as published) So in 
Being and Time we have an incomplete text, published in haste.2 The 
difficulties of the text are compounded because his project questioned the 
fundamental assumptions of Western metaphysics. 
"this task [is] one in which ... we are to destroy the traditional 
content of ancient ontology until we arrive at those primordial 
experiences in which we achieved our first ways of determining 
the nature of Being." (BT 44) 
Heidegger's way of phenomenological thinking is unlike a traditional 
philosophical progression by means of logical arguments.3 In order not to 
en tangle himself in the very thinking he was questioning he eschewed 
traditional philosophical terms and created new terms to express his 
innovative ideas. Heidegger took over the famous maxim of his teacher, 
Edmund Husserl, quoting him directly: "the term 'phenomenology' 
expresses a maxim which can be formulated as 'To the things 
1 In the preface to the seventh edition, published in 1953, Heidegger writes, "After a 
quarter of a century, the second half could no longer be added unless the first were to be 
presented anew." BT 17 
2 As Heidegger himself said later, "The fundamental flaw of the book Being lind Timt is 
perhaps that I ventured forth too far too early." Heidegger 1971 (b) p.7 
3 "Heidegger is not interested in giving the necessary and suffident conditions for existing 
in his sense. He is only interested in the de facto structure of this way of being. II Dreyfus 
1991, p.1S 
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themselves!,tt4 Phenomenology in other words, turns away from the 
traditional engagement with theories and consequential arguments and 
attempts to look afresh at what presents itself to us most immediately in 
life; what is, as it were, right under our noses. 
However although he acknowledged his debt to his teacher,S and 
dedicated the book to him, in two fundamentally important ways 
Heidegger disagreed with him. Husserl wished to 'bracket' prejudices, to 
start afresh and take nothing for granted, but Heidegger's understanding of 
the being of Dasein precluded the possibility of such radical Husserlian 
'bracketing'. As Merleau-Ponty put it in the Preface to The 
Phenomenology of Perception, 
"The most important lesson which the [phenomenological] 
reduction teaches us is the impossibility of a complete reduction. 
This is why Husserl is constantly re-examining the possibility of 
the reduction. If we were absolutely mind, the reduction would 
present no problem. But since ... we are in the world ... there is no 
thought which embraces all our thought. "6 
Secondly, fundamental to Heidegger's thinking is a rejection of the 
residual Cartesianism of his teacher's position. He does not carry over the 
dualistic structure of intentional objects and transcendental consciousness; 
"When Dasein directs itself towards something and grasps it, it 
does not somehow first get out of an inner sphere in which it has 
been proximally encapsulated, but its primary kind of Being is 
such that it is always 'outside' alongside entities which it 
encounters and which belong to a world already discovered." (BT 
89)7 
Heidegger's way of thinking in Being and Time is an ever deeper 
questioning and a penetrating of the Being of entities. Heidegger draws 
attention to our most immediate experience and then asks what must be 
the case such that our immediate experience is as it is.8 Rather than 
pressing forward, his investigation turns around to question the pre-
understanding which originally made possible its formulation. In 
4BTSO 
5 "The following investigation would [not] have been possible if the ground had not been 
prepared by Edmund Husserl" BT 62 
6 Merleau-Ponty 1962 p.xiv 
1 See also the 1927 lectures: "I cannot and must not ask how the inner intentional experience 
arrives at an outside." BP 63 
8 In John Caputo's words, "[In Being and Time! there is no formal deductive movement from 
premise to conclusion but a regressive hermeneutic movement bent on explication, aus-kgen, 
on unpacking the implidt components of an everyday functioning pre-understanding: RH 67 
11 
1 HElDECGER'S ONTOLOGY OF DASE1N 
traditional terms this is most akin to a recursive laying bare of the 
conditions for the possibility of the conditions for the possibility of our 
experience. Heidegger calls this method "phenomenology". It is he says, 
"the 'how' with which "phenomena are treated.9 Phenomenology is thus 
our way of access to phenomena and is concerned with "the Being of 
entities, its meaning, its modifications and derivatives. "10 The Being of 
entities is precisely what is not immediately obvious. We come across 
things, not what makes them things. Yet Being is what makes it possible 
for us to come across things, or conversely for things to show themselves 
to us. So phenomenon means, 
"something that proximally and for the most part does not show 
itself ... but at the same time ... something that belongs to what 
thus shows itself, and ... belongs to it so essentially as to constitute 
its meaning and its ground. n(BT 59) 
To engage in the philosophical activity of phenomenology is to describe 
the structures of Being that pertain to entities we meet.ll Precisely because 
phenomenology is descriptive Heidegger warns us in the introduction 
that his investigation will show that the meaning of phenomenological 
description as a method lies in interpretation and states, "The 
phenomenology of Dasein is a hermeneutic [which term] ... designates 
this business of interpreting."12 In his analysis of interpretation he shows 
that all comprehension relies on pre-conception)3 Every question has 
some direction, something which is enquired about, however minimally 
understood. That direction or thing is inherent in the question itself, and 
without it we would have no question, i.e. every question must ask a 
certain something of a certain something. Thus Heidegger shows we must 
already have some understanding of something as something in order to 
question it. Of course our understanding can be erroneous, nonetheless 
we have already, however inaccurately, partially understood whatever we 
question. Therefore there is no investigative process, least of all that of 
Being and Time, which can take nothing for granted, as a Husserlian 
phenomenologist would wish. Being and Time proceeds by uncovering 
and then questioning what we have taken for granted in order to question 
9BT59 
10 BT60 
11 Hence Heidegger says, "The expression 'descriptive phenomenology' ... is at bottom 
tautological." BT59 
12 BT62 
13 Section 32, BT 188ff. 
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at all. This turning round and studying the conditions of questioning is 
called hermeneutic by Heidegger.14 
2 BEING IN THE WORLD 
Being is all around us, in the form of everything that is, and yet it is never 
presented simply all by itself. It is always presented in the form of one 
thing or another. How therefore, Heidegger asks, can we get access to 
Being as such? It seems the most universal concept, and yet it remains 
always hidden by the particular manifestation of being of any given thing. 
Traditionally, metaphysics considered Being under two headings, essentia, 
essence, and existentia, existence. Essence was what an entity was, 
existence was that an entity was. The being of a tree can be discussed in 
terms of its existence. Does it owe its existence to the all seeing eye of God, 
or does it exist simply as the latest in a complex series of arrangements of 
energies that started ex nihilo with the Big Bang? On the other hand the 
being of a tree can be considered by asking what makes it a tree, as opposed 
to a table, a matchstick, or a broom-handle. What, in other words, is its 
essence? 
The being of human beings has been particularly studied in philosophy. 
Heidegger takes up the traditional distinction between essence and 
existence and proposes that in the case of Dasein the distinction cannot be 
made, in fact the identity of essence and existence is definitive for Dasein. 
He claims that, 
"The essence of Dasein lies in its existence. Accordingly those 
characteristics which can be exhibited in this entity are not 
'properties' present-at-hand of some entity which 'looks' so and so 
and is itself present-at-hand;[15] they are in each case possible ways 
for it to be, and no more than that." (BT 67) 
The 'what-it-is' of a human being is its 'that-it-is'. What is fixed for us is 
'that-we-are' and yet we are always faced with having to choose, or avoid 
choosing, exactly how to be. We have to choose for ourselves how to live 
14 Hence Dreyfus writes, "Heidegger developed his hermeneutic phenomenology in 
opposition to Husser!'s transcendental phenomenology." Dreyfus, 1991, p.2. It is useful to 
use his phrase 'hermeneutic phenomenology' to describe Heidegger's methodology to 
differentiate it from the Husserlian phenomenology, as the former pupil subverted and 
redefined his mentor's term. 
15 See below for discussion of 'present-at-hand'. 
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out what we are presented with, that is to say we are always partly and yet 
never completely determined. To give a partial but graphic example, as 
long as we live we have a body but the condition of our bodies depends 
greatly on our actions, diet and stress levels about which we choose either 
actively or by default, as well as on our age and genetic inheritance. 
Having a body is a given, but its condition is radically affected by our 
choices. What is fixed for us is that we always are, or "take a stand" as 
Dreyfus puts it, in one manner or another and yet that manner is never 
fixed once and for all.16 Heidegger claims that we are always choosing, 
whether explicitly or not, how to be, and this fact is definitive for human 
beings. At any and every moment how I am is a matter for me to decide. 
That I am is constantly raising the question "How shall I be?" And this 
question does not cease to be asked until I am no more. 
Dasein is that being for whom its own Being is an issue. Being, we noted 
above, is never presented to us or made available purely as Being-as-such. 
It is always the being of some entity. But here, in Dasein, we come across 
an unusual way in which being is presented to us - our own being is 
presented to us as an issue, a matter about which we must decide. For this 
reason Heidegger decides that in the investigation of Being, Dasein has a 
priority, a special access to Being, not available to other entities. The being 
of Dasein is caught up with Being itself because our way of being is always 
to have access to Being by virtue of having to decide how to be ourselves. 
In the same process in which he establishes the ontological priority of 
Dasein Heidegger has started to unfold the existential constitution of 
Dasein. He has pointed out that at any moment we are choosing our 
'how-to-be'. This choosing is, necessarily, a choosing of one possibility 
amongst many. A way-to-be is not an entity separate from Dasein that one 
might pick up and put on like a coat, nor is it merely an abstract logical 
possibility. It is an inherent part of Dasein as a possibility. Possibility is 
not an added extra to an actual life. Possibility is constitutive of Dasein.17 
At this stage it is necessary to introduce a distinction of which Heidegger 
makes great use, between the ontological and the ontic. Ontological refers 
16 "Cultures and cultural institutions have existence as their way of being, and so does each 
of us. To exist is to take a stand on what is essential about one's being and to be defined by 
that stand. Thus Dasein is what, in its social activity, it interprets itself to be." Dreyfus, 
1991 p.23 
17 "In determining itself as an entity, Dasein always does so in the light of a possibility 
which it is itself and which, in its very Being, it somehow understands." BT 69 See also 
Gelven, "I do not simply have a possible life as well as an actuallifei rather, I have one 
life in which both the actual and the possible are significant. II Gelven 1970 p.74 
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to the definitive level of being - that which is ontological is necessarily the 
case for the entity in question to be the sort of being that it is. The Ontic is 
analogous to Kant's ciltegorial distinctions. It refers to the contingent 
qualities of a being - for example the particular way-to-be chosen by a 
Dasein is an ontic matter, the fact that I must chose one way or another is 
ontological. Dasein is itself as being-possible. This being-possible is the 
ontological ground for any ontic possible-way-to-be that is taken up at any 
one time. 
Heidegger points out that the choice of possibility that I make is necessarily 
mine. IS I cannot choose for another in this matter of how to be, nor can 
another choose for me. The fact that I am is continually an issue I have to 
deal with myself. The choice remains mine, even if I choose to treat 
myself as just like somebody else or just another thing. In Heideggerian 
parlance Dasein's being is characterised by "mineness". (Jemeinigkeit). 
This "mineness" is highly significant, because as we will see later, it is 
because every choice is in each case mine that the possibility of authentic 
choice arises. Mineness is an existentiale. An existentiale is a 
fundamental, inevitable, irreducible element of the being of Dasein. 
Heidegger defines the term in the following passage: 
"All explicata to which the analytic of Dasein gives rise are 
obtained by considering Dasein's existence-structure. Because 
Dasein's characters of Being are defined in terms of existentiality, 
we call them "existentialia". These are to be sharply distinguished 
from what we call "categories" - characteristics of Being for entities 
whose character is not that of Dasein." (BT 70) 
Heidegger reserves the term "existence" for the being of Dasein, and 
introduces other terms, which we will consider below, for the being of 
other sorts of entities. As well as pointing out that each one of us has to 
choose our way-to-be, Heidegger asserts that Dasein has also always made 
some sort of decision as to the way in which it is in each case mine.19 As 
Dreyfus puts it, "Human being is essentially simply self-interpreting."20 
Existence then, in each case has already chosen a way to be. Hence the 
'that-I-am-ness' is always mine in some way or another. Dasein is always 
actualising some possibility that it has, and decides, or fails to decide, to 
continue to align itself with that possibility or take up some other. Thus 
18BT68 
19 BT68 
20 Dreyfus 1991, p.23 Charles Taylor also interprets Heidegger in this way. See Taylor 
1989 
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Dasein is ontologically determined as always having chosen, always being 
as being possible, always characterised by mineness, but Dasein remains 
undetermined with regard to particular ontic possibilities. These three 
assertions that Dasein's way of being is being-possible, that in each case it is 
mine, and that it always has taken up its possibilities in some particular 
way or other are the foundations of Heidegger's subsequent enquiries 
developed in Being and Time. 
Now if each of us considers our own everyday situations we are aware that 
we can choose to behave in this way or that, and we can think of ourselves 
as having certain characteristics. Indeed we can even look back on our 
judgements of ourselves and in turn judge them to have been more or 
less accurate, but actually, most of the time, we do no such thing. We get 
on with life. We wake up, have breakfast and go to work without making 
a big deal about the various choices that a philosophical analysis of our 
actions might deem us to have made. There is no immediate evidence 
that our actions follow from deliberate choices based on internal beliefs. If 
we are honest we cannot say we are choosing a specific, definite way of 
acting or existing, nor can we be said to be interpreting ourselves in any 
deliberate or particular way. We are just, to use a telling colloquialism, 
"getting on with things". According to Heidegger the very casual, ordinary 
unthinkingness of this way of being has lead philosophers to overlook its 
importance. 
"Because this average everydayness makes up what is ontically 
proximal for this entity, it has again and again been passed over in 
explicating Dasein. That which is ontically closest and well known, 
is ontologically the farthest and not known at all; and its 
ontological signification is constantly overlooked." (BT 69) 
However far from being destructive of his analysis, everydayness is crucial 
to Heidegger's exegesis: 
"This undifferentiated character of Dasein's everydayness is not 
nothing, but a positive phenomenal characteristic of this entity .... 
We call this everyday undifferentiated character of Dasein 
'averageness' (Durchschnittlichkeit)." (BT 69) 
Heidegger calls this average, everyday way of being inauthentidty. In his 
lecture course of 1927 he describes it as follows, 
"Firstly and mostly, we take ourselves much as daily life prompts; 
we do not dissect and rack our brains about some soul-life. We 
understand ourselves in an everyday way or, as we can formulate 
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it terminologically, not authentically in the strict sense of the 
. word, not with constancy from the most proper and most extreme 
possibilities of our existence, but inauthentically, our self indeed 
but as we are not our own, as we have lost our self in things and 
humans while we exist in the everyday. 'Not authentically' 
means: not as we at bottom are able to be own to ourselves." (BP 
160) 
In our mundane dealings with the world we do as 'one' does. In German 
one would say, " man es macht." So Heidegger coins the term "Das Man". 
"The 'they' [das Man], which is nothing definite, and which all are, 
though not as the sum, prescribes the kind of Being of everydayness. "21 
So although we can deliberately choose how to be, that is we can consider 
and choose our way of behaving on the basis of a clear-sighted 
consideration of our own, unique situation, mostly we do things and act 
in the usual, ordinary way. The ordinariness, this average way of 
behaviour, belongs to no one in particular, it is just the way things are 
done. Mostly therefore our choice is a default choice to do and be as 
people in general are. It is not just something that happens from time to 
time, nor a mere characteristic, it is a way of being, an existential 
possibili ty. 22 
Authentic being is choosing a way to be on the basis of our own, unique 
existence. On reflection it is clear that it is in fact a modification of 
inauthentic being, for we are born and educated in the milieu of social 
and communicative norms. These norms make possible our self 
understanding and offer possibilities which we can take over and make 
our own. Human society comprises a tessellation of meaningful acts, 
possibilities and significations within which we have the (ontological) 
possibility of discovering and acting on our own unique (on tic) 
possibili ties. 
Heidegger states that both authenticity and inauthenticity are grounded 
"upon that state of Being which we have called 'Being-in-the-world"',23 
and further that "the compound expression 'Being-in-the-world' indicates 
in the very way we have coined it, that it stands for a unitary 
phenomenon. "24 Although the phenomenon is unitary he analyses its 
elements one at a time. Nevertheless he insists that each part of being-in-
21 BT 164 
22 "Dasein's average everydayness, however is not to be taken as a mere 'aspect'. Here too, 
and even in the mode of inauthenticity, the structure of existentiality lies II priori. " BT 69 
23BT78 
24BT78 
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the-world is equally primary, fundamental and irreducible; for which 
characteristic he coins the term "equiprimordial".25 
The first element he considers is Being-in. By Being-in he does not mean 
'in' in the way a flower is in a garden or a chair is in a room. Heidegger 
means rather to evoke a sense of being-familiar-with as implicit in the 
notion of dwelling within. He is striving to shed light on how any such 
thing as 'touching' or 'questioning' is possible. 
"As an existentiale, 'Being alongside' the world never means 
anything like the Being-present-at-hand-together of Things that 
occur. There is not such thing as the 'side-by-sideness' of an entity 
called 'Dasein' with another entity called 'world'. Of course when 
two things are present-at-hand-together alongside one another, we 
are accustomed to express this occasionally by something like 'The 
table stands "by" the door,' or 'The chair "touches" the wall'. 
Taken strictly, 'touching' is never what we are talking about in 
such cases, not because accurate re-examination will always 
eventually establish that there is a space between the chair and the 
wall, but because in principle the chair can never touch the wall, 
even if the space between them should be equal to zero. If the 
chair could touch the wall, this would presuppose that the wall is 
the sort of thing 'for' which a chair would be encounterable. An 
entity present-at-hand within the world can be touched by another 
entity only if by its very nature the latter entity has Being-in as its 
own kind of Being - only if, with its Being-there something like 
the world is already revealed to it, so that from out of that world 
another entity can manifest itself in touching, and thus become 
accessible in its Being-present-at-hand." (BT 81) 
The toucher must be not just co-present but also be understandingly 
available in a world disclosed such that he is amidst other entities. Dasein 
can touch things because it does not have to 'come out of' the 'inner 
world of the soul' to relate to entities in the world, it always already relates 
to entities in the world. As Dasein we are already existentially involved in 
the world. Dasein is a sort of openness. In the passage quoted above 
Heidegger in fact hyphenates Dasein as Da-sein in order to bring out its 
etymology, literally 'being-there', to emphasise this interpretation of 
existence. 26 
In fact for Heidegger the fact that we are already 'out-there' means that 
world is part of our Being. For Heidegger 'world' is an existentiale of 
2S BT 170 
26 See also BT 398 and BT 401 
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Dasein. He differentiates four ways in which the term 'world' can be used 
and defines his own primary usage of the term as, 
"not ... those entities which Dasein essentially is not and which 
can be encountered within-the-world, but rather ... that 'wherein' 
a factical Dasein as such can be said to 'live'." (BT 93) 
Along with human beings and the world, the being of ordinary things that 
we come across in the world like hammers, windows, and footpaths is 
considered afresh in Being and Time. The Western metaphysical tradition 
takes substantiality as the primary manifestation of being, so a description 
of an entity in its Being would, in the first instance, describe it in terms of 
its physical constitution, extension in space and duration in time. In this 
tradition, and because of the far-reaching influence of Descartes' exercise 
in doubt, our relationship to entities has been treated as almost exclusively 
the problem of knowledge of the world. In other words it was assumed 
that one received sense-data and interpreted them, and thus was enabled 
to perceive entities and 'know' the world.27 However Heidegger observes 
that we do not generally have the experience of receiving sense data and 
then interpreting them. Actually our most common, most primary and 
most intimate meeting with entities is as 'for something'. 
"The Being of those entities which we encounter as closest to us 
can be exhibited phenomenologically if we take as our clue our 
everyday Being-in-the-world, which we also call our 'dealings' in 
the world ... The kind of dealing which is closest to us is ... not a 
bare perceptual cognition, but rather that kind of concern which 
manipulates things and puts them to use" (BT 95) 
In making a drink of tea, I do not, upon opening the kitchen door firstly 
perceive a rigid horizontal surface extended in space below and in front of 
my feet and subsequently interpret it as 'the floor'; I simply walk across it. 
The floor to me is 'for walking on'. Similarly the kettle is 'for boiling 
water' and the mug 'for holding tea'. It is only when things go wrong that 
I contemplate the properties of things as such. When I trip on a loose 
plank in the floor the looseness of the plank makes me aware of a 
smoothness and ease of use of the floor that is missing. When the floor is 
horizontal and firm I simply use it without contemplating it. When the 
kettle is broken or the mug is cracked I see them differently - as objects that 
fail, that are not available for my use. They are still present, spatially 
27 See Mulhall 1990 for a comprehensive demolition of the latest incarnation of this 
attitude as held by Davidson. 
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situated, but as mugs and kettles they are deficient. Their utility to me is 
absent or flawed and their being is therefore modified. 
Heidegger's analysis refutes the traditional ontological priority given to 
substance.28 In the scientific rational tradition the purpose of a kettle 
would be considered contingent, albeit determinative of its design, but 
certainly not ontologically constitutive of its being. But this scientific 
theoretical apprehension does not describe how the kettle is for me as I 
normally meet it. We gain access to beings through our possibilities of 
being with them, primarily by way of using them. Scientific or theoretical 
description is a modification of our primary way of being with things. It is 
popularly supposed to describe the 'true' or 'objective' nature of things, 
but in fact, reading Heidegger, we see that theory describes a theoretical 
world, not the one that we actually live in. 
The way of being of things that we meet most immediately, as we go about 
our daily life, is called by Heidegger "Zuhandenheit", translated by 
Macquarrie and Robinson as "readiness-to-hand". Readiness-to-hand has 
a correlative mode of being of Dasein, "Besorgen ", translated by 
Macquarrie and Robinson as "concern". The way of being of things that 
obtrude because they are unserviceable or that we deliberately take a step 
back to consider, to describe or to stare at as 'pure objects' he calls 
"Vorhandenheit", translated by Macquarrie and Robinson as "presence-at-
hand". 
"Heidegger is arguing ... that to see the world as present-at-hand is 
merely one mode of Dasein's relating to its world. For the 
scientific attitude of objectivity is still only an attitude." (Gelven, 
p.57) 
Heidegger's ontology implies that the being of entities we encounter is 
relational. For Heidegger the Being of beings in the world of Dasein is 
determined by the way Dasein takes up its own possibilities of being. 
Traditional ontology is relegated by Heidegger to an analysis of the 
present-at-hand which is designated as a modification of the primordial 
way of being of things in the world, readiness-to-hand. Metaphysical 
theories, in other words, far from providing a superior, more insightful, 
view, are a derivative way of 'knowing' the world, because we modify the 
being of entities by apprehending them theoretically. 
28 Heidegger's refutation is not of course without precedent. Nietzsche, most famously, 
precedes him. See TM Will to Power 1968, esp. p.268, "The concept of substance is a 
consequence of the concept of the subject: not the reverse! U we relinquish the soul, 'the 
subject', the precondition for 'substance' in general disappears." 
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3 SIGNIFICANCE AND WORLDHOOD 
If our primary meeting with things is as 'for something' and their way of 
being is 'ready-to-hand', then that way of being is given by our purposes, 
our 'in-order-to's', which we project onto them. Each thing we use, each 
piece of equipment, has its context. The kettle, for example, is in the 
kitchen. It sits on the work-surface which is 'for putting things on', 'for 
chopping on' and so forth. The whole kitchen is an equipmental whole 
for preparing food and drink. It, in tum, is part of the house which is 'for 
sheltering' and 'for living in'. In other words everything, every piece of 
equipment, has a context and is part of a network of interlocking and 
overlapping purposes and contexts. 
"What we encounter as closest to us (though not as something 
taken as a theme) is the room; and we encounter it not as 
something 'between four walls' in a geometrical spatial sense, but 
as equipment for residing. Out of this the 'arrangement' emerges, 
and it is in this that any 'individual' item of equipment shows 
itself. Before it does so, a totality of equipment has already been 
discovered." (BT 98) 
All items of equipment eventually point back to Dasein - they are all 'for-
the-sake-of' Dasein, and in each individual case, 'for-the-sake-of-me'. 
Heidegger designates this interlocking network of relationships 
"Significance" (Bedeutsamkeit) and it is what makes world - that wherein 
Dasein finds itself.29 World is constituted by a network of relationships 
that point back to Dasein. When Heidegger writes that worldhood is an 
existentiale of Dasein he is not suggesting that there would be nothing if 
there were no human beings, or that all being is reducible to human being, 
but that worldhood makes possible the encountering of entities as such.3o 
A world without Dasein is not just our everyday world from which all 
human beings have been removed. The conception of such a human-free 
world is still based in concepts and proportions grounded in Dasein. 
Indeed to distinguish our own material planet as such relies on a point of 
view created by the particular factual characteristics of human beings. 
From the point of view of an entity smaller than a neutron our material 
world is as empty as the space of our solar system is to ourselves. Equally 
29 See BT 120 
30 BT64 
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to an entity as large, or indeed small, as the constellation Orion our world 
is inaccessibly microscopic. Similarly, just as the spatiality of our concepts 
is determined by the particular characteristics of human beings, so too are 
our notions of time and duration. This is not to assert a reductionist 
relativism but to point out that not only does the concept of things as such 
depend upon Dasein but so too does their revelation as things as such. It 
is ultimately Dasein that distinguishes one thing from another such that it 
has a world with inner-worldly entities. 
We have to go back to Platonic metaphysics to find the genesis of scientific 
rationalism. Protagoras stated that "Man is the measure of all things." In 
the Theaetetus Plato makes Socrates present Protagoras' doctrine in the 
most ridiculous light possible, viz., "a thing is for any individual what it 
seems to him to be,"3l the better to refute him, and this facile reading has 
been held up and Protagoras mocked through it ever since. But as Michel 
Haar writes: 
"We are too quick and indeed wrong to understand the human 
measure in terms of the modern Cartesian or Kantian primacy of 
subjectivity that claim that the human subject is the condition for 
every object." (Haar 1993 p.155)32 
It is Plato's reading that is extra-ordinary, indeed in the modern sense of 
the word, sophistry.33 Plato's refutation of Protagoras rests precisely on 
the mis-representation of the nature of knowledge of entities in the world 
that Heidegger rejects. Compare Plato's schoolboy argument; 
"are we going to agree that when we perceive things by seeing or 
hearing them, we always at the same time know them? Take, for 
example, the case of hearing people speaking a foreign language 
which we have not yet learned. Are we going to say that we do not 
hear the sound of their voices when they speak? Or that we both 
hear it and know what they are saying? Again, supposing we do 
not know our letters, are we going to insist that we do not see 
31 Theaetetus 161c 
32 According to Haar, 1993 p.154ff., Heidegger attempted in Neitzsche nand Holzwege to 
show than man according to Protagoras is essentilllly the same as the man of the tragedians 
and Heraclitus - that is man before the division arose between being and altthtilJ, "as a 
presence that unfolds of its own accord." (ibid p.l48) Indeed, "Heidegger acknowledges 
that alethtia is not thought as such by the Greeks, it is not thematized." (ibid 148) 
33 "[pre-Socratic] Greek man does not compare the entities before him; above all he does not 
relate them back to himself in the first instance. Entities as a whole understood as phusis-
that is, as that which freely spreads out and opens itself of its own accord - address 
themselves to man. Man does not inquire about his 'r, his subjectivity, to seek the 
conditions of possibllity of entities as such. The form of reflectioPl is not predominant for 
the Greeks." Haar 1993 p.149 
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them when we look at them? Or shall we maintain that, if we see 
them, we know them?" (Theaetetus 163b) 
with Heidegger's insight in Being and Time: 
'What we 'first' hear is never noises or complexes of sounds, but 
the creaking waggon, the motor-cycle. It requires a very 
artificial and complicated frame of mind to 'hear' a 'pure noise'. 
The fact that motor-cycles and waggons are what we proximally 
hear is the phenomenal evidence that in every case Dasein, as 
Being-in-the-world, already dwells alongSide what is ready-to-
hand within-the-world; if certainly does not dwell proximally 
alongside 'sensations'; nor would it first have to give shape to the 
swirl of sensations to provide the springboard from which the 
subject leaps off and finally arrives at a 'world'. Dasein, as 
essentially understanding, is proximally alongside what is 
understood. ... Even in cases where the speech is indistinct or in a 
foreign language, what we proximally hear is unintelligible words, 
and not a multiplicity of tone-data." (BT 207)34 
The depth of Heidegger's thought reveals the pusillanimity of the 
dichotomies that Plato presents.35 Plato's arguments are sophistic 
constructions of his theoretical, objectifying discourse and do not accord 
with our immediate experience.36 Without man there is no measure, and 
without measure there are no 'things'. Without such an entity there is 
only immeasurable and indefinable time or space. Equally there is no 
absolute scale, nor any constant measure. Indeed the very words time and 
space become problematiC, and the distinction between one thing and 
another, between object and ground cannot be discovered. 
In his discussion of substance in A Grammar of Motives, Kenneth Burke's 
observations have an extraordinary resonance with Heidegger, and his 
etymological analysis makes a very Heideggerian point. Burke points out 
that the literal meaning of "substance" is "standing under". 
34 Heidegger makes the same point in "The Origin of the Work of Art": "We never really 
first perceive a throng of sensations, e.g., tones and noises, in the appearance of things - as 
this thing-concept alleges; rather we hear the storm whistling in the chimney, we hear the 
three-motored plane, we hear the Mercedes in immediate distinction from the Volkswagen. 
Much closer to us than all sensations are the things themselves. We hear the door shut in 
the house and never hear acoustical sensations or even mere sounds. In order to hear a bare 
sound we have to listen away from things, divert our ear from them, i.e., listen abstractly." 
Krell 1993, p.151-2 
35 In Chapter Four we consider a possible cause of Plato's attitude. 
36 Havelock, 1983 p.63, points out that the noun 'things' is not present in the original of 
Protagoras' aphorism. He suggests that substituting 'events' for things we could read 
Protagoras as suggesting that "man makes his own history, an assertion which could be read 
as part of his anthropological theory." Reading onta substantially gives Plato the excuse 
to attack the saying as relativistic. 
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"the word 'substance,' used to designate what a thing is, derives 
from a word designating something that a thing is not. "(Burke, 
1945, p.23) 
And further: 
"the word in its etymological origins would refer to an attribute of 
the thing's context, since that which supports or underlies a thing 
would be a part of the thing's context. And a thing's context, being 
outside or beyond the thing, would be something that the thing is 
not." (Burke, 1945, p.23) 
Burke finds in 'substance' a meaning Heidegger would have treasured, for 
even in 'substantiality' itself lurks the 'not' and a hint that Heidegger's 
notion that the being of entities in the world is precisely given by the 
worldhood of the world.37 Burke thus undermines the substantiality of 
substance itself in exactly the way that Heidegger would wish. Just as 
'substance', used to describe the being of things in traditional metaphysics 
refers, according to Burke, to the thing's context, so Heidegger's 'world' is 
not 'things' but 'what lets beings be'. World in fact, is that which is 
'beneath' (sub) that which 'stands', in that it is the 'context' of things - and 
yet of course it is no 'other thing', no 'container' of things, but rather the 
condition of their possibility of being.38 Heidegger defines worldhood in 
the following passage (italics are in the original): 
"Dasein always assigns itself from a 'for-the-sake-of-which' to the 
'with-which' of an involvement; that is to say, to the extent that it 
is, it always lets entities be encountered as ready-to-hand. That 
wherein [Worin1 Dasein understands itself beforehand in the 
mode of assigning itself is that for which [das Woraufhin1 it has let 
entities be encountered beforehand. The 'wherein' of an act of 
understanding which assigns or refers itself, is that for which one 
lets entities be encountered in the kind of Being that belongs to 
involvements; and this 'wherein' is the phenomenon of the 
world. And the structure of that to which [woraufhin1 Dasein 
assigns itself is what makes up the worldhood of the world." (BT 
119) 
37 The resonance with the topic of "What is Metaphysics 7" (1929) collected in Heidegger 
1946, is even more striking. There is no evidence that Burke had read Heidegger before 
1945. See Southwell 1987. 
38 En ptISSIlnt we can note that Burke also remarks, "There is a set of words comprising 
what we might call the Stance family, for they all derive from a concept of place, or 
placement. In the Indo-Germanic language the root for this family is stlz, to stand (Sansait, 
stha). ... In German, an important member of the Stance family is stellen, to place ... 
Surely, one could build a whole philosophic universe by tracking down the ramifications of 
this one root." Burke, 1945. p.21 A prescient observation indeed, for even as Burke was 
writing Heidegger was engaged in just such an activity. 
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Worldhood is part of the being of Dasein whereby beings can become 
manifest. World is structured by significance. Thus for Heidegger the 
Being of what we encounter primarily is not separable from our encounter 
with it. We will return to this point in the analysis of meaning in the next 
chapter. 
Along with being-in-the-world Dasein is equally characterised by being-
with.39 In coming across things in the world the Dasein that uses them is 
implied; our whole environment is shaped and understood by virtue of 
being lived in by people in general, by Dasein.4O 
"Being-with is an existential characteristic of Dasein even when 
facti cally no Other is present-at-hand or perceived. Even Dasein's 
Being-alone is Being-with in the world. The Other can be missing 
only in and for a Being-with." (BT 156-7) 
Every piece of equipment is "indicative of Others. "41 The others indicated 
are not particular others, but just Dasein in general, which I understand 
normally in terms of the Dasein I am, which is often precisely not 
individuated but just one of the 'they'. The Dasein that I am always 
alread y with as being-in-the-world is one from whom I do not 
differentiate myself. I take other Dasein to be as I am, and I am always 
already involved in them.42 I understand any particular other person as 
Dasein, rather than as a physical object which mayor may not turn out to 
be sentient. I meet another as "thou" on the basis of our being-with-as-
being-in-the-world. 43 Because Dasein's being is being-with "its 
understanding of Being already implies the understanding of Others. "44 
But Being-with is not just a phenomenon of inauthenticity. Authenticity 
is a modification of inauthentic being and being-with as existentiale 
cannot be left behind.45 Heidegger sometimes makes a distinction 
between being-with and Dasein-with (Mit-sein and Mit-Dasein) but he 
does not always sustain it.46 Throughout this thesis I use the term being-
with to include both being-with and Dasein-with. Dasein's being is 
characterised by always already being open to the being of the other, 
39 BT 149, BP 160-1 
40 BT 153 
41 BT 154 
42 And indeed I shared to a greater or lesser extent my mood as well as my understanding 
with those I am with. See BT 205 
43 BP 278 
44 BT 161 
45 "Authentic Being-one's-Self ... is ... an existentiell modification of the 'they" BT 168 
46 Cf. BT 149 and BT 206 
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although it may of course disguise that open-ness or cover it over with the 
average, indifferent going-along with the other which is characteristic of 
the 'they'. One can know another intimately on the basis of being-with, 
but the extent and depth of such knowing "depends ... upon how far one's 
essential Being with Others has made itself transparent and has not 
disguised itself. "47 In authentic being-with Dasein takes up its ownmost 
possibilities including its own engagement with the being of another.48 
We will consider a particular case of this in Chapter Five. 
4 THE EXISTENTIALIA AND FALLING OF DASEIN 
At the next level of his analysis Heidegger looks again at the being of 
Dasein. Dasein is being-in-the-world. It has been established that there is 
no 'inside' from out of which we peer to perceive the world; it follows 
that Dasein is already 'out there'. Dasein is not a thing with added 
consciousness, it is disclosedness, its being is to be there such that entities 
within the world can be encountered.49 He characterises Dasein by 
existentialia, his term for that which is ontologically necessary and 
definitive for the being of Dasein. Three existentialia in particular he 
defines as equiprimordial, that is equally primary, and constitutive of 
Oasein; discourse (Rede), understanding (Verstehen) and attunement 
(Befindlichkeit).so Macquarrie and Robinson translate the latter with the 
awkward and potentially misleading phrase "state-of-mind". Dreyfus 
offers, "without great enthusiasm ... affectedness."S1 I am following King 
in using "attunement" to avoid the mentalistic and cognitive overtones of 
the use of the word "mind" in Macquarrie and Robinson's composite 
term.S2 
Of attunement (Befindlichkeit ) Heidegger writes: 
47 BT 162 
48 BP 287-8 
49 "The entity which is essentially constituted by Being-in-the-world is itself in every case 
its 'there'. . .. DlISei,. is its disclosedness." BT 171 
50 "The fundamental existenfialia which constitute the Being of the 'there', the 
disdosedness of Being-in-the-world, are states-of-mind and understanding. ... Discourse is 
existentially equiprimordial with state-o/-mind and understanding." BT 203 
51 Dreyfus, 1991, p.x 
52 King 1964 
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"What we indicate ontologically by the term "attunement" is 
ontically the most familiar and everyday sort of thing; our mood, 
our Being-attuned." (BT 172) 
He points out that even dullness and equanimity are moods and he goes 
on to assert that Dasein is always in some mood or other.53 This is 
difficult to contest, although at first sight it does not appear to be a 
comment of much philosophical import. Yet the omnipresence of mood 
marks it out as an inescapable part of our everyday being. The mood itself, 
whatever it is, "makes manifest 'how one is, and how one is faring"'.54 In 
having a mood Dasein meets the fact that it is, and must be. Heidegger 
coins the term "facticity" to refer to that which is the case for any particular 
Dasein, whose way of being is existence, in contrast to the factual nature of 
contingent circumstances of entities other than Dasein whose way of being 
is present-at-hand or ready-to-hand. Attunement reveals to us that we 
exist, and that our being is our own concern and burden. The particular 
characteristics of how we exist in any given case is our facticity. 
Furthermore it is because of attunement, because we can like and dislike, 
that things can matter to us. Mood is disclosed at the same time as world 
and the way world is disclosed depends on the mood we are in. It is by 
way of our attunement that things can affect or be of concern to us. Only 
because what we encounter can matter to us can the relational network 
subsist such that we can encounter an entity at all. The fact that we are in 
the world, undeniably revealed by our continually having a mood, 
Heidegger calls thrownness (Gewor/enheit).55 We are always already 
entangled in the possibilities and activities of the world; and the world 
and inauthenticity, the way of being of the 'they', are always already there 
ahead of us. 
Existentially equiprimordial with attunement is understanding 
(Verstehen).56 Heidegger uses the term here ontologically. Any particular 
act of understanding is ontic and derived, and therefore to be 
distinguished from this fundamental existentiale which is the condition 
of the possibility of any particular act of understanding. Every attunement 
has its understanding, and vice versa. As understanding we see what we 
can do. This 'see' and this 'can' here are the keys to understanding. That 
which I see I can do is my possibility. When I see I can do something I am 
S3 "in every case Dasein always has some mood" BT 173 
54 BT 173 
55 BT 114 
56 BT 182 
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projecting a potential, primarily my own potential, upon the future. And 
always I understand myself in the light of some future possibility, 
however minimal, towards which I am moving. Such projection is not 
merely one possible way of being amongst others.57 As long as we are in 
the world, as long as we live, we project understandingly. This project 
structures at the same time our selves and our world. We don't exist and 
then understand, we exist understandingly. 
"understanding has in itself the existential structure which we call 
'projection'. ... As projecting, understanding is the kind of Being 
of Dasein in which it is its possibilities as possibilities." (BT 184-5) 
Projecting our possibilities we reveal the world and entities within it to us. 
But this revelation is not an action on the part of Dasein, it is not a decided 
or achieved act - it is ontological. As long as we exist we understand. We 
may in fact do so erroneously, but even that is made possible by the 
existentiale of understanding. We can grasp Heidegger's notion of 
understanding more completely if we realise that it has been prepared for 
and is implicit since the very earliest chapters of Being and Time. 
Heidegger has claimed that the primordial way in which we meet entities 
in the world is for something, that is for some possible use. The 
understanding of the thing as a thing is the projecting of a possibility of 
Dasein's involvement with it.58 Equally Dasein's being as being-an-issue-
for-itself means that Dasein's self-understanding is in question. Dasein 
must continually decide to be in a certain way, in other words to live out 
one of its possibilities. Dasein must in fact always have already projected 
possibilities such that its being can be an issue for it - if there was only a 
single definiteness and no possibilities there would not be an issue of how 
to be for Dasein. Furthermore we can recall that these possibilities are 
always mine, so Dasein is, in each case, my possibilities. So to understand 
myself is to see myself as the one who can and may do such and such a 
thing in such and such a way, in other words to project possibilities.59 
The ontological structures of understanding and attunement sustain in 
every Dasein a certain ontic mood and understanding. Such moods and 
57 "The kind of Being which Dasein has, as potentiality-for-Being, lies existentially in 
understanding. Dasein is not something present-at-hand which possesses its competence for 
something by way of an extra; it is primarily Being-possible: BT 183 
58 "Any mere pre-predicative seeing of the ready-to-hand is, in itself, something which 
already understands and interprets." BT 189 See the whole passage for the complete 
discussion. 
59 As the specific issue of meaning is of course tied in with the discussion of understanding 
we will look at it again in the next chapter. 
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understanding are structured by a third equiprimordial existentiale: Rede, 
translated by Macquarrie and Robinson as "discourse".60 Discourse is the 
articulation of understanding and attunement, the articulation which 
makes possible any ontic understanding or attunement as such. Heidegger 
writes: 
"Discoursing or talking is the way in which we articulate 
'significantly' the intelligibility of Being-in-the-world." (BT 204) 
Articulate here does not mean 'put into language'. Rather Heidegger is 
talking about the fundamental classifying, discriminating and com-
prehending (in the sense of "holding together") of our moods and 
understanding. In many cases the latter may not be expressible in 
language, and yet they are not indefinite. They are quite specific. For 
example it is common, upon joining a group of people to become aware of 
a certain atmosphere, that is an emotional tenor to the group, and one's 
awareness leads one to act and react in finely judged ways. We can say that 
in this situation one has a precise feel for the situation, an understanding 
in fact, and yet one might not be able to capture it satisfactorily in words. 
Another everyday example would be when, if questioned in the middle of 
some complex activities, one is quite sure of what one is doing and yet not 
capable of giving a verbal description of the totality and significance of 
one's actions.61 Discourse qua existentiale is that structuring of 
understanding and attunement which makes this non-linguistic 
exactitude possible. 
As we speak and express ourselves, whether on the most mundane 
matters or complex issues, we are faced with a choice between striving 
towards expressing precisely the understanding we have or making do 
with the less accurate, less precise, stock phrases that come readily to us. 
The experiences of, respectively, struggling to make clear what one thinks, 
and realising one has failed to express oneself accurately, bear witness to 
the ubiquity of this choice, and the degree to which language so often falls 
short of our articulated understanding. 
On those occasions when we use stock phrases in our thinking or our 
speech we fall into idle talk (Gerede).62 Stock phrases, accepted opinions, 
and the usual way of expressing things are all of course articulated, but 
that articulation is impersonal and never individual. Idle talk is the 
60 BT203 
61 Gendlin 1988 gives several good examples of precise non-verbal understanding. 
62 BT211 
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inauthentic co-relate of discourse, that is it is the mode of discourse of 
Dasein that constitutes itself as having the possibilities of the 'they' whilst 
overlooking those possibilities which are uniquely its own. Idle talk is 
clearly unavoidable, indeed integral to socialised Dasein.63 We become 
linguistically competent by hearing and learning what 'they' say, so that in 
due course we may have the possibility of expressing ourselves. 
"This everyday way in which things have been interpreted is one 
into which Dasein has grown in the first instance, with never a 
possibility of extrication. In it, out of it, and against it, all genuine 
understanding, interpreting, and communicating, all re-
discovering and appropriating anew are performed. In no case is a 
Dasein untouched and unseduced by this way in which things 
have been interpreted, set before the open country of a 'world-in-
itself', so that it just beholds what it encounters." (BT 213) 
Not only do we meet language primarily as constituted by the 'they', it is 
also clear that the significations that make up the worldhood of the 
everyday world are always already dominated by the 'they'. Thus just as 
in idle talk we talk without actually expressing the true uniqueness of our 
own revelation of being, so we can even treat our world, our own 
environment, as if it was just a collection of things merely present for our 
amusement or delectation with nothing personal about it at all. But of 
course it follows from Heidegger's analysis of world that our immediate 
world is, fundamentally, nothing other than our ownmost revelation of 
being. Although we inherit from the Dasein that has gone before us the 
means by which we articulate the significance of world,64 each Dasein has 
ontologically its own way of revealing being. In so far as we do not grasp 
that in revealing the world we reveal also our own being, we see the 
world as made up of things which could have nothing to do with us. In 
that case our involvement with it is simply to use it to satisfy our whims 
or desires. We pay attention to what amuses or gratifies us. Heidegger 
calls this way of being curiosity.65 
63 It must be remembered that neither Rede nor Goede are merely verbal, nor even 
linguistic. They characterise articulated being with. Even the casual, non-verbal greeting 
of the wave of a hand can be given, and understood to have, a personal and direct, or 
impersonal and inauthentic character. 
64 The means by which we articulate world will turn out to be, in fact, -that wherein the 
intelligibility of something maintains itselr BT 193 viz. meaning. 
65 In his later ｷｯｲｾ＠ when the emphasis has moved from Dasein to Being, the same issue of 
the mis-taldng of being is approached in the discussion of entities as BestaPld ('standing-
reserve') See "The Question Concerning Technology- in Krell, 1978. 
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Because of the nature of idle talk and curiosity there arises an ambiguity as 
to what exactly is discussed in everyday talk and the grounds for everyday 
action. Is what I am saying what 'they' think or value? Or is it my 
ownmost unique understanding? Are my views conventional or 
essential? There is no immediate test for this difference, nor any 
guarantee that what can be taken to be authentic genuinely is so. By virtue 
of the ontological structure of my being I am Dasein-with-others, in my 
mood and understanding I am already existentially involved with others, 
yet in idle talk and curiosity I treat an other as a separate being whose 
being is hidden from me. This mis-taking of my situation gives rise to 
ambiguity, which is the result of falling in so far as it denies our co-
attunement (Mitbe/indlichkeit).66 A most common everyday example of 
this is the way that we can sense somebody's mood when we meet them. 
They need not tell us, they may even wish to conceal their mood, but 
nonetheless we can sense it. In so far as we deny to ourselves that we 
sense anything, or collude with their denial that they are, in their being, 
showing their mood we deny our ownmost being-with. And yet we 
cannot help sensing the denial, hence arises ambiguity. A common 
response is to flee into ever more definite characterisations of self or other 
but this does not do away with the problem. 
Our being is to be an issue for ourselves and we cannot settle the maHer 
however definitive our characterisations.67 We discover ourselves 
continually forced to repeat and reiterate them. Even if we try to ignore 
the matter we cannot completely avoid it. Somehow we always recognise 
that we have choice. We are, as it were, "called back" to our authentic 
possibilities by the silent recognition of the possibility that things could be 
otherwise with us. Heidegger names this calling "the call of conscience".68 
But the ease and hence attractiveness of idle talk is tempting and 
comfortable by comparison with the demands of authentic speech, so 
there is a natural tendency to pass over the authenticity of one's own 
being in favour of the public interpretation. Heidegger sums up the 
consequences. 
"In the ambiguity of the way things have been publicly interpreted, 
talking about things ahead of the game and making surmises 
about them curiously, get passed off as what is really happening, 
while taking action and carrying something through get stamped 
66 Re co-attunement see BT 205; re the phenomenon of ambiguity see BT 219 
67 Same's example of the waiter (Same 1969 p.59) illustrates this point perfectly. 
68 BT 316ff. 
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as something merely subsequent and unimportant. Thus Dasein's 
understanding in the 'they' is constantly going wTong in its 
projects, as regards the genuine possibilities of Being." (BT 218) 
This ambiguity, he claims, extends even to Dasein's being towards itself. 
As a result in Being-with-others, we constantly are ourselves as one is and 
interact with the other as 'they' see him. Our being with the other is 
constantly invaded by the sight of the 'they'. At the same time as curiosity 
and idle talk run ahead of, and away from, any genuine encounter with 
entities in the world their chatter and fleeting interest passes for what is 
really happening. Thrown into this way of being-with-one-another-in-
the-world Dasein loses itself, and yet, as the being whose being is an issue 
for itself it continually seeks itself. The ambiguity in which it loses itself 
does not arise from intentional disguise or distortion, it arises from the 
conditions of the existentiality of Dasein. 
"Idle talk, curiosity and ambiguity characterise the way in which, 
in an everyday manner, Dasein is its 'there' ... In these ... there is 
revealed a basic kind of Being which belongs to everydayness; we 
call this the 'falling' [veT/allen] of Dasein. This term does not 
express any negative evaluation, but is used to signify that Dasein 
is proximally and for the most part alongside the 'world' of its 
concern. This 'absorption in ... [au/gehen bei ... ]' has mostly the 
character of Being-lost in the publicness of the 'they'. Dasein has, 
in the first instance, fallen away [abge/allen] from itself as an 
authentic potentiality for Being its Self, and has fallen into the 
'world'. 'Fallenness' into the 'world' means an absorption in 
Being-with-one-another, in so far as the latter is guided by idle 
• talk, curiosity, and ambiguity." (BT 219-20) 
This fallenness is a strange sort of falling. Dasein can apparently fall away 
from itself! How can we make sense of falling as thus described? 
Fallenness is the drifting movement of groundlessness, a sort of ignoring 
or overlooking of the possibilities of choosing for oneself. Because of the 
'seduction' of idle talk, Being-in-the-world is tempting in so far as there is 
always already available the public interpretation of things and of self.69 
The certainty and decidedness of the 'they' seem to imply there is no need 
for authenticity or authentic understanding. This "seduction" obscures 
from Dasein its ownmost potential, and Dasein becomes alienated from 
itself, leading it to consider itself to have the same sort of being as other 
entities present-at-hand which it encounters in the world. Never quite 
69 BT 213 
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able to completely define human being, Dasein strives ever harder to get 
more scientific knowledge that will enable it to do so, unaware that the 
striving is in vain because it has turned away from considering the true 
nature of its own being.70 In idle talk Dasein falls away from its ownmost 
possibilities and aligns itself with or takes up possible ways of being-itself 
which are available in the world to anyone. Such Dasein has the way of 
being of the 'they'. 
5 DREAD, CARE AND TEMPORAUTY 
Having analysed being-in-the-world and teased out its constituents, 
Heidegger recapitulates and then reunites the existentialia he has 
examined separately. Dasein is being-in-the-world. Dasein is not only a 
thrown potentiality for being in the world, but it is also always absorbed in 
the world of its concern, it is always falling. This is Dasein's everyday 
existence, absorbed in the world or in being-with other Dasein.71 But why 
exactly does Dasein fall, why does it turn away from its ownmost 
possibilities? Falling comes about because of the nature of Dasein's 
existence as the being whose being is an issue for it. Dasein has no certain 
self to hang on to, no identifiable thing it can point to and say, "That is my 
essence." On the contrary it is beset with negativity. It is thrown into 
choice, and yet can never choose not to choose, nor can it choose the basis 
of its choice.72 As projection it always takes up certain possibilities, and 
thereby does not take up others, which it potentially is.73 Dasein is 
something which is not.74 Substance, certainty and the personal self are 
70 "this alienation drives [Dasein] ... into a kind of Being which borders on the most 
exaggerated 'self-dissection', tempting itself with all possibilities of explanation, so that 
the very 'characterologies' and 'typologies' which it has brought about are themselves 
already becoming something that cannot be surveyed at a glance." BT 222 
71 "DtlSein's 'average everydayness' can be defined as 'Being-in-the-world which is falling 
and disclosed, thrown and projecting, and for which its ownmost potentilliity-/or-Being is 
an issue, both in its Being alongside the 'world' and in its Being-with Others". BT 225 
72 "'Being-a-basis' means never to have power over one's ownmost Being from the ground up. 
This 'not' belongs to the existential meaning of 'thrownness'" BT 330 
13 [Casein] always stands in one possibility or another: it constantly is not other 
possibilities, ... tlS projection it is itself essentially null." BT 331 
14 This exposition of nothing at the heart of being inspired Sartre who took it over and 
developed it in Being and Nothingness, Sartre 1969. 
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all threatened by the notion that at the centre of Dasein's being is an 
essential nothing. 75 
In accordance with the dictates of his phenomenological approach the 
Heideggerian threat of nullity is not merely theoretical. He sees it as 
arising from, and evident in, dread (Angst).76 For Heidegger dread is that 
phenomenon of being afraid, not of anything encountered in the world, 
but just afraid of being - that is one's own being, being-in-the-world.77 In 
dread the world is disclosed as world, and yet nothing in it is fearsome. 
The fear that dread evokes is fear in the face of one's own possibilities. 
Certain particular, ontic possibilities can be chosen or evaded, some come 
upon us unbidden. But whatever happens, whatever we do, whatever we 
choose, what cannot be evaded is the continual possibility of choosing to 
do or attempt to do otherwise than one does. This possibility is 
continually present, and yet it is impossible to obtain external, 'objective' 
knowledge as to the best course of action to choose or of the authenticity of 
our choices. This impossibility is grounded in two facts. Firstly an 
unactualized possibility cannot be fully known until it is actualized, 
secondly, my own choice of possibilities as uniquely mine is necessarily 
unique, and hence incomparable. I can have no comforting public 
guarantee that my own personal specific choices are authentic. 
"Anxiety thus takes away from Dasein the possibility of 
understanding itself, as it falls, in terms of the 'world' and the way 
things have been publicly interpreted. Anxiety throws Dasein back 
upon that which it is anxious about - its authentic potentiality-for-
Being-in-the-world." (BT 232) 
Dread is a fundamental disposition of Dasein. This dread is our very own, 
and it is because we experience it as an inescapable threat from 'nowhere' 
that we turn away from it to the reassuring 'somewhere' of absorption in 
the world, and hence away from ourselves as our ownmost possibilities of 
75 Dasein's own self is the revelation of Being as such. But that which lets things be seen is 
necessarily nothing, an emptiness or openness in which things become accessible. To utilise 
a commonplace it is because 'nothing is in the way' that we see things. In WhIlt is 
Metaphysics ? in 1929 the connection between 'nothing' and the openness of Dasein is 
brought out more clearly: "Only in the clear night of dread's Nothingness is what-is as 
such revealed in all its original overtness (Ol/enheit): that it 'is' and is not Nothing." 
Heidegger 1946, p.369. In Being and Time this is foreshadowed in the talk of 'clearing' in 
the analysis of temporality; "Ecstatical temporality cletlr5 the 'there' primordildly." BT 
402 
76 Angst is translated by Macquarrie and Robinson as Anxiety - I follow King's translation 
'Dread'. 
77BT235 
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being. In dread we confront our own finitude and the lack of an objective 
self. In recognising that we have to choose ourselves, to take a stand on 
ourselves, we see also that our choice is always limited by our own 
particular situation. The ultimate, inescapable personal limitation is the 
inevitability of our own death.78 For each Dasein worldhood ceases upon 
our death. We are then no more. Dread reveals to us the finitude of 
being-in-the-world; its thrownness, its irreversible movement towards 
death and the lack of any certainty or guarantee of our criteria for such 
choice as we do exercise. Thus the 'not' at the heart of Dasein's being, has 
two aspects, the 'not' of our own inevitable death, and the 'not' of all 
those possibilities which are our own and yet which we do not take up 
because whenever a choice is made other choices are negated.19 
This 'no more', death, is in a strange way the completion of Dasein. It is 
our ultimate possibility to be nothing. In the light of the knowledge of 
our own death we can look over our life and see it for what it is: in death 
Heidegger finds something firm and ultimate. It is the sole guarantee of 
our life. It is precisely the nothing which is available to us upon which 
firmly to ground our choice of being. And as dread reveals our death it 
also individualises us, for every death is the death of a particular, 
individual Dasein. This is why Heidegger sees dread as positive, 
revelatory possibility for Dasein.80 
"This individualisation brings Dasein back from its falling, and 
makes manifest to it that authenticity and inauthenticity are 
possibilities of its Being." (BT 235) 
Equally dread reveals to the phenomenolOgical enquirer the unity of the 
being of Dasein. 
78 "The pre-eminent revealing power of dread lies in bringing man before the finite freedom 
of his being-in-the-world, as the same being into which he is already thrown and 
delivered." King 1964, p.133 
79 There is another level of 'not' here which I have not gone into which pertains to 
thrownness. Michel Haar examines this aspect in detail, i.e. "The 'not' does not reveal a 
lack situated in any subsistent being or on the side of the existence of other, but one situated 
at the very heart of one's own Dasein. The original lack in Dasein is one that results from 
its being thrown. Dasein must take over the role of cause, principle and ground, though it 
cannot give itself and has not given itself the ground. It is not ground, but 'only' the being of 
the ground; that is, the one who takes over being the ground. "The self that has to lay the 
ground of itself as such can never master this ground and yet has to take on being a ground by 
existing". (McNeiU's translation) SZ284/BT330." Haar 93 p.20 
80 In the interests of clarity and brevity I have not considered Heidegger's notion of 'guilt' 
nor considered in depth the notion of 'the call of conscience' which arises from the 
'uncanniness' revealed by dread. 
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"Anxiousness as a state-of-mind is a way of Being-in-the-world; 
that in the face of which we have anxiety is thrown Being-in-the-
world; that which we have anxiety about is our potentiality-for-
Being-in-the-world. Thus the entire phenomenon of anxiety 
shows Dasein as factically existing Being-in-the-world. The 
fundamental ontological characteristics of this entity are 
existentiality, facticity, and Being-fallen." (BT 235) 
In other words in dread we are confronted with the predicament of our 
ontological situation. 
Heidegger goes on after the passage quoted above to draw out the temporal 
nature of existentiality, facticity, and Being-fallen. Existentiality refers to 
Dasein's being-possible. Dasein's possibilities are clearly futural.81 It is of 
the nature of possibilities that they are not actual, and yet they may be. In 
everyday talk we would say possibilities are in the future. It is also 
conversely true that when we speak of the future we necessarily speak of 
possibilities (or impossibilities). Both future and possibilities point to that 
which is not yet but may be.82 But we must note carefully that 'future' 
and 'possibilities' are not equivalent. Some possibilities in fact will not 
come to pass as fact, and yet they are present as possible. So possibilities 
are the presence of future-ness, independent of what will actually happen. 
But of course this projection of possibilities is none other than the being of 
Dasein itself, Dasein as understanding. We understand our world 
primarily as equipment which is equipment for doing something, i.e. in 
terms of the possible action, what can in the future be done with it. In 
other words Dasein itself is futural. Futuricity in this sense is therefore 
existentially constitutive of the being of Dasein. In the first instance 
Heidegger labels this futuricity Dasein's ＢｂｾｩｮｧＭ｡ｨ･｡､ＭｯｦＭｩｴｳ･ｬｦＧＮＸＳ＠ Later 
he draws attention to its character of standing-out beyond what we 
factically are in projecting possibilities. Then he uses the term "ecstasis" 
to refer to this standing out.84 The futural existential element of Dasein is 
the ecstasis of the future. 
Just as existentiality relates to understanding, facti city relates to 
attunement. Our mood, whose ontological foundation is attunement, 
reveals to us that we find ourselves already thrown into the world. 
Always already we are situated and have a mood (Stimmung). The 
81 "The prinuuy metming of existentiality is the future." BT 376 
82 "Understanding, as existing in the potentiality-for-Being, however it may have been 
projected, is primarily futural." BT 387 
83 BT236 
84 BT 388 
42 
1 HFJDEGGF.R'S ONTOLOGY OF DASEIN 
German, Befindlichkeit, "how I find myself" points more obviously to this 
phenomenon - if I find myself, I must already be there, and that I am there 
already is evidenced by the fact that I am there with a certain mood. In 
the American or English idiom one might say that mood reveals "where I 
am coming from". This colloquial expression points to the essentially 
historical nature of Dasein, which shows itself even in the most casual 
situations. I always am myself as the one who has been in such and such a 
place, manner or way and who is thereby disposed in a certain mood. I 
always already have been. I am always therefore involved in and carrying 
over my past. The involvement with the past implicit in attunement, 
that is to say my past, whether I have lived it authentically or not, is my 
"having been". My past thus obtrudes into the present so again Heidegger 
will use the term ecstasis.85 Now it is clear that the possibilities that are 
present to me are determined in part by how I find myself, so existentiality 
is determined by facticity, and Dasein's being is not just "ahead of itself' 
but "ahead of itself in already being in a world".86 
Finally Dasein's existence always has the possibility of being absorbed in 
the world, so its falling is ontolOgical, an essential part of its being. We 
are always fallen into the world insofar as we are bound up with the affairs 
of our fellow Dasein and those things within-the-world with which we 
concern ourselves. We cannot have nothing to do with things in the 
world because our being is to be open to them - not only can we touch 
them, we cannot get out of touch. This Heidegger characterises as Being-
alongside.87 As alongside we are present, and the present is the third 
temporal ecstasis.88 The present is ecstatic precisely because for something 
to be present touchable and acccessible it cannot be present only in an 
infinitely small "now". If "now" was like a mathematical point with no 
extension nothing could be accessible through it. "Now" must have some 
"spannedness. "89 We will return to this point shortly. Combining these 
three new descriptions he produces a new formulation of the Being of 
Dasein and a new name for that formulation. 
"The Being of Dasein means ahead-of-itself-Being-already-in-(the-
world) as Being-alongside (entities encountered within-the-world). 
8S e.g. BT 396 
86 BT236 
87BT80 
88 BT 376 
89 See BT 472-6. A complementary and somewhat dearer exposition of the span of the now 
is in BP 268-70 
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This Being fills in the signification of the term "care" [Sorge]. II (BT 
237) 
"Care" here is a Heideggerian technical term.9O Care names this three-fold 
structure, it is not something Dasein has or does. It is what Dasein is. 
That is, whether we know it or not, whether we exist authentically or 
inauthentic ally, our Being is grounded in Care.91 
This definition of Care is the basis for the next level of Heidegger's 
hermeneutic phenomenology, which draws out the temporal nature of 
the ecstases. In Being and Time Heidegger propounds a view of time as 
radical as his view of being. Time, as it is commonly thought of nowadays 
is a sequence of "nows. "92 The past is no longer, the future is yet to come 
and the present is like a mathematical point with no internal dimensions, 
precisely demarcated and infinitely small. Heidegger claims this is a 
derivative notion of time.93 His analytic reverses the traditional 
philosophical priorities so that rather than understand man as existing in 
time, he claims that time as we usually understand it is derived from the 
primordial temporality of Dasein. He starts by pointing out that however 
time is measured, and before it is ever measured, Dasein has a way of 
"reckoning with its time".94 
"When we say 'now', we always understand a 'now that so and 
so .. .' though we do not say all this. Why? Because the 'now' 
interprets a making-present of entities." (BT 460-1) 
This reckoning, this interpreting of the now, he says comes before any 
measuring of time, indeed it is what makes measuring possible. But 
nowadays the everyday view of time is 'what a clock measures'. This 
defines time not as it is, but in terms of an apparatus made possible by 
90 Dreyfus reports that in conversation Heidegger said that with the term "care" he 
wanted to name the very general fact that "Sein geht mich an" roughly, that being gets to 
me. Dreyfus 1991, p.239 
91 "Care, as a primordial structural totality, lies before every factical 'attitude' and 
'situation' of Dasein, and it does so existentially a priori; this means that it always lies in 
them." BT 238 
92 Kocklemans has a good, basic discussion of the ordinary view of time. E.g. "For the man 
in the street, time is an obscure power which continuously makes short moments of 'now' 
reach the present from the future, thereby making them real, and then driving them at once 
into the past by constantly bringing forward new moments of 'now' ." Kockelmans 1965, p.86 
93 And Walter Ong considers it artificial, for reasons we shall come across later. "Time is 
seemingly tamed if we treat it spatially on a calendar or the face of a clock, where we can 
make it appear as divided into separate units next to each other. But this also falsifies 
time. Real time has no divisions at all, but is uninterruptedly continuous". Ong 1982 p.76 
94BT456 
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time. Mumford traces out the history of the development of the common 
understanding of time and is well aware of its significance.95 
"The categories of time and space underwent an extraordinary 
change, and no aspect of life was left untouched by this 
transformation. The application of quantitative methods of 
thought to the study of nature had its first manifestation in the 
regular measurement of time; and the new mechanical conception 
of time arose in part out of the routine of the monastery" 
(Mumford 1934, p.12) 
"The bells of the clock tower almost defined urban existence. 
Time-keeping passed into time-serving and time-accounting and 
time-rationing. As this took place, Eternity ceased gradually to 
serve as the measure and focus of human actions." (Mumford 
1934, p.14) 
Mumford's historical analysis, unhindered by the demands of rigorous 
philosophical thoroughness, races ahead and makes in a few pages the 
connections between nature, technology, time and being that Heidegger 
was to concern himself with in philosophical profundity for the next forty 
years. 96 Mumford (like Heidegger) had read Bergson, and his 
interpretation of Bergson's "Duration", which Mumford calls "organic 
time," bears similarities to Heidegger's thinking: in organic time, "the past 
that is already dead remains present in the future that has still to be 
born, "97 though Mumford, like Bergson, does not break through to an 
95 Mumford was writing in the United States and Technics and Civilisation was published 
just a few years after Sein und Zeit in 1934. There is no evidence that he knew of 
Heidegger's work. 
96 It is illuminating to quote Mumford once more, at length, to show how similar was his 
understanding of the relationships between these topics: "The clock ... is a piece of power-
machinery whose 'product' is seconds and minutes: by its essential nature it dissociated 
time from human events and helped create the belief in an independent world of 
mathematically measurable sequences: the special world of science. There is relatively 
little foundation for this belief in common human experience; throughout the year the days 
are of uneven duration,... In terms of the human organism itself, mechanical time is even 
more foreign while human life has regularities of its own, the beat of the pulse, the 
breathing of the lungs, these change from hour to hour with mood and action, and in the 
longer span of days, time is measured not by the calendar but by the events that occupy it. 
The shepherd measures from the time the ewes lambed; the farmer measures back to the 
day of sowing or forward to the harvest ... And while mechanical time is strung out in a 
succession of mathematically isolated instants, organic time - what Bergson calls duration -
is cumulative in its effects. Though mechanical time can, in a sense, be speeded up or run 
backward, like the hands of a clock or the images of a moving picture, organic time moves 
only in one direction - through the cycle of birth, growth" ､･ｶ･ｬｯｰｭ･ｮｾ＠ decay, and death -
and the past that is already dead remains present in the future that has still to be born." 
Mumford 1934 p.I5-16 
97 Mumford, 1934, p.16 
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ecstatic view of temporality and remains caught up in Aristotelian ways of 
speaking about time.98 
Heidegger unfolds primordial temporality by unfolding the "now 
that ... ".99 In the now beings show themselves in their everydayness. The 
everyday conceptions of past, present and future all ultimately hang on 
this now. The past is that which is no longer now, the future is not yet 
now and the present is here and now alongside what is manifest in this 
manner. lOO Now is where we find ourselves, in some mood or other, and 
where, as concern, we can fall into absorption with what is made present 
to us. 
However, according to Heidegger's analysis in order to understand we 
must reach forward to possibilities, in fact we are stretched into the future 
of possibilities and also bring futural possibilities into the present. Equally 
our being, those possibilities and the manner in which entities around us 
are present, are all conditioned by how we find ourselves. We are thrown 
and must carryover ourselves as we have been. It is not the past as past 
events which makes up Dasein's historicality. Rather it is the past as my 
"having-been" and Heidegger coins a new word, Gewesenheit, to 
emphasise this distinction.101 And the present where I am, far from being 
an immeasurably small moment, is the openness in which beings and my 
dispositions, facticity and possibilities are made present. So Dasein's now 
is made of the futuricity of possibilities, the historicality of attunement 
and the openness of being-alongside or being-fallen. Dasein is the 
openness to Being which lets beings be and the temporal ecstases are what 
hold open its openness. It is clear from any moment of self-reflection that 
we do not experience the present as a series of infinitesimal small passing 
moments. On the contrary we experience a sense of enduring 
continuity.l02 In authenticity Dasein is stretched alongside this sequence 
of nows such that it retains its own having-been and reaches forward into 
98 See BT 382 and especially Heidegger's note xxx (to the discussion on pp.483-4) on BT 500 
99 BT459 
100 BT 458-464 
101 "Heidegger expressly distinguishes between 'having-beenhood' (Gewesenheit> and 
'past' (Vergangenheit). The last term indicates the past in the usual sense of the word, in 
which time is considered to be a pure sequence of moments, and the past is the sum total of 
the 'nows' that are no more. If, however, time is nothing outside Dasein, in other words, if 
Dasein itself temporalizes, itself is time, then there must also be a past that is distinct 
from the past in the accepted sense of the word. This past of which Dasein can claim that 
it is its own is the 'having been'. This 'having been' is not something distinct from me; it is 
what I have been and what I still am in some way; it is that ... which is present as having 
been." Kockelrnans 1965, p.87 
102 BT 461-3 
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its future. Heidegger's claim is that this ecstatic openness which lets being 
be manifest is the authentic being of Dasein, and he calls it 
"temporality" .103 
"Temporality temporalizes, and indeed it temporalizes possible 
ways of itself. These make possible the multiplicity of Dasein's 
modes of Being, and especially the basic possibility of authentic or 
inauthentic existence. ... Temporality is the primordial 'outside-
of-itself' in and for itself. It (BT 377) 
For the most part Dasein understands itself, and hence time, 
inauthentically. Inauthentic time is not at all ecstatic, in fact in 
in authenticity time is clock time, measured time, it is public time.104 The 
true nature of time is as hidden from the 'they' as the true nature of being. 
Inauthentic Dasein deals with itself, and the past and future, as though 
clocks and calendars entirely explained the phenomenon of time and were 
all one needed to deal with it. But such measuring devices neither give 
rise to time nor explain it, they arise from our inauthentic dealings with it, 
and then dominate the public discourse on time. As a result the ecstatic 
nature of Dasein's being is overlooked and Dasein erroneously considers 
itself to be "the sum of the momentary actualities of Experiences which 
come along and successively disappear."10S This view gives rise to the 
pseudo-problem of how the Self maintains its selfsameness throughout 
this string of changing experiences. As Heidegger remarks dryly, 
"opinions diverge" on how this selfsameness persists,106 and in his view 
such opinions go astray in so far as they do not realise that ordinary time 
arises from, and is made possible by, the ecstatic temporality of Dasein. 
Original temporality arises in Dasein and has a span during which the 
events of manifestation, calendrical dating, and measuring can take 
place. 107 Authentic Dasein does not interpret itself in terms of the 
timetable of the 'they'. In authenticity Dasein temporalises itself as the 
authentic present which Heidegger calls the moment of vision 
103 BT 374. In The Basic Problems he writes, "Temporality is stretch itself" BP 270 
104 "Publicly, time is something which everyone takes and can take. In the everyday way 
in which we are with one another, the levelled-off sequence of 'nows' remains completely 
unrecognizable as regards its origin in the temporality of the individual Dasein .... The 
only time one knows is the public time which ... belongs to everyone - and that means, to 
nobody." BT 477 
105 BT 426 
106 BT 425 
107 BT 461-4 
47 
1 HEIO£GGFR'S ONTOLOGY OF OASEIN 
(Augenblick ).108 This does not require that Dasein reads and understands 
Heideggerian ontology, but rather that it takes up its possibilities in the 
light of its own ontological situation. The disclosure of the inevitability 
and individualness of our own death allows the possibility of taking our 
ownmost disclosure of being seriously. 
Heidegger calls the attitude which recognises and actualises the 
possibilities of authentic existence "anticipatory resoluteness."109 In so far 
as Dasein lives in anticipatory resoluteness its present is the Augenblick -
the spacious revelation of the being of beings and of Dasein. In 
authenticity Dasein takes up its own possibilities in a manner which is 
made possible by its ecstatic being. In inauthenticity Dasein mistakes its 
own being and takes up its possibilities as though it was an entity "within 
time"110 and must take over its own way of being from what is made 
available by the 'they'. The way of being of the 'they' in which we 
inevitably participate, turns away from the significance that Heidegger 
attributes to death. In inauthenticity we even tend to avoid the realisation 
of the inevitable finitude of every particular Dasein. These two basic 
modes of being are two fundamentally different ways in which Dasein 
temporalises itself. 
This exposition of primordial temporality is brief, although the subject is 
interminable and complex.111 With this exposition of Heidegger's 
ontology as our basis, in the next chapter we will look at the existentiale of 
meaning. We will take up the issue of temporality again when we 
examine the relationship of meaning to narrative, and the temporality of 
Dasein that makes stories possible. 
108 "When resolute, Dasein has brought itself back from falling, and has done so precisely 
in order to be more authentically 'there' in the 'moment of vision' as regards the Situation 
which has been disclosed." BT 376 
109 See Section 62, BT 352ff. esp. "The phenomenon of resoluteness has brought us before the 
primordial truth of existence. As resolute, Dasein is revealed to itself in its current factical 
potentiality-for-Being, and in such a way that Dasein itself is this revealing and Being 
revealed." BT 355 
110 "The ordinary way of characterizing time as an endless, irreversible sequence of 'nows' 
which passes away, arises from the temporality of falling Dasein .... proximally and for 
the most part, even history gets understood publiC/lily as happening within-time." BT 478 
111 The exposition of temporality in Sdn und Zeit is neither complete nor pelludd. 
Blattner in Dreyfus and Hall 1992 probes Heidegger's exposition of existential 
temporality, but acknowledges that he lays bare more questions than he answers. King 
1964, Kockelmans 1965, Guignon 1983, Dreyfus 1991 and Steiner 1992 all offer useful 
overviews. 
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The Existentiale of Meaning 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The object of a psychotherapist's attention is a human being, and it 
therefore behoves him to understand the being of the object of his 
attention. On the whole psychotherapists have not confronted the issue of 
the essential nature of human being) Freud and many who have 
followed him simply posited intra-psychic entities, not on the basis of 
phenomenological ontological argument but as a hypothetical account of 
what they believe themselves to have observed.2 It is proposed that 
Heidegger's ontology of Dasein offers a preferable and more useful 
understanding of human being than such hypothesizing. Heidegger's 
ontology of Dasein is particularly pertinent for psychotherapists because he 
claims that meaning is existentially constitutive of human being. Many 
psychotherapists claim meaning is a significant issue in therapy and many 
clients complain of a lack of meaning.3 An understanding of the exact 
1 This is not to say no psychotherapists have done so, merely that it is rare. Many take 
over an evolutionary notion of man, some follow Freud. Boss, see Boss 1994, is an exception 
who took over Heidegger's ontology of Dasein. Jung also was curious about the essence of 
human being and in many ways arrived at conclusions similar to Heidegger: "neither 
psyche nor Dasein should be confused with the ego-boundaries of the individual person who 
is seen situated bodily at a particular place. Both psyche and Dasein describe pre-personal 
existence, that fundamental matrix that precedes and is the condition for personal identity 
formation. For both Jung and Heidegger, the establishment of personal identity is a process 
of appropriating as one's own what is found to be already lived, however dissodatively or 
primitively. Moreover, both Jung and Heidegger regard that process of differentiation as 
essential to human fulfillment - individuation for Jung, and authenticity for Heidegger." 
Brooke 1991, p.88 See entire work for a detailed comparison of ontologies. Mindell (1985 
(a) and (b» builds on Jung's notions although with less concern for ontological matters. 
2 As previously noted Freud's writing contains both admissions of his hypothesizing, (e.g. 
"What follows is speculation, often far-fetched speculation" Freud 1922 p.27) and dogmatic 
assertions ("the thoughts contained in [The Ego and the ld] are synthetic rather than 
speculative in character" Freud 1927 p.7). He converts speculation to dogma mainly by dint 
of sheer repetition although he claims his results justify his assumptions (Freud 1964 
p.l44). See also Freud 1962, pp.l03-116. According to Boss, Heidegger "did not want to 
have to accept that such a highly intelligent and gifted man as Freud could produce such 
artificial, inhuman, indeed absurd and purely fictitious constructions about homo sapiens." 
Boss 1988, p.9 
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nature of existential meaning and its part in human being would clearly 
help in the practice and teaching of psychotherapy. We will return to the 
psychotherapeutic view of meaning in Chapter Six, but here we will seek 
to elucidate Heidegger's view. 
Heidegger grants to meaning an existential status, i.e. it is constitutive of 
the being of Dasein.4 In this chapter we take a close look at this claim. In 
fact we will see that his exposition is confused and that the existentialia are 
not as separable as is implied by their names as distinct elements. We will 
uncover what phenomena can be understood from Heidegger's exposition 
and propose that these phenomena can be understood from the point of 
view of the individual Dasein in terms of narrative. For Heidegger the 
meaning of being is time, and the meaning of Dasein's being is 
temporality,S specifically the unity of the temporal horizons.6 That unity 
of temporal horizons is what is necessarily articulated in a primordial 
narrative. It may be that Heidegger abandoned the terminology of 
existentialia after Being and Time because he discovered that it did not 
easily describe the phenomena. However, our analysis of the existentiale 
of meaning will lay bare that which can be better understood in terms of 
primordial narrative which we will lay out in Chapter Five. 
There are two words in German that can be translated into English by 
'meaning' - "Bedeutung", and "Sinn". They are respectively translated, 
for the most part, by Macquarrie and Robinson as "signification" and 
"meaning". In colloquial usage one comes across the "bedeut-" stem most 
commonly in the form, "Was soli das bedeutet?" "What does that 
mean?" Bedeutung has overtones of referring ("deuten" means "to 
interpret") and is used by Heidegger to refer to the relations of the in-
order-tos with-whichs and the for-the-sake-ofs which constitute the 
world hood of the world.7 Sinn is both related to, and often elsewhere 
translated by, "Sense". In German, as in English, the same word is used 
for the senses (die Sinne), and Sinn is used in many of the various ways 
that "sense" is used in English. Sin n e, (plural) can mean one's 
3 E.g. Yalom 1980, p.447; Eagle 1984, p.73; Spinelli 1994, p.294; Bettleheim 1991, p.3; van 
Deurzen Smith, 1988, p.3; Polkinghorne 1988, p.154; May 1983, p.60; and many others. 
4 "Meaning is an existentiale of Dasein" BT 193 
5 "Temporality has manifested itself ... as the meaning of the Being of care." BT486 
6BT416 
7 "The 'for-the-sake-of-which' signifies an '-in-order-to'; this in turn, a 'towards-this'; the 
latter, an 'in-which' of letting something be involved; and that in tum, the 'with-which' 
of an involvement. These relationships are bound up with one another as a primordial 
totality; ... the relational totality of this signifying we call 'significance'." BT 120 
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consciousness. In "etwas in Sinn haben" Sinn means one's mind - as in to 
have something in mind; in "Sinn fUr Kunst" Sinn means a feeling for 
art; in "das ist nicht der Sinn der Sache", Sinn means the point as in "that 
is not the point", or "the point (object) of the exercise". Just as in English 
one can talk of making sense of things, in German one can say "Oer Satz 
gibt Sinn", "The sentence makes (literally gives) sense". Sinn means all 
this as well as meaning. We cannot simply carry across a definition from a 
German dictionary to interpret Being and Time; rather in examining 
meaning in Being and Time we must ask what is Heidegger getting at, 
what is the "sense" of meaning he intends. 
As well as inheriting and writing within the colloquial German 
understanding of Sin n above Heidegger uses 5 inn to denote an 
existen tiale of Dasein. Furthermore he uses the word'S inn' in his 
formulation of the question with which he starts the book "der Frage nach 
dem Sinn von Sein"s. Thus there are three important uses of what can be 
translated as "meaning" in Being and Time: (1) "the meaning of Being", 
(2) Bedeutung, translated by Macquarrie and Robinson as "signification" 
or "significance", and (3) meaning as Heidegger defines it: "Meaning is an 
existentiale of Dasein."9 We will look briefly at aspects of the first two uses 
and then turn to the third. Using commentaries and a close reading we 
will try to discover what Heidegger intends by his use of 'meaning' [Sinn], 
whether indeed there is a single coherent, comprehensible usage, and 
what we can understand from his designation of meaning as an 
existentiale. 
2 THE MEANING OF BEING 
Let us examine the first of these uses of 'meaning'. Heidegger claims that 
it is because we no longer know what is meant by the word 'being' that "it 
is fitting that we should raise anew the question of the meaning (Sinn) of 
Being. "10 This quotation from the first numbered page of the German 
edition of Sein und Zeit does not present the actual question itself in a 
S Title of Introduction SZ 2, BT 21 
9 BT193 
10 BT 19 
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specific formulation. He describes the question,11 and he describes what is 
entailed in asking the question,12 but the question itseH is not given a 
single, specific, verbal formulation. As Heidegger is aware, any specific 
formulation of the question of Being gives rise to problems. He does not 
simply write, 'What does this word, 'being', mean?" because to do so 
would be essentially to ask about a word - ''being'' - not Being itself. That 
would perpetuate exactly the overlooking that he is seeking to make 
evident, and then dismantle. For this reason, he cannot simply take over 
the question implicit in the quotation from the Sophistes - "What do you 
mean by Being?" It is not clear who, if anyone (and the best candidate in 
fact turns out to be the "anyone" [das Man]!), could stand in for the long 
gone "you" - those philosophers, whom the Visitor from Elea is 
hypothetically interrogating.13 Heidegger's claim is that in our time no 
one knows what being is. He himseH is always on the way to Being - he 
does not proclaim that he knows the answer to his question. 
Furthermore he is not the one questioned, he is taking, on our behalf, the 
role of questioner. He does not wish to engage in a dialogue with the 
'they', or any generally accepted view of being, because, as is clear from his 
analysis of in authenticity, any such view would be levelled down, a 
concealing of the truth of the matter. Nor is he asking "What is?" but 
rather what is the situation such that there is some whatever of which to 
ask that. But the situation is neither one of total ignorance nor a simple 
matter of clarification; 
"Even if we ask, "What is 'Being'?", we keep within an 
understanding of the 'is', though we are unable to fix 
conceptionally what that 'is' signifies. We do not even know the 
horizon in terms of which that meaning is to be grasped and 
fixed." (BT 25) 
Heidegger is not asking "What do we really mean by Being 7" because he 
claims that in fact, for the most part, "We do not know what "Being" 
means. "14 The question certainly can be read as What is it that we mean, 
but do not know we mean, by being 7' To read it thus is to take it as 
11 "In the question which we are to work out, what is asked about is Being - that which 
determines entities as entities, that on the basis of which [woraufhin] entities are already 
understood" BT 2S-6 
12 "the hardened tradition [of Western Philosophy] must be loosened up, and the 
concealments which it has brought about must be dissolved." BT 44 
13 "(those philosophers] who say that all things are just some two things, hot or cold or 
some such pair" (Sophistes 243<1) 
14 BT 25 
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essentially Heidegger' s question. He wishes, in spite of our ignorance, that 
it might become our question too. He needs to dismantle the tradition of 
Western Metaphysics, to carry out the "destruction of the history of 
ontology"15, in order to re-gain access to Being in such a manner that we 
can question it without begging the question.16 In exposing the vagueness 
of his first formulation of his question we unpack the major issues that he 
will tackle in the book. He cannot specify the meaning of "meaning of 
Being" (or anything else) at this stage, given the radical and fundamental 
nature of his enquiry. Yet somehow we already understand his question 
in a vague, and provisional fashion. The hermeneutic of Being and Time 
explores this 'somehow' and in doing so the question of the place of 
meaning in the inquiry, and in the ontology of Dasein, is raised. 
3 SIGNS AND SIGNIFICATION 
We have already looked at significance in the previous chapter. We will 
look briefly now at signs and Heidegger's rejection of the notion that signs 
give us meaning. Certain items of equipment, signs, present themselves 
as meaningful and it is tempting to fall into interpreting them as the 
quintessence of meaning from which all other meaning is derived. In 
order to see why Heidegger does not do so, we will look briefly at Section 
17 of Being and Time. We shall do so using Okrent's Heidegger's 
Pragmatism, enabling us at the same time to consider an example of the 
pragmatist view Heidegger. Okrent does not appear to make any 
distinction between Bedeutung and Sinn but nevertheless gives a succinct 
exposition of the sign in his discussion of interpretation, meaning and 
assertion; 
"someone has understood the meaning of the sign when he 
knows what to do relative to the sign." (Okrent 1988 p.60) 
Signs are equipment, they are ready to hand, for example, "Stop signs are 
equipment for travelling. "17 But Okrent does not step beyond the 
15 BT44 
16 As Charles Guignon puts ｩｾ＠ "In the background of Being and Time is the assumption that 
the whole history of Western thought has been set on the wrong track by the Greek 
interpretation of Being as ousia or parousia." (Guignon 1983 p.1S) See the translator'S 
footnote (1) on BT 47 for an overview of Heidegger's thinking on ousia and parousia. See 
also An Introduction to Metaphysics, 19S9 p.61 
17 Okrent 1988, p.60 
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prejudices of his pragmatic background and later writes that "meaning ... 
achieves a certain objectivity"18 and later still misses the existential 
significance of worldhood and significance.19 He similarly takes meaning 
(Sinn) as related to the meaning of equipment "but ... somewhat 
simpler"20 and suggests the relationship between the meaning of x and 
possible uses of x, "supplies one element of the objectivity of the 
"meaning of x. "21 In sticking to the analytic language of pragmatism and 
his aspiration to discover conditions for the possibility of objective 
meaning he overlooks the importance of the existential involvement of 
Dasein in meaning and the phenomenological significance of signs. For 
Heidegger the sort of referring a sign does is not identical to the referring 
inherent in the in-order-to's of the being of the ready-to-hand outlined in 
Chapter One above.22 Rather, the Being of Dasein, as concernfully 
engaged in travelling, for example, makes the stop sign accessible as a 
sign.23 To one who does not travel and knows not what travel might be, 
the sign is not a sign. So along with the signhood of the sign goes a 
certain concern of Dasein. In Heidegger's words, 
"A sign is not a Thing which stands to another Thing in the 
relationship of indicating; it is rather an item of equipment which 
explicitly raises a totality of equipment into our circumspection so 
that together with it the worldly character of the ready-to-hand 
announces itself." (BT 110) 
That is, 
"Signs always indicate primarily 'wherein' one lives, where one's 
concern dwells, what sort of involvement there is with 
something." (BT 111) 
180krent 1988, p.60 
19 Although he writes "the practical context of activity 'grounds' and supplies the 
conditions that must be met if a being is to be a definite sort of thing," moments later he 
reintroduces a transcendental assumption of some 'more real' being by continuing, "my 
practical understanding in no way determines whether the thing is a hammer" Okrent, 1988 
p.167 
200krent 1988, p.60 
21 Okrent 1988, p.61 
22 "Signs ... are ... items of equipment whose specific character as equipment consists in 
showing or indicating." BT 108 
"This indicating which the sign performs can be taken as a kind of 'referring'. But ... this 
referring as indicating is not the ontological structure of the sign as equipment." BT 109 
23 "the sign .. is related in a peculiar and even distinctive way to the kind of Being which 
belongs to whatever equipmental totality may be ready-to-hand in the environment, and to 
its worldy character." BT 109 
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Signs are therefore a special case of significations and "significations, as 
what has been Articulated from that which can be Articulated, always 
carry meaning. "24 The signification (Bedeutung) of the sign is the 
assertion, directive, hortatory, cautionary or whatever, which it 
instantiates. The meaning (Sinn) of a sign is that Dasein has a concernful 
involvement with entities in the world as engaged in that for which the 
sign is significant. Thus even where meaning (Sinn) is not referred to, but 
as signification entities are experienced as referring, the existential 
presence of meaning subsists in Dasein. That which is revealed by an 
explicit discussion of meaning as an existentiale is what sort of 
involvement there is with something, in other words Dasein's Being itself 
as attuned and understanding.25 Any particular signification is an on tic 
phenomenon. The totality of significations (Bedeutsamkeit) makes up the 
structure of the world,26 and the meaning which subsists beneath any 
Signification is a function of the being of Dasein. We do not get meaning 
from signs, neither immediately nor originally, but rather as Dasein we 
give meaning to signs. Ontologically the meaning of signs originates in 
Dasein, so to find the origin of meaning we cannot look to signs but must 
investigate further the being of Dasein. 
4 SINN: TWO CONTEMPORARY VIEWS 
We turn now to considering the understanding of 5 inn of two 
contemporary philosophers, each influential and both representative of 
different current approaches to Heidegger. Hubert Dreyfus is chosen 
because he has concentrated his study on Being and Time, (and mainly the 
first division thereof) which is the primary source of the ontological basis 
of this thesis, and John Caputo is chosen as representative of those with a 
more deconstructionist bent who comment on both the earlier and the 
later Heidegger. 27 Caputo's reading is not merely an exegetical 
commentary but an interpretative appropriation. 
24 BT 204 
25 Nicolson concurs: "Sinn, in the general structure of existence, is the foundation of 
Bedeutung." Nicolson 1992, p.l02 
26 See BT 120 
27 Caputo has written widely on Heidegger. I am considering here his position in Rsuliad 
Hermeneutics wherein he addresses the issue of meaning in Being and Time most directly. 
Caputo's deconstructionism is also typical of many modem commentators but I will not 
address it at this stage, as the entire deconstructionist project is based on a prioritization of 
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In his commentary on Being and Time Hubert Dreyfus draws two points 
out of Heidegger's formal definition of meaning.28 His fundamental view 
is that Sinn, (which he translates as "sense") is part of the structure of 
understanding the world. In his words, 
"Sense ... is that on the basis of which we can make sense of 
something. It is a name for our background familiarity with each 
domain of being - a familiarity that enables us to cope with beings 
in that domain." (Dreyfus 1991 p.222) 
This is a very Diltheyean reading of Heidegger,29 indeed Dreyfus could 
almost be simply updating Dilthey, rather than overcoming the 
"ontological indefiniteness"30 that Heidegger claims to identify and to 
move beyond.31 Dreyfus also identifies a second usage: 
"It [meaning] is also the name for the general structure of that 
background, in terms of which the ontologist makes sense of 
being." (Dreyfus 1991 p.223) 
Dreyfus here introduces a distinction between the technical term to be 
utilised by the ontologist and the background familiarity.32 Dreyfus' 
reading seems to be weak on two counts. Firstly his distinction does not 
stand up. "The general structure ... in terms of which the ontologist 
makes sense of being" is a particular case of "The background familiarity 
with each domain of being ... that enables us to cope with beings in that 
domain". The formality of the structure corresponds to the formality of 
the being of the Dasein constituting himself for the moment as "the 
ontologist". Dreyfus is seeing the same phenomenon from two different 
points of view and misunderstanding it to be two ontologically distinct 
phenomena. Even if we concede that "meaning" is a "background 
familiarity", which I argue below is inadequate, to say it is that in terms of 
text with which I will take issue later. I believe that Caputo mis-reads Heidegger, to the 
extent that he tends towards desconstructionism. From a deconstructionist point of view, 
however my belief could be seen to reflect my entrapment in a totalizing authoritarian 
view of truth, and Caputo's reading might be neither justified nor un-justified but a re-
presentation of the flux of thinking. 
28 Dreyfus, 1991 
29 Compare this passage with Dilthey: "Meaning is the comprehensive category through 
which life can be understood." Dilthey 1976 p.235 But note hearing 'meaning' is used to 
translate Bedeutung from Dilthey's original (Gesammelte Schriften Bd. VU, p.232) 
30BT253 
31 See BT 252ff. and BT 455 
32 Heidegger does not make this distinction, in fact I argue below that he conflates the 
reader, a fellow ontologist, and the layman who has a 'background familiarity' in the 'wir 
sagen', BT 192 
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which an ontologist makes sense of being is to add nothing more. To 
describe its structure is simply to describe the same ontological 
phenomenon in the greater detail of a particular ontic example. 
Secondly, and more importantly, it is difficult to differentiate this 
definition of meaning from that of the worldhood of the world - that 
network of significations that make up the equipmental context in terms 
of which we make sense of entities-within-the-world. Indeed, given the 
use of his coining "das Woraufhin", we can say that Heidegger himself has 
encouraged this confusion in his definition of worldhood and its overlap 
with his attempt at a definition of meaning. This reading of meaning by 
Dreyfus harks back to worldhood; 
"That wherein [Worin] Dasein understands itself beforehand in 
the mode of assigning itself is that for which [das Woraufhin] it 
has let entities be encountered beforehand. The 'wherein' of an 
act of understanding which assigns or refers itself, is that for which 
one lets entities be encountered in the kind of Being that belongs 
to involvements; and this 'wherein' is the phenomenon of the 
world. And the structure of that to which [woraufinl Dasein 
assigns itself is what makes up the worldhood of the world." (BT 
119, underlining is mine.) 
There is no significant difference between this definition of worldhood 
and Dreyfus' reading of meaning. Dreyfus is certainly justified in his 
reading, because of the crucial place of "das Woraufhin" on both BT 119 
and BT 193. However if meaning is equivalent to worldhood, why did 
Heidegger use two different terms? The question to bear in mind is "Does 
the confusion and conflation of meaning with other terms arise from the 
fact that Heidegger is developing his thought through the hermeneutic of 
Being and Time, or does it reflect an essential redundancy of the latter 
term?" We will read BT 192-4 closely to see if Heidegger means by 
"meaning" something more than worldhood. We may read Heidegger as 
himself thinking alongside this interpretation, and pausing at the 
interpretation that is picked up by Dreyfus, not as a final point in his 
thinking, but a staging post. He may be digging beneath the statement to 
find a better expression, to elucidate what has not yet been brought out in 
this partial, ongoing explanation. If so in this passage we must be as ready 
to read sentences as standing in anti-thesis as standing in apposition, 
because Heidegger is in the process of thinking the difference between 
meaning and worldhood, of exploring that for which he has coined the 
term "Woraufh in ". 
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Caputo in Radical Hermeneutics, claims "Meaning is not ... what is 
understood ... but ... the organising component in what is understood't,33 
which given that meaning is an existentiale is clearly an unexceptionable 
reading. But then he posits, 
"an implicit distinction between primary and secondary phases of 
the work of projection. The being is projected first in a 
preliminary way upon its 'Being' and then in a second and 
determinative way upon the 'meaning' of that Being." (RH 84) 
He explains this distinction and the two phases as follows. 
"The organising principle or centre of reference in the 
understandability is called the 'upon-which' of the 'primaryt or 
first phase of projection. We are thus to distinguish in the 
projective understanding of any being the initial projection - of the 
being in its Being - from that upon which the projection was 
carried out (that upon which it maintains itself, that which 
organises and structures the projection). When we have 
determined the meaning (the 'upon-which', the second 
determining element) of the Being (the primary projection, the 
ini tial or provisional determination) of a being we will 
understand that which makes that being possible as a being." (RH 
84-5) 
This distinction seems to serve Caputo's intention more than it honours 
Heidegger's. Where Heidegger does talk of a "primary projection" the 
primacy is clearly that of the ontological over the ontic, not the first part of 
a two phase ontological structure.34 Furthermore Caputo's commentary 
has the weakness of introducing a significant distinction that is not made 
by the author, which had it been intended would surely have been made 
given its importance. A more obvious objection to Caputo's reading is 
that his distinction raises a problem far more serious than the one it 
purports to solve. In spite of the apparently explicatory paraphrases, "the 
first phase", "initial or provisional" and the "second determining", he 
does not state in what realm or dimension his first projection has priority 
over the second. The most obvious possibility is the most ludicrous: the 
implicit temporal priority of the "initial or provisional" phase over the 
"second determining" phase of the project re-introduces at the ontological 
level a sequential linear time in the middle of an analysis which is on the 
way to showing precisely that such time is not primordial but is derivative 
33 RH84 
34 8T371 
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from originary ecstatic temporality. Nothing inherent in an existentiale 
can have such temporal priority. Nor, given Heidegger's explicit 
emphasis on the equiprimordiality of the constituent existentialia of 
Dasein, could it have ontological priority. We may understand meaning 
by seeing a two-foldness in the nature of the projection of understanding -
that which is projected, and that 'upon which' it is prOjected - but any talk 
of primary and secondary at the ontological level is absurd.35 Further we 
must be alert to the possibility that this two-foldness is inherent not in the 
phenomenon but in the word or metaphor "projection" used to describe 
it. This two-foldness may illustrate that we are straining the limits of 
usefulness of 'projection' as a descriptive term for the phenomenon.36 
The division into that which is projected and the upon-which inherent in 
this terminology may have encouraged Caputo to develop in his Radical 
Hermeneutics the notion of a drive to get "beyond Being".37 It is worth 
diverting briefly to consider this notion of Caputo's because it is both 
typical of, and influential upon, a significant sector of contemporary 
Heideggerian scholarship, although it seems to me to be a misreading to 
consider Heidegger to have been concerned to get beyond Being, either in 
Being and Time or in his later thought. The notion itself is made possible 
by the pride of place given to text in modern philosophy. The fixity of a 
text obscures the ambiguity which arises from its decontextualization. 
Whilst lecturing Heidegger, by tone and emphasis, and if necessary by 
question and answer could, and I believe would, have made it quite clear 
that his quest was always to answer the question of being, not to move 
beyond it. We will return to the significance of orality later. Certainly the 
later Heidegger writes "Bciftg" and then "Ereignis", but in so doing he is 
not necessarily moving beyond Being. When he talks of tiEs gibt" and the 
"Gegend", "Wohnen" and "das Geviert" the different words do not signify 
that he is going beyond Being but that he is thinking Being more deeply. 
To read Heidegger otherwise is to mistake "what the talk is about" and to 
listen "only to what-is-said-in-the-talk as such".38 It makes of Being an 
3S Certainly five years later Heidegger explicity refuses to contenance any sequentiality to 
projection: "'Projection' does not refer to some sequence of actions or to some process we might 
piece together .... rather ... it refers to .. the unity of an action .. of an originary and 
properly unique kind" PC 363 
36 Grieder 1996 (a) spells out in detail the incoherence of Heidegger's description of 
understanding. Nonetheless, as Grieder notes, the discrepancies of Heidegger's account 
have not prevented his fundamental ideas from being "a great inspiration to many·, 
including this author. 
31RH85 
38 Cf. BT 206 &: 212 
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entity that one could get beyond; and although, "Being is always the Being 
of an entity"39 "The Being of entities 'is' not itself an entity."40 Otto 
Poggeler knew Heidegger well over many years and offers a more accurate 
description of Heidegger's thought. 
"Heidegger's thought must be understood as a way. It is not a way 
of many thoughts but one that restricts itself to a single, solitary 
ｴｨｯｵｧｾｴ＠ .... Heidegger has always understood his thinking as 
travellIng along a way... into the neighbourhood of Being." 
(POggeler, 1987, p.2) 
Caputo would disagree with this view. In Radical Hermeneutics he refers 
twice to a passage from The Basic Problems of Phenomenology to support 
his reading.41 The passage he cites is this. 
"If being is to become objectified - if the understanding of being is 
to be possible as a science in the sense of ontology - if there is to be 
philosophy at all, then that upon which the understanding of 
being, qua understanding, has already pre-conceptually projected 
being must become unveiled in an explicit projection. 
We confront the task not only of going forth and back from a being 
to its being, but, if we are inquiring into the condition of possibility 
of the understanding of being as such, of inquiring even beyond 
being as to that upon which being, itself, as being is projected." 
(Heidegger 1982, p.282) 
Heidegger pursues his questioning of being throughout his work but he 
abandons many of the terms he uses in this formulation from this course 
he gave in the summer of 1927. He rejects the notion of doing philosophy 
and begin to talk of thinking, equally he later becomes suspicion of the 
name ontology, a name already corrupted by its part in the architectonic of 
Western metaphysics. The use of "objectified", let alone the reification 
one could read into it, would be anathema to the later Heidegger, and 
reflects simply his entanglement in the vocabulary and concepts of the 
metaphysical tradition from which he is struggling to extricate himself. 
But during the 1920s he is in the process of doing so, and we 
misunderstand his thought and his purpose if we take him to task for 
using the terminology which is to hand and not that which he is in the 
process of creating and at which he has not yet arrived. Further the 
passage continues, after the sentences cited by Caputo, 
39BT29 
4OBT26 
41 R H pp. 85 and 174 
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"This seems to be a curious enterprise, to inquire beyond being; 
perhaps it has arisen from the fatal embarrassment that 
philos.ophy has run out of problems; it is apparently merely the 
despamng attempt of philosophy to assert itself as over against the 
so-called facts. ... the more fundamentally the simplest problems 
of philosophy are posed, without the host of secondary questions 
arbitrarily snatched up by the mania for criticism, the more 
immediately will we stand by ourselves in direct communication 
with actual philosophising." (Heidegger 1982, p.28242) 
The passage can be read as a harbinger of Heidegger's abandonment of 
philosophy in favour of thinking precisely because philosophy in the 
Western Metaphysical tradition cannot think being as such. Heidegger 
will leave it to go beyond the confines of philosophy's thinking of being. 
Caputo is surely heading in the wrong direction.43 "Beyond" in this 
quotation from The Basic Problems does not mean further away either 
conceptually or ontologically, but it means deeper beneath the traditional 
ways of understanding, which in fact means deeper into the primordial 
ontological structure of Dasein. Twenty two years later, Heidegger 
explicitly refers to the definitive passage in Being and Time, and there is 
no talk of primary or secondary phases, nor of going beyond Being: 
"Understanding is a project thrust forth and ecstatic, which means 
that it stands in the sphere of the open. The sphere which opens 
up as we project, in order that something (Being in this case) may 
prove itself as something (in this case, Being as itself in its 
unconcealedness), is called the sense. (Cf. BT p.151) "The sense of 
Being" and "the truth of Being" mean the same." (Kaufman 
195744) 
In this passage from 1949 Heidegger explicitly states what is yet to be fully 
worked out in Being and Time, and yet already is implicit, "The sense of 
Being" and "the truth of Being" mean the same. Unfortunately this 
quotation cannot be taken without reservation to be the final word on the 
meaning of meaning in Being and Time because Heidegger was not above 
42 Translation corrected with the help of William McNieU's reading. 
43 Sadler would agree: "The ongOing publication of ... [the] Gesamtausgabe has provided us 
with ... nothing to change the judgement that his abiding and overriding preoccupation 
always remained the 'question of being'. On the other hand, Heidegger's unyielding 
pursuit of this one question is often lost sight of in contemporary commentary." Sadler 1996, 
p.l 
ｾＴ＠ Heidegger, The Way Back Into the Ground of MetaphysiCS, written in 1949 as an 
introduction to his earlier What is MetaphysiCS? in Kaufman 1957 p.217 (Kaufmann 
translates 'Sinn" as "sense"). 
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revising his opinions about his own earlier writing.45 Nevertheless it is 
not only more coherent and plausible, but it is also more illuminating, to 
see in Being and Time the seeds of his later thought than to read The Basic 
Problems of Phenomenology as definitive of the meaning of the terms 
used either in Being and Time or his later projects. 
Early in Radical Hermeneutics Caputo seems to read meaning as 
existential,46 but later, still trying to press "beyond Being", his explanation 
introduces, and mixes together, more distinctions and "meanings". He 
writes, 
"meaning ... has the ... sense of the "Woraufhin," the meaning 
maker or producer which organises meanings or horizons and 
shapes them up. It is not itself a meaning in the conventional 
sense, (a quod) but a kind of meta-meaning which sets up meaning 
(a quo) in the straightforward sense. And to the extent that 
Heidegger was concerned with 'meaning' in this sense, he was 
well on the way beyond the 'meaning' of Being in the 
metaphysical sense." (RH 174) 
The meaning as Woraufhin must be the existentiale and the meanings it 
organises must be ontic meanings but the horizons are surely ontological. 
In fact, I argue later that the horizons are not organized by meaning but 
rather that the unity of the horizons of the temporal ecstases is 
Heidegger's eventual formulation of what he is approaching with 
meaning. Caputo here is several steps behind Heidegger, not, as he seems 
to think, ahead of him. The being of Dasein, which is itself a quo not a 
quod, is the meaning maker. The point of Heidegger's hermeneutic is to 
demonstrate this. Indeed he explicitly refrains from reading Sinn as 
"meaning in the conventional sense (a quod)" or the "metaphysical 
sense".47 Caputo seems to insist on separating meaning and the being of 
Dasein but Heidegger himself was not offering anything on the level of 
the metaphysical debates of his predecessors. It is highly inappropriate to 
describe his interpretation of the meaning of being as "a meta-thesis about 
45 As Kaufmann wrote (in 1957), "Most of his [Heidegger's] old pupils who felt dose to him 
in the period of Being and TIme insist, though for the most part not in print, that he did not 
mean what he now explains he meant." Kaufmann 1957p.36 
46 "Meaning is supplied by Dasein when Dasein projects a horizon which gets filled by 
entities" RH 71 
47 "We ma.ke no advance restriction upon the concept of 'meaning' which would confine it to 
signifying the 'content of judgement', but we understand it as the existential phenomenon ... 
in which the formal framework of what can be disclosed in understanding and Articulated 
in interpretation becomes visible." BT 199 
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how metaphysical theories take shape."48 Heidegger invites us to think 
with him what we have already grasped and lived by in a vague and 
unthought way. His analysis is not 'meta' in any sense but rather prior to 
metaphysics. 
5 MEANING: SAYING, HAVING, BEING. 
I turn now to my own reading of meaning in Being and Time. Within 
section 32 Heidegger offers his first definitions of meaning, and writes at 
greatest length about it.49 He then discusses meaning again for two pages 
in Section 65.50 This adds up to a very brief treatment for an existentiale, 
which is by definition of fundamental importance. Heidegger's writing on 
meaning is confusing and not entirely consistent. We have already noted 
his definition of worldhood is sufficiently close to that of meaning for 
Dreyfus effectively to conflate the two, with some justification as 
Heidegger uses his own coining "das Woraufhin" in important places in 
both definitions.51 Even more puzzling, he writes that "Meaning is an 
existentiale",52 and a few lines later "Dasein can be ... meaningless."53 Yet 
by definition Dasein cannot be without an existentiale. As Heidegger 
himself is inconsistent it will be impossible to find a reading that is totally 
consistent, rather we must look for an explanation for the inconsistencies. 
Heidegger introduces meaning and defines it in the middle of his exegesis 
of understanding and interpretation. 54 In spite of its apparent definitional 
intent, the passage is bafflingly dense.55 In conSidering why Heidegger 
48 RH 175 Caputo's deSCription of Heidegger's thinking earlier in the book is more 
accurate: "'Thinking' is never 'taken in' by anyone of the epochs or by any fusing or 
combination of them. It does not allow itself to think that there is any master name, or 
fusing of master names, or ongoing renaming with a series of 'finite' names for the 'infinity' 
of Being itself." RH 114 
49 BT 192-5 
50 BT 370-2 
S1 BT 119 &: 193 
S2 BT 193 
S3 BT 193 
54 BT 192 
55 It is worthy of note that in this short space Heidegger writes meaning in three different 
ways: meaning, "meaning", and the concept of meaning. By "meaning" ( BT 193, 1.3) he 
seems to refer to everyday usage, and by 'concept of meaning' (BT 193,1.3-4) the existential 
framework within which everyday meaning is possible - viz. the existentiale. However at 
the beginning of the following paragraph Heidegger writes "This Interpretation of the 
concept of 'meaning' .0. (BT 193, 1.19) In the final analysis the passage is too dense and too 
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introduces meaning and treats it in this way we must bear in mind the 
context in which he was writing and the influences on his work. In 
contrast to his relationship to Kierkegaard, Heidegger is almost fulsome 
in his references to the work of Dilthey.56 As Guignon points out, in 
Heidegger's writing in the early 20's he took over many concepts from 
Dilthey, including meaning. 
"In his accounts of 'factical life' or 'Leben-in-der-Welt' during ... 
[the early 1920's], Heidegger employs Dilthey's holistic conception 
of 'meaning' as the basic category for characterising life." 
(Guignon 1983 p.59) 
But for what is translated here as 'meaning' Dilthey mainly uses the term 
'Bedeutung' not 'Sinn' and he mainly considers the latter to be a subset of 
the former. 57 Heidegger's usage would seem therefore to be a reversal of 
Dilthey's although there is definitely a hangover of Diltheyean 
terminology in the text.58 According to Guignon, it is actually Dilthey's 
term 'life' which most closely approaches what Heidegger wishes to call 
meaning. 
"In ... [Dilthey's Der Aufbau der geschichtlichen Welt in der 
Geisteswissenschaften, ] 'life' plays the role of a medium in which 
the other is made accessible to the knowing subject by virtue of 
their shared forms of life in the historical culture in which they 
find themselves. This notion of life as the medium of shared 
intelligibility bears interesting similarities to Heidegger's 
conception of 'meaning' [Sinn] and 'historicity'. It (Guignon 1983 
p.49) 
It seems that although he was using Sinn and not Bedeutung Heidegger 
was thinking along Diltheyean lines and carried over his concepts. In 
ambiguous to assign specific, differentiated meanings to each different expression. His use 
of inverted commas is not consistent. 
56 In Being and Time Kierkegaard is mentioned only in three footnotes. Dilthey is 
discussed at length over BT449-4SS and mentioned in ten other places. Heidegger 
acknowledges his debt to Kierkegaard more openly in The Fundamental Concepts . 
57 See Dilthey, Wilhelm, Gesammelte Schriften VIl. Band: Der Aufbau geschichtlichen 
Welt in den Geisteswissenschaften, Verlag von B. G. Teubner, Leipzig, 1927 p.232 The 
discussion is of 'Bedeutung' (translated by Rickman and others as 'meaning') and Sinn is 
used to denote the meaning of a specific expression or sentence or a part of life to the whole 
of which pertains Bedeutung. However as Rickman notes Dilthey "was, as even his closest 
disciples complained, notoriously careless in his terminology." Rickman 1979, p.ll0 
58 Heidegger puts 'generation' in inverted commas at BT 436 (German edition p.385), as he 
does 'meaning' on BT 193, and in a footnote he writes, "On the concept of the 'generation' d. 
Wilhelm Dilthey, 'Uber das Studium .. .'"<BT 498) Both the inverted commas and the 
expansion with the phrase 'the concept of are paralleled in the writing on 'meaning' at BT 
192-4. 
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section 76 Heidegger writes that his existential Interpretation of the 
historicality of Dasein, "is the constant goal to which the researches of 
Wilhelm Dilthey seek to bring us closer".59 In other words, at least in part, 
Heidegger sees Being and Time carrying on and completing the task 
attempted by Dilthey, but although he attempts to clarify with 'Sinn' that 
which he finds lacking in Dilthey he fails to do so and he will eventually 
abandon the term. It maybe that carrying over the concepts from Dilthey 
and yet reversing the terminology contributed to the complications of 
Heidegger's usage of the term 'Sinn'. Heidegger's writing becomes opaque 
when 'Bedeutung' and 'Sinn' are used in close proximity to convey both 
meaning in its existential aspect and meaning as that which is conveyed by 
an expression. Hence in spite of identifying meaning as an existentiale of 
Dasein, the concept is not well developed in Being and Time. In his later 
writings the concept or phenomenon labelled 'meaning' in Being and 
Time is increasingly considered in his analysis of truth, language and 
Being howsoever variously he names it.60 Meaning as such is left behind, 
because it was not Heidegger's main concern. His thinking was focused, 
and remained focused, on Being. In fact, I believe Heidegger was already 
leaving meaning behind even as he wrote Being and Time. That which 
he identifies as meaning in sections 32 and 65 is subsumed into the 
exposition of temporality by section 69. 
The way in which Heidegger writes about meaning becomes more 
understandable if we remember that he wishes to emphasize what it does 
not mean. Heidegger does not want us to understand meaning as 
propositional meaning nor as an entity at a metaphysical level that 
corresponds to the item. To a modern Heideggerian scholar this may 
seem scarcely worth repeating, but in 1927 the point needed to be made. 
He is rejecting the traditional notion of meaning as the relation of a 
symbol to an object, and the concept of the knowing subject that that 
implies. To Heidegger this epistemology is inadequate, and is based on an 
ontological misapprehension. The meaning of an entity is fundamentally 
its relation to Dasein, so meaning pertains, if it can be said to pertain to 
any entity at all, to Dasein.61 
Having acknowledged the inconsistencies in the exposition of meaning, 
and mentioned some possible causes for those inconsistencies, let us now 
59BT449 
60 See RH 176-7 
61 "Meaning is an existentiale of Dasein, not a property attaching to entities, lying 'behind' 
them, or floating somewhere as an 'intermediate domain'." BT 193 
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examine the key passages to see what positive points are being made about 
meaning. We can usefully start our examination in Section 32. 
"When entities within-the-world are discovered along with the 
Being of Dasein - that is, when they have come to be understood _ 
we say that they have meaning." (BT 192) 
Who are the "we" who say "entities-within-the-world ... have meaning"? 
At one level "we" are simply those of us who say such things, who talk of 
the meaning of entities. This "we" could be and mostly would be, 
although is not necessarily, inauthentic. The German is WiT sagen, not 
Man sagt. Heidegger's most common use of "we" is in the convention 
whereby the author assumes the reader concurs in his intentions; we -
myself as author and you as reader - are travelling this (hermeneutic) path 
together.62 We can best read this passage if we take WiT sagen here to 
cover a double reference to the reader as the author's hermeneutic 
travelling companion and to colloquial usage. The double reference 
occurs because he is thinking aloud with his reader, that is thinking and 
developing his thought as he writes this passage.63 Further, his thinking 
aloud is almost in the form of a dialogue,64 for Heidegger himself is about 
to correct what "we" say.65 But why did "we" say it in the first place? 
Perhaps because it is a colloquialism that rolls off the tongue. But this 
colloquial definition he has just given of the situation in which we say 
entities have meaning is crucial to his exegesis. This everyday expression 
shows an important aspect of the phenomenon of things "having 
meaning." He claims that we say that entities have meaning when they 
are "discovered along with the Being of Dasein". In this everyday event of 
saying something "has meaning" we are equally saying something about 
62 Another example, of many, is "What we are seeking is an authentic potentiality-for-
Being of Dasein." BT 312 I also follow this convention. 
63 See the discussion on orality on the next page, also the comments of own of his former 
students on his lectures upon which Being and Time was based: "When he turned to his 
lecture notes, he did not actually read from the text; in his speaking, he created anew what 
he presented - sometimes deviating from his notes, sometimes adding to them. For those 
who listened carefully, even the most difficult train of thought became simple and 
intelligible." Petzet, 1993, p.l0 
64 The tradition of philosophy as oral dialogue did not die with the Greeks. Walter eng, 
points out that Aquinas' Summa theologica proceeds in "a roundabout, residually 
disputatious form, a kind of inside-out debate." He believes that in the Middle Ages "the 
art of structuring thought was take to be dialectic, an art of discourse, rather than pure 
logic". Ong, 1967, pp.59-60 Heidegger is close to the Ancients in this sense in his way of 
philosophizing, as well as in his philosophical concerns. 
65 "But that which is understood, taken strictly is not the meaning but the entity, or 
alternatively, Being." BT 192-3 
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ourselves, and whether we notice or not that we are disclosing our own 
Being. 
To reveal the full import of this paragraph (BT192-3) we must pause for a 
moment to consider the genesis of Being and Time. Heidegger's 
reputation was built on his lecturing. We remember that Being and Time 
was rushed into print because the authorities were not prepared to 
confirm his appointment to the Chair of Philosophy at Freiburg solely on 
the basis of his reputation for teaching. They wanted to see a book. 
However George Steiner identifies "a central orality in Heidegger's 
teaching."66 For Gadamer "When Heidegger lectured, one saw things as if 
they had taken on bodily form." His praxis was "a meeting with live 
language. "67 The text of Being and Time originates in Heidegger's 
teaching and hence essentially in his speaking.68 Steiner observes that, 
"passages in Heidegger which are opaque to the reading eye ... 
come to more intelligible life, take on a logic of an almost musical 
kind when they are read aloud" (Steiner 1978 p.xv)69 
I will have more to say on the issue of orality in Chapter Four. Here we 
will simply use what can be made to show itself by reading aloud the 
written passage under consideration. We will utilise the orality that 
Steiner and Gadamer emphasise.70 If we follow Steiner's praxis and read 
the following two sentences aloud with a minor emphasis on "generally" 
and the major emphasis on "world" in the first sentence, and the stress on 
66 " [the] prodigality and textual strength [of Heidegger's written corpus] are themselves, 
paradoxical. They tend to obscure a central orality in Heidegger's teaching and concept of 
the enterprise of serious thought." Steiner 1978 p.xiii 
67 Gadamer 1985 p.47 Gadamer also has remarked in the context of discussing the 
difficulty of Heidegger's texts that "as a speaker Heidegger was quite understandable." 
Gadamer quoted in Grieder 1995 
68 Heidegger himself remarks in his prefatory note to the 1953 edition of An Introduction to 
Metaphysics, "There is a difference between the spoken and the written word." Sadly, he 
does not elaborate there upon that difference. 
69 Gadamer, whilst agreeing on the power of Heidegger's language is less complementary 
about his style, "Heidegger's language and style had a certain plastic power, boorish, 
barbarian, admittedly - like an elephant going through the primeval forest." Quoted in 
Grieder 1995 p.120 
70 This search for meaning at an oral level is not an fandful device, indeed I will later 
argue that speech as being-with is always more meaningful that the written word. 
Psychologists found "22 times more variance is accounted for by the tone of one's voice than 
by the content of the utterance when people are asked to interpret utterances." Argyle et al. 
1970. Nevertheless the text as written is, at best ambiguous. To make it unambiguously 
mean what I have read into it Heidegger could have inserted Aller (But> at the beginning of 
the second sentence, before "Wenn innerweltliches Seiendes ... "("When entities within-
the-world ... > That he did not do so underlines the fact that my reading of Being and Time 
(like any other in fact> remains an interpretation not a definitive commentary. 
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'Being of Dasein' in second, they sound like a rhetorical antithesis: 
generally one finds that, but in this special case this. 
"Entities within-the-world &enerally are projected upon the world 
- that is upon a whole of significance, to whose reference-relations 
concern, as Being-in-the-world, has been tied in advance. When 
entities within-the-world are discovered along with the Beina of 
Dasein - that is, when they have come to be understood - we say 
that they have meaning [Sinn]." (BT 192 my underlining)7t 
That is, the ordinary way that we come across things is by using them, and 
we come across them in terms of their utility.72 In such cases the Being of 
Dasein is concern. Dasein is engaged in the world and with tasks in the 
world. It is neither considering itself nor transparent to itself. Being as 
such is not revealed because it is covered over by concern. When an entity 
comes to have meaning something special happens: the Being of Dasein is 
discovered along with the inner-worldly-entity. "Along with the Being of 
Dasein [mit dem Sein des Daseins]" here means not just that the thing is 
disclosed but that Dasein is co-revealed. What is the relationship of this 
co-revelation to the colloquial "saying" that an entity has meaning? 
In the scientific, objective world view objects do not have meanings except 
in the special case of signs.73 In that world view meanings pertain to 
language. One colloquial usage however stands out: if I say a[n inner-
worldly] thing has meaning I indicate that it has some significance for me, 
which typically has an emotional component, and is related in some way 
to what I care about. Let us consider, for example, the chair from myoid 
school library that is now in my home. The chair has meaning for me 
because it can evoke feelings, moods, hopes or memories. I have some 
history with the chair. Of course I may overlook it on some days entirely, 
or I may simply use it. If so it has no meaning and its way of being is 
ready-to-hand, as a more or less noticeable part of the whole equipmental 
context of the world. If I bump into it, it may become present-at-hand. But 
when it has meaning in so far as its presence reveals itself as having 
meaning for me it simultaneously reveals my being, as affected, and 
71 Though illustrated here in the English translation these emphases also make sense in a 
similar way of the original German text: "Oas innerweltlich Seiende Qberhaupt ist auf 
Welt hin entworfen, das heiSt auf ein Ganzes von Bedeutsamkeit, in deren 
Verweisungsbeziigen das Besorgen a1s In-der-Welt-sein sich im vorhinein festgemacht hat. 
Wenn innerweltliches Seiendes mit dem Sein des Dasejns entdeckt, das heiSt zu 
Verstlndnis gekommen ist, sagen wir, es hat Sinn," Sein urad Zeit, p.lS1 
72BT9S 
73 See section 3 above. 
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understanding, alongside it. What I care about and my emotional state are 
revealed in my recognition that the chair has meaning for me. I am no 
longer lost, absorbed in the world of my concern, nor am I detached, 
unheedful of my own being and contemplating the world as a collection of 
entities with objective properties. Rather, I am recalled to myself - the 
very one who worked and talked and sat wistfully daydreaming in the 
library on this very chair. It is not at all necessary that I am able to 
articulate exactly what the chair evokes. The being that is disclosed, my 
being, understands and is attuned and articulated without necessarily 
being verbalised. The chair has meaning because my relatedness to the 
chair is what I am, as disclosing, understanding, articulated attunement. 
There is confirmation of the validity of this reading later in the same 
passage if we read the whole of this sentence in apposition to its italicised 
predecessor: 
"That is to say, its [Dasein's] own Being and the entities disclosed 
with its Being can be appropriated in understanding, or can 
remain relegated to non-understanding." (BT 19374) 
In other words we come across the phenomenon meaning, that is we say 
that entities have meaning, when the Being of Dasein is revealed along 
with entities in the world.75 Entities "have meaning" only when Dasein's 
being is disclosed.76 Dasein's being is disclosed as care. 
Stack, in his analysis of meaning and existence, also differentiates two 
concepts of meaning which correspond to this distinction between 
meaning qua existentiale and the special case of meaning wherein 
Dasein's being is also revealed. 
74 Nicolson translates the same sentence, "The exister's own being can be made accessible in 
an understanding, along with whatever entities have also been disclosed by the exister's 
being, or, on the other hand, that being and those entities may be lost to our understanding." 
Nicolson 1992 p.103 
75 Dasein's being, and the being of other beings, is of course always understood, that is 
revealed to some extent, mostly in an unthematic, implicit manner. It is when the Being of 
Dasein and the being of other entities are both explicit in some way that we come across 
meaning. 
76 In Section 6S we can find confirmation of the thesis that when entities are understood, 
that is to say we can say they have meaning, the being of Dasein, (Being-in-the-world) is 
revealed (disclosed) as well: "When Being-in-the-world has been disclosed to itself and 
understands the Being of that entity which it itself is, it understands equiprimordially the 
Being of entities discovered within-the-world, even if such Being had not been made a 
theme, and has not yet even been differentiated into its primary modes of existence and 
Reality." BT 371 (my underlining) Here Heidegger approaches what he has said in Section 
32, but from the other direction, that is from a discUssion of Being-in-the-world rather than 
of the meaning of entities. . 
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"The . ｦｩｲｳｾ＠ ｣ｯｮ｣･ｰｾ＠ of ｾ･｡ｮｩｮｧ＠ includes the apprehension of 
ｭ･｡ｲｵｮｾ＠ ｾ＠ ex.penences In terms of the interpretive, projective 
appropnahon m understanding of the intelligibility of man and 
non-human beings. (Seiendes). The second formulation of 
meaning refers to meaning in existence, to the existential 
encounter with the meaningful in terms of the spiritual 
movement towards authentic existence. This is ... an encounter 
with meaning in the lived-experience of purposive self-existence 
or the 'constancy of the self'. " (Stack 1978, p.91) 
Heidegger approaches meaning as the unity of the temporal horizons 
through the ontic event of Dasein's saying an entity in the world has 
meaning. This causes great confusion. The meaning actually pertains to 
Dasein, but everyday Dasein typically says something like, "The chair 
means a lot to me". Of course Dasein could not have such meaning 
without the chair or some other entity but meaning is nonetheless 
grounded in Dasein. We must remember however that when we say 
something has meaning we meet an ontic phenomenon (a disposition of 
comprehending Dasein in relationship to an entity) which is founded in, 
and shows to the phenomenological enquirer, an ontological 
phenomenon. 
Because understanding and meaning are both existentialia, Dasein always 
understands and has meaning and Being is always understood and 
revealed to some extent but mostly in an unthematic, implicit manner. 
In the special case when we say entities have meaning the being of Dasein 
and the entities disclosed along with it are "a ppropria ted in 
understanding".77 This reading of meaning therefore necessarily involves 
taking "appropriated in understanding" as some event which is not 
simply the ongoing of the existentiale of understanding. We may read it 
in non-Heideggerian parlance as "brought to awareness." This need not 
be, and indeed most often would not be theoretical, conceptual or even 
thematic. Indeed, as I will argue later, it could, and most often would, 
happen in the event of understanding or telling a story about something. 
If the meaning of an entity, for example the meaning of myoid school 
library chair, entails the co-disclosure of my being, my involvement with 
it is not concern such that it is ready-to-hand nor is it present-at-hand to 
my disinterested gaze. I am not fascinated, absorbed or fallen into the 
world,78 nor am I modifying myself to look at the world as an objective 
77 BT 193 
78 0. BT 149 
10 
observer; 79 rather my being as there and attuned is disclosed. In 
understanding the meaning of myoid school library chair I am disclosing 
to myself how it matters to me. This that-it-matters is founded in the 
story of my relationship to the chair. As we shall see later, if I tell that 
story, and tell it well, then I, and my listeners feel precisely how it matters 
to me. Being, in so far as it enters into my intelligibility, is shown to me 
for my being is relatedness across the opening of the there to entities 
which reveal themselves, hence Being is understood because my Being is 
laid bare in an encounter with a entity which I say has meaning. This 
reading brings out the ontological structure which lies beneath what could 
be referred to as the emotional component of meaning. The colloquial 
usage in the example given exemplifies the affect which is the ontic 
corollary of the existentiale of attunement. 
If meaning is an existentiale it subsists beneath any understanding, even if 
in the normal course of events it is not articulated as such. In the way of 
being of the 'they' it is covered over in the same way that our own Being 
is covered over by fallenness and idle talk. In his reading of this passage in 
Section 3280 Guignon draws attention with italics (as Steiner suggests one 
can do by reading aloud) to this distinction; 
"with the concept of 'meaning' Heidegger is trying to identify a 
source of intelligibility that lies at a level even deeper than that of 
the totalities of significance we appropriate in our interpretations. 
Whereas 'significance' refers to what as a matter of fact has been 
articulated in explicit interpretations, 'meaning' embraces what 
'can be articulated in a disclosure by which we understand'" 
(Guignon p.ll1)81 
Meaning underlies all and any signification and all discourse. Meaning is 
that on the basis of which Dasein can make interpretations. It is that 
which is articulated in discourse in an interpretation, but qua existentiale 
it is the involvedness, the sphere opened by projection of the 
understanding, which is the nourishment and sustenance of the Da of 
Dasein.82 As long as Dasein exists meaning supports the network of 
significations which constitute the worldhood of the world. In this sense 
79 O. BT88 
80 BT 193 
81 See also BT 204 "That which can be articulated in interpretation, and thus even more 
primordially in discoune, is what we have called 'meaning'. That which gets articulated 
as such in discursive Articulation, we call the 'totality-of-significations' .... Significations, 
as what has been Articulated from that which can be Articulated, always carry meaning: 
( my underlining.) 
82BT311 
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meaning nourishes Dasein, Dasein is disclosed to itself by its relations 
with entities within the world or other Dasein, whether or not Dasein 
ever says or raises such meaning to the level of interpretation - which for 
the most part, absorbed by its concern for entities within the world it does 
not.83 
We can therefore delineate three levels of Dasein's engagement with 
world. Firstly, the existentiale of understanding as the project of 
possibilities makes the world available to me as a network of significations 
such that I can go about the business of living. Secondly, understanding 
can be raised to the level of interpretation.84 At this level understanding 
makes an entity available to me as an entity. I can contemplate entities 
within the world as such, I can name them, and further consider them as 
present at hand, which amongst other things makes possible an 'objective 
scientific point of view'. Thirdly, if I understand such an entity such that I 
can say it has meaning my own being as meaningful has been disclosed 
along with the thing and my Being is disclosed as involved with this 
entity within the world. My being is always involved in this manner with 
entities within the world but in the first two modalities of understanding 
the involvement is covered over, and meaning, though it exists, "remains 
relegated to non-understanding. "85 
In Section 65 Heidegger expands on what it is to say of entities that they 
"have meaning": 
"If we say that entities 'have meaning' this signifies that they have 
become accessible in their Being; and this Being, as projected upon 
its "upon-which", is what 'really' 'has meaning' first of all. 
Entities 'have' meaning only because, as Being which has been 
disclosed beforehand, they become intelligible in the projection of 
that Being - that is to say, in terms of the 'upon-which' of that 
projection. The primary projection of the understanding of Being 
'gives' the meaning. The question about the meaning of the Being 
of an entity takes as its theme the 'upon-which' of that 
understanding of Being which underlies all Being· of entities." 
(BT 371-2) 
Macquarrie and Robinson point out in a footnote (marked here by the 
asterisk) that in the earlier editions this line read not "underlies all Being 
83 A significant and important occasion on which it does do so, as we shall see, is in the 
event of storytelling. 
84 "In interpretation, understanding does not become something different. It becomes 
itself." BT 188 
8S BT 193 
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(Sein) of entities" but "underlies all Being towards (Sein zu) entities." The 
original formulation is significant. It brings out the relationship of Being 
and Dasein: the Being of entities is projected by Dasein, hence all Being of 
entities is Being-towards those entities from Dasein, and equally Being-
towards Dasein from those entities.86 However although it brings out this 
relationship, which is implicit throughout Being and Time, it can be read 
as giving existential priority to Dasein above entities. Worse it can be read 
as prioritising Dasein above Being, that is appearing to present Being as a 
product, as well as a project of Dasein. This is an interpretation that, as he 
continued his work after the first editions of Sein und Zeit, Heidegger 
wished to avoid. He emphasised later that Dasein exists by virtue of its 
relation to Being in genera1.87 For Heidegger the question of the meaning 
of Being raises the question of the understanding of Being, which pertains 
to Dasein.88 And Being enters into the intelligibility of Dasein as 
meaning.89 Greenier spells out the implications of this: 
"Meaning is the formal structure of projective (or decisive) 
understanding itself and being as well as beings are not understood 
properly speaking through or in terms of an extra medium called 
"meaning"; but what is 'understood' is exactly that which is 
projected in understanding insofar as it is projected and this is 
nothing else but being. What then is the difference between being 
86 Heidegger approaches this characteristic of the relationship between Dasein and 
entities again in The Fundamental Concepts. There he writes of the 'binding' character of 
things (Verbindlichkeit) as a moment of world-formation (PC 348-9). He defines Dasein as 
world-forming (FC 352) but insists that the projection of Dasein and the binding character 
of things form a unity, (FC 361-2) thus aVOiding the ontological confusion that threatens to 
arise from his analysis in Being and Time. 
87 "being-there is allotted to me in order that my self should be being-there. But being-
there signifies: care of the ecstatically manifested being of the essent as such, not only of 
human being. Being-there is 'in every case mine'; this means neither 'posited through me' 
nor 'apportioned to an individual ego'. Being there is itself by virtue of its essential 
relation to being in general. That is the meaning of the sentence that occurs frequently in 
Sein und Zeit: Being-there implies awareness of being." Heidegger 1959 p. 28-9 
88 Greenier glosses this passage as follows: "Here Heidegger says that the understanding of 
the meaning of a being is the understanding of the being of a being - a being has being 
because it is understood in its meaning; and a being has meaning because it is understood in 
its being. But furthermore because the question of the meaning of the being of beings is also 
a question about the urulerstanding of the being of all beings in their various modes of being; 
the question of being as such is a question which has as its object of investigation that in 
terms of which all categories of being are understood - namely in the understanding or 
projection of being itself in Dasein's understanding of being." Greenier 1975, p.136 
89 See BT 193-4 "if we are inquiring about the meaning of Being our investigation .00 asks 
about Being itself in so far as Being enters into the intelligtbility of Dasein. The meaning of 
Being can never be contrasted with entities, or with Being as the 'ground' which gives 
entities support; for a 'ground' becomes accessible only as meaning - even if it is itself the 
abyss of meaninglessness." 
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and meaning - or between being and its meaning?" (Greenier 
p.131) 
Heidegger states that all experience of entities is based on the projection of 
their being and it is Dasein which projects.90 So meaning lies beneath any 
encounter with beings, just as does Being. Furthermore Being only 
becomes accessible as meaning.91 To ask about the meaning of anything is 
to ask about it "in so far as it enters into the intelligibility of Dasein".92 
But we cannot however simply equate meaning and being, because 
meaning is an existentiale - a necessary constituent of the Being of Dasein. 
The being of an entity in the world is not a necessary constituent of 
Dasein's being. 
Ultimately the indistinguishability of being and the meaning of being 
arises from Heidegger's rejection of any transcendental basis of being. The 
being of Dasein, which is our access to Being as such, is relational. There is 
neither meaning nor being floating out there to be arrived at or 
encountered by Dasein. Rather being is always already accessible because 
entities are always already present. Equally meaning is always there 
because Dasein always projects itself understandingly and discloses entities 
as it does so. So the answer to Greenier's question quoted above is that 
meaning qua existentiale and being are different but are not separable fOT 
Dasein because meaning is that structure of Dasein which is Dasein's 
access to Being. Dasein may of course overlook meaning, as it overlooks 
Being as such, and in that case it overlooks its own structure. That is the 
meaning of inauthenticity. But meaning is Dasein's access to Being,93 
whether or not that access is acknowledged. Meaning will be revealed as 
the unity of the temporal horizons, which in turn are the foundation of 
the equiprimordial existentialia. It is the ecstases of temporality which 
constitute Dasein's being which is itself access to Being, and the being of 
90 "All ontical experience of entities ... is based upon projections of the Being of the 
corresponding entities" BT 371 
91 Cf. Richardson: "what Heidegger means by the 'sense' (Sinn) of a being ... is the 
comprehensibility (Verstehba,keit) of this being, not as grasped by an explicit concept and 
thematically understood, but as illumined by There-being, which in its fundamental project 
comprehends this being as that which it is, sc. in the Being-structure which makes the 
being to be what it is. Briefly: the sense of any being is its Being, insofar as this is 
comprehended by There-being." Richardson 1963, p.85 
92 BT 193 
93 "The meaning of Being can never be contrasted with entities, or with Being as the 
'ground' which gives entities support; for a 'ground' becomes accessible only as meaning, 
even if it itself the abyss of meaninglessness: BT 193-4 
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other entities. Thus meaning, qua existentiale, is the unity of futuridty, 
present and having-been. 
It is argued later that a narrative obtains its unity from this temporal unity 
of Dasein. Because having-been, futuridty and present are essentially 
bound together in Dasein when any Dasein considers its own existence it 
tends to do so in terms of a story.94 To stand back and consider one's life 
objectively is to modify one's primary sense of self. The existential 
dimension of meaning is pre-ontologically understood as the narrative 
quality of human existence. We will return to this point in Chapter Five. 
6 THE STRUCTURE OF MEANING AND ITS 
TEMPORALITY 
Heidegger paints a picture of meaning as the unity of the temporal 
horizons through his spatial metaphors. When commenting on the 
ecstatical temporality of the spatiality that is characteristic of Dasein, he 
remarks that "Dasein's interpretation of itself ... [is] dominated through 
and through by 'spatial representations'."95 His own use of the word 
'structure' [Struktur] is a case in point. Walter Ong traces this trend in 
thinking back to the influence of chirography and printing and cites Pierre 
de la Ramee as the progenitor of the modem organization of thinking by 
analogy to visual structure.96 Heidegger is his heir, and in turning against 
the orthodoxy of Western Metaphysics rejects his inheritance. In Chapter 
Four we will look further at the significance of this point. Here we will 
examine what can be gleaned from Heidegger's structural similies. The 
fact that ultimately he abandons them is not entirely unconnected with 
the limitations that Ong notes are imposed on thinking by such 
representation.97 
94 Hence Kerby's remark; "In the same way that a story traditionally demands 
followabUity and closure, we tend to expect unity and continuity in other people's lives and 
in our own." Kerby 1991 p.56 . 
9S BT421 
96 "Ramism ... is at root a cluster of mental habits evolving within a centuries-old 
educational tradition and specializing in certain kinds of concepts, based on simple spatial 
models, for conceiving of the mental and communicational processes and, by implication, of 
the extramental world." Ong 1958 p.8 
97 See eng 1958 
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Heidegger writes frequently of the structure of Dasein and of the 
existentialia of Dasein, including meaning.98 But when one asks about the 
particular form of the structure of meaning the plethora of descriptions, 
all metaphorically spatial, plunges the enquiry into chaos. We will 
consider the sundry descriptions of the structure of meaning and attempt 
to discover if their complexity amounts to contradiction, complementarity 
or incoherence. Four distinct characterisations of the structure of 
meaning, of differing degrees of spatio-metaphoric sophistication, are 
given in Being and Time. Meaning is variously described as 'the upon-
which', as having a fore-structure, as circular, and as being related to 
horizons. I shall consider these four descriptions in that order. 
Firstly meaning is portrayed as the 'upon-which' - as in some way 
beneath, or supporting, or receiving a projection.99 As understanding 
Dasein, we project possibilities. Meaning is that upon-which the 
projection is made. It is that which bears our projection and from which 
in some manner, as projection, we return to ourselves. The projection of 
the understanding does not, as it were, carryon forever further and 
further away from its point of origin.l00 Rather it is a projection that 
continually is rooted in its origin. Nicolson is typical of those who take 
the 'upon-which' rather too literally: 
"Generically, [Sinn] ... is the 'whereupon of a projection' and 
therefore one of the conditions of the possibility for projection, 
since Dasein does not have the option of just projecting into the 
blue - something has to play the role of a screen upon which the 
beam of a projection is cast." (Nicolson 1992, p.104)101 
This dubious extension of the metaphor (e.g. the 'beam' of projection) has 
little explanatory effect and introduces new entities of undefined 
ontological status. Such explanation as he does offer seems to be wide of 
the mark: 
98 BT 65, 149, 189 etc. 
99 For example "Taken strictly, "meaning" signifies the "upon-which" of the primary 
projection of the understanding of Being." BT 371 
100 "Factical Dasein, understanding itself and its world ecstatically in the unity of the 
'there', comes back from these horizons to the entities encountered within them." BT 417 
101 He goes on to say that the screen is "no blank screen", it has acquired its articulation 
from the three elements of the fore-structure. 
"Where they have yielded that preliminary articulation, there exists a Sinn upon which 
we can cast the beam of our projection; that is what enables us to accomplish an 
interpretation. That 'screen' is what permits the 'as'- structure - it now permits something 
to be taken as something, and when that is accomplished, we understand the subject.· 
Nicoloson 1992, p.104 
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"To understand Sinn as an 'existentiale' is to say that it has to 
supplement the projections of the exister, that the exister cannot be 
what it is - projective - without that domain into which the 
projections are aimed. That Sinn inhabits that domain means, as 
well, that no exister can project without being led to make 
interpretations." (Nicholson 1992, p.104) 
Nicolson seems to have added to the existence of Dasein a domain 
inhabited by meaning.1 02 But this addition of more terms to the 
multiplicity of definitions of Sinn does not clarify our comprehension, 
and throws up a further question as to the ontological status of such a 
domain. Instead of adding this domain to our list of problems let us 
remember that upon which Dasein projects itself is in the first instance 
itself as Being-possible. The upon-which is not the thing (an entity in the 
world such as cup or a book) nor a distinct domain or screen but my own -
or one's - putative use of the cup, or reading of the book, so the upon-
which is a possible action or more broadly my own potentiality for 
being.l03 It is the futuricity of my own being. In understanding I project 
upon myself. The upon-which of meaning is constitutive of the Being of 
Dasein. 
Heidegger says meaning is an existentiale, precisely because it is not 
separate from Dasein but is constitutive of its ecstatic nature.104 I am 
outside myself such that I can project myself upon myself. Meaning is 
myself as outside, as that possibility towards which I project myself such 
that in the opening of my projection beings are revealed. The upon-which 
is not a separate entity such as a screen. We can perhaps make sense of the 
upon-which as the outside of Dasein by proposing an analogy with the 
peculiar case of the Moebius strip. A Moebius strip opens, and encloses, an 
opening, and yet its other side is always its one and only side. The upon-
which is like the other side of a Moebius strip. The other side is other in 
the sense that when I hold a Moebius strip at any given point my two 
fingers can hold two different sides that seem opposed and separate from 
each other and yet it is the same in that I can trace my finger along it and 
find that this other side is one and the same as that to which it is other. 
102 Sallis ascribes a domain to the understanding, and suggests that "meaning is a medium 
or space" which he appears to ascribe to understanding: in other words for Sallis Sinn does 
not inhabit a domain, but is the domain pertaining to the understanding. Sallis 1990, p.99 
103 "The meaning of this Being - that is, of care - is what makes care possible in its 
Constitution; and it is what makes up promordially the Being of this potentiality-for-
ｂ･ｾＧＢ＠ BT 372 
104 "The meaning of Dasein's Being is not something free-floating which is other than and 
'outside of itself, but is the self-understanding Dasein itself." BT 372 
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Projection and upon-which are, in the same way, so ontologically 
involved with each other as to be mutually interdependent, inseparable 
and yet not reducible to each other. The benefit of this proposal is that it 
offers an understanding of the upon-which. The drawback is that it 
subverts the distinction between understanding and meaning. 
We turn now to the second spatial metaphor for the structure of meaning. 
"Meaning is the upon-which of a projection in terms of which 
something becomes intelligible as something; it gets its structure 
from a fore-having, a fore-sight, and a fore-conception." (BT 193) 
Is the structure that meaning gets a fore-structure? Or does it get some 
other kind of structure from the fore-structure? In fact the translation 
"gets" here gives a false impression of sequentiality. I read the following 
sentence as in apposition to the previous one, quoted above, 
"The concept of meaning embraces the formal existential 
framework of what necessarily belongs to that which an 
understanding interpretation Articulates" (BT 193) 
Reading it in apposition implies that "the formal existential framework" 
is the threefold fore-structure not that one is subsequent to the other. The 
fore-structure itself however clearly has a temporal as well as a spatial 
aspect. Indeed the former explicitly predominates in the passage just two 
pages earlier in which Heidegger introduces "fore-" structures, where he is 
describing interpretation. 1 OS But what existentiale of Dasein could be in 
advance of the projection of the understanding which is itself Dasein as 
ahead of itself? Surely Heidegger cannot wish to say that the fore-structure 
of Meaning is further in advance of the projection of the understanding? 
To read him thus is indeed to begin to create a "baroque metaphysical 
structure" such as is ascribed to him by Stephen Mulhall in his thoroughly 
analytic approach to Being and Time. 106 Let us rather presume, as 
105 BT 191 
106 "for Heidegger, to say that Dasein exists in the world is to say that the act of 
understanding through which Dasein grasps its own Being and potentiality-for-Being must 
always encompass the world in which it is, i.e. must always relate to the environment 
which the equipmental totality constitutes, and which alone furnishes the equipmental 
domain within which human purposes can be achieved. 
Needless to say, Wittgenstein produces no such baroque metaphysical structures ... For him, 
part of what is meant by saying that we directly perceive things as kinds of object rather 
than as pieces of world-stuff which must then be interpreted is that our verbal and non-
verbal behaviour in relation to such entities takes a distinctive form, one in which their 
status as a particular kind of object is taken for granted." Mulhall, 1990 p.143 It is of course 
how the status of such objects is taken for granted that Heidegger is investigating, a point 
18 
proposed earlier, that Heidegger is in the throws of comprehending the 
phenomenon and that he approaches it, now through understanding, 
now through meaning. This is why the two existentialia are so entangled. 
Indeed, two pages later he comments that, "the structure of meaning ... is 
rooted in ... the understanding which interprets."107 This is more support 
for the "Moebius" interpretation of the upon-which. 
The projection of the understanding is projection upon meaning, and yet 
meaning is rooted in the understanding which interprets. There is a sort 
of boot-strap circularity to this description. Understanding projects upon 
meaning which is rooted in understanding which projects upon meaning 
- and so on. The search for the foundation of this sequence is not unlike 
searching for the other side of the Moebius strip. The other side is 
apparently present at anyone point at which one picks it up, but when we 
set out to define its limits or separate one side from the other it disappears. 
The course of Heidegger's analysis separates meaning and understanding 
but they are no more separable than the two sides of a Moebius strip. 
There is a further anomaly. We recall that interpretation is the 
"development of the understanding".108 It seems that we must extend the 
status of equiprimordial existentiale ascribed to understanding, 
attunement and discourse, not just to meaning, but also to interpretation. 
Heidegger does not do this explicitly but he comes very close to doing so, 
in so far as it is logically implicit in the discussion on the first three pages 
of Section 32. He writes, 
"The 'as' makes up the structure of the explicitness of something 
that is understood. It constitutes the interpretation." (BT 189) 
and 
"If the 'as' is ontically unexpressed, this must not seduce us into 
overlooking it as a constitutive state for understanding, existential 
and a priori." (BT 190) 
Interpretation is the taking of something 'as' something and it is 
grounded in a fore-having, a fore-sight and a fore-conception,l09 which is 
"the fore-structure of understanding".110 The fore-structure is that of 
to which Mulhall in magnificently indifferent. He atones for this overSight in his 
commentary on Being and Time published five years later. 
101 BT 195 
l08BT 188 
109 BT 191 
110 BT 192 
understanding, but is it not also that of meaning? Is it the very same 
structure, or a separate but identical structure? Or, in fact, different 
altogether? Heidegger's text, in offering and defining separate terms, 
seems to suggest the latter, but in the end it is hard to avoid the conclusion 
that the unitary quality of the phenomena defeats his enterprise. 
Meaning, understanding and interpretation are so bound up with one 
another as to defy cogent, discrete definition. 
The interpenetration of the characteristics of meaning, understanding and 
interpretation is clear in the third way in which Heidegger characterises 
meaning: as circular. The understanding of anything, including 
understanding, en tails a circular process.lll 
"The 'circle' in understanding belongs to the structure of 
meaning" (BT 195) 
This circle he says "is the expression of the existential fore-structure of 
Dasein itself. "112 In other words the second spatio-metaphorical 
characterisation of meaning, the fore-structures, is not yet the whole of the 
story, it is also expressed as a circle. Heidegger introduces the idea of the 
circle initially in his consideration of "derivative ways of understanding 
and interpretation, such as philological Interpretation. "113 He emphasises 
the inevitability of the circle in "the act of understanding".114 We note 
here that Heidegger is considering understanding as an on tic event (an 
act), but he next asserts that, "this circle ... is an expression of the existential 
fore-structure of Dasein itself. "115 Heidegger is discussing both the ontic 
and the ontological here.116 Considering only the ontological for our 
111 This passage is the origin of the concept of the hermeneutic circle in Heidegger's 
thought, which has been followed up by a host of philosophers, most notably perhaps by 
Gadamer 1979. In view of the ample discussion of the hermeneutic circle elsewhere I will 
limit my discussion of it here to its part in the spatio-metaphorical structure of meaning. 
112 BT 195 
113 BT 194 
114 BT 194, my underlining. 
115 BT 195, my underlining. 
116 It is not my purpose here to challenge or defend the legitimacy of this move, which is 
typical of the entire hermeneutic of Being and Time, for we can, in the end, only decide the 
legitimacy of the path of thinking of Being and Time by following it and deciding for 
ourselves. Any 'objective' verification is by definition ruled out. Rather I draw attention to 
the move from ontic to ontological, as Heidegger often fails to, in order to point out that 
this circularity is not argued or deduced at an ontolOgical level but introduced by a 
generalization of a phenomenological observation, and to note that the reader must be 
careful to establish whether the term 'understanding' is used at an ontic or ontological 
level. In Section 32 he oscillates between discussing the enquiry of Being and Time, an ontic 
enquiry into a situation characterised by the ontological involvement of one element of 
what is enquired into, and the ontological constitution of Dasein as such. Furthermore 
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purposes let us now pay attention to Heidegger's italicised emphasis. The 
circle of understanding (which belongs to the structure of meaning) is 
also the expression of the existential fore-structure of Dasein. 
Unambiguously he re-iterates the point, 
"An entity for which ... its Being is itself an issue, [i.e. Dasein] has, 
ontologically, a circular structure." (BT 195) 
In other words the structure of meaning is the structure of Vasein. It is 
circular and it is also a fore-structure. Such confirmation that we have 
that the fore-structures constitute the structure of meaning also confirms 
that to this same structure belongs a circle. So why does Heidegger use two 
different terms? Is the differentiation made above between the fore-
structures and the circle vacuous? Not entirely, because the fore-
structures of themselves contain no indication of return, no coming back, 
as is clearly entailed in the hermeneutic circle. The fore-structures 
highlight the nature of the 'out-bound' half of the projection of 
understanding. With the fore-structures Heidegger is emphasising the 
conditions for the possibility of interpretation and the thrown nature of 
Dasein, even as understanding. Because Dasein is thrown and ecstatic 
meaning is always already there as Dasein's relatedness, albeit inarticulate, 
before being articulated by an understanding interpretation.117 The 
ontological circle in understanding means that ontically any particular 
meaning is provisional, but this is not in itself problematic for Heidegger. 
The circular characterisation of meaning is intended to show the 
continuous out and back nature of meaning. Meaning is not a thing 
which would entail it having a location, its circularity is the structure of 
the movement of Dasein's Being. 
Heidegger is still trying to establish the bona fides of his hermeneutic phenomenology in 
the face of the dominant transcendental-categorial philosophy of the time. Circular 
thinking offends the objectivity of rationalism so Heidegger needs to assert, "we see this 
drcle as a vidous one and look out for ways of avoiding it, even if we just 'sense' it as an 
inevitable imperfection, then the act of understanding has been misunderstood from the 
ground up. The assimilation of understanding and interpretation to a definite ideal of 
knowledge is not the issue here." (BT 194) His argument thus moves not only between ontic 
and ontological but also between his own exposition and the rejection of antecedent 
Idealism. Because of this double level of movement of the argument of Being and Time, 
confusion is perhaps inevitable. It is exacerbated because for the purposes of his enquiry he 
ts 'pulling apart' that which he wishes equally to define as a unity with manifold aspects 
and potentialities. 
117 "when something within-the-world is encountered as such, the thing in question 
already has an involvement ... and this involvement is one which gets laid out by the 
interpretation." BT 190-1 
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Further complexity arises from the fact that circularity also describes the 
hermeneutic of Being and Time.1 18 We must be aware throughout the 
text that there are three circles referred to; first that of the hermeneutic of 
the text, which is a particular case of the hermeneutic circle of 
interpretation in general; second that of the existentiale of meaning; and 
third that of Dasein as a whole. In fact the second and third circles are not 
clearly separated. Even as we work through these spatio-metaphorical 
descriptions we find that what describes meaning also describes 
understanding or interpretation. Indeed recurrently, as being-in-the-
world, as care, and finally as temporality Heidegger re-unites those 
elements or existentialia that he has for expository purposes separated. 
Completing our review of the spatial metaphors of the structure of 
meaning, fourthly and finally, we must consider the idea of the horizon. 
Although Heidegger never actually characterises it explicitly as equivalent, 
as Nicolson puts it, "Heidegger often links the notion of Sinn to that of 
'horizon'. "119 Unfortunately, like Caputo, Nicolson seems to be thinking 
in terms of a two-stage projection, first, Sinn at work, then the projection 
which aims at what it structures.120 This is not helpful, as it promotes the 
illusion that one can break meaning down into a sequence of quasi-
mechanical components. When Heidegger writes that Dasein is ecstatic 
and projects itself upon its potentiality-for-Being, there is a sense of 
simultaneity rather than sequence.121 Hence we pOSited above that the 
upon-which is Dasein as its ecstatic self. Unfortunately Heidegger does not 
explicitly equate the upon-which with the horizonal schema. He does say 
that to each ecstasis there belongs a 'whither' [Wohin]: 
"Ecstases are not simply raptures in which one gets carried away. 
Rather, there belongs to each ecstasis a 'whither' [Wohin] to which 
118 BT 362-3 
119 Nicolson 1992 p. 103 
120 Nicolson's reading of the link, like his postulation of a 'screen' above, is concrete and 
yet in the end tells us nothing new. He continues, "Where a projection is made, and is made 
articulate, a Sinn has been at work already, structuring that single domain or that single 
horizon into which the projection was aimed and from which the articulating 
interpretation will draw its information." Nicolson, p.103-4 There is much more that is 
unhelpful in this short quotation, but it is not worthwhile to go into all the problems raised 
by the postulation of "a Sinn", "a single domain" and "single horizon", the "aim" of the 
projection and so forth. We can simply note that it is not unreasonable to suggest that 
Heidegger failed to eluddate Sinn with suffident clarity to prevent the proliferation of 
bewildering extensions of the possibilities of the descriptions and metaphors he utilised. 
121 "We call ... the phenomena of the future, the character of having been, and the Present, 
the 'ecstases' of temporality. Temporality is not, prior to this, an entity which first 
emerges from itself; its essence is a process of temporalizing in the unity of the ecstases." BT 
3" 
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one is carried away. This 'whither' of the ecstasis we call the 
'horizonal schema'." (BT 416) 
The key question is whether this 'whither' (Wohin) of the exstasis of the 
future is equivalent to the 'upon-which' (das Woraufhin> of the 
projection of understanding. Heidegger says that ''The schema in which 
Dasein comes towards itself futurally ... is the 'for-the-sake-of-itself. "122 
The for-the-sake-of-itself is ultimately the foundation of the network of 
the in-order-tos which constitute world and make possible the encounter 
of the ready-to-hand.123 The in-order-to is what defines the "horizonal 
schema for the Present".1 24 In other words the Present arises from the 
Future, as Heidegger maintains throughout his analysis.125 In view of his 
overall project he is more concerned to explain his understanding of the 
temporality of Dasein than he is with meaning. Hence what goes missing 
in the analysis is meaning. In explaining the whither of the ecstases 
Heidegger comes up with "horizonal schema".1 26 The schema are not 
more elements or existentialia in the ontology of Dasein, but rather the 
arrangement of the elements already under consideration, in this case the 
arrangement of the horizons. The significance of the passage is that the 
horizonal structure is introduced where before there was the term 
meaning. We can posit therefore that Heidegger does not state that 
meaning has an horizonal character because the horizons replace meaning 
in his analysis.127 He moves explicitly from the earlier exhibition of the 
relationships of the in-order-to, the towards-which and the for-the-sake-of 
as significance to the horizonal schema.128 It seems that less explicitly he 
has moved from meaning to horizons. He does not simply identify the 
upon-which of meaning with the Wohin of the ecstasis of the future. In 
122 BT 416 
123 BT 116-118 
124 BT 416 
125 The priority of the future is emphasised over and over again: "Ecstatico-horizonal 
temporality temporalizes itself primarily in terms of the future." BT 479; "the future has 
a priority in the ecstatical unity of primordial and authentic temporality." BT 378; 
"Temporality temporalizes itself primordially out of the future." BT 380 "Self-projection 
upon the 'for-the-sake-of-oneself' is grounded in the future and is an essential 
characteristic of existentiality. The primary meaning of existentiality is the future." BT 
375-6 
126 BT 416 
127 The hypothesis is that in the development of the hermeneutic of Being and Time the 
horizonal structure takes over the naming and description that was done by the term 
'meaning'. The equation of meaning and horizon is commonplace in the secondary 
literature. See, for example, Sallis 1990, p.97 para. 1 where meaning is placed without 
comment in apposition to horizon. 
128 BT 415-6 
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so far as he identifies the upon-which with any horizons it is with the 
unity of the horizons. 
"The horizon of temporality as a whole (which) determines that 
whereupon [worau{hin] factically existing entities are essentially 
disclosed." (BT 416) 
Still the situation is not entirely clear. The horizon "determines" that 
whereupon entities are disclosed. The horizon is not explicitly equated 
with the upon-which; and we note that woraufhin here is written without 
inverted commas and the term is used in the dative not the accusative. 
The point Heidegger is making is that on the basis of temporality 
"something like a world ... has been disdosed"129 to Dasein, he simply 
does not appear to be concerned to achieve consistency in his use of the 
term "meaning" or those terms by which he defines it. 
This is the same point that was made earlier, before the exposition of the 
temporality of Dasein. We recall from Section 18 that "the structure of 
that to which [woraufhin] Dasein assigns itself is what makes up the 
worldhood of the world. "130 In other words meaning is either worldhood 
itself or that which structures worldhood. In spite of diluting the 
distinction Heidegger seems to be making between significance and 
meaning we must read meaning as constituting the worldhood of the 
world. This was certainly his thinking two years before the publication of 
Being and Time. In his 1925 lecture course he said, 
"When we say that the basic structure of worldhood, the being of 
the entity which we call world, lies in meaningfulness, this 
amounts to saying that the structure as we have characterized it 
thus far, the references and the referential contexts, are basically 
correlations of meaning, meaningful contexts." (Heidegger 1985 
p.203) 
In The Basic Problems, his lectures from the year Being and Time was 
published Heidegger wrote that "shoe-equipment ... is intelligible ... only 
by way of the particular world that belongs to the existential constitution 
of Dasein "131 and we remember that in Being and Time "Meaning is that 
wherein the intelligibility of something maintains itself."132 That which 
renders something intelligible is called in the one text "world" and in the 
129 BT417 
130 BT 119 
131 BP 171 
132 BT 193 
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other "meaning". In the Basic Problems Heidegger does not use the 
terminology of the existentialia of Dasein, but he is still analysing "the 
essential Structures of Dasein's existence."133 And he asserts, 
Ｂｾ＠ order to understand in the contexture of their functionality the 
beings that are closest to us and all the things we encounter and 
their equipmental contexture, we need an antecedent 
understanding of functionality-whole, significance-con texture, 
that is world in general." (BP 171) 
This "world in general" can surely be understood as worldhood, and also 
meaning. This is not to say that in Being and Time meaning is always 
equivalent to worldhood, but that within a year of publication the term 
"meaning" had been left behind and world was used, in the context of 
equipment, to do the same job. The horizon of temporality determines 
the whereupon, [Woraufhin] of disclosure of entities, which we can read 
as meaning either that the horizon is the meaning or determines the 
meaning. However we can, and I submit we should, read it as meaning 
that any particular, that is ontic event of, meaning is determined by the 
manner in which Dasein temporalizes itself; but ontologically meaning is 
the inescapable determination of Dasein's relation to itself and that which 
is disclosed in its 'there' by temporality. This is consonant with the 
quotation from the earlier discussion of meaning in section 32 cited above, 
'''meaning' must be conceived as the formal-existential 
framework of the disclosedness which belongs to understanding." 
(BT 193) 
Meaning is a unitary framework constituted by the three temporal 
horizons. The four spatial characterisations of meaning in the ontology of 
Dasein each highlight a different aspect of the existentiale, but they 
simultaneously demonstrate that meaning appears more and more to be a 
temporary, expedient, explanatory term that Heidegger uses on his way to 
explaining the ecstatic nature of temporality. It is of course the intent of 
the whole book to, "point to temporality as the meaning of the Being of 
that entity which we call 'Dasein'. "134 Heidegger starts with this 
formulation, and intends to work via temporality to Being itself. Equally, 
just as meaning in Being and Time is incompletely defined, and 
eventually superseded by the horizonal schema, the horizonal schema 
133 BP 171 
134 BT 38 In The &sic Problems Heidegger repeats that "temporality constitutes the 
meaning of the being of the human Dasein" BP 16 
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will also be variously defined and redefined over the next few years.135 
The structural metaphors for meaning amount to forerunners of the 
exposition of temporality as ecstatic. 
7 SUMMARY 
The fruits of this intensive examination of meaning in Being and Time 
are meagre indeed. Heidegger's own definitions of meaning are unclear 
yet the phenomenon itself, either as the worldhood of the world or as the 
unity of the temporal horizons, is integral to his exposition of Dasein. 
Ontic meanings arise from Dasein's (temporal) structure which is either 
identical, or at the very least closely related, to the existential meaning. 
The structure of meaning would thus be the structure of Dasein.136 If so 
Heidegger has not in the end added very much to his ontology by using 
the term "meaning." I will propose in the following chapters that we can 
understand that structure in Dasein, and meaning as an existentiale, in 
terms of narrative. Heidegger himself does not use this concept. He does 
however describe Dasein in terms of historicality after he has turned to the 
temporal analysis of Dasein.137 But Heidegger is more concerned with the 
resonance between Geschehen ('happening' translated by Macquarrie and 
Robinson as 'historicality') and Geschichte (history) than with the 
happening of meaning as narrative. Nevertheless we will look at 
historicality in the next chapter. What is clear from the analysis of 
temporality and historicality is that Dasein is an event, and so too is 
meaning. Other commentators agree. Writing on the application of 
Heideggerian thinking to psychotherapy, Scott locates meaning in the 
eventhood of Dasein. He writes, "the meaning of human being is to be 
found in how man's worldly presence occurs."13S Sheehan also sees 
meaning as an event. 
135 In The Basic Problems the term meaning is soon elided but the analysis is nonetheless 
directed towards showing that "temporality constitutes the meaning of the being of the 
human Dasein." BP 16 See Sallis 1990, p.SOff for a succinct review of the evolution and 
mutations in Heidegger's presentation of the horizonal schemata from Being and Time, 
through The Basic Problems to The Metaphysiad Foundations of Logic. 
136 See p.31 above. 
137 "The proposition 'Dasein is historical' is confirmed as a fundamental existential 
ontological assertion" BT 381 
138 Soott 1984, p.1S3 
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"Heidegger's topic is the event of sense, the movement of Illetheill 
where the lethe-dimension functions as the withdrawn but 
present power for the meaningful appearance of things." (Sheehan 
1977, p.313) 
Heidegger does not abandon his interest in the topic, but in his later work 
he approaches it differently, perhaps because in Being lind Time he threw 
up too many different types of meaning. As Stack puts it in one of the few 
commentaries to focus on meaning, "clearly ... Heidegger has more than 
one conception of meaning. "139 In spite of the resultant confusion it is 
possible to interpret it in such a way as to clarify the nature of meaning as 
an existentiale, and separate out a special usage of the term "meaning" in 
the particular case wherein we say that entities-within-the-world have 
meaning. The existential phenomenon that Heidegger refers to as 
"meaning" before Division Two, Section IV, he thereafter refers to as "the 
unity of the temporal horizons" or "the horizon of temporality as a 
whole" .140 Meaning is the unity of the temporal horizons, that is to say 
the temporal horizons as a whole, in their entirety.141 This unity or as-a-
wholeness is what gives unity, that is worldhood, to the world. 
Worldhood and meaning are both existentialia of Dasein, and they are 
different facets of the same phenomenon viewed from different 
interpretative approaches.142 The unity of the phenomenon of world is 
grounded in worldhood which is given by Dasein. Similarly the 
intelligibility of entities within-the-world is grounded in meaning which 
is given by Dasein. In this sense meaning is a deeper version of 
worldhood. The existentialia of Dasein are brought together in care and 
temporality arrived at as the meaning of the Being of care.1 43 It is the 
ecstatic horizonal structure of Dasein's temporality onto which the 
understanding is projected, against which the facticity of our thrownness 
139 Stack 1978, p.91 
140 "The horizon of temporality as a whole determines that whereupon [woraufhinl 
factically existing entites are essentially disclosed." BT 416 
141 "The temporal unity of life is to be understood under the irreducible category of 
'meaning' (Sinn). Experience, as a 'relation' or 'comportment' (Verhalten) toward entities 
that 'exist-for-me' (fUr mich Da-sein), is possible only in the field of a unified whole of life 
which is bound together by meaning." Guignon 1983, p.so 
142 Later Heidegger moves away from Dasein as the centre of his thinking about Being, but 
retains, and rephrases, the relationship of Dasein to world: the view of Dasein, that is 
Dasein's understanding articulation of world as such, constitutes the worldhood of the 
world, "World view, properly understood, therefore means, not a view of the world, but 
the world understood as view." See Heidegger 1951, p.279 
143 "Temporality has manifested itself as th[el basis [of the primordial whole of ... 
Dasein] and accordingly as the meaning of the Being of care." BT 486 
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is revealed and within which the intelligibility of entities maintains itself. 
Hence meaning pervades and sustains Dasein's being, whether or not it is 
ever raised to understanding or awareness. Dasein cannot escape 
meaning, although it may often turn away from it. In the special case in 
which we say entities have meaning, the being of Dasein is revealed along 
with the entities. The being of Dasein is what is constituted by the 
existentialia, that is attunement, understanding and discourse. So when 
an entity has meaning for us Dasein's attunement (or better its "being-
attuned"), its understanding and its articulation of both understanding 
and attunement is revealed too. 
I will demonstrate in the following chapters that the primordial 
articulation of the revelation of Dasein's being alongside an entity which 
has meaning is a certain, primordial form of narrative.t 44 In this 
primordial narrative Dasein always reveals its own being, alongside that 
which the narrative is about. In such narrative is shown the 
meaningfulness of Dasein's life which it cannot escape, although it can 
turn away from it. This meaningfulness, which is a function of the 
structure of Dasein's temporally ecstatic being, is not necessarily verbally 
articulated or expressed. In the hypothetical case of the library chair 
discussed earlier the meaning of the chair is constituted by my having-
been with the chair, my possibilities with the chair, and my openness to 
the presence of the chair. The articulation of these three moments has the 
form which is the ontological condition for any ontic instance of 
narrative. We shall see that in any well-told oral storytelling event the 
being of Dasein is revealed. Thus such moments are special occasions on 
which Dasein is confronted with the meaning of its own being. To clarify 
what I mean by narrative and its relationship to temporality and meaning 
in Dasein, and to distinguish my usage from many other interpretations, I 
turn in the next chapter to a review of significant contemporary 
approaches to narrative. 
144 An instance of this form of narrative need not be a complete story. As we shan see, a 
moment of such narrative can occur within the telling of a story, but it does not depend on 
any fixed "plot" or sequence. The essential temporal elements are projected by Casein. 
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Chapter Three 
Approaches to Narrative 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Heidegger barely mentions narrative, and never uses the term to explain 
the ontology of Dasein.1 However an understanding of the place of 
narrative in Dasein (and Dasein in narrative) elucidates Heidegger's 
ontology of Dasein as well as bringing a new depth to our understanding 
of narrative. The claim that human being and narrative are intimately 
related is not new. 2 The nature of the link, is not however clear. I 
propose my own explication of this link in the next chapter. In this 
chapter I review pertinent elements of contemporary views on narrative 
and highlight the common, but I contend erroneous, conflation of 
narrative and text. The closest that Heidegger gets to the issues I tackle 
under the heading of the storytelling event is his analysis of Historizing. 
We start therefore with a reading of Historizing in Being and Time, and 
then look at Paul Ricoeur as representative of modern text-based 
approaches to narrative and MacIntyre whose use of narrative is central to 
his ethics. We next turn to a brief review of literary and anthropological 
thinking on narrative. We finish with a look at Anthony Kerby's recent 
study which draws together the question of the self with narrative. His 
findings support the thesis that there is an ontological relationship 
between narrative and the human self.3 Even Kerby however, does not 
consider the existential significance of the distinction between oral and 
written discourse or narrative, as he draws his understanding of narrative 
mainly from Ricoeur. I review these thinkers in order to orient my own 
1 In Being and Time Heidegger mentions narration only once (BT 201) in a list of possible 
locutions which have their source in circumspective interpretation. He does not analyse 
narration further but significantly he does write of the many sorts of interpretation between 
the extremes of those "wholly wrapped up in concernful understanding" and "theoretical 
assertion about something present-at-hand" and concludes "We cannot trace back these 
'sentences' to theoretical statements without essentially perverting their meaning." BT 201 
2 E.g. Bruner 1986 and 1990, Polkinghorne 1988, Sarbin 1986 (a), MacIntyre 1981 
3 "in order to be we must be as something or someone, and this someone that we take 
oursdvl's to be is thl' charader delineated in our personal narratives." Kerby, 1<}q1, p.109 
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thesis within the field of scholarship on narrative and to highlight the 
points of agreement and disagreement. I do not attempt to review the 
whole field of narrative scholarship because it is a field with no 
boundaries. Narrative is investigated or used as an explanatory concept in 
and across almost the entire range of academic disciplines, and scholars are 
not shy of declaring the relevance of their work outside their own field.' 
Equally, even within a single field the term narrative can be approached 
and understood in a multitude of ways. I add therefore that, in particular, 
I have little to say about narratology because, as will become clear, there is 
a profound difference between the thesis expounded here and the 
ontology implicit in narratology.5 
2 DASEIN'S HISTORIZING 
Heidegger does not turn his thinking in Being and Time to the place of 
narrative as such in the being of Dasein, although, as we will see later, he 
｡ｳ｣ｾｩ｢･ｳ＠ to poetry that which I wish to show also, and perhaps more 
properly, belongs to the well-told oral storytelling event.6 The closest he 
comes to thinking about the place of narrative in the being of Dasein is in 
his exposition of Historizing, Geschehen. An ordinary translation of this 
would simply be "happening," but Macquarrie and Robinson translate it as 
"Historizing" in order to bring out the etymological connection in the 
German with Geschichte - "History."7 By the beginning of chapter 5, 
Division II Heidegger has laid out his case that temporality is the meaning 
of the Being of Dasein. At that point he proceeds by probing into "the 
connectedness of life in which Dasein somehow maintains itself 
constantly. "8 This connectedness is for Heidegger "the ontological 
4 For example it is claimed on the back cover of Na"ative and SociIll Control, Critical 
Perspectives, (Mumby, D. K. Ed. Sage, Newbury Park, 1993) that this collection of mostly 
post-modern sociological papers is relevant, indeed "essential reading" for students in 
"communication studies, organization studies, family studies, cultural studies, sociology, 
political science, peace studies, anthropology, philosophy and gender studies." 
5 Narratology is a structuralist approach to narrative exemplified by the work of Seymour 
Chatman (e.g. Story and Discourse, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1978) and Gerald 
Prince (e.g. Na"atology: The form and functioning of ｎｾ｡ｴｩｶ･Ｌ＠ Mouton, Berlin, 1982) 
6 "In poetical discourse, the communication of the existential possibilities of one's state-of-
mind can become an aim in itself, and this amounts to a disclosing of existence." BT 205. See 
also BP 171-2 and Chapter Five below. 
1 See Translator's footnote, BT 41 
8BT425 
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problem of Dasein's historizing.'t9 Heidegger is probing here towards the 
notion of the self.l0 If Dasein is not a thing but an openness, what 
constitutes the wholeness of Dasein, such that it is not merely the there of 
a series of inchoate experiences? His analysis of Historizing is intended to 
show that the unity of the temporal horizons is ontologically constitutive 
of experience. He believes that we only ask the question about the 
connectedness of our experience because in inauthenticity we understand 
time to be the succession of one thing after another and we do not see 
what it is that makes it possible for us to have this misapprehension. In 
authenticity however the connectedness of our actions is revealed in our 
stance of anticipatory resoluteness. This connectedness is the ground for 
our possibility of grasping any ontic meaning of our life, and it is revealed 
by the projection of our understanding upon the temporal horizons of our 
being as unified; that is the existentiale of meaning. In in authenticity we 
turn away from our own possibilities and all that is revealed when we 
take up our ownmost possibilities and instead try to understand ourselves 
in terms of the world of the 'they'. 
Historizing is defined as "the specific movement in which Dasein is 
stretched along and stretches itself along" .11 Heidegger tells us that 
"Disclosing and interpreting belong essentially to Dasein's historizing."12 
This is the re-presentation to the reader of the fact that Dasein is 
ontologically understanding and disclosure, and in interpretation entities 
within the world are understood as such.13 However we know from the 
analysis of everyday Dasein that for the most part Dasein does not 
understand itself as temporally ecstatic,14 and in everyday life Dasein is 
fallen, not authentic. Therefore in Dasein's everyday understanding "the 
Being of the world-historical is experienced and interpreted in the sense of 
something present-at-hand which comes along, has presence, and then 
disappears. "15 This world-historicality, arising from the ordinary 
understanding of Being as presence-at-hand, is shown to be the basis on 
which the question of the connectedness of Dasein's life arises. The 
problem, like so many others identified in Being and Time, is traced back 
9BT427 
10 See Zimmerman 1986, pp.113ff. 
11 BT427 
12 BT428 
13 See BT 189 
14 However Dasein understands itself it remains ecstatic. As fallen it is outside of itself in 
the they, as authentic it comes back to itself. 
15 BT441 
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to the mis-taking of the nature of Being. Dasein's primordial 
connectedness is obscured by its deficient understanding of Being. In 
contrast to the everyday understanding in which Dasein interprets itseH in 
terms of the world-historical, authentic Dasein is resolute. This 
resoluteness is made possible by Dasein's being towards Death. Being 
towards death entails accepting one's finitude and one's individuality as 
the particular one who will die. In the light of this individuation one can 
see what one's ownmost possibilities factically are. These possibilities are 
projected out of one's own having-been which one has handed down to 
oneself. 
"Once one has grasped the finitude of one's existence, it snatches 
one back from the endless multiplicity of possibilities which offer 
themselves as closest to one - those of comfortableness, shirking, 
and taking things lightly - and brings Dasein into the simplicity of 
its fate [Schicksals]. This is how we deSignate Dasein's primordial 
historizing, which lies in authentic resoluteness and in which 
Dasein hands itself down to itself, free for death, in a possibility 
which it has inherited and yet has chosen." (BT 435) 
Authentic Dasein's historizing is "fate". But because Dasein also exists 
essentially in Being-with-others its historizing is also a co-historizing. 
Heidegger calls this co-historizing 'destiny' [Geschick] - the historizing of a 
community or people. This destiny is not just the sum total of the fates of 
many individuals but something that has "already been guided in 
advance"16 because the world hood and the world-historicality of the 
'they' is always already there before any individual Dasein. Nevertheless 
it bears within it possibilities that can be taken over authentically. 
Therefore Heidegger writes, 
"Only in communicating and in struggling does the power of 
destiny become free. Dasein's fateful destiny in and with its 
'generation' goes to make up the full authentic historizing of 
Dasein." (BT 436) 
This amounts to an acknowledgement of the significance of phenomena 
such as the event of non-boring storytelling. To make sense of 
"communicating" we must read it as authentic communicating. It will be 
seen that the event of excellent non-boring storytelling is a pre-eminent 
case of this sort of communicating. Heidegger's main concern is neither 
the relation of the individual Dasein to the past and his having been, nor 
16BT436 
92 
3 APPROAOJe; TO NARRATIVE 
the means by which individual Dasein may sustain his authentic being. 
Rather, for him "the ... aim of this exposition is to lead us face to face with 
the ontological enigma of the movement of historizing in general:'17 His 
whole analysis is oriented towards establishing the priority of Dasein's 
temporality over the understanding of time of the orthodox metaphysics 
of his day, and demonstrating how it has been hidden by the 
inauthenticity of our everyday mode of being. He returns again and again 
to make this same point, which he italicises in the first section of the 
chapter. 
"In analysing the historicality of Dasein we shall try to show that 
this entity is not 'temporal' because it 'stands in history', but that, 
on the contrary, it exists historically and can so exist only because it 
is temporal in the very basis of its Being." (BT 428) 
Heidegger's purpose in establishing the temporality of Dasein is to secure 
his access to Being as such. My concern goes only as far as the being of 
Dasein. I will not adopt, adapt or interpret further his group of terms 
based on "Schicken" - [historiology, historizing, world-historical etc.]. I 
eschew such a continuity or critical commentary for five reasons. Firstly, 
to do so would be laborious and terminologically complex. Secondly, his 
terminology is not suited to clarifying the nature of the temporality of 
Dasein as such, but rather to establishing it in the face of the notions of 
time that prevailed at the time of writing. Thirdly, Macquarrie and 
Robinsons' translations have laid too great an emphasis on history and 
obscured somewhat the essential eventhood of Dasein. Fourthly, what I 
intend to show can not simply be unpacked from Heidegger's terminology 
and thinking. It is rather my own development based on his exposition of 
Dasein's temporality. In fact, we will find that the essentially narrative 
structure of Dasein can be explained in terms of the temporality implicit in 
Heidegger's initial characterisation of Dasein's being as care.18 My own 
proposal is a re-presentation of care but is essentially less complex than 
Heidegger's view of time as a whole approached through and by the 
destruction of Western metaphysics. I have considerable sympathy with 
Havelock's view, examined later, that Western metaphysics is built on the 
products of the orality-literacy shift. Without Havelock's historical 
insight, Heidegger struggles mightily to elucidate the deep structure 
17BT441 
18 "the Being of Dasein means ahead-of-itself-Being-already-in-(the-world) as Being-
alongside (entities encountered within-the-worJd). This Being fills in the Signification of 
the term "are" [Sorge)." (BT 231) 
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beneath the public use of the concept of time.19 Heidegger's elucidation of 
the temporality of Dasein however can be most fruitfully used to furnish 
the structure of narrative which is not made clear by Havelock. Fifthly 
and finally, the narrative structure of Dasein's being makes history 
possible both as world-historical and as authentic historizing but it is not 
confined at all to history, nor to the level of ontological analysis. It also 
makes possible meaning in everyday discourse and that telling and 
showing of the being of Dasein in well-told oral storytelling events. 
To rephrase this, the claim is that the term "narrative" describes the 
structure of Dasein as that which lends unity to an observable event, the 
telling of a story. Our own experience of telling, or listening to a story will 
be shown to be a manifestation of the temporal structure that Heidegger 
approaches through his terminology of "historizing" and its associated 
terms. Guignon understands the goal of Heidegger's thinking about 
history and historicity to be a search for a "concealed meaning ... below the 
tumult and clamour of our commentaries"20 and "a time of purity, 
spontaneity and belongingness to Being".21 He even characterises that 
which Heidegger seeks in terms of narrative. 
"The unifying thread of meaning is found not in Platonic forms, 
consciousness in general, or transcendental subjectivity, but in the 
Story of history - the logos that weaves the arche of our heritage 
and the telos of our destiny into a coherent, meaningful 
narrative." (Guignon, 1983, p.236) 
Guignon does not follow through what is implicit in this statement and 
refer it back to the being of Dasein as such. We will however take this 
further step. By means of phenomenological examination of storytelling 
we can free ourselves from the inadequacy of text-based hermeneutic 
phenomenology. We must remember that man expresses himself most 
fully in embodied discourse, and that in writing down speech something 
essential - that is something of the essence of man as existing - is lost. 
Words on paper cannot show the being of Dasein in the way that the 
spoken word can. Before we examine how this is so, we must outline 
briefly significant theories of narrative in contemporary philosophy.22 
19 What Heidegger explains in terms of epochs of Being, Havelock and Ong explain in 
terms of the shift, in classical times, from orality to literacy, and in modem times from 
literacy to secondary orality. See Havelock 1963 and 1986, and Ong 1971, 1982, and 1986. 
20 Guignon 1983, p.23S 
21 Guignon 1983, p.235 
22 Again, as noted earlier, it must be baldly stated that a comprehensive, let alone 
authoritative, review of the use of the term narrative in philosophy is not possible. The 
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3 RICOEUR 
Paul Ricoeur is perhaps foremost amongst modern theorists of narrative. 
His status in the academic community is illustrated by Hayden White's 
comment that "Temps et recit ... must be accounted the most important 
synthesis of literary and historical theory produced in our century."23 
That paean of praise however also includes the paraphrase 'literary ... 
theory' which indicates the factor that puts a limitation upon his work. 
Ricoeur's view of narrative is trammelled, complicated and compromised 
by his textualization of the phenomenon he examines. He conflates 
narrative and text. Like most of his peers, Ricoeur takes text, not speech, 
as the paradigm of narrative, and indeed discourse.24 As a result, he 
struggles with phenomena which arise from the physical act of 
engagement with text and with phenomena which arise from rendering 
narrative into specific written and verbal form at the same time as dealing 
with narrative itself, and he mostly overlooks the important distinctions 
between these types of phenomena. Indeed the complexity of his analysis 
is in part a function of the fundamentally mistaken priority he gives to 
text. Nevertheless he reaches many insights in the course of his thinking, 
and at times he comes close to the view of the relationship between time 
and narrative that I propose.25 However for the most part he approaches 
the phenomena in a manner diametrically opposed to Heidegger, in spite 
of drawing on the latter's analysis of time.26 For example for Ricoeur, 
"time becomes human to the extent that it is articulated through a 
narrative mode, and narrative attains its full meaning when it 
becomes a condition of temporal existence" (Ricoeur, 1984 p.52) 
current rate of publication outstrips the reading capacity of a single scholar. Of course much 
of what is published on narrative concerns issues far from the core topiC of this thesis. This 
is often true even of publications which appear to concern identical topics, such 
Champigny's Ontology of NIl"lltive 1972. Champigny's thinking is guided, like Ricoeur's, 
by the prioritization of text, and further by a structuralist view of meaning. However his 
ｾｬ･Ｌ＠ and his attempt to cover a huge range of issues render his text almost unusable. 
In Wood, Ed. 1991, p.141 
24 Indeed much French philosophy of the last thirty years has operated more or less 
entirely inside a belief that text is an adequate and illuminating metaphor for discourse, 
dialogue and even life itself, not, it must be admitted, entirely without some understanding 
of the baleful consequences. As Barthes remarks, ''The mythologist is condemned to live in 
a theoretical sociality ... His connection with the world is of the order of sarcasm." 
Barthes, 1973, p.171 
2S He does so in particular in ''Narrative Time" in Mitchell 1981. 
26 See Ricoeur 1984 Vol. 1, pp.60-64 for Ricoeur's reading of Being 1ln4 Time and his 
appropriation of it. 
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For Heidegger time as it is ordinarily understood is a phenomenon 
derived from the temporality of Dasein. Its origin is in humanity so there 
is not a question of it becoming human. Mostly in fact, through the 
articulation of inauthentic discourse the human origin of time is covered 
over.27 So, pace Ricoeur, time does not become different, rather Dasein, 
temporalizing itself authentically, takes up a different mode of being. In 
communicative discourse humans take up their temporality authentically 
to the extent that they express their existential meaningfulness, and the 
foremost manner in which this is done is in authentic, oral face to face 
storytelling. This is yet to come, and for reasons I will explain in due 
course, my claim requires that we take the event of non-boring, face to face 
oral storytelling as the primary paradigm, and primary form of narrative. 
Ricoeur does notice and acknowledge the radical nature of the change 
from the hegemony of the oral to the literary but he grasps neither its full 
significance nor the entirety of its consequences. Here is a passing 
reference to the oral in From Text to Action. 
"at first sight ... mediation [by texts] seems to restrict the sphere of 
interpretation to writing and literature to the detriment of oral 
cultures. This is true. But what the definition loses in extension, 
it gains in intensity. Indeed, writing opens up new and original 
resources for discourse. Thanks to writing, discourse acquires a 
threefold semantic autonomy: in relation to the speaker's 
intention, to its reception by its original audience, and to the 
economic, social and cultural circumstances of its production. It is 
in this sense that writing tears itself free of the limits of face-to-face 
dialogue and becomes the condition for discourse itself becoming-
text ." (Ricoeur, 1991 (a), p.17) 
Ricoeur seems to believe that text brings to narrative more than it drives 
out. A number of objections can be raised against this belief. Firstly, the 
"intensity" gained by textual mediation is not defined, nor on reflection is 
it obvious. Certainly the text gains autonomy but the plethora of possible 
readings is likely to diminish and dilute a text or story rather than 
intensify it. Ambiguity is a strange intensity. What text undoubtedly lacks 
is the possibility of the intensity and richness of meaning endowed by 
gesture, and the timing, enunciation, accent and tone of the spoken word. 
What is intensified is the ranging of our interpretative activity, what is 
diminished is the depth and potential for precision of the emotional 
27 "The ordinary way of characterizing time ... arises from the temporality of falling 
Dasein." BT 478 
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nuance of vocal speech. Secondly, Ricoeur grounds in the autonomy of 
text the possibility of discourse itself "becoming-text." This is the crucial 
step of departure from any possibility of concordance with either 
Heideggerian ontology or hermeneutic phenomenology. Heidegger 
would agree with Ricoeur that "neither of the two subjectivities, neither 
that of the author nor that of the reader, is ... primary in the sense of an 
originary presence of the self to itself."2S However whereas Ricoeur 
therefore takes text to be primary, Heidegger (and I submit, we) must take 
the being of Dasein as primary. Dasein is being-there and being-with and 
always is the possibility of revealing beings before interpreting and 
constituting itself as 'subject' or 'object' by means of the modern notion of 
the self.29 Dasein is never a text and its discourse can never become text 
without a radical semantic reduction. 
Ricoeur's analysis over and over again touches upon points that 
illuminate narrative, and come close to understanding the narrative 
nature of Dasein,30 but equally, over and over again he mistakes his own 
analysis for the phenomenon he analyses. For example he writes: 
"every narrative presupposes a familiarity with terms such as 
agent, goal, means, circumstance, help, hostility, cooperation, 
conflict, success, failure, etc., on the part of its narrator and any 
listener." (Ricoeur, 1984, p.55) 
Surely this is an example of a thinker falling into the thrall of his 
theoretical terminology. There is no need for familiarity with such terms 
to listen to, or tell, or make up a story.31 Such abstract terms are only 
familiar to educated literates. Further it is arguable that a true 
understanding of such theoretical abstractions is only made possible by a 
prior acquaintance with narrative. From stories one can abstract such 
concepts, one does not need such abstract concepts to build stories. 
Ricoeur also claims that "following a story is a very complex operation."32 
I suggest that Ricoeur's analysis of story and of following a story are 
28 Ricoeur, 1991 (a), p.17 
29 See BT 155 and BT 204 
30 He comes so near, and yet stays so far away from this understanding. In Life in qJUSt of 
rumldive he even speaks of "the pre-narrative quality of human experience." Ricoeur 1991 
(b), p.29 
31 Michael Bamberg shows that "children at an early age begin working on narrative 
characteristics using the linguistic means they have at their disposal" (Bamberg, 1987 p.4), 
and long before they have any familiarity with abstract concepts. "most people can use 
the important rudiments of story structure before finishing the third year." Mancuso 1986 
ｾＱＰＴ＠ See also Sutton-Smith, 1986 
In Wood, 1991, p.21. 
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complex but the activity of following a story is actually a very simple 
operation that we do almost constantly and with no discernible effort. 
Only the contortions of certain modern novelists and cinematographers 
cause us any difficulty, and then only because either they have made 
deliberate efforts to do so, or they have not mastered their medium. 
Ricoeur is a prisoner of his theoretical approach. In Text and Action he 
writes, 
"If ... narrativity is to mark, organize, and clarify temporal 
experience ... we must seek in language use a standard of 
measurement that satisfies this need for delimiting, ordering, and 
making explicit. ... the text is the linguistic unit we are looking 
for." (Ricoeur, 1991 (a) p.3) 
His goals are the fundamental reasons why he mistakes the original 
situation, and as a consequence why his project as a whole does not help to 
explain the relationship between human being and the event of oral 
storytelling. The quotation implies that narrativity is a process or concept 
which requires some action or understanding from Ricoeur, and his 
fellow philosophical disciples and opponents, to achieve the marking, 
organizing and clarifying of the temporal character of human experience. 
But Ricoeur here is pursuing a theoretical goal. The event of oral 
storytelling already does mark, organize and clarify the temporal character 
of human experience and as philosophers we must ask why and how it 
does so, and indeed whether it does anything else as well. Ricoeur's 
project, as he himself states it, if it is to be meaningful at all, begs the 
question that there is some third entity, other than Dasein and its 
discourse, which makes storytelling possible. Further it assumes that such 
an entity has some standard structure, and his philosophical task is to 
discover it and break it down, and furthermore that this entity is the text: 
an entity which is essentially written. But his quest is redundant. The 
"organizing and clarifying of temporal experience" has always already 
been achieved when we understand a story and often precisely without a 
text.33 Only a philosopher in the desolate wastes of descriptive analysis 
has a "need for delimiting, ordering and making explicit" to be satisfied. 
We must examine and explore what is already given to us in story, and 
the being of Dasein before there is any mention of text. 
33 Brockmeier, for example, identifies seven discrete temporal levels in telling a simple 
anecdote about a conference in Turin, which is readily understood with no effort at all by 
any ordinary speaker of English. The point is that we can already have clarity before any 
text and before any textual analysis. (Brockmeier 1994, p.14-S) 
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Ricoeur maintains that, within a text, the unity of a story is given by the 
plot. 
A story ... must be more than just an enumeration of events in 
serial order; it must organize them into an intelligible whole, of a 
sort such that we can always ask what is the 'thought' of this story. 
In short, emplotment is the operation that draws a configuration 
out of a simple succession. It (Ricoeur 1984, p.65) 
Ricoeur defines emplotment as Ita synthesis of heterogeneous elements"34 
but the elements and their discreteness arise from his analysis, not the 
phenomenon. Thus according to Ricoeur the plot "serves to make one 
story out of the multiple incidents."35 But I argue that the interpolation of 
the term "plot" here is in defiance of Ockham's Razor. A plot does not 
give the wholeness to a story, rather it is an abstraction made possible by 
the as-a-wholeness already present, which is in fact given to the story by 
Dasein. 
A story gets its coherence both of time and world from the Dasein of the 
teller and hearer. At an ontic level the unity of the story is manifest in its 
binding together the elements and incidents of the story, and any 
particular binding may be analysed as a plot - but its bound-together-ness, 
does not come from that plot, nor any other plot, but is that which makes 
any plot at all possible. The being of the story as a unity makes possible the 
abstraction of the plot. Plot is a post hoc abstract, theoretical term, a 
construct, not an ontological constituent of a story. Hence where Ricoeur 
holds that "the plots that we invent help us to shape our confused, 
formless, and in the last resort mute temporal experience"36 it is clear that 
he has not read Heidegger as I do. Dasein always already understands its 
world,37 and whenever Dasein hears a story it has always already given a 
wholeness, that is the story-hood of the story, such that it understands any 
particular word, sentence or gesture as part of the story. Ricoeur compares 
34 Wood, 1991, p.21 
35 Wood, 1991, p.21 See also Ricoeur 1984, e.g., "a plot ... exercises, within its own textual 
field, an integrating ... function," Ricoeur, 1984, p.65 
36 Wood, 1991, p.6 
37 "If being-in-the-world is a kind of Being which is essentially befitting to Dasein, then to 
understand Being-in-the-world belongs to the essential content of its understanding of 
Being. The previous disclosure of that to for which what we encounter within-the-world is 
subsequently freed, amounts to nothing else than understanding the world - that world to 
which Casein as an entity always comports itself." BT 118 
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the act of emplotment with Kant's operation of judgement,38 one part of 
which he calls the configurational act.39 
Ｂｔｨｩｾ＠ ｣ｯｮｦｩｾｵｲ｡ｴｩｯｮ｡ｬ＠ act consists of 'grasping together' the 
detailed actions or what I have called the story's incidents. It 
draws from this manifold of events the unity of one temporal 
whole." (Ricoeur 1984, p.66) 
What Ricoeur calls an act is what Heidegger has laboured throughout 
Being and Time to show is an ontolOgical determination of Dasein.40 It is 
on the basis of a whole, the worldhood of the world or the unity of the 
temporal horizons as the meaning of Dasein, that any acts or incidents are 
understood in the first place, whether in the world or in a story. All 
understanding of Dasein takes place within a context, from the grasping of 
the ready-to-hand within the context of equipmentality in the light of the 
task to be done,41 to the understanding of an abstract concept within the 
context of a philosophical enquiry.42 The wholeness of that context is an 
existentiale of Dasein, the worldhood of the world in the first case, and the 
existentiale of meaning in the second. This projection of the unity of 
Dasein's ecstatic temporal horizons is constitutive of Dasein's being. 
Dasein itself is an event wherein a certain "grasping together" is always 
already taking place; such a "grasping together" is not an act which it can 
choose to do, or not to do, because it is always already happening. In the 
moment of telling or understanding a narrative, primordially in the 
gripping speech of a storyteller, and in a potentially diminished form in 
the act of reading a text, Dasein transposes its own taking-as-a-whole into 
the Da of the story. There is no need, nor place, for a mediating third party 
such as a plot. What is essential for the event of storytelling is there as 
long as Dasein is there. The essence of a story is not constructed in the 
38 Ricoeur, 1984, p.66 
39 Ricoeur borrows this term from Louis O. Mink - see Mink, "Interpretation and Narrative 
Understanding" in The Journal of Philosophy 69, no.9, (1972): 735-7 
40 "in any involvement that has been discovered ... what we have called the 'worldly 
character' of the ready-to-hand has been discovered beforehand. In this totality of 
involvements which has been discovered beforehand there lurks an ontological 
relationship to the world." BT 118 "on the basis of the horizonal constitution of the 
ecstatical unity of temporality, there belongs to that entity which is in each case its own 
'there', something like a world that has been disclosed." BT 416-7 "the 'in-order-to', the 
'for-the-sake-of', and the 'with-which' ... are relationships in which concemful 
drcumspection as such already dwells. [They are] ... constitutive of worldhood." BT 122 
See also Barash, 1988 on ZUStmfmtnluang, and PC Section 73 (d). 
41 BT 105 
42 BT 193-4 
100 
3 APPROAam5 TO NARRATIVE 
manner of a literary text, nor is it an artifice of literary criticism such as the 
abstraction "plot." 
Ricoeur effectively takes the creation of literary fiction as paradigmatic for 
the world of human action with the result, as Arendt puts it that "the 
story resulting from action is misconstrued as a fictional story."43 But in 
the lived, human world "the invisible actor behind the scenes 
[corresponding to the plot or the plot-creator] is an invention arising from 
a men tal perplexity bu t corresponding to no real experience. "44 For 
Arendt, as for myself the notion of plot as constitutive, rather than as a 
descriptive abstraction, is supernumerary. 
''The realm of human affairs, strictly speaking, consists of the web 
of human relationships which exists wherever men live together . 
... It is because of this already existing web of human relationships 
... that action ... 'produces' stories with or without intention as 
naturally as fabrication produces tangible things." (Arendt 1958, 
p.183-4) 
Ricoeur sees narrative as the fundamental structure of the experience of 
time but he is remarkably reticent as to why human beings tell stories, 
venturing only the occasional, egregious, political remark.45 For Ricoeur 
"narrative does not resolve aporias, it makes them productive",46 hence, 
in the style of much recent French philosophy, at the end of Time and 
Narrative he throws doubt on the conclusions he has moved towards 
throughout the work. This is a further reason, on top of the far more 
problematic prioritization of text in his discussion, why, for all his 
ingenuity and erudition, I have not taken him as a primary guide in my 
own approach to narrative. Nevertheless I will refer to his essay 
"Narrative Time"47 in the next chapter because although he continues to 
take written narratives as ontologically equivalent to oral narratives 
nonetheless he makes points that are in fact founded in the primary, oral 
form of narrative. 
43 Arendt, 1958, p.l86 
44 Arendt, 1958, p.l85 
45 'We ten stories because in the last analysis human lives need and merit being narrated. 
This remark takes on its full force when we refer to the necessity to save the history of the 
defeated and the lost. The whole history of suffering cries out for vengeance and calls for 
narrative." Ricoeur, 1984, p.75 
46 Wood, 1991, p.S 
47 In Mitchel11981 
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4 MAONTYRE 
I tum now to Alistair MacIntyre. Narrative plays an important part in his 
seminal work, After Virtue, even though he establishes neither the 
ontological status nor the structure of narrative. He defines man in terms 
of narrative, "man is in his actions and practice ... essentially a story-
telling animal"48 but he does not define narrative itself. He takes it as a 
term that needs no explanation, which in one sense is quite reasonable 
because we all do in fact know what stories are. Children and adults all 
understand what a story is, and both tell and listen to stories without ever 
needing a theoretical explanation of the nature of a story. 49 MacIntyre 
makes considerable use of our pre-existent understanding of narrative to 
explain what he sees as the fragmentation of moral consensus and the 
historical shift he identifies in man's understanding of moral 
terminology. 
He starts by constructing an allegorical fable. Imagine, he suggests, that the 
natural sciences suffered a catastrophe. Laboratories and libraries were 
destroyed, scientists lynched and the teaching of science forbidden. Later 
an attempt is made to revive science but all that remains are fragments, 
the odd page or two of an article, instruments whose purpose has been 
forgotten and so on. Largely by guess-work these fragments are cobbled 
together and "science" is once again practised and taught. However 
"science" now lacks coherence and there are arguments arising from the 
differences between the ways that different "scientists" have attempted to 
reconstruct the knowledge they conveyed. The language of natural 
science in this scenario, he proposes, is analogous to the actual state today 
of the language of morality. Philosophers of ethics attempt to have 
discussions using terminology the meaning of which they have not 
agreed.SO 
Macintyre summarises and demolishes Moore's doctrine of Emotivism, 
but points out that in spite of its philosophical shortcomings it is the basis 
48 MacIntyre, 1981 (hereafter AV) pol01 
49 This point is examined in more detail in Chapter Five section 1 
SO As Ogden and Richards (1936) observed more than half a century ago, Moore and his 
successors even used 'meaning' without any coherent view of its meaning. They conclude, "A 
study of the utterances of Philosophers suggests that they are not to be trusted in their 
dealings with Meaning." (1936, p.185) Sadly the naivety of their own proposal to treat 
"knowledge as a causal affair open to ordinary scientific investigation" (1936, p.24S) meant 
that their high hopes for "the Science of Symbolism" (1936 pol42) were not realised. 
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for the moral relativism he finds in contemporary society.51 Our society, 
he claims, has three types of person whose role in society is pivotal for the 
self-concept and structure of society as a whole: the Aesthete,52 the 
Bureaucrat,53 and the Therapist.54 None of these three are guided by 
moral absolutes. The modern self is democratised, and its judgements are 
criterionless and arbitrary. 55 It is not defined by the contingent state of 
affairs in which it finds itself, it is objective and this objectivity is taken to 
be the condition for the possibility of moral agency. MacIntyre draws 
51 "Emotivism has become embodied in our culture" AV 21. In Principia Ethica Moore 
claimed to have discovered that good is a non-natural property, not derived from pleasure, 
and that to state 'X is good' is to state an 'intuition', an unprovable statement about an 
unverifiable perception. As Maclntyre remarks, "one of the things that we ought to have 
learned from the history of moral philosophy is that the introduction of the word 
'intuition' by a moral philosopher is always a signal that something has gone badly wrong 
with an argument." AV 67 "Right" is, following this theme, that which produces the most 
Good. This reduces the 'right' and 'good' to terms in a private language, and is in 
Macintyre's words, a "plainly false and badly argued position" AVIS. Nonetheless it was 
praised, an as a result, MacIntyre quotes Keynes to explain, ''In practice, victory was with 
those who could speak with the greatest appearance of clear, undoubting conviction and 
could best use the accounts of infallibility" AV 16 However if this was the state into 
which moral debate had fallen Emotivism was a reasonable theory - not about moral 
debate but about the use of moral terminology at that time in the wake of Moore's 
reductionism. 
52 For the aesthete he draws his archetype from Ralph Touchett in Henry James's Portrait 
of a Lady. Aesthetes are those "who see in the social world nothing but a meeting place for 
individual wills, each with its own set of attitudes and preferences and who understand 
that world solely as an arena for the achievement of their own satisfaction, who interpret 
reality as a series of opportunities for their enjoyment and for whom the last enemy is 
boredom." AV 24 
53 For bureaucrats, ''bureaucratic rationality is the rationality of matching means to ends 
economically and efficiently." AV 24 "Questions of ends are questions of values, and on 
values reason is silent."AV 25 MacIntyre draws for his description of the bureaucrat on 
Weber who he claims is essentiallyemotivist. On this account justification is a rational 
procedure, and the choice of ends, or values, is essentially non-rational. Therefore, "no 
type of authority can appeal to rational criteria to vindicate itself except that type of 
bureaucratic authority which appeals precisely to its own effectiveness. And what this 
appeal reveals is that bureaucratic authority is nothing other than successful power". AV 
25 The hegemony of rationality means the bureaucrat never enters moral debate as his 
watchword is simply efficiency. 
S4 The Therapist "treats ends as given - outside his scope. His concern also is with 
technique, with effectiveness in transforming neurotic symptoms into directed energy, 
maladjusted individuals into well-adjusted ones." AV 29 
55 A rare comment by Heidegger on social roles within his own field, academia, alludes to a 
similar drift towards socially determined goals and relativism; "The decisive 
development of the modem business character of science therefore forms men of a different 
stamp. The scholar disappears. He is replaced by the research man who is engaged in 
research projects. This, rather than the pursuit of scholarship, gives his work its keen 
atmosphere. He contracts to work for commissions from publishers, who now help to 
determine what books must be written. •.. The research worker forces himself 
automatically into the orbit of the technologist in the form essential to his work. Only in 
this way does he remain effective and thus, in the sense of his age, real." Heidegger,1951, 
p.276 
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from Sartre and Goffman, two theorists who are ostensibly opposed in 
modem debate, the crucial point upon which he claims they agree. 
Whereas Sartre holds that the self is entirely distinct from its social role, 
Goffman claims that it is nothing more than its role. 
"For Goffman, for whom the social world is everything the self is 
therefore nothing at all, it occupies no social space. For Sartre, 
whatever social space it occupies it does so only accidentally, and 
therefore he too sees the self as in no wayan actuality." (AV 31) 
The self itself, as it were, is nothing. MacIntyre contrasts this objectivised, 
anonymized self with "many traditional societies ... [wherein] individuals 
inherit a particular space within an interlocking set of social 
relationships."56 In the world of the ancient Greeks in particular one's 
'self' was one's place in society.57 The modern self, by contrast, is 
presumed to be independent of its context, and hence the morality that 
guides it must be absolute, not relative to its social context. It was, 
MacIntyre suggests, as a result of the abrogation of contextual 
determination of the self that the Enlightenment set out a project of 
rational justification for morality. This was not just a quest of 
philosophers but pervaded culture in general. In his view it failed.58 The 
difficulty facing the Enlightenment thinkers is summed up by MacIntyre 
as follows: since classical moral injunctions had as their point to correct, 
improve and educate human nature they are clearly not going to be such 
as to be deduced from true statements about human nature - so the 
Eighteenth Century project to find rational basis for moral belief in 
human nature was doomed to failure.59 
Madntyre claims modern society lacks any teleological view of man, let 
alone a communal one. However he believes that classical societies did 
have such a view. In those cultures "every individual has a given role 
and status within a well-defined and highly determinate system of roles 
56 AV 32 
57 Guignon (1983) makes no reference to MacIntyre, but he also notes the contextual 
determination of the self in ancient Greece and relates it directly, as I do below by a 
different route, to Heidegger's notion of self: ''The conception of the everyday self which 
unfolds in Being and Time may be seen as closer to that found among the ancient Greeks than 
it is to our modem picture. For the Greeks, to be human was to be a place-holder in the 
natural structure of the oilcos, or later, the polis. The most unhappy of all men in the times 
Homer describes was not the slave, but the free man <lira) who had no place in the world." 
58 "A central thesis of this book is that the breakdown of this project provided the 
historical background against which the predicaments of our own culture can become 
intelligible." A V 38 
59 "once the notion of essential human purposes or functions disappears from morality, it 
begins to appear implausible to treat moral judgements as factual statements". AV57 
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and statuses. "60 Along with the roles went obligations and expectations. 
The virtues were those dispositions which sustained a man in his role, 
and the role itself.61 For MaCIntyre these roles arise from the na"ati'De 
form of human life. 
"human life has a determinate form, the form of a certain kind of 
story. It is not just that poems and sagas narrate what happens to 
men and women, but that in their narrative form poems and sagas 
capture a form that was already present in the lives which they 
relate." (A V 117) 
Hence narrative was the dominant mode of moral education. For 
MacIntyre, "Heroic social structure is enacted epic narrative:'62 He 
believes that for Homer virtue assisted men in fulfilling their social roles, 
and so we need to know of these roles to determine the virtues. Moral 
understanding is made possible by narrative.63 In Aristotle he sees a 
move of abstraction from roles to the telos of man in general.64 The good 
life for man, his telos, determined the virtues so we need to know more of 
that telos. Madntyre proposes that a core concept of virtue lies at the heart 
of the original, essential usage of virtue words and that in order to 
understand them we need amongst other things a notion of the narrative 
order of human life.65 To understand virtue we must understand action 
and every characterisation of action or actor relies on a context, even the 
limit case of the hypothetical example used in philosophical discussion. 
To understand self, causes and descriptions we need a setting, a 
comprehensible here and now, which must arise from a before. Hence, 
"Narrative history of a certain kind turns out to be the basic and 
essential genre for the characterisation of human actions." (A V 
194) 
It is in MacIntyre's understanding of action that we begin to see distinct 
resonances with Heidegger's understanding of the being of Dasein. Both 
60 AV 115 
61 Hence Macintyre claims "morality and social structure are in fact one and the same in 
heroic society. There is only one set of social bonds. Morality as something distinct does not 
vet exist. Evaluative questions are questions of social fact." A V 116 
52AV 121 
63 Hayden White believes that this connection is bivalent - that is understanding a 
narrative entails taking a moral stance: "Where, in any account of reality, narrativity is 
present, we can be sure that morality or a moralizing impulse is present too." Hayden 
White, 1987, p.24 
64 MacIntyre does not ask why Aristotle makes this move. We will see in the next chapter 
Havelock's explanation of its cause. 
65 AV 172-5 
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philosophers reject the atomistic reduction of phenomena, and for both 
human beings understand the world in terms of purpose before any 
theoretical grasp of abstract concepts. They even share similar views on 
Western history since Hellenic times.66 
Macintyre posits an overtly narrative concept of selfhood: "I am the 
subject of a history that is my own and no one else's, that has its own 
peculiar meaning. "67 My own history is made up of actions which have a 
meaning for me. MacIntyre like Heidegger sees that a pure action is an 
abstraction from life which is always shot through with understanding.68 
Only from our own purposive doing, (and by means of it) can we abstract 
the notion of an action which is not necessarily intelligible. In so far as 
we act well, we do so in the light of an "adequate sense of tradition"69 
which has a sense of what is handed down from the past and what is 
opened up as a possibility of the future. MacIntyre's understanding of 
time and action sounds rather like an echo of Heidegger's exposition of 
the three-fold nature of Dasein's temporality. 
"there is no present which is not informed by some image of some 
future and an image of the future which always presents itself in 
the form of a telos - or of a variety of ends or goals - towards which 
we are either moving or failing to move in the present. 
Unpredictability and teleology therefore coexist as part of our lives 
... our lives have a certain form which projects itself towards our 
future" (AV 200-1)70 
The parallelism with Heidegger, albeit at a much more down to earth 
level, is continued in his insistence on the equality (in Heideggerian terms 
the equiprimordiality) of the key moments of his analysis. 
ttl am not arguing that the concepts of narrative or of intelligibility 
or of accountability are more fundamental than that of personal 
identity. The concepts of narrative, intelligibility and 
66 John Caputo also remarks on the similarities between the theses of the two thinkers. 
"Heidegger and ... Macintyre ... agree in all the essentials: the great beginning in the 
Greeks, the terrible decline in modernity, the hope in a new beginning; nostalgia, 
antimodemism. They both look to antiquity for light and a time of original solidarity; 
they both point their finger at the theory of 'values', and specifically at Nietzsche, as the 
heart of the modem ethical malaise; and they both leave us dreaming of a new dawn 
(while the forces of oppression ravage the land)" RH 241 
61 AV 202 
68 "the concept of an intelligible action is a more fundamental concept than that of an 
action as such" A V 195 
69 "an adequate sense of tradition manifests itself in a grasp of those future possibilities 
which the past has made available to the present. to A V 207 
10 See also description of action: "Action itself has a basically historical character." AV 
197 
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｡｣｣ｯｵｮｴ｡＿ｩｬｩｾ＠ ｰｲｾｳｵｰｰｾｳ･＠ the applicability of the concept of 
personal Identity , Just as It presupposes their applicability and just 
as indeed each of these three presupposes the applicability of the 
two others. The relationship is one of mutual presupposition." 
(AV 203) 
Although we must remain aware that Madntyre's terms 'identity', 
'narrative' and 'intelligibility' do not have direct parallels in Heidegger, 
and his entire philosophical orientation is far from phenomenological, we 
can note with interest that his very different path of thinking has thrown 
up findings that are remarkably harmonious with our reading of the 
latter. For MacIntyre, and on my reading of Heidegger, narrative and 
intelligibility are equally primary and constitutive of human being. In 
making this very approximate equation I do not mean to suggest that two 
such disparate philosophers are simply saying the same thing, so I must 
qualify it. Firstly MacIntyre's "intelligibility" refers I believe to the 
phenomenon that Heidegger claims is founded in the existential of 
meaning; that is Dasein always already makes some sense of itself and the 
world as long as it exists. Secondly, the equiprimordiality of narrative, 
which MacIntyre assumes more than he argues for, foreshadows my claim 
in the next chapter that the temporality of Dasein is manifest at the ontic 
level by the fact that Dasein understands itself always in terms of a 
narrative structure, howsoever deficient that may be. We must also note 
that the identity of the self is not a given in Heidegger's ontology of 
Dasein. In fact for the most part Dasein takes up inauthentic possibilities 
so its identity is not as individual as we commonly, wishfully, think it is.71 
"The Self of everyday Dasein is the they-self, ... As they-self, the 
particular Dasein has been dispersed into the Ithey', and must first 
find itself. II (BT 167) 
In other words Heidegger considers a deficient form of identity to be an 
ontological pOSSibility of man, which does not form part of MacIntyre's 
ontology. It is not however incompatible with it. Heidegger sees, where 
MacIntyre is not concerned to look, that intelligibility and identity can 
have deficient forms, that is inauthentic modalities, wherein although 
Dasein still exists it is lost to itself. MacIntyre sees this lostness at the level 
of morality, but not at the ontological level. He maintains a simpler view 
71 Ricoeur also suggests that narrative enables the construction of a narrative identity, but 
in the conclusions of Time and Narrative Vol 3 acknowledges that "it makes identity 
somewhat unstable, insofar as many stories can be woven from the same material". See 
Wood, 1991, p.4 
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of human being and sees a fragmentation and dissolution at the moral, 
rather than ontological level. More straightforwardly, he posits that the 
unity of an individual life is "the unity of a narrative embodied in a single 
life"72 which leads him to the culmination of his moral philosophy with 
the claim that "To ask, 'What is good for me?' is to ask how best I might 
live out that unity and bring it to completion."73 The notion of narrative 
as constitutive for human being is essential to his thesis. It is therefore a 
problematic omission that he does not define it. However his analysis of 
its place in human life confirms that it is integral to human being. 
Charles Taylor's Sources of the Self is, like Macintyre's After Virtue, a 
work of moral philosophy with a strong normative element and an 
equally exhortatory peroration. He has read both MacIntyre and Heidegger 
and synthesizes their influence in his own description of self-knowledge. 
"To know who I am is a species of knowing where I stand. My 
identity is defined by the commitments and identifications which 
provide the frame or horizon within which I can try to determine 
from case to case what is good, or valuable, or what ought to be 
done, or what I endorse or oppose. In other words, it is the 
horizon within which I am capable of taking a stand." (Taylor 1989, 
p.27) 
He fuses MacIntyre's concern about morality with elements of Heidegger's 
ontology.74 For Taylor the self is a moral self,75 and it is this morality 
which drives us towards narrative as the modality in which we can 
answer the unavoidable questions thrown up by our moral being. 
"making sense of one's life as a story is ... not an optional extra; ... 
our lives exist ... in this space of questions, which only a coherent 
narrative can answer." (Taylor 1989 p.47) 
Taylor seems to approach an understanding of the ontological inevitability 
of meaning but he does not suggest that narrativity is essential to the being 
of the self, merely to our understanding of ourselves.76 His talk of 
"horizons within which we take a stand" remains on the ontic level and 
72AV 203 
73 AV 203 
74 For further evidence of the Heideggerian influence see in particular pp. 34 (and 
footnote),49, and 463ff., (Taylor 1989). 
7S "To know who you are is to be oriented in moral space." Taylor, 1989 p.28 
76 He comes very close to doing so but does not seem to understand projection as ontological: 
"making sense of my present action ..• requires a narrative understanding of my life, a sense 
of what I have become which can only be given in a story. And as I project my life forward 
and endorse the existing direction or give it a new one, I project a future story." (Taylor 1989, 
p.48) 
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he does not penetrate to the ontolOgical level at which Heidegger 
articulates the structure that MacIntyre simply asserts. Taylor is in the end 
more concerned with prescription than description. Taylor, like 
Macintyre, believes that mankind is in a parlous situation. Although he 
makes no such connection, I believe his indication of what is needed can 
be understood to be exactly what I will unfold as the sort of language that I 
believe is constitutive of good storytelling. 
"As our public traditions of family, ecology, even polis are 
undermined or swept away, we need new languages of personal 
resonance to make crucial human goods alive for us again." 
(Taylor 1989, p.513) 
Personal resonance refers to a quality of knowledge and engagement 
founded on internal criteria of feeling which are neither translatable nor 
reducible to an external expression of code and measurement. Taylor's 
book stops just before it might explain how this need will be fulfilled. The 
well-told oral storytelling event, defined in Chapter Five below, is a 
paradigmatic example of the type of discourse he seeks. 
MacIntyre, equally frustratingly, finishes After Virtue "waiting for another 
5t Benedict. "77 For all his moralizing MacIntyre offers little moral 
direction. His book amount to an exposition of what he understands to be 
the disintegration of morality from Homeric to modern times. He 
catalogues as a social historian what Heidegger sees at the level of the 
history of metaphysics. Over the same period of time Heidegger believes 
that Western Metaphysics rigidified and buried ever more deeply the 
question of being. John Caputo has also read MacIntyre alongside 
Heidegger and he too sees a similarity, also at a different level. 
"Modernity is for [Heidegger 1 too an Abfall, decadere, a decay, but 
one which had eaten into the very movement of the history of 
Being. So Heidegger's tale speeds along at a much higher altitude 
than does Macintyre'S. And his critique is much more radical ... 
He thinks all the trouble started when Plato and Aristotle 
launched the project of a philosophical ethics, for that led ... 
straight to modern subjectivism, value theory, and Nietzsche, i.e., 
the end of ethics. The trouble starts not with the Enlightenment 
but as soon as philosophy opens its door and begins unloading its 
conceptualizing tools. The decline, the Abfall, actually sets in with 
philosophy itself, so the primordial ethos can be preserved only by 
poetic thinking, not by a restoration of the classical notion of 
ethical rationality." (RH 244) 
77 AV 245 
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We will see when we turn to Eric Havelock's reading of Plato what he 
believes caused the fundamental shift in thinking that occurred when 
"philosophy opened its door." Macintyre's assertion of the narrative 
nature of human being is meant to redress the exceSSively rational view of 
the Enlightenment on the one hand, and on the other the arbitrary 
relativism of the Emotivism that followed it. As he expounds his views, 
it is clear that, although he does not argue it, narrative must play some 
ontological part in human being. My thesis is that it does indeed do so, 
and is thus support for MacIntyre's argument. His utilisation of narrative 
is evidence for the validity of my thesis. H, after all, human being is 
fundamentally narrative we could reasonably expect Macintyre to have 
noticed. When we tum to Ong and Havelock it will not escape the reader 
that the pre-Hellenic period from which MacIntyre draws his notion of 
narrative offering archetypes of social organisation was a primarily oral 
society. We will also see why ethical debate as such arose with Aristotle, 
and why it was doomed to decay. 
5 NARRATIVE IN ANTHROPOLOGY AND LITERARY 
CRITICISM 
There is little comfort in turning to other academic disciplines to find a 
definition of narrative free of the sorts of limitations we have 
encountered in philosophy. Narrative is being studied and discussed in 
more and more fields, generating an overwhelming amount of writing.78 
Narratives seem to occur in every field of human activity.79 There is such 
a huge amount of writing on narrative in literary criticism and 
anthropology that an uncontraversial or comprehensive review of the 
topic in one field let alone two, is impossible for one writer.80 
Nonetheless it is clear from a broad reading that all theorists seem to agree 
on the importance of narrative, few agree on its structure and none seem 
78 As Deborah Tannen remarks, ''There is a burgeoning and overwhelming literature on the 
structure and functions of narrative" (Tannen 1989, p.212). 
79 ''Everywhere and on every occasion we make up stories and tell tales of many different 
kinds." Mair 1989 p.276; "the narrative is present at all times, in all places, in all 
societies; the history of narrative begins with the history of mankind; there does not exist, 
and never has existed, a people without narratives." Barthes, quoted in Polldnghome 1988, 
p.14 
80 ''There is no single theory of [narrative] ... acceptable to a majority of those who have 
addressed it, and the unresolved differences among the critics cannot be either easily 
adjudicated or cavalierly dismissed." Martin 1986, p30 
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to venture to define its ontological basis. Here for example is Hayden 
White: 
"To raise the question of the nature of narrative is to invite 
reflection on the very nature of culture and, possibly, even of the 
nature of humanity itself. So natural is the impulse to narrate, so 
inevitable is the form of narrative for any report on the way things 
really happened, that narrativity could appear problematical only 
in a culture in which it was absent - or, as in some domains of 
contemporary Western intellectual and artistic culture, 
programmatically refused .... far from being one code among many 
that a culture may utilize for endowing experience with meaning, 
narrative is a meta-code, a human universal on the basis of which 
transcultural messages about the nature of a shared reality can be 
transmitted .... the absence of narrative capacity or a refusal of 
narrative indicates an absence or refusal of meaning itself." 
(Hayden White 1987, p.1-2) 
Hayden White's position seems so reasonable that it scarcely seems to 
need substantiation. But that is precisely the problem with narrative. We 
understand it so naturally that hardly anyone questions exactly how it is 
that we understand it and what exactly makes a narrative a narrative and 
not, for example, a list. Hayden White is right to realize that to question 
narrative is to invite reflection on "possibly ... the nature of humanity 
itself." He himself does not however reflect a great deal, although his 
observations are accurate. Victor Turner shares Hayden White's 
understanding of the ubiquity of narrative (he uses the term drama as he 
refers to the same phenomenon under a different aspect) but he too is 
silent regarding its ontological origins.81 Much theorising by 
anthropologists is based on borrowing from philosophy, be it 
structuralism, speech-act theory or deconstructionism, and attempts 
thereby to provide a theory in which to house discussion of their field 
work. 82 The borrowings are on the whole unsuccessful as the 
philosophical theories of narrative promote more argument about 
theories than elucidation of the real world, and most theories introduce 
logical and categorial distinctions that native speakers inconveniently 
disregard. Robert Scholes in the company of anthropologists offers a more 
81 "In many field situations in markedly different cultures, in my experience of Western 
social life, and in numerous historical documents, we can dearly discern a community's 
movement through time as taking a shape to which we can hardly deny the epithet 
"dramatic"." Turner 1981, p.39 
82 See Mitchell 1981 and Turner and Bruner 1986 
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sparse definition of narrative than he did in his earlier work with Robert 
Kellogg (see below). 
''Narrative is not just a sequencing, or the illusion of sequence ... 
narrative is a sequencing of something for somebody. . .. One 
cannot narrate a picture, or a person, or a building, or a tree, or a 
philosophy. Narration is a word that implicates its object in its 
meaning. Only one kind of thing can be narrated: a time-thing, or 
to use our normal word for it, an 'event'." (Scholes in Mitchell, 
1981 p.205) 
However Scholes goes on to assert baldly that narrative is 
"symbolization. "83 Edward Bruner acknowledges the place of narrative 
and ascribes it a meaning giving function, but describes on the whole what 
narrative does rather than what it is. When he does venture an 
ontological statement it is insufficiently precise to merit close 
philosophical analysis.84 Elizabeth Tonkin considers narratives 
throughout her study of oral history, but her work is aimed towards 
clarifying notions of the self and oral history. She wisely avoids 
attempting to define narrative.8S 
Many literary theorists have claimed to consider narrative independent of 
text or specific medium. In their widely quoted book Scholes and Kellogg 
state that, in contrast to their predecessors,86 they "hope to put the novel 
in its place. "87 
"it will not be our intention to view the novel as the final product 
of an ameliorative evolution, ... we hope to view the nature of 
narrati ve and the Western narrative tradition whole, seeing the 
novel as only one of a number of narrative possibilities." (Scholes 
and Kellogg 1966, p.3) 
Scholes and Kellogg provide a useful summary of previous approaches 
and attempt to move beyond the narrow confines of literary criticism. 
83 "A narrated event is the symbolization of a real event: a temporal icon." Scholes in 
Mitchell, 1981 p.205 
84 ''My position is that the story is prior to, but not independent of, the discourse." Bruner in 
Turner and Bruner 1986 p.l46. The terms here are not adequately defined. See also comments 
on the temporal structure of narrative in the same paper. 
8S Tonkin, Hke Polkinghome (1988) and Kerby (1991), has an essentially narrative notion of 
the self. However, more alive to the mutability of oral narrative she understands the self 
to be ''both variable and wlnerable" Tonkin 1992, p.136 
86 Representative of their predecessors are Northop Frye Anatomy of Criticism, Princeton 
University Press, 1957, and Erich Auerbach, Mimesis, Princeton University Press, 1953. The 
latter, in particular, they take to task for his "single-minded devotion to realistic 
principles" Scholes &: Kellogg 1966, p5, See also pp. 6 and 203. 
87 Scholes and Kellogg, 1966, pol 
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Nonetheless in spite of devoting a chapter to the Oral Heritage of Written 
Narrative their definition of narrative is as follows: 
"By narrative we mean all those literary works which are 
distinguished by two characteristics: the presence of a story and a 
story-teller. A drama is a story without a story-teller; in it 
characters act out directly what Aristotle called an 'imitation' of 
such action as we find in life. A lyric, like a drama, is a direct 
presentation, in which a single actor, the poet or his surrogate, 
sings, or muses or speaks for us to hear or overhear. Add a second 
speaker ... and we move toward drama. Let the speaker begin to 
tell of an event ... and we move toward narrative. For writing to 
be narrative no more and no less than a teller and a tale are 
required." (Scholes and Kellogg 1966, p.4) 
This definition of narrative, although not in thrall to the novel, still takes 
for granted a written format ("literary works ... writing") in spite of a 
liberal use of oral terminology ("sings ... speaks ... speaker ... overhear ... 
tell") the significance of which is not examined by the authors.88 The key 
phrases in the first and last sentences of the quotation are ontologically 
ambiguous: the "presence" of story and story-teller and its synonymic 
repetition, the requirement of "a teller and a tale", are not explained. It 
soon becomes clear that for Scholes and Kellogg the requirement for 
presence can be fulfilled by the virtual presence of a teller in a written text. 
Any written text which includes a narrator character constitutes a 
narrative for Scholes and Kellogg, however a drama, such as Hamlet, does 
not.89 Scholes and Kellogg, as we have seen, are by no means alone in 
their assumption that the essence of narrative is to be found in a text and 
we have already decided to bypass Ricoeur's work for this reason. The 
Scholes and Kellogg definition boils down to an attempt to distinguish the 
sort of texts which they do not wish to call narrative. Unfortunately if we 
strip out the references to text in their definition it is almost vacuous: 
"narrative requires a teller and a tale." Nearly twenty years later, in spite 
of huge amounts of research and writing literary critics are no nearer a 
88 Scholes and Kellogg are interested in the oral mainly in so far as it is the forerunner of 
written narrative. They are careful to note, and dissociate themselves from, the 
unfortunate pairings of oral with primitive and written with civilised, but they do not 
investigate the importance of the physical co-presence of teller and audience. They also 
take over Milman Parry's unfortunate oxymoron "oral literature:' (see S &: K, 1966, p.1S) 
89 By contrast I maintain that of the types of 'narrative' mentioned in the quotation above 
only the physical performance of a drama could possibly be a primordial narrative. There 
may be no designated narrator but the Casein of the players collectively presents the story. 
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definition of narrative.9O Martin asks what it might be on the last page of 
his Recent Theories of Narrative. 
Ｂｗｨｾｴ＠ ｴｨ･ｾ＠ is ncu:rative? Having reached the point at which a 
genuInely Interesting book on narrative would begin, I can only 
say that I would never have undertaken a discussion of recent 
theories if I had known how to answer the question. An 
understanding of narrative is a project for the future" (Martin, 
1986, p.190) 
It is to Martin's credit that he recognises the failings of the theories of 
narrative he has reviewed. Perhaps he was unable to make good those 
failings because he did not have access to the ontology of Dasein that I 
contend is the ground for a sound explanation of narrative. This thesis 
proposes an answer to one reading of Martin's question.91 I suggest that 
the temporally ecstatic structure of Dasein gives the structure of the 
primordial form of narrative. 
6 KERBY: NARRATIVE AND THE SELF 
Anthony Kerby in his recent study makes a strong link between narrative 
and humanity. His main inspiration is Paul Ricoeur, but he draws also 
from MacIntyre and from many of the other scholars mentioned above. 
Kerby's hypothesis is that, "the self is given content, is delineated and 
embodied, primarily in narrative constructions or stories,"92 and he 
defines the self as, "the implied subject of self-referring utterances. "93 It is 
through telling stories of ourselves and to ourselves that we become and 
know ourselves. He takes over a Husserlian view of time, that is "the 
present transcends itself in a continual and unbroken anticipation of the 
90 As already noted, writing on narrative is so voluminous as to be beyond cataloguing. 
There are purveyors of grand theories from Booth (1961), Burke (1945), to Ricoeur (1984), 
and innumerable collections by editors and reviewers from Hillis Miller (1971) who has a 
deconstructionist slant, to Nystrand (1982) at the psychological end of the spectrum. Each 
has their own, more or less explicit, variation on an essentially text-based theory of 
narrative. See also Howard 1991. I cite Martin (1986) below as a summariser of literary 
theories. Further references are myriad. 
91 I concentrate on oral narrative and do not attempt an explanation of the nature of 
narrative in its mediated forms such as text, film, pictorial representation and so on, which 
I take Martin to be including in his generic term 'narrative: Nonetheless I maintain that 
the latter are founded in the former. 
92 Kerby 1991, pol 
93 Kerby 1991, p.4 
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future and retention of the past,''94 and from Heidegger he takes the point 
that lived time "is always someone's. ''95 As we speak about our lives we 
are the one who speaks, or the "speaking subject" and we bring into being 
the "subject of speech" (designated by personal pronouns and other 
deictical indications) and the "spoken subject."96 These three parts form a 
whole, the self, which is created by the narration of our pre-narrative 
experience. Summing up this self Kerby quotes approvingly from Taylor 
who writes, "the self that is to be interpreted is essentially that of a being 
who self-interprets."97 Thus for Kerby the self is the upshot of the use of 
language by a self-referring creature which knows and articulates its own 
experiences in and over time. I am broadly in agreement with his 
findings, which replicate my own position; however there are various 
lacunae in his argument and in his phenomenolOgical ontology to which I 
will advert below. Firstly, however, on the positive side Kerby draws 
attention to the relationship between narrative and meaning. 
"Prior to some degree of narration, the meaning of human events 
for us is obscure or simply absent." (Kerby 1991, p.48) 
Kerby links meaning here with emotion, and he clearly means by 
meaning here the type of case of meaning wherein "we sayan entity has 
meaning" illustrated in the previous chapter by the example of the old 
library chair.98 He shows that what Taylor calls "higher" emotions are 
constellated by a narrative context. A wound for example tends to be 
painful, but it will give rise to say, anxiety, shame or pride depending on 
the context, the story, in which it was inflicted. In this sense the meaning 
of the wound is constituted by my relation with the wound which is 
articulated or understood in a narrative structure. If we label the wound 
'prenarrative' we can agree with Kerby that "the narrative is the meaning 
of the prenarrative experience. "99 However Kerby uses the term 
prenarrative to indicate that narrative in some way is already present in 
94 Kerby 1991, pIS 
95 Kerby 1991, p.lS 
96 Kerby 1991, p.l05 
9 7 Taylor, Charles, Human Agency and LlJnguage, Philosophical Papers I, C. U . P . 
Cambridge 1985, p.15; quoted in Kerby 1991, p.l08 
98 Along with emotion which is the articulation of the manner in which we care, or do not 
care, for the events and dramatis personae narrated goes the possibility of judging and 
valUing. In fact, he suggests, in the process of telling stories "we seem ... to be immediately 
involved in generating the value of a certain state of affairs or course of action" Kerby 1991, 
p.54 
99 Kerby 1991, p.84 
115 
3 APPROA0IE5 TO :--; ARRA TIVE 
our lives. He proposes that our lives have an inherently "pre-narrative" 
or "quasi-narra ti ve" structure. lOO "Prenarrative" does not mean before 
any narrativity at all but rather before any articulation of narrativity, it is 
"the drama we call our lives."ID1 Along with Heidegger and MaCIntyre, 
Kerby agrees that human life always involves understanding, and human 
action is always understood in terms of a context that is effectively 
narrative. But Kerby, borrowing from Ricoeur, grounds his 
"prenarrative" ultimately in the notion of "emplotment."102 Like Ricoeur 
he has effectively removed the question of the organising structure of 
human experience by positing a construct "plot" to do the job for him. 
Ultimately although Kerby convincingly links the self to narrative he does 
not explain the latter, because he does not question the process of 
emplotment, nor the ontological status of the plot. Although he does link 
meaning to narrative, via emotion,103 he does not turn his attention to 
the significance of the medium of narrative, nor the modalities of that 
medium. Thus although most of his examples seem to be taken from 
spoken discourse, his theory is mainly drawn from analysts of texts such as 
Ricoeur. In failing to examine the moment of telling of a story Kerby fails 
to catch sight of the ontological structure of Dasein which primordially 
lends narrative its structure. He simply stops with the unexplained 
concept, inherited from Ricoeur, of emplotment. Furthermore he also 
fails to see that the variables in the moment of telling determine the 
degree to which the narrative does give meaning to what he calls the 
prenarrative. 
Kerby cites two psychoanalysts, Schafer and Spence, both of whom talk of 
the construction of a narrative in analysis and notices that the 
psychoanalytic process can easily generate "a proliferation of 
narratives. "104 Kerby believes that the story co-constructed with the 
analyst is beneficial because it "facilitat[esl understanding and integration" 
even if it is not an exercise of "strict historical verisimiltude".lOS But most 
patients already have a narrative understanding of their lives. They walk 
in to the analyst's office with a story, and often a coherent, even integrated 
one. What exactly is it that characterizes the story co-constructed with the 
I 00 Kerby 1991, p.8 
101 Kerby 1991, p39 
102 Kerby 1991, p.43 
103 Kerby 1991, p.43-47 
104 J...:l'rby 1991 p.89 
105 Kerby 1991, pp.89-90 
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analyst such that it is therapeutic? Most psychotherapists and analysts 
have come across the sort of patient who knows his own story, knows all 
the facts, all the diagnostic labels and all the causative traumas of his life, 
and yet is still not cured. Equally coherence, which is one of Spence's aims 
in analysis, is not always necessary.106 There are many satisfied ex-patients 
and not a few non-patients who do not have a neatly integrated life story. 
Kerby believes that, 
"The final judgement of a narrative is its acceptance by the one 
whose experience it recounts and whose reflected life it becomes, 
even though this acceptance may not be easily won." (Kerby 1991, 
p.90) 
The key question, not addressed by Kerby is how the acceptance is won. 
Apart from noting en passant that one's own acceptance of a narrative 
may be influenced by whether other people accept one's account, 
(although it is clearly neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition) Kerby 
does not look at other factors which influence the acceptance of a 
narrative.107 I maintain that a highly significant factor in the acceptance of 
a personal narrative in psychotherapy is the way the story is told. The 
same variable, how a story is told, governs the degree to which a narrative 
is attended to in such non-psychotherapeutic contexts as informal 
conversations and in professional performance. Indeed the degree to 
which a story is accepted as a "good" story is essentially a function of how 
it is told. The manner of telling of a story can be analysed in countless 
ways. I want to home in on just one variable. Is the story boring or not 
boring? I will maintain, not so much against Kerby as beyond him, that 
this variable above all - is the story boring or not? - is what is important in 
stories. 
As Heidegger demonstrates in The Fundamental Concepts boredom is not 
a trivial phenomenon, and yet it is often overlooked, precisely because it 
trivialises. When we are bored that which bores us does not seem to 
mean anything or matter much. However that we are bored may well 
matter greatly to us. A "good" story thoroughly engages our being, a poor 
story does not. In fact, we can suggest that what is essential to story is what 
makes it a good story; and a boring story is fundamentally deficient as a 
story. We listen to it only because we know pre-conceptually what it 
should be and are caught in a conventional response that is an imitation 
106 See Spence 1982 p.24 
107 Kelby 1991 p.90 
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of an authentic response to its true potential. If it does not engage us, 
move us, nor make present another world to us it is merely the recitation 
of a sequence of events, a boring imitation of a story. We will expand on 
this point in Chapter Five. In order to prepare to do so we must look 
more closely at how a story is told and the variables in that telling. I have 
indicated that story as a modality of discourse is founded in speech, not 
text. How a story is spoken affects its being-a-story. I will propose that the 
primordial form of story, whence it draws its essence, is the non-boring 
orally spoken story. It is by reference however hidden or automatic to this 
primordial form of story that we all understand stories to be stories in 
their derivative, diluted or mediated modes such as novels, films cartoons 
and so forth. Written words get their meaning from the spoken word, as 
the moon shines with the light it gets from the sun. In so far as a text tells 
a story, it reflects more or less successfully the lived being-with of oral 
storytelling. 
To recap, Kerby establishes the relationship between narrative and self, but 
he does not extend it far enough. Although he offers a good argument for 
taking the ontological basis of the self to be narrative, he does not question 
the ontological basis of narrative. As a result he is not able to explore the 
significance for the self of the variable of boredom in the happening of 
narrative, nor can he discover in the oral event of Dasein's storytelling the 
structure and the moments of the story that he, along with Ricoeur 
ascribes to the plot. Because neither Kerby nor Ricoeur consider seriously 
the oral event of storytelling neither of them consider what it is that 
makes such a telling "good" or "bad." That variable, I contend, is crucial to 
the understanding of the primordial form of storytelling, and its relation 
to Dasein. That is the issue to which we turn in the next chapter. We will 
look at the different effects of orality and literacy on society and thinking. 
Havelock and Ong demonstrate the transformative effects of literacy, the 
consequences of which are unwittingly paraded by Ricoeur, and 
deconstructed by Derrida.1 08 This is not the place to discuss 
Deconstructionism given the centrality of text to the entire movement. 
Nonetheless we must acknowledge, with Ong,109 that Derrida does the 
oralists great service by undercutting the chirographic bias towards 
believing that there is a one to one correspondence between word and 
object, and by challenging the "medium" model of communication 
108 See Derrida's commentary on Rousseau in Of Grtmamtllology, 1976. 
109 Ong 1982, p.166ff. 
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wherein texts are vessels carrying the meaning inserted by the author 
safely to the interior of the reader. However Derrida goes too far in 
asserting that because a text has autonomy and ambiguity it refers to 
nothing outside of itself, or that differance defers all meaning. Indeed 
when he writes, ''Writing precedes and follows speech, it comprehends 
it"110 one can only conclude that his disregard for history arises because 
his thinking has been overwhelmed by theories of textuality to such an 
extent that, for him, not only is the truth of text undecideable, but truth 
itself is invaded by the undecideability of text. I II 
Having established the significance of orality in general we will turn to the 
issue of the crucial variable in oral delivery: boredom. We turn to 
Heidegger's analysis of boredom in The Fundamental Concepts to 
elucidate the existentiell modification of Dasein which determines 
boredom, so that in Chapter Five we can draw together the significance of 
orality, the analysis of boredom and the idea of narrative to give a 
coherent account of the place of story in the being of Dasein, and the 
significance of particular variables in the telling of story for the 
modification of Dasein's way of being. 
110 Derrida 1976 p.238 
111 For a broad but incisive critique of the excesses of Deconstructionism see Vickers 1995 
and 1989. 
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Chapter Four 
Orality, Narrative and Boredom 
1 INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter I draw on scholarship on orality make clear the significance 
of the differences between an oral and a textual narrative, and to establish 
the primacy of the former. I have suggested that Ricoeur and others have 
misunderstood a primordial dimension of narrative because they have 
taken the primary form of narrative to be a text. I will draw on the work 
of Eric Havelock and Walter Ong to show what facilitated Ricoeur's 
misapprehension and argue that there are significant differences in 
thinking, behaviour, and world view between oral cultures and those 
which have alphabetised writing and widespread literacy.1 Havelock's 
work in the main concentrates on the classical world and re-reading 
classical texts in the light of the impact of alphabetised writing.2 Ong's 
work considers the interplay of orality and literacy down to modern times, 
and into the era of electronically reproduced speech.3 Ong makes a useful 
distinction, which I shall follow where necessary, between primary orality, 
"the orality of cultures untouched by literacy,"4 and secondary orality, "the 
orality of telephones, radio and television, which depends on writing and 
prin t for its existence. "5 
Having established the significance of orality I then turn to the ubiquitous 
but under-researched variable in narrative which is boredom. Heidegger's 
temporal analysis of boredom in The Fundamental Concepts shows how 
1 The Greek alphabet, complete with vowels, was a significant improvement on previous 
scripts: "the initial advantage offered by alphabetic efficiency was to provide a script 
which could fluently and unambiguously transcribe the full gamut of orally preserved 
speech .... Such complete visibility for language had not been developed in previous writing 
systems, and consequently difficulty of interpretation had limited their use." Havelock 
1986 p.90-1 For a discussion of the superiority of alphabetised writing see Olson, 1994. 
Olson also summarizes (pp.33ff) the to and fro of academic debate since Parry first 
published and Havelock picked up his work. In spite of some disagreement and 
qualification, and notwithstanding the need for further research, I take the original theses 
to be essentially sound and well-supported. 
2 Havelock 1963, 1982, 1986 
J Ongl967, 1977, 1982, 1986 
4 Ong 1982, p.6 
:; Ong 1982, p.3 
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Dasein is modified in boredom. Boredom is a modification of Dasein's 
temporality. As storytelling is a comportment of Dasein, stories too, are 
modified in boredom. Our engagement with story is founded in our 
ecstatic temporality. In so far as we turn away from our ownmost time 
and understand ourselves and our time in terms of public, objectively 
measured time, we do not engage in the story. We will see that the 
essential form of story must be non-boring, which prepares us for the exact 
description of what constitutes story in Chapter Five. 
2 HAVELOCK, ONG AND ORALITY 
In Preface to Plato Eric Havelock made the proposition that Plato's 
Republic was essentially an attempt to reform Greek education, and that 
the proposed reformation was made possible by concepts and ways of 
thinking which arose as a direct consequence of the introduction of 
alphabetic writing during the previous three hundred years.6 He later 
claimed that the inception of western metaphysical philosophy was a 
result of the introduction of alphabetic writing into Greek society.7 To do 
justice to Havelock's claims, and to place his comments on narrative in 
perspective, we will briefly outline the recent history of what Havelock 
calls the "orality-literacy" debate.8 Both Havelock and Ong were inspired 
and stimulated by the work of Milman Parry.9 Parry's hypothesis was not 
welcomed when he first advanced it in his M.A. thesis at the University of 
California,tO but has become widely accepted since, due to the work of his 
son, Adam Parry, and of his student, Albert Lord, as well as through 
Havelock and Ong. Parry hypothesised that the Iliad and the Odyssey were 
6 tithe Republic sets itself a problem which is not philosophical in the specialised sense of 
that term, but rather social and cultural. It questions the Greek tradition as such and the 
foundations on which it has been built. Crucial to this tradition is the condition and 
ｾｵ｡ｕｴｹ＠ of Greek education. tI Havelock 1963, p.12-3 
Havelock 1986, p.llO-ll. 
8 Havelock dtes Milman Parry, Marcel Jousse and indeed Rousseau as forerunners of the 
modem academic concern with orality (For an overview of Jousse's work see Sienaert 1990). 
However in Havelock 1982 he offers 1963 as a starting date for modem consideration of the 
"Orality Problemtl, as that year saw the publication of his own Preface to P14to, McLuhan's 
The Gutenberg Galaxy, Mayr's Animal Species and Evolution, ｌｾｶｩＭｓｴｲ｡ｵｳｳＧｳ＠ LIl Pensee 
SIJuf1tlge, and Goody and Watt's The Consequences of LiterllCY. 
9 See Parry Milman, L 'Epithete traditionelle dans Homere, ｓｯ｣ｩｾｴｾ＠ Editrice des Belles 
Lettres, Paris, 1928, translated and augmented by further studies in Parry 1971, both cited 
in Havelock 1963, and 1982, and also dted in Ong 1982. See also Lord 1960 
10 See Havelock 1986, p.51 
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not created by a writer but were transcriptions of oral compositions. 
Furthermore the oral compositions were not single events of creation, 
which thereafter were repeated verbatim, but rather were ongoing re-
creations. Parry showed that the teller of the Iliad knew the story not as a 
script but as a series of scenes, one leading to another. He did not have a 
fixed text but he did have a fixed rhythmical metre in which to tell the 
story. A huge text of thousands of lines, each with a fixed form, represents 
a formidable challenge to the memory - and an unnecessary one. Parry 
demonstrated that instead of such a text the Homeric storyteller had a 
collection of formulae at his disposal, grouped around set themes such as 
"banquet", "receiving strangers," "setting sail", "preparing a horse for 
battle" and so on.11 When telling each such event in a tale he would build 
a description from these formulae around the particular circumstances 
and characters involved. The characters of his epic would each have a set 
of epithets resulting in an appellation of different metrical lengths so that 
the person could be named in the appropriate one of many different ways 
in accordance with the available feet of the metre.12 
"Parry's discovery might be put this way: virtually every 
distinctive feature of Homeric poetry is due to the economy 
enforced on it by oral methods of composition. These can be 
reconstructed by careful study of the verse itself, once one puts 
aside the assumptions about expression and thought processes 
engrained in the psyche by generations of literate culture." (Ong, 
1982, p.21) 
Together with Albert Lord, Parry tested the validity of his claims about 
poetic tale tellers in an oral culture with field work in Yugoslavia. The 
results, vindicating his hypothesis, were published in Lord's The Singer of 
Tales. In Yugoslavia Parry and Lord found non-literate bards whose 
performance was a formulaic composition, echoing that which Parry 
ascribed to Homer. Formulaic phrases, made to the ten-syllable Yugoslav 
meter, were used and re-used, but no two performances of the same story 
were the same. Nevertheless, the singer would insist that he had told 
exactly the same story, in exactly the same way. Lord observed that from 
the singer's point of view this is entirely reasonable. 
11 See Lord 1960, p.30 
12 For further details see Havelock 1963, and Pany M. "The traditional epithet in Homer" 
in Parry A., 1971. Lord 1960 gives a detailed analysis of the techniques of non-literate 
twentieth century oral epic singers. 
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"There is nothing in the poet's experience (or in ours if we listen 
to !he same song from several singers and to the same singer 
tellmg the same song several times) to give him any idea that a 
theme can be expressed in only one set of words. Those singers 
whom he has heard have never reproduced a theme in exactly the 
same words, and he has no feeling that to do so is necessary or 
even .normal practice. The theme, even though it be verbal, is not 
any fixed set of words, but a grouping of ideas. Some singers, of 
course, do not change their wording much from one singing to 
another, especially if the song is one that they sing often." (Lord 
1960, p.69) 
In fact, not only do the singers insist that they are telling the same story, 
but the grounds of the difference a literate auditor might hear are not 
readily available to singers in an oral culture. On enquiry, Lord discovered 
that the singers he interrogated did not have the notion of word as a 
discrete linguistic particle.13 So accustomed is the modem mind to the 
universality of concepts such as 'word' that it is difficult to grasp the 
significance of Lord's findings. Lord's notes indicate that sometimes 
singers expressed the same themes in different words. The singers 
themselves disagreed with him and insisted that they had said the exactly 
the same thing each time. The phonemes and words did not have the 
same sort of being for the taker of notes and the singers of tales. Our 
modern notion of word is sustained by the written word. Only when it is 
written does a word become an object, a thing out there, separate from the 
action of a speaker. In the non-literate world a word is an event. 
"Sound only exists when it is going out of existence. It is not 
simply perishable but essentially evanescent, and it is sensed as 
evanescent. When I pronounce the word 'permanence', by the 
time I get to the '-nence' the 'perma-' is gone, and has to be gone . 
... There is no way to stop sound and have sound. I can stop a 
moving picture camera and hold one frame fixed on the screen. If 
I stop the movement of sound, I have nothing - only silence, no 
sound at all. All sensation takes place in time, but no other 
sensory field totally resists a holding action, stabilization, in quite 
this way. Vision can register motion, but it can also register 
immobility. Indeed, it favours immobility, for to examine 
something closely by vision, we prefer to have it quiet. We often 
13 ''Man without writing thinks in tenns of sound groups and not in words, and the two do not 
necessarily coincide. When asked what a word is, he will reply that he does not know, or 
he will give a sound group which may vary in length from what we call a word to an entire 
line of poetry, or even an entire song. The word for "word" means an "utterance". When a 
singer is pressed then to say what a line is, he, whose chief daim to fame is that he traffics 
in lines of poetry, win be entirely baffled by the question" Lord 1960, p.2S 
123 
• 0RAlJTY, NARRATIVE AND BOREDOM 
reduce motion to a series of still shots the better to see what 
motion is. There is no equivalent of a still shot for sound. An 
oscillogram is silent. It lies outside the sound world." (Ong 1982 
ｾｾ＠ , 
Havelock observes that "there is probably no attestable instance in Greek 
of the term logos as denoting a single 'word', though it is often translated 
as though it did. The first 'word for a word' in the early philosophers 
seems to have been onoma - a 'name'."14 The word "word" refers to a 
phenomenon that shows itself firstly in written language. Writing words 
down produces an illusion of permanence about the being of the word; it 
transforms the word from an event into a thing. Hence there arises also 
the illusion that what is talked about in words also has an equivalent 
permanence. This is the transformation that allowed narrative, a telling, 
an event, to be (mis)taken to be a thing.15 According to Havelock it was 
historically alphabetic writing which gave rise to the Presocratic concern 
with being, as opposed to becoming.16 When an oral society becomes a 
chirographic society the very business of talking is transformed)7 Even 
thinking changes: if a thought can be written down and contemplated as 
an object external to and independent of the mind of the thinker one can 
reflect upon it and consider it outside the time and place of its genesis. It 
achieves a status independent of its originator. 
14 Havelock 1986, p.113 
15 "it is only as a language is written down that it becomes possible to think about it. The 
acoustic medium, being incapable of visualization, did not achieve recognition as a 
phenomenon wholly separable from the person who used it. ... This [independent] existence 
[of documents] invited examination of itself. So emerged, in the speculations of the sophists 
and Plato, as they wrote about what they were writing, conceptions of how this written 
thing behaved ... The term logos, richly ambivalent, referring to discourse both as spoken 
and as written <argument versus treatise) and also to the mental operation (the reasoning 
power) required to produce it, came into its own, symbolizing the new prosaic and literate 
discourse. ... A distinction slowly formed which identified the uttered epos of orally 
preserved speech as something different from logos and (to philosophers) inferior to it." 
Havelock 1986, p.112-3 
16 "as the new statements in documented form began to separate themselves as visible 
artifacts from the consciousness of the speaker, who now could write them down, they 
become objects seen and contemplated, and so the notion was encouraged that what was 
being described also existed as an object which became single and unique. This object now 
did not just happen or perform, but existed, under two guises: as the total description, and as 
the total 'fact', meaning the single physical fact which was being described .... there would 
arise a felt need to replace the verbs of action and happening which crowded themselves 
into the oral mythos by a syntax which somehow stated a situation or set of situations 
which were permanent, so that an account could be given of the environment which treated 
it as a constant. The verb called upon to perform this new duty was tim';, the verb to be." 
Havelock in Robb 1983, p.21 
17 See Havelock in Robb 1983 esp. pp.20 - 31 
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To clarify this point we will digress briefly to consider the situation in 
modem academia. This shift in the modality of thinking has become 
pronounced in the academic field, and notably philosophy, with the 
proliferation of printed texts in the last thirty years. In an oral discussion 
there are two tendencies that generally guide argument. H positions are 
irreconcilable then either the fundamental axiomatic disagreement is 
revealed as the talking continues or, if there is the possibility of and 
willingness for agreement, thoughts are continually reformulated until a 
form is reached on which consensus can be agreed. A debate carried out 
via written papers is quite different. Each sentence, fixed and preserved on 
paper, is an opportunity for disagreement and qualification. A written text 
is not clarified by either the emphases of speech or the theme of a 
particular discussion. As a written debate continues it tends to develop 
into more and more detailed defences, refinements and attacks, all of 
which produce yet more grounds for disagreement and qualification. To 
put this aphoristically, the job of a philosopher is to disagree with his 
colleagues, but not too much. The livelihood of every academic depends 
on contributing to the extension of textualised debate and the preservation 
of its form, so his work consists of continuing to argue rather than 
rupturing the debate completely.18 The proliferation of detailed 
arguments in every academic field has forced academics into ever 
narrower specialisations as there is simply too much publishing to keep 
up with. It is estimated that 200,000 academic journals are published in 
the English language, and that the average number of readers per article is 
five.19 Given that a few articles by well-known authors are very widely 
read it is likely that the modal number of readers is less than one. 
Furthermore in some fields a small number of writers produce a 
disproportionate number of publications. Norcross et al. found that for 
British clinical psychologists the modal number of journal articles and 
conference papers is zero. Eight per cent produced half of all published 
18 Hence there are very firm rules governing the form of academic debates. "It is very 
noticeable in our scientific story telling that there are fierce conventions as to how the 
stories have to look and sound. They have to be logical and make a convincing claim that A 
did lead on to B and then to C. It is still not so very widely recognized that most of this 
logic is put in after all the other work on the story has been done, and is part of the final 
rhetoric of the scientific story teller's art." Mair 1989, p.278 
19 Malcolm, Noel "Sinking in a sea of words", ｬｮ､ｾ＠ on Swulay, 21/7/96 
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work.20 Textually based debate has effectively silenced the input of many 
practitioners. 
To return to our central theme, it is uncontestable that writing down 
thoughts changed the nature of thinking.21 Havelock points to the 
dissemination of the Greek alphabet as the genesis of the process that has 
culminated in the our modem text-saturated way of thinking. 
"The linguistic symptoms of this radical shift away from oralism, 
which has ever since underlain all European consciousness, 
occurred in a proliferation of terms, for notions and thoughts and 
thinking, for knowledge, and knowing, for understanding, 
investigating, research, inquiry. The task set himself by Socrates 
was to bring this new kind of terminology into close connection 
wi th the self and with p 5 Y c he. For him, the terminology 
symbolized the level of psychic energy required to realize thought 
of what was permanently 'true', as opposed to what fleetingly 
happened in the vivid oral panorama. ... The linguistic formula 
in which such intellection expressed itself was par excellence the 
'is' statement, in preference to the 'doing' statement, the one 
literate, the other oralist, with a corresponding contrast between a 
'true' mental act of knowing and an oral act of feeling and 
responding." (Havelock 1986, p.llS) 
Havelock's explanation is prosaic, in both literal and metaphorical senses, 
compared to the almost mystical obscurity of Heidegger's writings in his 
later years on the pre-Socratics, but there is common ground.22 There are 
certainly possibilities for fruitful research to ascertain to what extent the 
path of Heidegger's thinking runs towards or alongside those phenomena 
Havelock ascribes to the shifts in the ways of thinking of the world of 
primary orality as it incorporates alphabetised thinking.23 
20 Norcross, J.C., Brust, A. M. and Dryden W., "British clinical psychologists: II Survey 
findings and American comparisons", Clinical Psychology Forum, 40, 25-291992 
21 "Consciousness of words permits their distinction from the ideas that words express. 
Writing, therefore, gives rise to the idea of an idea and the mind becomes the storehouse of 
those ideas." Olson 1994, p.242. Against this view see Scribner S. and Cole M. The 
Psychology of Literacy, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1981. For a rebuttal 
of Scribner and Cole see Goody 1987. See Olson 1994 also for further substantiation of the 
Qns/Goody I Havelock position. 
22 Walter Benjamin, had he lived longer, might have provided a firm bridge between 
literary and philosophical understandings of existence. In what he left we see hints of an 
understanding that could have read and related Havelock and Heidegger: "During long 
periods of history, the mode of human sense perception changes with humanity's entire 
mode of existence. The manner in which human sense perception is organized, the medium 
in which it is accomplished, is determined not only by nature but by historical 
circumstances as well." Benjamin ed. Arendt, 1970 p.216 
23 "The substitution of the 'timeless present', turning into the 'logical present', in place of 
the 'immediate present' or the past or future, became a preoccupation of the pre-Platonic 
philosophers, particularly Pannenides. His verse indeed vividly illustrates the dynamics 
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Whereas the theme of Heidegger's later work is a consideration of the 
ways in which Being comes to show itself differently, Havelock and Ong 
simply suggest that man thinks and sees his world differently having 
interiorised the technology of writing.24 In a discussion in The 
Fundamental Concepts Heidegger does allude to a transformation of 
existence transpiring "along with" new language, but not in an 
indentifiable historical context, nor does he press the connection as far as 
the orality theorists.25 Havelock himself noticed that philosophers of 
hermeneutics such as Heidegger, seeking deeper and deeper meanings in 
texts "have come near to suggesting that buried behind the text may be 
realities expressible in oral language rather than written even though the 
hidden reality is described as a being in metaphysical, not oral, terms."26 
However Havelock, a classicist, was kept busy dealing with the impact of 
his theories on classicists and did not know Heidegger's work well enough 
to realise how significant his observations on the pre-Socratics might be to 
a Heidegger scholar .27 
of the partnership between oral and written idiom as they existed in his day. This no place 
to examine his system, except to note his dramatization of the verb 'to be' in its present 
tense esti and its neuter generic present particuple eon as embodying a linguistic usage 
which, as he saw it, must replace the Homeric language of action and event - of 'becoming' 
and 'perishing'. Discussion of the logical and epistemological and ontological dimensions 
of this verb has become a commonplace among historians of Greek thought, especially as 
such concerns come to the fore in Plato's dialogues, which, it must always be remembered, 
were written documents, the fruit of a writer's lifetime preoccupation. Sufficient here to 
say that the genesis of this Greek problem becomes uncovered once it is placed in the context 
supplied by ... [Havelock's] theory of Greek literacy." (Havelock, 1986 p.106) 
24 Havelock is not the last man to propose a contraversial theory to account for this change. 
Julian Jaynes considers the same change to have had a bio-mechanical origin. See Jaynes, 
Julian, The Origin of Consciousness in the brellkdown of the bicameral mind, Allen Lane, 
London, 1CJ76 
25 "we find ourselves forced to adopt another language because of a fundamental 
transformation of existence. Or to put it more precisely, this change transpires along with 
this new language." PC 203 
26 Havelock in Olson and Torrance, 1991, p.18-9 
27 Ong notes the connection, but seems to consider Heidegger a lost cause: 'Words in an oral 
culture are used typically not to set up static definitions but to discourse actively on the way 
a thing acts or behaves or operates in the human lifeworld. Words in oral cultures 
paradigmatically go with action and with things that act. As writing is interiorized, 
verbalization migrates from a predominantly action frame to a predominantly 'being' 
frame: the verb to be becomes more urgent than it had ever been in an oral culture. The quest 
is on to find Aristotle's to ti en ei1llli, that is, 'what it is to be' or 'what being is'. In these 
perspectives metaphysiCS is seen to be indebted to writing not only for the kinds of 
protracted analytic explanations with which it and all science works, but also for 
identifying its own spedal quarry, 'being' itself, which it has always pursued. Writing in 
the sense I have tried to explain here separates being from time and a longe sets up 
Heidegger's project of rejoining the two. But Heidegger's Sein und Zeit is written in the 
alphabet in a far-gone print culture, and whether it has fully achieved what it set out to 
do is In the minds of many open to question. " eng 1986, p.44-S 
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It is not my purpose in this lightning sketch of Havelock's work to divert 
into a discussion of the impact of his work on a reading of Heidegger's 
concern with being as such, rather I note the possibility for more detailed 
research by others.28 My concern is to approach an understanding of 
narrative, and to emphasize that as we do so we must bear in mind a 
realistic understanding of the extent to which our thinking is affected by 
literacy. Just as we take a concept of word for granted without realizing 
that is derived from the sight of the written word, so too the modern 
mind is so accustomed to the universality of the concept "concept" that it 
is difficult to conceive of a mind which cannot conceive of concepts. Such 
however is the mind that Havelock and Ong propose is the mind of pre-
literate man.29 
"As long as oral discourse retains the need of visualization it could 
not properly be said to indulge in abstraction. As long as its 
content remained a series of doings or of events none of these 
could properly be regarded as universals, which emerge only 
through the effort of rearranging the panorama of events under 
topics, and of reinterpreting it as chains of relation and cause. The 
era of the abstract and the conceptual is yet to come." (Havelock 
1963 p.188) 
Some fascinating field work by A. R. Luria is cited in support of their 
theories.. In the 1930s Luria spent many months with pre-literate and 
semi-literate peasants in Uzbekistan and Krighizia. Luria described his 
project as follows: 
"We hoped to reject the Cartesian notion of the primacy of self-
consciousness, with a secondary rank accorded to the perception of 
the external world and other people. We assumed the reverse: the 
perception of oneself results from the clear perception of others 
and the processes of self-perception are shaped through social 
activity, which presupposes collaboration with others and an 
analysis of their behavioural patterns. Thus the final aim of our 
investigation was the study of how self-consciousness is shaped in 
the course of human social activity." (Luria, ed. Cole, 1976, p.19) 
28 An excellent starting point for a deeper investigation of the process of alphabetization 
and the orality-literacy shift is Olson 1994. His refinement of the insights opened up by 
Havelock and others suggests among other points that "writing is not the transcription of 
speech, but rather provides a conceptual model for that speech. ... the history of scripts is 
... the by-product of attempts to use a script for a language for which it is ilI-suited .... 
writing is in principle meta-linguistics. ... and ... the models provided by our script tend to 
blind us toward other features of language which are equally important human 
communication." Olson 1994, p.89 See also Denny in particular in Olson and Torrance, 1991, 
Robb (eel.) 1983 and Robb,1994. 
29 See eng, 1982 pp.42ff., and Havelock, 1963 ｰｰＮＱｾＱＸＸ＠
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Luria's intention echoed the phenomenological challenge to traditional 
metaphysics and his findings mirrored Heidegger's claims, in particular 
his claim that, "the kind of dealing which is closest to us is ... not a bare 
perceptual cOgnition, but rather that kind of concern which manipulates 
things and puts them to use."30 Luria tried, and failed, to get his subjects 
to utilise categories to classify objects,31 and to use syllogistic logic to reach 
conclusions about things of which they had no direct knowledge. They 
refused to do so. 
"we had no luck in getting these [illiterate) subjects to perform the 
abstract act of classification. Even when they grasped some 
similarity among various objects, they attached no particular 
importance to the fact. As a rule, they operated on the basis of 
'practical utility', grouping objects in practical schemes rather than 
categorizing them. When we referred to a generic term they could 
use to designate a distinct group of objects, they generally 
disregarded the information or considered it immaterial. Instead, 
they adhered to the idea that objects should be grouped in practical 
arrangements." (Luria, ed. Cole, 1976, p.59) 
Heidegger would surely have been greatly interested to know of Luria's 
findings, for most certainly the way of relating to the objects in the world 
of these oral subjects is clearly primarily as equipment. They find it 
difficult to see things as acontextual objects. Indeed, when pressed they 
refused to make the sort of objective definition that literates tend to 
believe all competent users can make, and take for granted as necessarily 
constitutive of competent language use.32 Ong comments on Luria's 
findings, 
30 BT95 
31 One of the groups of objects offered included, amusingly in the light of Heidegger's 
discussion at BT98-100, a hammer, in the group hammer - saw - log - hatchet. Asked to 
pick the odd one out, the subject refused, "They're all alike. The saw will saw the log and 
the hatchet will chop it into small pieces. If one of these things has to go, rd throw out the 
hatchet. It doesn't do as good a job as the saw." Another subject was asked, "If you had to 
put these in some kind of order, could you take the log out of the group?" and replied, "No, 
if you get rid of the log, what good would the others be?" Luria, ed Cole, 1916, p.60-62 
32" Luria transcribed his attempt to get I1li-Khodzh, a 22-year old illiterate, to make a 
definition. 'Try to explain to me what a tree is.' 'Why should I? Everyone knows what a 
tree is, they don't need me telling them.' 'Still, try and explain it.' 'There are trees here 
everywhere; you won't find a place that doesn't have trees. So what's the point of my 
explaining?' 'But some people have never seen trees, so you might have to explain.' Okay. 
You say there are no trees where these people rome from. So I'll tell them how we plant 
beetroots by using seeds, how the root goes into the earth and the leaves come out on top. 
That's the way we plant a tree, the roots go down. .. ' Luria notes that this is a description 
of how to plant a tree, not what a tree is, so he tries again, 'How would you define a tree in 
two words?' 'In two words? Apple tree, elm, poplar.' Luria, ed. Cole, 1976, p.86-7 
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.. ｾ＠ oral culture simply does not deal in such items as geometrical 
fIgures, ｡｢ｳｴｲｾｾｴＮ＠ categorization, formally logical reasoning 
ｰｲｾ･ｳｳ･ｳＬ＠ definitions, or even comprehensive descriptions, or 
｡ｲｴｩ｣ｵｬ｡ｴｾ､＠ self-analysis, all of which derive not simply from 
thought Itself but from text-formed thought Luria's questions are 
schoolroom questions associated with the use of texts, and indeed 
closely resemble or are identical with standard intelligence test 
questions got up by literates. They are legitimate, but they come 
from a world the oral respondent does not share." (Ong, 1982 p.5S) 
Havelock and Ong claim that literacy changes our way of thinking. It leads 
to the creation of a vocabulary of abstract concepts which are the basic tools 
of all theoretical thinking, including metaphysics. Luria's fieldwork 
supports their claims. In other words not only would Ricoeur's analysis of 
what is necessary for narrative fail to apply to the tale-tellers of such a 
culture, but his terminology and his very way of thinking would be 
inaccessible to them. 
The studies of anthropologists and oralists show without exception that 
the dominant form of preserved knowledge in societies with primary 
orality is narrative.33 It is indisputable that narrative precedes theory 
historically. The earliest discursive texts we have are stories, and each has 
a history of long existence as an oral epic before being written down.34 
Havelock proposes three main reasons why narrative plays such an 
important part in the discourse of primary orality. His discussion of 
narrative is closely interwoven throughout his work with his discussion 
of the significance and function of poetizing. The two are interwoven 
because in many cases formal narratives in societies with primary orality 
were told in a poetic form. One should bear in mind therefore that some 
of those effects ascribed to narrative may be brought about or enhanced by 
poetizing as well. Havelock claims for example that poetizing assists 
memory by virtue of its rhythmical structure and by virtue of the pleasure 
that rhythm engenders.35 Here however I will restrict the discussion to 
33 See Ong 1982, Goody and Watt, 1968, Goody 1977 and 1986. 
34 This is true of The Mahabar/lfa and The Epic of Gilgamesh as well as the Homeric 
verse. The vast body of traditional tales and mythology recorded by anthropologiSts over 
the last hundred years bears witness to the same pre-eminence of the oral and absence of 
the theoretical in primary orality societies. 
35 ''The only possible verbal technology available to guarantee the preservation and fixity 
of transmission was that of the rhythmic word organised cunningly in verbal and metrical 
patterns which were unique enough to retain their shape. This is the historical genesis, 
the /Ons If Drip, the moving cause of that phenomenon we stiU call 'poetry'." Havelock 
1963, p.42-3. Also: "The various motor reflexes, despite the complexity of their interaction, 
were so organised that they operated without any need on the part of the subject to think 
about them. This meant that like similar reflexes of the sexual or digestive apparatus 
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those functions ascribed to narrative. Firstly he suggests the narrative 
form assists memory, and indeed he claims oral narrative is typically 
constructed to maximise such assistance, with both repetition and 
anticipation built into the performance. Future events are heralded by 
prophecies and the scene is prepared for each episode during the 
enactment of the previous one.36 We will see that it is not mere 
coincidence that this involvement of the future in the present of the tale 
reflects at an ontic level the ontology of Dasein. Havelock supports his 
notion that memory is facilitated by narrative by citing one of Luria's later 
experiments with a professional mnemnomist. "Luria found ... that 
disconnected names in a long list were memorized by being made to 
represent actors in a narrative context".37 Secondly, Havelock claims the 
narrative form is more pleasurable to a hearer, or reader than theoretical 
discourse.38 Thirdly he suggests that narrative is instructional. In a 
society lacking the conceptual thinking made possible by literacy there is 
no abstract notion of 'good' or 'bad'. One learns socially acceptable 
behaviour through the examples handed down through stories. 
In Havelock's account of narrative one may hear loud and clear 
resonances with MacIntyre's analYSis of the transmission of pre-Hellenic 
Greek notions of virtue. In 1986 Havelock asked rhetorically, "Can moral 
philosophy find any comfort in a historical formula which proposes that 
the language of ethics, of moral principle, of ideal standards of conduct, 
was a creation of Greek literacy?"39 Five years earlier, in After Virtue, 
(1981) MacIntyre had addressed the problem of the nature of ethics before 
the dawn of philosophy. Furthermore Macintyre realised, although he did 
not frame it in terms of the orality-literacy debate, that before Aristotle the 
concepts necessary for ethical debate were lacking. As a result there was no 
they were highly sensual and were closely linked with the physical pleasures. Moreover, 
they could confer upon the human subject a specific type of pleasure. The regularity of the 
performance had a certain effect of hypnosis which relaxed the body's physical tensions 
and so also relaxed mental tensions, the fears, anxieties, and uncertainties which are the 
normal lot of our mortal existence." Havelock 1963, p.152 
36 Havelock 1982, p.141-3 
37 Havelock, 1986, p.40 
38 He observes "the average adult would prefer to take a novel to bed with him rather 
than a treatise, because a novel relates a story, not a series of factual statements. The 
narrative format invites attention because narrative is for most people the most 
pleasureable form that language, spo1cen or written, takes." Havelock 1986 p.15 
39 Havelock 1986, p.121 
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possibility of a purely ethical debate as such.4O Evaluative questions were 
assimilated to questions about particular actions. Hence moral instruction 
was not theoretical or abstract but based in action. MacIntyre, like 
Havelock, saw that Homeric man understood what was good in the 
context of action, and what was good was excellence in any field that 
promoted the common weal. In lieu of moral instruction, the 
terminology for which was unavailable, man learned how to behave 
through the example of stories. So MacIntyre writes: 
"In all those cultures, Greek, medieval or Renaissance, where 
moral thinking and action is structured according to some version 
of the scheme that I have called classical, the chief means of moral 
education is the telling of stories" (AV 114) 
Havelock similarly points out the telling of stories was not merely for 
entertainment, nor simply an activity to while away the hours. The 
whole notion of artistic endeavour or enjoyment as a leisure activity 
separate from work or education is thoroughly modem. Poetry was not 
primarily an aesthetic activity in a primary oral culture, "but a political 
and social necessity."41 MacIntyre and Havelock agree that education, and 
perforce memorisation, was assisted by narrative (which was mainly 
poetized) and Havelock asserts, as we may verify from our own 
experience, that narrative is a pleasurable form of discourse and that 
narrative stories are more memorable than lists of facts. However 
Havelock (like MacIntyre) does not consider in depth whllt narrative is, 
why it assists memory, why it is a pleasurable form of discourse nor why is 
a paradigmatic form of instruction. 
Walter Ong makes a number of perspicacious points about the nature of 
narrative, but he cannot quite pin down its essential nature. He recognises 
it is ubiquitous, and considers it "paramount among verbal art forms" 
because it lies beneath so many other forms of art.42 Ong comes as close as 
is possible, without the benefit of an ontology of Dasein, to pinpointing 
40 "morality and social structure are in fact one and the same in heroic society. There is 
only one set of social bonds. Morality as something distinct does not yet exist. Evaluative 
questions are questions of social fact." AVl16 
4l Havelock 1963, p.l2S. Heidegger, in his later writing on poetry and technology does not 
connect poetry and narrative but he does realise that poetry was not originally "aesthetic". 
He understood it to have been not merely a tool of education, social cohesion and morality 
but the tecltne of revealing, "At the outset of the destining of the West, in Greece, ... the 
arts were not derived from the artistic. Artworks were not enjoyed aesthetically. Art was 
not a sector of cultural activity .... it was a revealing that brough forth and made present, 
and therefore belonged within poims." Heidegger 1978 p.339 
42 Ong 1982, p.140 
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the essence of narrative in his belief that it reflects the shape of human 
experience, and for that reason helps us interpret the latter.43 I will show, 
with the help of Heidegger's analysis of the temporal ecstases, how it does 
this in the next chapter. Although Ong asserts that narrative reflects the 
nature of life in its temporal flow, he is careful however not to accept 
Aristotle's notion of the plot one finds in drama as definitive of 
narrative. 44 He points out that oral epic poets do not construct the 
climatic linear plot that is taken as paradigmatic in literate and typographic 
cultures. He quotes Horace's comment in the Ars Poetica that the epic 
poet "hastens into the action and precipitates the hearer into the middle of 
things. "45 He believe the epic poet has no choice but to go straight to the 
action to grab the attention of the audience, with no great concern for 
chronology. 46 
"Starting in 'the middle of things' is not a consciously contrived 
ploy but the original, natural, inevitable way to proceed for an oral 
poet approaching a lengthy narrative ... If we take the climactic 
linear plot as the paradigm of plot, the epic has no plot. Strict plot 
for lengthy narrative comes with writing." (Ong 1982, p.l44) 
For Ong plot, the very backbone of narrative in Ricoeur's analysis, does 
not necessarily exist. Ong agrees with Havelock that because primary oral 
cultures do not have scientific abstract categories, "they use stories of 
human action to store, organize, and communicate much of what they 
know. "47 But what they know is not facts, theories or data, nor is such 
knowledge abstracted from the story by the listeners after the event of its 
telling. The storyteller does not primarily impart information such that 
what he alone knew is now known to his audience. 
"The singer [of an epic) is not conveying 'information' in our 
ordinary sense of 'a pipe-line transfer' of data from singer to 
listener. Basically, the singer is remembering in a curiously public 
43 "knowledge and discourse come out of human experience and ... the elemental way to 
process human experiences verbally is to give an account of it more or less as it really comes 
into being and exists, embedded in the flow of time. Developing a story line is a way of 
dealing with this flow." Ong 1982, p.140 
44 Significantly Greek drama, though orally performed, was the first verbal genre to be 
composed as a written text. See eng 1982, p.142 
45 A,s Poetiallines 148-9, quoted in eng 1982, p.142 
46 "Of course, narrative has to do with the temporal sequence of events, and thus in all 
narrative there is some kind of story line. As the result of a sequence of events, the situation 
at the end is subsequent to what it was at the beginning. Nevertheless memory, as it guides 
the oral poet, often has little to do with strict linear presentation of events in temporal 
ｾｵ･ｮ｣･ＮＢ＠ eng 1982, p.147 
47 eng 1982, p.l40 
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way - remembering not a memorized text, for there is no such 
thing, nor any verbatim succession of words, but the themes and 
formulas that he has heard other singers sing .... The oral song (or 
other narrative) is the result of interaction between the singer, the 
present audience, and the singer's memories of songs sung. In 
working with this interaction, the bard is original and creative on 
rather different grounds from those of the writer." (Ong 1982, 
p.145-6) 
In emphasising the interaction of audience and singer Ong is pointing out 
the effect of the interpersonal dynamic on the particular form that the 
narrative takes on each occasion of its performance. This is why the 
metaphor of a 'medium' of communication, like a pipeline, is unhelpful. 
He grounds this observation in a particularly Heideggerian comment on 
the nature of verbal communication in general. 
"Human communication, verbal and other, differs from the 
'medium' model most basically in that it demands anticipated 
feedback in order to take place at all. In the medium model, the 
message is moved from sender-position to receiver-position. In 
real human communication, the sender has to be not only in the 
sender position but also in the receiver position before he or she 
can send anything .... To speak, I have to be somehow already in 
communication with the mind I am to address before I start 
speaking." (Ong 1982, p.176) 
Ong understands oral communication to entail the communicator(s) 
being in both 'sender' and 'receiver' position. In the case of the oral event 
of narrative the being of the narrative is always affected by the dynamic of 
the relation between teller and listener. This relationship is founded in 
the existentiale of being-with.48 I wish to take up a strong version of Ong's 
position outlined above and assert in the next chapter that the essence of 
narrative is not plot, a concept which arises after the impact of writing on 
narrative, but this relation between teller and audience which is open to 
human presence, having-been and possibility. 
48 N.B. I assimilate Dasein-with to Being-with throughout this thesis. 
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3 THE ORALLY TOLD STORY 
Bvery oral telling of a story is an event, and each such event takes place in 
a certain situation.49 In pre-literate societies such telling-events might be 
formal, ritual occasions or simply fireside entertainment. In modern, 
Western society these traditional occasions of story-telling are very rare 
indeed. Traditional stories that were passed down in families and villages 
for thousands of years are no longer told, and have consequently been 
forgotten. Of course stories are still told informally in conversation in 
myriad forms from neighbourhood gossip to apocryphal anecdotes, but 
storytelling no longer has the social place it had in pre-literate societies 
because it no longer provides moral or tribal education; neither does it 
form nor inform the coherence of social, tribal or racial groups. The 
professional after-dinner speaker, the salesman and the pub raconteur are 
the impoverished heirs of the professional storytelling tradition. 
Of course in spi te of this social change, as Hard y has observed, the 
narrative form is ubiquitous in human society.50 It is just the actual event 
of an orally-told story that has become rarer. However in modem 
Western societies there are three main situations in which storytelling as 
an overt, identifiable activity takes place, and I list them in diminishing 
order of occurrence. This is not necessarily an exhaustive list of situations 
in which stories are told. The first is informal discourse amid friends and 
acquain tances. 51 Such stories are mostly true stories of the life of the 
speaker or his acquaintances. 52 Such stories are ubiquitous and range 
from trivial, occasionally amusing everyday chatter to the telling of 
existentially significant, emotionally-laden life events. The second 
situation in which oral storytelling is common is psychotherapy. 53 A few 
psychotherapists use stories as a modality of treatment,54 many more, 
including most psychoanalysts consider the patient telling their own 
49 See Bauman 1986 p.l02ff for a detailed examination of an example of the effect of 
situation on content and style of storytelling. . 
50 "we dream in narrative, daydream in narrative, remember, anticipate, hope, despatr, 
believe, doubt, plan, revise, criticize, construct, gossip, learn, hate, and love by narrative." 
Hardy 1968, p.S 
51 "Almost any verbal utterance will be laced with more or less minimal narratives" 
Herrnstein Smith 1981, p.228 
52 For an analysis of narrative in such informal occasions see Bauman 1986 
53 See Polkinghome 1988, esp. pp.154-182. . 
S4 See for example, Rosen S Ed. My voice will go with you - flu ttllChing tides of Milton H. 
Erickson, Norton, New York 1982, Gersie, A. and King, N, Storymaking in Education 111"' 
TMrapy, Jessica Kingsley, London, 1990, Franzke 1989, Gordon 1978, Peseschkian 1986 and 
White and Epston 1990 
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autobiographical stories to be an essential element of the therapeutic 
process.55 We will consider this area in more detail in Chapter Six. The 
third situation in which oral storytelling occurs is in a demarcated context 
of entertainment. There is a revival in contemporary Western society of 
the practice of "traditional storytelling" by a number of professional 
storytellers. For the most part they have not inherited their tales from the 
telling of their elders, but they learned them from texts written by folklore 
scholars and collectors. 56 The modern storyteller often performs in 
schools, where there is a more or less overt educational agenda and the 
audience has not necessarily chosen to attend. Equally such a storyteller 
may be heard at a festival or in a theatre or Arts Centre by an audience 
who have paid in advance and bought a ticket to be entertained. I list 
these diverse situations in order to point out that in each case the 
situation of telling has a huge impact on mode of telling, the meaning of 
the telling and the way of listening. For example, the audience in a theatre 
of a modern professional storyteller is utterly different in its composition, 
motivation and understanding from the audiences that would have 
listened to traditional stories in a pre-literate, pre-industrial society. The 
former have expectations formed by a tradition of buying entertainment to 
be viewed passively in a building dedicated to the arts, which are 
understood to be separate from education, work or religion. The latter 
would not have, let alone make, such categorial distinctions, nor would 
they have buildings dedicated to "the arts." Similarly both the speaker and 
hearer of a story in psychotherapy bring to their apprehension of the story 
expectations which render the understanding, and the telling, of the story 
different in many ways from either the professional storytelling situation 
or neighbourhood chit-chat. 
The situation in which a tale is told affects its telling and its meaning.57 
The 'same' story means different things in different contexts.58 This is 
apparently not true of a text, which, qua text, is independent of context. Of 
course it is true of a narrative text if one insists that a text only becomes a 
55 See Mcleod 1996 (a) and 1996 (b), Goncalves 1994, Efran 1994, Pennebaker 1988, Schafer 
1981, and Spence 1982 
56 Sobol 1992, p.72 
57 See Montenyohll993 and Hymes 1975 
58 It is a teUing irony that the term for interpretative situation, 'context', derives from a 
textualized understanding of the world. The meaning and usage of "Context" is a good 
illustration of how text-based metaphors have invaded and become sedimented in our 
language. 
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story when it is read, and that every reading of course has a context.59 
Even under these conditions however, the contextual meaning is 
diminished because in the act of reading, even sub-vocalising, one's 
attention is turned away from the immediate environing world and one is 
separated from the rich meaning of immediate human contact.60 The 
reader of a novel is alone. No kinesic meaning is given by a text. The 
meaning, albeit ambiguous, of a text is a function of the relationship 
between the reader and the text. Plato noted that as soon as the text is 
disseminated the author's control and influence is all but extinguished.61 
But every story orally told has a particular delivery, it is told with 
particular tones, pauses, stresses and so on which suffuse it unavoidably 
with non-verbal (kinesic) meaning.62 Whereas a text is, as 
deconstructionists have not tired of telling us, unavoidably ambiguous, 
the spoken word is unavoidably laden with meta-verbal meaning.63 All 
speech shows emotional disposition, even though that disposition may be 
simply indifference or equanimity. Thus the meaning of an orally-told 
story is affected not just by the words, not just by the dispOSition of the 
listener, but also by the way of telling of the teller. In short, unlike a text, 
the wayan oral story is told is a function of the relationship between teller 
and hearer. 64 It is also clear when one listens to a story that the dictionary 
59 See Bruner, 1986 pp.24ff and Wolfgang Iser's The Act of RelJding, Johns Hopkins 
University Press, Baltimore, 1978 Bruner explores the importance of presuppositions that 
are brought to a narrative but he does not explore the oral/literacy divide. Indeed he 
refers to "the reader-hearer" (p.27) and "a reader (or a listener)" (p.28) explidtly 
conflating the oral and written narrative. 
60 There are degrees of separation of course but the apotheosis of text, the novel, is as 
Benjamin observed that text the reader of which is most isolated from his environing world 
and fellow humans; "A man listening to a story is in the company of the storyteller; ... The 
reader of a novel, however, is isolated, more so than any other reader." Benjamin, ed. 
Arendt, 1970 p.99 
61 "once a thing is committed to writing it circulates equally among those who understand 
the subject and those who have no business with it; a writing cannot distinguish between 
suitable and unsuitable readers. And if it is ill-treated or unfairly abused it always needs 
its parent to come to its rescue; it is quite incapable of defending or helping itself." Plato 
1973 # 275. Ct. also Grieder 1996 (b). 
62 See Birdwhistell1970 Birdwhistell's attempt to codify non-verbal meaning seems to me 
a Sisyphean labour. However his identification of the significance and vastness of the 
field he attempts to map is of the utmost importance. 
63 Which is not to say that such meta-verbal meaning may not be deliberately or 
inadvertently ambiguous. 
64 "conversational discourse is characterized by linguistic, paralinguistic, and kinesic 
'involvement strategies', designed to create interaction and integration between speaker 
and listener. Unguistic involvement strategies, such as repetition, constructed dialogue, 
and representational imagery, are common to oral and literary storytelling, though 
originating in speech. Paralinguistic and kinesic involvement strategies can include 
variation in pitch and tempo, gesture, physical and emotional mirroring, as well as the 
137 
4 ORAUfY, NARRATIVE AND BOREDOM 
and grammatical meanings of the words are not necessarily the most 
significant or important part of the story or the telling. The words may 
not even carry the most meaning. 
Ｂｓｯｭ･ｴｩｾ･ｳ＠ a performance will seem halting, as the 
conversational teller gropes for new images, and new words to 
convey them - these hesitations would be damaging to the trust 
engendered by the performer-audience relationship, were it not for 
the fact that words, in the textual sense, are not the primary 
standard by which the oral performer builds that trust. He works 
instead by the standard of involvement and interaction - eye 
contact, solicitations of agreement, spontaneous remarks to and 
about the listeners, the feeling that each listener is being directly, 
excitedly, conversationally addressed, without the performer's 
attention being diverted by the superego-like intervention of a 
text. On the other hand, an oral story may become so smoothed by 
frequent repetition that hesitations and interjections disappear, 
and its performance assumes the character of a recitation. It may 
gain then in verbal fluency, and yet lose in communicative force." 
(Sobol 1992, p.75) 
It is clear from these brief remarks that the variables affecting the 
performance and the meaning of an oral story are uncountable in number, 
immeasurable in subtlety and almost infinite in gradation. Birdwhistell's 
valiant attempts at "Kinesic Recording" demonstrate the enormity of the 
task of codifying the full gamut of non-verbal communication.65 All such 
proposals demonstrate however that the written word is irredeemably 
semantically impoverished by comparison with the contextualized, 
spoken word.66 However it is not my purpose here to pursue a 
microkinesic analysis of storytelling or to attempt to identify all the 
variables which affect the significance of oral storytelling. Many scholars 
of the oral tradition are aware of the limitations of text, and the richness of 
oral communication. As Edson Richmond put it, "folklore is everything 
that didn't get communicated when an oral performance is transcribed."67 
past register of implicit information that constitutes the relationship of conversational 
partners. None of these are available to the writer, except in a refracted and distanced 
form:' Sobol 1992, p.70 
65 See Birdwhistell 1970; p.283-S for example and pp.285ff for notation. See also 
Silverman 1993 and Edwards and Potter 1992 for similar approachs. Elizabeth Fine (The 
Folklore Text, from PerfontUlnce to Print, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1984) 
attempts to notate specifically the performance of traditional oral tales. . 
66 Montenyohl (1993) discusses the limitations of such approaches, however detailed the 
notation, to oral storytelling. His suggested solution, 'personal experience narrative,' is 
essentially to propose that one should write the story of hearing the story. 
67 Quoted in Rosenberg 1987, p.86 
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4 ORAL STORYTELLING AND BOREDOM 
Having opened up the alarmingly vast area of the huge number of 
influences on the meaning and being of a story, I want to explore just one 
variable which is always present in oral-storytelling, in relation to which 
every listener can always locate themselves and which is of primary 
importance to the event of storytelling. That variable is boredom. 
Every story-telling event is either to some extent boring or it is non-
boring. I use the term non-bOring because all the available positive terms 
that are antonymic to boring are misleadingly partial. "Engaging" for 
example can have whimsical overtones, although a non-boring story 
definitely engages the listener. "Gripping" is better but there are two 
confusing factors. Firstly "grip" is the English equivalent of "Grie/en" 
which Heidegger plays on throughout The Fundamental Concepts.68 
Secondly it tends to be applied to sensationalist novels, and so tends to 
designate an almost addicted and highly stimulated engagement by the 
listener. "Interesting" on the other hand can sound too dispassionate. 
There are similar problems with "exciting" (a non-boring story may not be 
exciting as such), "moving" (non-boring stories are moving in the sense 
that they touch one's emotional being, but they are not necessarily 
emotional or sentimental which is connotated by "moving") and so on. I 
will use the term "well-told" later when referring to an oral storytelling 
event specifically as a synonym for non-boring. The lack of an exact 
antonym for "boring" is perhaps not accidental, for as we shall see, 
whereas a boring story has an identifiable lack, the non-boring story has an 
authenticity which is a unique response to the particular situation of its 
telling. It is not surprising therefore that there is no single categorial 
description that can capture an essentially existential determination. We 
must also note at this stage that it is not entirely clear whether boring is an 
analogue or a digital distinction. We say a story can be quite boring or very 
boring. On the other hand, more trenchant critics may say, "Either it is 
good or it is boring." What is more although we can all have an opinion 
about whether or not a story is boring there is no obvious, commonly 
agreed cause of, nor cure for boredom. 
68 There is of course a relationship between the 'grip' of a story and the 'ergriffen' that 
Heidegger discusses (See PC 7 and translator's footnote) but it is not essential to explore it to 
press this thesis forward and it involves too great a detour to explore at present. 
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In all the thousands of books on narrative and performance there are a 
mere handful of references to boredom. An exemplary exception is the 
writing of Peter Brook.69 The Empty Space explores his concern with the 
essence of theatre, and he identifies boredom as its greatest enemy.70 
Brook is the director of the Centre International pour Recherche 
Theatrale in Paris. He often refers to the company, one of the most 
celebrated and respected theatre companies in the world, as a "many 
headed storyteller. "71 He speaks of the significance of boredom. 
"Le plus grand guide que je connaisse dans Ie travail, celui que 
j'ecoute tout Ie temps, c'est l'ennui. Au theAtre, l'ennui, tel Ie 
diable, peut surgir A chaque moment. n suffit d'un rien et il vous 
saute dessus, il guette, il est vorace! n cherche Ie moment pour se 
glisser de maniere invisible A l'interieur d'une action, d'un geste, 
d'une phrase. Lorsqu'on sait cela, il suffit d'avoir confiance en soi-
ｭｾｭ･＠ pour travailler. 11 suffit de se donner comme critere 
principal de jugement cette faculte que l'on partage avec tous les 
ｾｴｲ･ｳ＠ de la terre: l'ennui! Quelle merveille! Je peux regarder une 
repetition, un exercice et me dire: "Si je m'ennuie, c'est qu'il y a 
une raison." Alors, par desespoir, je cherche cette raison. Je donne 
une idee A l' autre personne, ou au contraire je la secoue, je me 
secoue ｭｯｩＭｭｾｭ･＠ ... Des qu'apparait en moi l'ennui, c'est un 
clignotant rouge." (Brook 1991, p.47)72 
It is Brook's business to prevent and pre-empt boredom. He is always 
searching to make each moment alive.73 A good storyteller must do the 
same. But what exactly is boredom? It is a universal variable in 
storytelling (that is one can always have an opinion as to whether or not a 
story is boring) and yet it is clearly not objective. One member of an 
69 Brook 1972 and 1991 
70 Brook 1972, p.45 
71 An Interview with Peter Brook, Paris October 1989, in the programme of the 1989 
Storytelling Festival at the South Bank Centre, London; p.12. 
72 "The best guide I know, to which I always listen is boredom. In theatre, boredom, like 
the devil, can strike anywhere. It's always lurking hungrily, - any excuse and it goes for 
you. It is looking for the moment to slide inside an action or a world. If you know that you 
just have to trust yourself to work. All you need to do is to use as your principal criterion the 
faculty you share with everyone else on the planet boredom! It is marvellous. I can look at 
a rehearsal, or an exercise and say to myself, "If rm bored there must be a reason." So I 
search desparately for that reason. I give an idea to someone, or I shake them, or I shake 
myself ... As soon as I feel bored, it's a red light" My translation: the text is a transcript of 
a seminar given for French Drama teachers. 
73 "Brook is concerned with the question: What is theatre? What is a play? What is an 
actor? What is the relationship between them all, and what conditions best serve this 
relationship? Again and again he stresses the transient nature of theatre - as opposed to 
the repetory principle of repetition. A play for Brook has no reality except now." Roose-
Evans, 1984, p.175 
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audience may be bored whilst another is entranced. It is not simply 
volitional (one cannot simply choose not to be bored) and yet it is neither 
uncontrollable (one can choose to take an interest or to resist engagement 
in a story) nor automatic. Boredom is in some way a function of the 
relationship between the storyteller and the audience. It may also be 
affected by the relationship between different members of the audience. In 
Heideggerian terms boredom is a modality of being-with.14 And it is to 
Heidegger that we turn as the source of an analysis of boredom. 
I advance the claim that the essence of story is non-boring storytelling. In 
other words our understanding of the term "story" and our understanding 
of stories as such is founded on the experience or possibility of a non-
boring story. We can draw a simple analogy with a motor-car. Our 
understanding of the term "motor-car" and our engagement with actual 
motor-cars is founded on their function of conveying people from A to B. 
This is a clear case of the priority of the ready-at-hand way of being.75 As a 
matter of fact some motor-cars don't work. In so far as a given car does 
not work its being as a motor-car is modified, and indeed one might say, 
reduced. As a particular present-at-hand entity it remains a motor-car, 
albeit defective, but its being a motor-car remains founded in its erstwhile 
transporting capacity. A broken-down motor-car that is left in a field for 
twenty years and used to house chickens becomes, as ready-to-hand 
equipment, a chicken-house, although one could still comprehensibly call 
it a motor-car. But a world in which motor cars existed but no motor cars 
worked or had ever worked would be nonsensical. Nor could we truly 
understand what a motor-car was if we understood it merely as a potential 
chicken-house. The primary function of the motor-car is determinative of 
its being.76 If an entity is identified as a motor-car and is not capable of 
transporting people it is understood to a greater or lesser extent to be 
deficient or defective. In the same way I maintain that the primordial 
essence of a story is that it is a particular non-boring form of discourse of 
the being-with of Dasein. We understand the term story, and any 
particular story, in terms of this non-boring discourse of being-with, 
although in fact many stories are actually experienced as boring. It must be 
conceded that to the extent that boring stories become, or have become, the 
norm, the way of being of Dasein changes, and so too does Dasein's 
74 N.B. As noted earlier I take this term to be inclusive of Dasein-with (Mitdasein). 
75 "Every machine is a piece of equipment" PC 214 See also BT 95-7 
76 .tAll equipment is what it is and the way it is only within a particular context." FC 215 
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understanding of the term "story". I will assume for the purpose of this 
thesis that the reader has had the experience of listening to a wonderfully 
non-boring story, although this may not be the case. It is safer to assume 
that the reader has had the experience of being bored. To ground that 
experience in existential phenomenology we tum now to Heidegger's 
analysis of boredom in The Fundamental Concepts. 
5 BOREDOM IN THE FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS OF 
METAPHYSICS 
The lectures that constitute The Fundamental Concepts were delivered 
just two years after the publication of Being and Time when Heidegger's 
approach to the question of Being was still vectored through the being of 
Dasein. Although the approaches, and the goals, of the two texts are 
different they are founded in the same ontology. We can therefore 
legitimately treat the two texts as complementary and in spite of certain 
differences use the one to illuminate the thinking in the other.77 The 
Fundamental Concepts, like Being and Time, is not a pellucid text so the 
commentary below is necessary to clarify and extract the key points. At the 
time of writing there are no commentaries available in English on this 
text, so this reading goes into considerable detail in order to elucidate the 
the points Heidegger is making. As in Being and Time, Heidegger's own 
writing is a formidable obstacle to comprehension. In The Fundamental 
Concepts Heidegger addresses the question of boredom on his way to 
uncovering what he claims is the fundamental attunement that guides 
philosophy.78 Heidegger tackles the subject of boredom for some hundred 
pages in which he identifies three forms of boredom: "being bored by ... ," 
''being bored with ... ," and "it is boring for one." 
(D Being bored by ••• 
The first form, "being bored by ... ," is the most familiar and obvious form 
of boredom. We say of something, "a thing, a book, a play, a ceremony, yet 
77 Heidegger explidtly refers to both the parallelism and complementarity (FetSt &£ tTl) 
and deviations (PC 305) of the paths of the two texts. . 
78 "Conceptual philosophical comprehension is grounded in our being gripped, and this is 
grounded in a fundamental attunement." PC 7, "This profollrul boretlom is the fundamental 
attunement." FC 80 
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also a person, a group of people, indeed even an environment or a 
place"79 that it is boring. We speak of such a situation as if boringness 
were an attribute of the thing which bores us; the thing is boring. 
However although we call the thing boring it is we ourselves who are 
bored; in other words boredom is not an entirely objective property but 
necessarily involves us, the ones who are bored. ''The characteristic of 
'boring' ... belongs to the object and is at the same time related to the 
subject".80 Boringness is, at least in part, some way in which the boring 
thing is relating to Dasein. But this involvement is not that the boring 
thing causes boredom in the one who is bored. The suggestion that such 
and such a phenomenon causes one to be bored raises the problem of 
finding a causal mechanism and a reason why such a mechanism is 
intermittent. Neither are evident, and Heidegger does not want to posit 
any hypothetical causative agents. In fact the idea that causation is an 
explanatory concept here provokes from him a positively sarcastic 
comment.81 The closer we look at boredom the more curious it seems. 
"For what does it mean to say that certain things and people cause 
boredom in us? Why precisely these things and that person, this 
place and not another? Furthermore, why this thing now and not 
at another time, and why does what bored us earlier suddenly not 
do so at all?" (FC 83) 
Neither the objective characteristic model nor the causation model is 
adequate to explain it, and introducing either model renders the issue 
more, rather than less, complicated. And it is already complicated enough. 
Heidegger mentions the curious fact that it is possible for us to read a book, 
for example, without feeling boredom welling up or increasing inside us 
and yet say afterwards that it was a boring book. 
"it is certainly possible that in reading we have not been bored at 
all, that we did not 'have the feeling' that boredom was being 
induced in us. And yet we call the book boring, and this without 
saying anything untrue and without lying. II (FC 86) 
When I am bored by something it does not fulfil me, nor does it engage 
me. I am not lost in it, nor carried away by it, but rather I am left 
unfulfilled. However I do not simply turn away from it to something else 
79 PC 82 
so PC 84 
81 'What is this ClJUSlItion? Does it correspond to some process like the onset of cold which 
causes the column of mercury in a thermometer to sink? Cause - effect! Marvellous!" K 83 
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as I would from an empty cigarette machine to a full one, or from a broken 
hand dryer to a serviceable one. When I am bored I am somehow held by 
that which is boring. This being held, but not being satisfied is 
characteristic of boredom. I am neither carried away by the story nor 
brought back to myself. I am "held in limbo."82 And by what exactly am I 
held? Not by any physical thing, nor any activity - indeed I would like to 
plunge into an activity to pass the time. In that phrase lies a clue: in 
boredom I am held by time, and specifically time as it drags.83 I experience 
time as burdensome, I wish it would pass. Yet I cannot make it pass faster. 
I look at the clock, hoping it will show that time has passed and feeling 
trapped because it has not.84 
When I am bored I feel caught but not satisfied. Something about the 
boring situation or thing is lacking. This lack, writes Heidegger, is the 
ground for "being left empty."85 ''The inherent predicament of becoming 
bored is precisely that we cannot find anything in particular" to fulfil us or 
divert us.86 Yet we know we lack something. We know something is 
missing, but we cannot see it, nor see what it is, nor find it anywhere. We 
wish our situation were different but there is a peculiar helplessness to 
our situation. This boring situation is not identical to the situation of 
frustration. One who is frustrated is not necessarily bored, nor vice versa, 
although frustration may lead to boredom. For example I may wish to 
attend a football match and find my wishes are frustrated so I do not go to 
the football match. I may then become bored. I am therefore both 
frustrated and bored. But although going to the football match might be 
what I think I lack, and indeed actually going to it might dissipate my 
boredom the boredom itself arises from a lack in the situation of not-
going-to-the-match which is not simply the lack of being able to carry out 
my initial wish. Boredom does not arise invariably from a frustrated 
wish, nor is it always avoided by being able to indulge our every wish. 
82 'We straightaway take 'boring' as meaning wearisome, tedious, which is not to say 
indifferent. For if something is wearisome and tedious then this entails that it has not left 
us completely indifferent, but on the contrary: we are present while reading, given over to 
it, but not taken by it. Wearisome means: it does not rivet us; we are given over to it, yet not 
taken by it, but merely held in limbo by it. Tedious means: it does not engross us, we are left 
empty... that which bores, which is boring, is that which holds us in limbo and yet leaves 
us empty." Fe 86-1, my underlining. 
83 FC99 
84 See PC 91-8 
8S "being left empty is always possible only where there is some claim to being fulfilled, 
where the necessity of a fullness exists; it is not the indifference of emptiness." PC 139 
86 PC 99 
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When we are bored it is not a straightforward matter to improve our 
situation. There is a strange lack of clarity, and we act as though that 
which we lack is unattainable; we are reduced to passing the time. 
Heidegger offers a vivid example: 
Ｇｾ･＠ are ｾｩｴｴｩｮｧＬ＠ for .example, in the tasteless station of some lonely 
mmor raIlway. It IS four hours until the next train arrives. The 
district is uninspiring. We do have a book in our rucksack, 
ｴｨｯｵｾ＠ - shall we read? No. Or think through a problem, some 
question? We are unable to. We read the timetables or study the 
table giving the various distances from this station to other places 
we are not acquainted with at all. We look at the clock - only a 
quarter of an hour has gone by. Then we go out onto the local 
road. We walk up and down, just to have something to do. But it 
is no use. Then we count the trees along the road, look at our 
watch again - exactly five minutes since we last looked at it. Fed 
up with walking back and forth, we sit down on a stone, draw all 
kinds of figures in the sand, and in so doing catch ourselves 
looking at our watch yet again - half an hour - and so on." (Fe 93) 
It is only the peculiar time of boredom that prompts us to pass the time, 
and passing the time as such continually reminds us of the boredom that 
lurks beneath it. In other words it is not that we leave boredom behind 
when we are passing the time but rather we are fundamentally still bored, 
and cope by keeping ourselves occupied by something. 87 When we are 
passing the time we remain bored and if we become no longer bored we 
are no longer passing the time but doing something else. Just as the 
boring situation leaves us empty, so too the time-passing activities leave 
us empty. In spite of our endeavours we remain bored. Yet we try to pass 
the time; "to drive it on",88 as Heidegger puts it. Why? Because it is 
dragging. It is the dragging of time that seems to be constitutive for 
boredom. After all, surely it is because time is dragging that we want it to 
pass. In fact we can't push it faster; this time is relentlessly even, second by 
second, minute by minute. Passing the time is rather a matter of doing 
something else so that time passes without us noticing, so that we could 
look up and all of a sudden find those four, long, empty hours have 
87 In this English idiom 'keeping ourselves occupied' is an implidt reference to the void of 
'being left empty' which is, for the nonce, filled. It is the emptiness in us that is 'occupied' 
by the pastime. English has many of the linguistic hints as to the nature of the phenomena 
we are investigating which parallel, although they do not at all match, those 
etvmological dues that Heidegger seizes on with such enthusiasm in German. 
8I'FC93 
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gone.89 We cannot make time run faster, so we attempt to run away from 
it. But in so far as we know we are passing the time we are continually 
reminded of the dragging of time. We know that we are passing the time 
because we look again and again at the clock. 
Clock watching is the clue to the time involved in this form of boredom. 
In so far as we measure our existence by clocktime we are held by the 
inauthentic time of the 'they'. For clocks do not measure my ownmost 
time, but rather the derivative, objective time of the everyday with-
world.9o In letting ourselves be held by the dragging of inauthentic clock 
time we are letting ourselves fall away from our ownmost ecstatic 
temporality. Inauthenticity is not necessarily boring, but when we are 
caught in a situation that occludes our authenticity but are not fully 
immersed in an activity or sensation or anything in particular, then we 
are "held in limbo".91 The way we have our time is what is boring. 
If we relate this first form of boredom to our experience of listening to a 
story or watching a play we see it is the most familar and obvious fonn of 
boredom. If we are bored listening to a story it does not have meaning for 
us in a personal and gripping way (as discussed in Chapter Two) and 
accordingly our ownmost being is not revealed. On the other hand in so 
far as the story is revealed as boring our being is revealed as empty, as held 
in limbo and held by time as it drags. In boredom Dasein's being is clearly 
not characterised by anticipatory resoluteness.92 The entire situation is 
characterised by a diminished actualisation of the potentiality of Dasein.93 
If the teller of a story has not engaged the emotions of the listeners, if the 
listener is not caught up in expectation of what is to come and if the 
listener is not brought into the Da of the story this first form of boredom is 
what characterises the Dasein of the listeners and indeed the teller. Time 
89 "Passing the time means an occupation that diverts our attention away from time as it 
､ｾ＠ and from its oppressing us." FC 99 
90 In Being and Time (BT 465-70) Heidegger is concerned to establish that even clock time is 
grounded in Dasein's temporality, but this grounding is hidden from us. Hence usually, and 
as he shows in The Fundamental Concepts particularly in boredom, we experience it as 
objective: "The ordinary conception of time owes its origin to a way in which primordial 
time has been levelled off." BT 457 
91 PC 104-5 
92 0. BT344 
93 Telling, or listening to, a boring story is a going along with a fiction that one is engaged, 
or even merely entertained, when one is not. In so far as one is not admitting how one is one 
is not taking up what is revealed in one's ownmost possibilities. Sartre would call this bad 
faith, for Heidegger it amounts to denying one's Dasein: timan, if he is to become what he 
is, in each case has to throw Dasein upon his shoulders; ... he precisely is not when he 
merely lets himself set about things in the general fray, however 'spirited' this may be" PC 
165 
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drags in the telling of a boring story and rather than being engaged in the 
time of the story we are waiting for it to end. As we wait our own time is 
given over to public, clock-measured time. 
(ii) Being bored with. •• 
In situations like that of the railway station we know ourselves to be 
bored. We can say that this thing, this book or this situation is boring, 
hence we are bored by this thing, book or situation, and we can know that 
our restless attempts to pass the time are our response to this boredom. 
However there are other instances of boredom wherein we cannot identify 
that which bores us. One of these is the second form of boredom which 
Heidegger examines which he names ''being bored with ... " Whereas in 
the first type of boredom (being bored by ... ) we are bored by a certain object, 
relationship or situation, in the second form of boredom that which bores 
is indeterminate. He gives an example: 
"We have been invited out somewhere for the evening. We do 
not need to go along. Still, we have been tense all day, and we 
have time in the evening. So we go along. There we find the 
usual food and the usual table conversation, everything is not 
only very tasty, but tasteful as well. Afterward people sit together 
having a lively discussion, as they say, perhaps listening to music, 
having a chat, and things are witty and amusing. And already it is 
time to leave. The ladies assure us, not merely when leaving, but 
downstairs and outside too as we gather to leave, that it really was 
very nice, or that it was terribly charming. Indeed. There is 
nothing at all to be found that might have been boring about this 
evening, neither the conversation, nor the people, nor the rooms. 
Thus we come home quite satisfied. We cast a quick glance at the 
work we interrupted that evening, make a rough assessment of 
things and look ahead to the next day - and then it comes: I was 
bored after all this evening, on the occasion of this invitation." (FC 
109) 
At the party everyone was jolly and charming and amusing yet later we 
say, "I was bored." Yet we were not bored by any particular thing or 
person. We passed the time agreeably. Indeed we did just that, we passed 
the time. Once again, passing the time is the clue. In fact the entire 
evening is dedicated to passing the time agreeably.94 We do not spend the 
941ust as we are on the verge of playing with our watchchain or a button, agars are passed 
around again. We have already let them pass by once, but now we take a cigar. We are not 
getting sleepy, and yet - we smoke, not to become more sleepy, nor to be stimulated by the 
147 
4 ORAUI'Y, NARRATIVE AND 1JORP.OOM 
evening waiting for it to end, as we waited at the railway station for the 
train to arrive. On the contrary we are at the dinner party deliberately and 
we have voluntarily taken the time to attend it, yet nonetheless we pass 
the time. Smoking cigars, chit-chat, a glass of port: all the pleasures on 
offer are agreeable ways to pass the time. But the whole business, we 
realize later was boring. What was boring was the passing the time itself 
which turns out to have been "our entire comportment and behaviour ... 
the whole evening of the invitation itself. "95 Looking back on the 
evening it is not possible to separate out the boredom from passing the 
time.96 The time of the whole event was boring time. In a strange way we 
tacitly accepted it as such, so that our activities during the evening have 
no goal or end other than pleasant diversions to while away the time. But 
surely it is only boring time that needs whiling away? It is precisely 
because we do not on the whole recognize it as such that this 
inconspicuous yet commonplace boredom is more profound than the 
phenomenon of being bored as we wait at a railway station. It is a different 
sort of boredom in which it is difficult to point to one specific thing or 
element that is boring us.97 But it is precisely the inconspicuous ubiquity 
of boring time that prompts us to arrange and attend such dinner parties. 
The boredom is all the more profound for being so ordinary as to be un-
noticed. The very casualness with which we slip into the passing the time 
that whiles it away betokens its ubiquity, and our casualness conceals its 
profundity. For it is more hidden and more obscure - deeper in fact - than 
being bored by ... something. Hence it is only on reflection that we see that 
the entire evening was shot through with boredom. As Heidegger puts it: 
"It is not any particular being occupied within the situation, but 
the situation itself as a whole which functions as that which 
occupies us. With this expansion of passing time there is linked a 
further characteristic of it which we must now explicitly 
emphasise: the inconspicuousness of passing the time as such - not 
inconspicuousness merely or in the first instance for others, but 
insofar as passing the time does not specifically occupy us 
ourselves as such passing the time. We allow ourselves to slip 
nicotine, but because smoking itself is a socially ideal way of passing the time. . .. in this 
way ... an inconspicuous possibility of passing the time ｰｬ｡ｾ＠ right into our hands. ｰｾ＠
the time is thus there in this situation too, though adrruttedly hard to find, and this 
predaeJy because it presents itself in such a public manner." PC 111-2 
95 PC 112 
96 "In this boring situation, boredom and passing the time become intertwined in a peculiar 
way." PC 113 
97 "In the first instance of boredom what is boring is evidently this or that, ... in the second 
instance we find nothing that is boring:' PC 114 
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into it, just as though it were already lying in wait. For this reason 
such passing the time also lacks that fluttering unease of searching 
for something with which to occupy ourselves. It is peculiarly 
casual and assured." (FC 116) 
What has happened to time such that we while it away so casually? Is 
time the sort of thing that we must always while away? Not at all, for 
when we are occupied with making things or doing things we often wish 
for more time, and the last thing on our minds is whiling away the time. 
Nevertheless the sort of time we wish to while away is not unfamiliar to 
us; we are all too used to evenings such as the dinner party Heidegger 
describes. When we take time for such an evening we set it aside in 
advance. We allocate it as "for going out to dinner".98 In this sense we 
turn our backs on the remorseless ticking of the clock.99 We dedicate the 
evening to the dinner party so the way we have our time that evening is 
not as a string of nows like the clock-watching moments at the railway 
station but rather as one long now; the now of this dinner party. 
Tomorrow we may return to the concerns of our business and get on with 
things, but this evening is set aside. In taking this time we turn away from 
the concerns of our whole time, our whole life, and absorb ourselves in 
just whatever is present in our immediate situation. 
"[In the second form of boredom) We make time stand. We let the 
time we have taken for the evening - our taking consists precisely 
in this - endure in such a way during the evening that in being 
there alongside and part of whatever is going on we take no note 
of its flow or its moments. The enduring of the 'during' swallows 
up, as it were, the flowing sequence of nows and becomes a single 
stretched 'now' which itself does not flow, but stands. The 'now' 
is stretched ... in such a way that we are entirely present for what is 
present." (Fe 124) 
This is the nub of the second form of boredom. It is certainly possible to go 
out to dinner, to chat, to smoke cigars and enjoy oneself without being 
bored. However if we only pay attention to what is put in front of us, if we 
98 "Let us consider this evening. Although we are entirely immersed in it, we have given 
ourselves this time only, not time as a whole. What whole? That to which we ourselves 
are entrusted, and which is apportioned to us. We take time for ourselves. Yet in doing so 
we have not cut a piece out of this whole like a piece of cake. Instead we take this time for 
ourselves. What happens here? How does our whole time become transformed through 
this taking time? We bring it to a stand - yet do not cause it to vanish." FC 121 
99 "We dose ourselves off from this unsettling and paralysing sound of the sequence of nows 
ticking away which can be stretched to a greater or lesser extent. We take this time so as to 
leave it for ourselves, i.e., to give it up as flowing away." FC 123 
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attempt to divert ourselves with what is immediately present and turn 
away from our ownmost past, and future and openness to being, if we go 
along with each and everything that is happening around us then we are 
making ourselves "entirely present"lOO in a manner that invites boredom, 
and can be assessed, on reflection, as boring. Heidegger calls this being 
"entirely present." 
"This entails that we do not turn to whatever, however, or 
wherever we have been, it entails that we have forgotten it. 
Entirely present, we have no time either for what we have perhaps 
planned for tomorrow or for some other time, for whatever we 
have resolved or not resolved to do, whatever task, we turn 
ourselves to, whatever stands before us, whatever we shirk. 
Entirely present for whatever is happening, we are cut off from 
our having-been and from our future." (Fe 124) 
Our having-been and our future do not get lost or cease to exist, "they 
become modified in the peculiar manner of becoming enchained within 
the mere present."lOl Heidegger is striving to express a difficult thought 
here. We relate to our having-been and our future when we are "entirely 
present" in a removed and reduced fashion. We are not touched or 
personally concerned by our past, it is merely what happened. Our own 
having-been becomes just historical fact. Equally we are not concerned 
about or engaged in our future as our ownmost possibilities. The future is 
understood as indeterminate and inauthentic.l02 What happens next in 
such "making present" feels more like more "now" than progress into the 
future because in this situation, which he calls "standing time", we are not 
concerned with our own future possibilities but merely with what is 
present to us now.l03 The now "stretches itself" so we are cut off from the 
futuricity and having-been of our present.l04 We do not fear or long for a 
future possibility but just receive what happens such that we "go along 
with it at all times."lOS There is an inconsequentiality to our actions as 
100 "This chattering and letting oneself go with whatever is happening is possible only if, 
from the outset, we constantly let whatever is going on come toward us, come up against us, 
just as it is given. It is possible only if we are entirely present in the face of whatever is 
happening around us, or as we say, only if we simply m4ke present 1gegenwirtigen)" Fe 124 
lor PC 125 
102 "Having-been and future do not become lost, it is not that they are not there at all, but 
they become modified in the peculiar manner of becoming enchained within the mere 
present, i.e. in a joining in that merely makes present." PC 125 
103 PC 125 
104 "Through the 'now' becoming compressed into being in the 'now', the 'now' stretches 
itself." PC 125 
lOS PC 124 
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though the present has no bearing on our future. It can therefore be seen 
that as we are cut off from our own having-been and our ownmost future 
possibilities we are cut off from the meaning of our lives. We have 
proposed that meaning, qua existentiale, is the unity of the temporal 
horizons. H we modify our own time such that we are enchained in the 
"mere present" these horizons and the meaning of our lives is hidden 
from us.106 We do not bring or keep with us the fullness of our having 
been, with its concomitant attunement but casually, though deliberately, 
let it fall and abandon ourselves to the sensations on offer in this 
moment. Our past is "sealed off"l07 precisely so we can abandon ourselves 
to the moment. We turn continually to the next thing, the next joke, the 
next cigar, the next glass of wine, not because one leads to another or for 
any overarching reason, but simply to be pleasurably occupied. 
Earlier we saw that we can be bored by being bound to clock-time as it 
drags; in the second form of boredom we are bored by being held in one 
long now.108 In neither case is the boringness of the forms determined by 
the speed or slowness of time, nor by the number of nows, but rather it 
stems from the fact that both are modalities of suppression of Dasein's 
authentic, ecstatic temporality. In neither case does Dasein take up its 
ownmost possibilities, but rather gives itself over to a determination of its 
time, and hence itself, which is foisted on it by external circumstances. 
Dasein's way of being is how it has its time.t09 
In the analysis of boredom in The Fundamental Concepts Heidegger has 
approached, by a different route, the phenomenon he touched on in 
section 36 of Being and Time, in his discussion of curiosity: 
"When we take a rest, care subsides into circumspection which has 
been set free. ... Care becomes concern with the possibilities of 
seeing the 'world' merely as it looks while one tarries and takes a 
rest. ... Dasein lets itself be carried along solely by the looks of the 
world; in this kind of Being, it concerns itself with becoming rid of 
itself as Being-in-the-world In not tarrying, curiosity is 
concerned with the constant possibility of distraction. . .. This 
mode of Being-in-the-world reveals a new kind of Being of 
106 This suppression of ecstatic temporality in boredom may be what Heidegger was 
referring to in his contradictory remark in Being and Time that "only Oasein can be ... 
meaningless." BT 193 
101 PC 125 
108 "In accepting the invitation in the second case we have given ourselves time; we have 
time for it and leave ourselves time for it, whereas in the first case we do not wish to lose 
any time and are m at ease due to time's passing too slowly." PC 115 
109 BT 462-3 
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everyday Dasein - a kind in which Dasein is constantly uprooting 
itself." (BT 216-7) 
Dasein as being-in-the-world is existentially determined as temporally 
ecstatic. It can however take up its being in the way of denying the nature 
of its own being, and behave as if it were not temporally ecstatic. The 
Being-in-the-world of which Dasein wishes to rid itself in curiosity is the 
authentic mode of being-in-the-world as care: "ahead-of-itself-Being-
already-in-(the-world) as Being-alongside (entities encountered within-
the-world)."110 In curiosity it continually uproots itself from its own 
having been and turns away from its ownmost future to what is present to 
it.111 If it does so it precisely cannot rest in its own being for its having-
been and futuricity would again press upon it, so it seeks distraction in 
sensations, excitement and distractions which fill the now and drown out 
the call of conscience, the awareness of the ineradicable disquiet caused by 
our taking up our possibilities as though we were not the sort of being that 
can take up possibilities. This curiosity in Being and Time is the extreme 
towards which presses what is called in The Fundamental Concepts 
"passing the time. "112 
Whereas The Fundamental Concepts tackles the modalities of temporality 
head on, Being and Time moves toward temporality through the 
phenomenological analysis of Dasein's being. Dasein, it will be 
remembered, is characterised in Being and Time by the two facts that its 
being is an issue for itself, and it has "in each case mineness".113 In so far 
as Dasein takes up its ownmost possibilities of being its way of being is 
authentic and in so far as it does not do so its way of being is inauthentic. 
Both curiosity and idle talk are inauthentic modes of being of Dasein. The 
chit-chat of making conversation to pass the time is idle talk.114 Idle talk 
of any sort is fundamentally, though not necessarily superficially, boring 
110 BT 237 
111 In The Fundamental Concepts the phenomenon is described, although in an analysis 
proceeding from a different starting point, with the same metaphor: See p.276 "Our 
everyday comportment toward all beings does not move within Ｎｴｨｯｾ＠ /unda'!'enta' 
reliltionships that correspond to the peculiar character proper to the bemgs In ｱｵ･ｳｴｩｯｾＮ＠ It 
moves rather within a comportment which, from the perspective of those beings 
themselves, is uprooted and for that very reason is rampant and successful everywhere." 
(My underlining.) 
ttZPC93 
tt3 BT68 
114 Compare PC 111-2 and BT 211ff. Idle talk is not necessarily the banter of cocktail 
parties, it could even be the logical confectionary of philosophy seminars. 
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because it is precisely not the taking-up of Dasein's ownmost possibilities, 
but those of the 'they'. 
Reading The Fundamental Concepts we realize that boredom is a 
particular mode of inauthentic temporality, in which one's time is "cut 
off" and not entirely one's own. In boredom one can become lost not in 
the world but in one's temporal being-possible.ttS 
"the time we take for ourselves is our time. This time in its 
standing ... is ... our whole time of our Dasein in a peculiar 
transformation.... This standing time - this is we ourselves: it is 
our self as that which has been left behind with respect to its 
provenance and future." (FC 125; my underlining) 
For Heidegger we are our time, so in taking time out of the whole like this 
we are altering our mode of being. By designating the evening of the 
supper party as set aside for the whiling away of our time we alter the way 
we have our time as a whole; in so doing we alter the way we are 
ourselves. In boredom we do not take up our ownmost possibilities as 
rooted in our own having-been, and our ownmost possibilities, but rather 
we uproot ourselves and turn away from such idiosyncrasy and go along 
with whatever is present here and now.116 The "letting ourselves go 
along with being there and part of things"117 characteristic of passing the 
time is founded in a mode of our temporality. 
"Boredom springs from the temporality of Dasein. Boredom ... 
arises from a quite determinate way and manner in which our 
own temporality temporalizes itself." (FC 127) 
In the second form of boredom we simply give ourselves over to an 
activity which passes the time. When a story is told in this sort of 
concealed boredom nothing is taken personally, even if the story is being 
told in the consulting room of a psychotherapist. Teller and listener 
conspire to acknowledge and even, if appropriate, applaud feeling without 
feeling it. In modem times, much storytelling takes place in this second 
115 Heidegger develops this point under his consideration of the third form of boredom, 'It 
is boring for one.' ''This attunement in which Dasein is everywhere and yet may be 
nowhere has its own peculiar feature of entrancement. What entrances is nothing other 
than the temporal horizon. Time entrances [bannt) Dasein, not as the time which has 
remained standing as distinct from flowing, but rather the time beyond such flowing and its 
standing, the time which in each case Dasdn itself as a whole is. This whole time 
entrances as a horizon." PC 147 
116 'When, letting ounelves go along with being there and part of things, we are thus set in 
place by the standing 'now' that is our ｯｾ＠ albeit relinquished and empty self, then we are 
bored." PC 126 
111 PC 126 
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form of boredom. Rather than being caught up by the storytelling, 
transported, moved and engaged by it listeners pay attention to the story as 
one does and when their attention wanders they silently chastise 
themselves and try harder. Politeness prevails and attention is carefully, 
even pointedly, paid to the teller as all are acting within a social agreement 
of what is expected of storytelling. Peter Brook offers an example of this 
sort of occasion in which we tacitly accept being bored and go along with 
the situation in the manner of the 'they.' He points out how boredom 
(and he is effectively talking about Heidegger's second form of boredom 
here) is even accepted as meritorious. 
"Almost every season in most theatre-loving towns, there is one 
great success ... one play that succeeds not despite but because of 
dullness. After all, one associates culture with a certain sense of 
duty, historical costumes and long speeches with the sensation of 
being bored; so, conversely, just the right degree of boringness is a 
reassuring guarantee of a worthwhile event. ... Audiences crave 
for something in the theatre that they can term 'better' than life 
and for this reason are open to confuse culture, or the trappings of 
culture, with something they do not know, but sense obscurely 
could exist - so, tragically, in elevating something bad into a 
success they are only cheating themselves." (Brook 1972, p.13) 
(iii) It is boring for one. 
Heidegger is intent on discovering the nature of profound boredom. In 
the two examples cited above boredom has different characteristics. In the 
first we are aware of boredom in the immediate situation, and it appears 
that the boredom arises from the situation. In the second we do not notice 
until we reflect upon the matter that it was boring, because we have, 
without remarking upon it, given ourselves over to activities that are 
founded in the passing the time of boredom. The second case is more 
profound, more hidden, that the first. 
"in the first case [of the railway station] ... A particular situation 
with its circumstances transposes us into boredom. ... in the 
second case, what is boring does not come from outside: it arises 
from out of Dasein itself." (PC 128) 
Heidegger considers the second form, the more widespread and 
unremarked boredom, to be more profound. Analytically he considers the 
move from the first form to the second to be a move deeper into boredom 
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and thus further towards the profound boredom of the fundamental 
attunement of boredom. He proposes as deeper still the boredom which 
he calls "it is boring for one."ll8 This boredom does not arise from a 
thing, nor a situation, nor from an event, but has no locus whatever. One 
is simply bored, utterly and without orientation. He gives a most 
pedestrian example: 
"'it is boring for one' to walk through the streets of a large city on 
a Sunday afternoon." (FC 135) 
In this 'it is boring for one' we are left empty not by waiting for a train, nor 
through any particular situation. Indeed it is even not clear from the 
example Heidegger gives what the situation is. Is 'one' actually walking 
through a city, or merely contemplating such a walk? The point is that it 
doesn't make any difference. In the case of 'it is boring for one' one's 
particular situation, and one's personal proclivities or predilections are 
irrelevant. In so far as I feel, of whatever activity, 'it is boring for one' I 
am left empty by it, even if I am doing it. 
"With this 'it is boring for one' we are not merely relieved of our 
everyday personality, somehow distant and alien to it, but 
simultaneously also elevated beyond the particular situation in 
each case and beyond the specific beings surrounding us there. 
The whole situation and we ourselves as this individual subject 
are thereby indifferent, indeed this boredom does not even let it 
get to the point where such things are of any particular worth to 
us. Instead it makes everything of equally great and equally little 
worth. This boredom ... takes us back to the point where all and 
everything appears indifferent to us." (FC 137) 
This characterisation of boredom seems to be quite opposite to the first 
form of boredom of which Heidegger says explicitly that 'boring' is not 
taken to mean indifferent.119 But in the situation of 'it is boring for one' 
we do not even engage in passing the time, we are overtaken by the 
boredom. We are left empty. Everything around us is boring, it leaves us 
indifferent and we are even indifferent to ourselves. This is apparently 
paradoxical, as Heidegger points out: 
"can we then still speak of a being left empty when we ourselves 
after all belong to these things that have become indifferent? If we 
118 PC 134 
119 In his deecription of the first fonn of boredom he writes: 'We ... take 'boring' as meaning 
wearisome, tedious, which is not to say indifferent. For if something is wearisome and 
tedious then this entails that it has not left us completely indifferent" PC 86 
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ourselves belong to these things that have become indifferent 
then it is surely a matter of indifference whether we are satisfied 0; 
left ･ｾｰｴｹＮ＠ ａｦｴ･ｲｾＬ＠ being ｾ･ｦｴ＠ empty is always possible only where 
there IS ｳｾｭ･＠ ｾｬｾｭ＠ to ｢･ｾｮｧＮ＠ fulfilled, where the necessity of a 
fullness eXlsts; It Ｑｾ＠ not ｾ･＠ ｾ､ｩｦｦ･ｲ･ｮ｣･＠ of emptiness. Yet if beings 
as a whole stand m an mdifference, then everything indeed, even 
ｾｳ＠ being ｬｾｴ＠ empty, is indifferent, i.e., impossible. Certainly, and 
It IS for prectsely this reason that we say: it is boring for one; not for 
me as me, but for one, and that means for one as this particular 
Da-sein." (Fe 139) 
When it is boring for one my 'being-me' is itself a matter of indifference, 
effectively I am not me as such, but me as 'one.' As being left empty was 
used previously to indicate an unsatisfactory state it is not an appropriate 
description for this state of overall indifference. However indifference is 
precisely what Heidegger believes does characterise this form of boredom. 
It is able to do so because it has "already transformed Dasein. "120 In this 
boredom we are clearly not authentic, but neither are we inauthentic in 
the sense of being absorbed in the everyday world of work and everyday 
expectations.121 Even that world leaves us cold. The being of Dasein is 
transformed into one suspended between the 'they' and one's ownmost 
possibilities.122 This one is precisely not characterised by absorption in any 
particular situation, so the situation itself is transformed. As being-in-the-
world I am existentially involved in world which is the network of relata 
which makes up my engagement with entities in the world.123 If all such 
entities leave me cold, my relationship with them is diminished as far as 
is ontologically possible. If I am uninterested in entities around me I do 
not wish to project possibilities onto them and yet they do not disappear. 
What disappears is my interest in them. Yet I am still held, because 
ontologically I am always in relationship, I cannot cut myself off from the 
world, nor the world from me. In indifference I let possibilities of 
engagement, contemplation and utilisation lie unheeded, yet I am still 
120 FC 135-6 
121 "With this 'it is boring for one' we are not merely relieved of our everydllY personlllity, 
somehow distant and alien to it, but simultaneously also elevated beyond the particular 
situation in each case and beyond the specific beings surrounding us there." FC 131 
122 1The boredom of 'it is boring for one'] happens ... neither in such a way that we are 
merely blindly abandoned to this entrancement [by the temporal horizon), nor ｳｾ｣ｨ＠ that we 
can grasp the moment of vision, but in such a way that we are told of both ••. this is tile cme 
unitary phenomenon in which we, or rather the Dasein in us, oscillates out into the expanse 
of the temporal horizon of its temporality and thus is able only to oscillate into the moment 
of vision pertaining to essential action. This oscillating in between such expanse and such 
extremity is our being attuned, this boredom as attunement." PC 151 
123 BT 120 
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burdened with those possibilities which I am rejecting. Hence as my being 
changes, so too does the being of the entities in the world, and Heidegger 
says it changes to "telling refusal" [Versagen). 
"through this boredom Dasein finds itself set in place precisely 
before beings as a whole, to the extent that in this boredom the 
beings that surround us offer us no further possibility of action 
and no further possibility of our doing anything. There is a telling 
refusal on the part of beings as a whole with respect to these 
possibilities." (Fe 139) 
Dasein in its being "must comport itself toward"124 beings. That is 
Dasein's nature. Equally entities cannot be revealed without some 
possibility of understanding.125 In the situation of 'it is boring for one' 
both Dasein and entities are revealed in the most deficient form of their 
possibilities, that is the possibility of refusing possibilities. This amounts 
to an attempt to refuse one's Dasein and indeed what is refused is the 
meaning of the particular situation of one's Dasein.126 I refuse 'being-me', 
hence Heidegger talks of 'it is boring for one.' Hence when this boredom 
strikes "the whole expanse of the entire time of Dasein is there and not at 
all specifically articulated or delimited according to past and future."127 As 
Dasein's time is not articulated its meaning is not articulated either. I am 
precisely not touched, neither lacking nor fulfilled. In fact the situation is 
characterised by the telling absence of the possibility of being lacking or 
fulfilled. 
This form of boredom precludes any meaningful engagement with a story, 
so much so that even if one tried to pay attention to the story, one would 
be more than likely to fail to follow it. In this form of boredom we may 
say that no story, in fact nothing, would have any meaning for us.128 In 
this form of boredom one not only fails to take up one's ownmost 
possibilities, but one also fails to take up one's possibilities as the 'they.' 
Indeed the conventional possibilities of the 'they' can appear to be 
reprehensibly lacking in meaning or value. This lack of meaning may be 
taken up as cynicism, or in some cases as depression. In psychotherapy a 
124 PC 139 
125 Dasein's projective understanding is the condition for the revelation of all beings as 
such, primordially as "Equipment" (BT 96-7), and derivatively as things as such. "when 
something within-the-world is encountered as such, the thing in question already has an 
involvement which is disclosed in our understanding of the world" BT 190-1 . 
126 As he remarks earlier it is not accidental that we say "that we are .lmost tlyarlg 0/ 
".om." PC 96 (The phrase is a German cliche as it is in English.) 
127FC 148 
128 See Ch. 2 
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client with this form of depression tends to complain that nothing 
matters. The complaint itself is framed with the same paradoxicality that 
Heidegger identifies; that is the client oscillates between complaining that 
nothing matters and claiming that it doesn't matter that nothing matters. 
The diagnostic manual of the American Psychiatric Association, DSM - IV, 
comments that in depression, "some individuals ... complain of ... having 
no feelings ... Loss of interest or pleasure is nearly always present, at least 
to some degree. "129 We will examine the significance of boredom in 
psychotherapy again in Chapter Six. 
6 THE GROUND OF THE THREE FORMS OF BOREDOM 
Heidegger's three forms of boredom do not exhaust possible varieties or 
descriptions of boredom. As he admits, "the forms of boredom are 
themselves fluid: there are manifold intermediate forms in accordance 
with the depth from which the boredom arises".130 We may pass from 
one to another and back again. The second form is in fact a way of 
avoiding the first or third and may turn into either of them. Although 
Heidegger labours to establish that the second and third forms are 
progressively deeper than the first he states that the first form is not the 
origin of boredom. Profound boredom does not arise from an 
accumulation of boring incidents. 
"The first form is neither the cause, nor the reason or point of 
departure for the development of boredom into the second and 
third forms, but vice-versa: the third form is the condition of the 
possibility of the first and thereby also of the second. Only because 
this constant possibility - the 'it is boring for one' - lurks in the 
ground of Dasein can man be bored or become bored by things and 
people around him." (FC 156-7) 
The third form of boredom, and the other forms, are a "constant 
possibility" because all three forms are possible modes in which Dasein, as 
temporality temporalizes itself.131 The utter disengagement of the third 
129 A.P.A. 1994, p.32G-1 For extended commentary on the diagnosis of depression see Yapm 
1988 Ch. 3 
130 PC 157 
131 "What bores us in profound boredom, and thus ... what is solely and properly boring, is 
t.porality in II particullD' way of its temportJIizing. What is boring is neither beings nor 
things as such - whether individually or in a context - nor human ｾ＠ as ｾｰＱ･＠ we find 
before us and can ascertain, neither objects nor subjects, but temporality as sudt. R: p.158 
158 
4 oaAUlY, NARRATIVE AND BOREIJOM 
form of boredom is a way in which we lose" sight of our ownmost 
possibilities and our own death reminding us of the uniqueness and 
finitude or our own time. This is the ground on the basis of which we can 
feel our time is being wasted away, take time for a dinner party or seek to 
pass the time. t32 
Boredom as a whole is a way of giving ourselves over to the happening of 
time that takes us along with it and seems to remove our ownmost 
possibilities from consideration. We have lost something of our own in 
boredom, and wherever we look for it out in the world of things around 
us we do not find it. We have lost no thing. Nothing in the world has 
gone wrong. It is precisely the withdrawal of our ownmost possibilities 
that is so irksome in boredom. Boredom both removes our ownmost 
possibilities and in doing so highlights their absence. Boredom points 
beyond itself to Dasein's authentic possibilities. 
Heidegger writes that boredom is specifically a problem for contemporary 
man.t33 The safety and comfort of modern life and the hegemony of 
scientific rationalism distances us from life and death threats. When all 
can be understood and we believe that science can in principle deal with 
everything, nothing troubles us and nothing is particularly special. 
Everything can be explained. l34 Nothing causes us to question our 
existence as a whole. l3S 
No thing can rescue us from boredom, only the courage to take up the 
possibilities of our ownmost situation and face what is opened up to us, 
including our own way of being in the world as entranced by the mere 
132 It is also on the basis of this boredom that falling into the world is tempting because it 
is tranquillizing. See BT 221-4 
133 FC 163ff. 
134 Heidegger specifically identifies psychology as a culprit in this process: 'We cannot 
ascertain that profound boredom in the Oasein of contemporary man. We can only ask 
whether contemporary man precisely in and through all his contemporary human traits 
does not suppress that profound boredom, and that means: whether he does not conceal his 
Dasein as such from himself - in spite of all his psychology and psychoanalysis, indeed 
precisely through psychology, which today even presents itself as depth psychology." PC 
166 
135 'The absence of an essential oppressiveness in Dasein is the emptiness as a whole, so 
that no one stands with anyone else and no community stands with any other in the rooted 
unity of essential action. Each and every one of us are servants of slogans, adherents to a 
program, but none is the custodian of the inner greatness of Dasein and its necessities. This 
bring left empty ultimately resonates in our Dasein, its emptiness is the absence of any 
essential oppressiveness. The mystery (Geheimnis] is lacking in our Dase.in, and thereby 
the inner terror that every mystery carries with it and that gives Oasem its greatness 
remains absent. The absence of oppressiveness is what fundamentally oppresses and leaves 
us most profoundly empty, i.e., the fundtmrentld emptiPllSS that bores us." R: 163-4 
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present and passing the time.136 In taking up our ownmost possibilities 
and having been, including our having been bored, we transform our own 
way of being. Heidegger writes of the necessity to "bring to word that 
which Dasein wishes to speak about in this fundamental attunement"137 
and to do so in a word that is not just idle talk but "addresses us and 
summons us to action and to being."138 He is undoubtedly thinking of 
"word" here in terms of his own philosophy or thinking. In the next 
chapter I will present the case for the well-told oral storytelling event to be 
just such a "bringing to word" that brings Dasein back to its ownmost 
possibilities by ''bring[ing] itself before itself. "139 Hereafter when I refer to 
boredom, unless specifically designated, it includes the possibility of all 
three forms and of intermediate forms. 
7 BEING AND TIME AND THE FUNDAMENTAL 
CONCEPTS OF METAPHYSICS 
We know from Being and Time that entities have their being in specific 
modes. The kind of being of entities to which we are closest in the home 
and in the artisanal world, which Heidegger illustrates by the cobbler's 
workshop, is readiness-to-hand.14o In theoretical cognition and scientific 
enquiry the way of being of entities is present-at-hand.141 In the profound 
boredom of 'it is boring for one' the way of being of entities is telling 
refusal.142 In profound boredom "Beings as a whole have become 
indifferen t. "143 Even Dasein behaves as if it were indifferent to itself, 
cutting itself off from its own having-been and own future. Yet beings 
precisely because they have become indifferent and not possibly 
something else, that is to say not freely themselves or objective but 
essentially indifferent, that is indifferent as their way of being, announce 
136 The word Heidegger uses, Mut (PC 167), loosely translated as courage here, is the very 
word that Benjamin uses to describe the beneficence of stories: ''The wisest thing - so the 
fairy tale taught mankind in olden times, and teaches ｣ｨｩｬ､ｲ･ｾ＠ to ｾｳ＠ dar is ｴｾ＠ meet ｾ＠
forces of the mythical world with cunning (Untermut) and WIth high spants (Obmnut). 
Benjamin 1970, p.101 
137FC 167 
138FC 167 
139 PC 165 
140 BT99 
141 BT 105-6 
142FC 137 
143FC 141 
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in their refusal what they are not, viz. possibly otherwise.l44 Possibility is 
constitutive of the understanding of things, so things as such cannot not 
have possibilities but can have instead the possibility of announcing that 
they refuse their possibilities.l45 
Telling refusal is the announcement of the withdrawal of the possibilities 
of Dasein and things which are unexploited when one is gripped by 
boredom. Possibilities themselves are not announced in this telling 
refusal of beings but rather the ground of possibility itself which is 
Dasein's being possible: 'Whatever is utmost and primary in making 
possible all possibilities of Dasein as possibilities, whatever it is that 
sustains Dasein's potentiality for being, its possibilities, is affected by this 
telling refusal of beings as a whole."l46 In the telling refusal [Versagen) of 
beings is an unavoidable reference to the possibilities left unexploited. 
This reference Heidegger calls a "telling announcement [Ansagen)."147 
Two pages later he says this announcement is "a calling [Anrufen) ... 
which properly makes possible the Dasein in me" (in the German "ein 
Anrufen, das eigentliche Ermoglichende des Daseins in mir)."148 
"Properly" (eigentliche) making possible here clearly denotes the same 
modality as "eigentliche" translated as "authentically" in Being and 
Time.149 It seems therefore that this call is similar to the call of conscience 
in Being and Time. ISO For both the Anrufen referred to in The 
Fundamental Concepts and the Ruf of Being and Time, call Dasein back to 
itself as the ground of possibilities, that is to its authentic self in the 
moment of vision. lSl Dasein's essential being is temporal, and in the 
moment of vision [Augenblick) it takes up its possibilities, that is to say it 
understands itself, as anticipatory resoluteness, choosing its own future on 
the basis of its own having-been alongside other entities, understood as 
144 This point is emphasised in the German with a play on Versagen - to deny, refuse, and 
S&tn, to say, announce. 
145' In his discussion of understanding and interpretation in Being and Time Heidegger has 
foreshadowed this point; "the mere seeing of the Things which are closest to us bears in 
itself the structure of interpretation, and in so primordial a manner that just to grasp 
something free, as it were, 01 the 'as', requires a certain adjusbnent: When we merelY,stare 
at something, our just-having-it-before-us lies before us as a failure to understand at any 
more." BT 190 
146 PC 143 
147 PC 141 
148 PC 143 - German text Gesamtausgabe Band 29/30 p.216 
149 See BT 24 footnote 3 and BT 68 footnote 3 
150 BT 319ff., esp, BT34o-1 , 
151 "The telling announcement that points toward that which properly makes ｾｾｉｮ＠
possible in its possibility implels us toward the singular extremity of whatever origtnarily 
makes possible." PC 144 
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such in their possibilities for Dasein. When Dasein is authentic it is not 
bored, rather it is open to its future and its having been, that is to say its 
self· When Dasein is bored it is not open to its ownmost temporality and 
yet it is not completely absorbed in the 'they' because it is haunted by its 
proper, ownmost possibilities, including the very possibility of withdrawal 
from beings which makes possible boredom in the first place. And in 
boredom, precisely because it has not fallen completely into the 'they,' it 
hears the call all too clearly and knows itself to be lacking. 
In Being and Time Heidegger concentrates on the nature of Dasein's 
inauthentic self-interpretation. In The Fundamental Concepts he spells 
out a modification of Dasein's inauthentic interpretation of entities 
within the world. In both cases the interpretation of self and of entities-
within-the-world is grounded in the modification of the upon-which of 
the projection of the interpretative understanding. As we saw in Chapter 
Two, in Being and Time this upon-which is called meaning, which we 
have held to be equivalent to, although not explicitly stated to be, the 
unity of the temporal horizons. In The Fundamental Concepts our 
reading is vindicated. Heidegger describes "all doing and activity of 
Dasein" as having "three perspectives of respect, retrospect and 
prospect. "152 This is a re-presentation, in a different guise and context, of 
the three-fold sight of interpretation in Being and Time.1S3 Interpretation 
is the "development of understanding."IS4 Every understanding has its 
mood, and the existentialia of understanding and attunement are always 
articulated by discourse.1SS These existentialia are both Dasein's being and 
the grounds for the revelation of the being of beings other than Dasein. 
What can be articulated in interpretation is (in Being and Time) "what we 
have called 'meaning'. "156 This is precisely what is modified in profound 
boredom. In The Fundamental Concepts Heidegger claims that the three 
perspectives [Sichten] are originarily united. The withdrawal of beings as a 
whole in boredom is the modification of the united temporal horizon as a 
whole such that the having-been, the possibilities and the open presence 
of beings withdraws all at once. 
"There is a telling refusal of all beings ｳｾｵｬｴｾ･ｯｵｳｬｹ＠ in ＧｷｨｾｴＧ＠
and 'how' they are: as a whole, as we put It. This now means: m 
IS2 PC 145 
153 BT 191 
154 BT 188 
155 BT 182 at BT 203-4 
156 BT 204 
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one originarily unifying horizon of time. This 'as a whole' is 
･ｾｩ､･ｮｴｬｹ＠ ｾｳｩ｢ｬ･＠ only insofar as beings are enveloped by the 
smgle yet simultaneously threefold horizon of time. This horizon 
of the whole of time which is fully disclosed in this way must be at 
work if it is to be possible for there to be a telling refusal of beings 
as a whole.''' (FC 145) 
In the telling refusal of beings of profound boredom the horizon of time is 
modified. Entities thus become what we call colloquially 'meaningless.' 
OntologicaUy of course Dasein cannot exist without meaning hence the 
emphasis on the announcement of withdrawal of beings emphasised by 
the translators as telling refusal (Versagen means 'failure' in German. 
Sich etwas versagen means 'to deny oneself something'. The translation 
as 'telling refusal' is made to bring out the connection emphasised by 
Heidegger with sagen 'to say'.) In boredom Dasein's meaning is nihilated. 
Dasein's meaning is thus that it is meaningless. In such boredom Dasein 
itself is entranced, it "cannot bring itself to expect anything from beings as 
a whole in any respect, because there is not even anything enticing about 
beings any more. "157 The temporal horizon, that which holds beings as a 
whole open now "entrances Dasein ... as the time ... beyond flOWing and its 
standing, the time which in each case Dasein itself as a whole is."158 Thus 
in profound boredom Dasein "cannot find its way"159 to the beings 
amongst which it finds itself and hence its relationship to them is closed 
down to the emptiest possibility of being merely set amidst beings.l60 
8 BOREDOM, MEANING, ORALITY AND THE 
NARRATIVE EVENT 
We are now in a position to begin to draw together the themes of the 
forgoing exposition. In Chapter One we outlined a reading of Heidegger's 
fundamental ontology of Dasein which is the ontological foundation of 
the thesis. In Chapter Two we investigated the existentiale of meaning, 
and drew out of Heidegger's sketchy references and descriptions two 
conclusions. Firstly that, qua existentiale, meaning is the unity of the 
temporal horizons, within which and against which understanding is 
157FC 147 
158 FC 147 
IS9FC 147 
160 This empty relationship is frequently a significant component of depression, O. Yapko 
1988, pp.30-31 and Chapter Six below . 
. 
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projected. Secondly, in the special case where we say that an entity has 
meaning for Dasein, the being of Dasein is revealed along with the entity. 
It was proposed that we can understand meaning as an existential 
structure in terms of narrative. In Chapter Three we examined the 
understanding of narrative in modern scholarship and found it to be 
almost inextricably entangled with, and trammelled by, textuality. 
Understanding narrative as a textual phenomenon hides what we 
consider to be its essential nature as an event, and hides also the most 
significant variable in the eventhood of narrative, that is to say the 
variable of boredom. The significance of boredom, like the question of 
being, has been overlooked and obscured in and by the practice and 
consequences of text-based thinking and scholarship. Therefore in this 
chapter we turned to the scholarly discussion of the significance of orality 
and to Heidegger's analysis of boredom. In our reading of The 
Fundamental Concepts we have seen that the modification of authentic 
temporality which is constitutive of boredom is the same modification 
that leaves entities with no meaning for Dasein. 
However Heidegger's analysis of boredom turns out to be an analysis of 
the modification of the being of Dasein, and the question of the nature of 
boring or non-boring stories has not yet been addressed. In the next 
chapter we will therefore layout a description of the nature of the non-
boring storytelling event. As an event, telling a story is a comportment of 
Dasein. In the light of the foregoing exegesis I will maintain that the oral 
non-boring, or well-told, storytelling event is the primordial form of story, 
the mostly hidden form upon which all derivative forms ultimately 
depend or, in Heideggerian terms "nourish themselves."161 It is clear that 
the transience of the event of storytelling has made the phenomenon 
difficult to study in a text oriented milieu. The equally transient 
phenomenon of being not-bored or being bored, not to mention its highly 
personal, or subjective, quality has rendered boredom not only resistant to 
analysis, but almost completely overlooked not only in philosophy, but 
also in literature and even performance studies, although, as we have 
noted above, from an audience's, or a performer's, point of view boredom 
is the most immediately apprehensible phenomenon in performance, and 
161 The storyhood of the story, its meaning such that it is understood as a story, depends on 
the particular possibility of engagement of Dasein which is listening to (or telling) an 
engaging story. Hence the 'being a story' of a story is nourished by this hidden 
understanding. This is a particular case of the meaning (or upon-which) of the projection of 
the being of an entity to which Heidegger refers on BT 371 
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not the least important. Boredom strikes at our whole being.162 Boredom 
strikes at Dasein as a modification of the existentiale of meaning, in which 
the temporal horizons collapse into an "unarticulated unity."163 By 
contrast, therefore, that which is non-boring is that wherein Dasein '5 
existential meaning is articulated and, if it is utterly non-boring, Dasein's 
being will be authentic. H an entity has meaning for Dasein, through or in 
a story, then that which constitutes the meaning of Dasein's being, that is 
to say its being-attuned, being-alongside and being-possible will be 
revealed to Dasein along with the being of the entity. This revelation 
corresponds precisely to the state of being at the same time both 
transported and brought to oneself by a story which touches and moves 
one greatly. Non-boring story is a form of discourse in which Dasein, 
comporting itself towards Dasein lets entities have meaning and modifies 
its being. A non-boring story is therefore an instantiation of what 
Heidegger calls "historizing of ... resoluteness".164 We turn in the next 
chapter to a detailed analysis of the primordial structure of narrative and 
its grounding in the temporal being of Dasein. 
162 ''boredom .. can take hold of us in an instant like a flash of lightning, and yet preciaeIy 
in this instant the whole expanse of the entire time of Dasein is ｴｨ･ｲｾ＠ and not at all 
specifically articulated or delimited according to past and future. Neither merely the 
present nor merely the past nor merely the future, not indeed all these ｾｮ･､Ｎｴｯｧ･ｴｨ･ｲﾭ
but rather their Unllrticulilted unity in the simplicity of this unity of thelr honzon all at 
once." PC 148 
163FC 148 
164 See BT 442 
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Chapter Five 
The Essence of Narrative and Dasein 
1 INTRODUCTION 
An understanding of the essence of narrative allows us an approach to the 
topic of meaning and the eventhood of our own being which is of specific 
value to areas concerned with the modalities of human communication 
such as psychotherapy. Boss and Scott, an astute contemporary 
commentator, both point to the importance of understanding man as 
world-openness.1 We can now see that man's world-openness has a 
narrative structure. In this chapter I demonstrate that we can illuminate 
the ontological structure of Dasein and the primordial form of narrative 
by means of reference to each other. I propose that the primordial form of 
narrative is the well-told oral storytelling event. 'Well-told" means non-
boring. By well-told I mean that the audience caught up and is moved by 
the event. To understand the phenomenology of storytelling we must 
grasp the fact that the essence of the primordial form of narrative is not 
the recounting of a sequence of events but rather Dasein's involvement in 
the Dasein of the other in the unity of the oral storytelling event.2 In this 
comportment of Dasein we have a lived, non-theoretical showing of 
being-with. This comportment is of fundamental importance, not just in 
performance but also in the practice of psychotherapy (which we shall 
examine in Chapter Six) as it is the existentiell experience of the special 
case of how entities have meaning for Dasein and the revelation of 
Dasein's being as meaningful (as discussed in Chapter Two). 
1 Boss 1994, Scott 1984. 
2 Even though he is writing about text, Bakhtin gropes towards this understanding; ''before 
us are two events - the event that is narrated in the work and the event of narration itself 
(we ourselves participate in the latter, as listeners or readers); these events take place in 
different times (which are marked by different durations as well) and in different places, 
but at the same time these two events are indissolubly united in a single but complex event 
that we might call the work in the totality of all its events, including the external 
material givenness of the work, and its text, and the world represented in the text, and the 
author-creator and the listener or reader; thus we perceive the fullness of the work in all 
its wholeness and indivisibility, but at the same time we understand the diversity of the 
elements that constitute it." Mikhail Bakhtin quoted in Bauman 1986, p.112 
166 
5 mE ESSF.NCE OFNARRA1lVE AND DASEIN 
Oasein's existential involvement with other Dasein in everyday life is 
characterised by an indifferent going alongside the other, as each of us 
believes him or herself to be an isolated individual.3 However in a 
successful, that is non-boring, moving and engaging, oral storytelling 
event we are brought back from our indifference into authentic being-with 
wherein we experience ourselves and each other in attuned, 
understanding, articulated being-with.4 A successful non-boring oral 
storytelling event involves an existentiell transformation, that is a 
transformation in Dasein's way of being from the everyday indifference of 
the 'they.' In such an event Dasein cares for the Dasein that is revealed. 
This ontic event of caring is founded in the ontolOgical structure of care. I 
propose that the primordial event of narrative, which is most often 
hidden or unactualized in less successful storytelling events, lies in the 
existentiell revelation of Dasein's authentic temporality.S The successful 
oral storytelling event is not necessarily the only event in which this may 
occur but it is that on which we concentrate in this thesis.6 We listen to 
stories and recognise them as such because of this often obscured and 
forgotten expectation or recognition that a story is not merely a present-at-
hand spectacle for our amusement but a possibility of a different form of 
engagemen t with our fellow Dasein. In so far as this is forgotten this 
fundamental possibility of engagement is supplanted by sensational and 
spectacular stimuli which satisfy the inauthentic correlate of such 
understanding, attuned engagement, viz. curiosity} 
In fact in contemporary Western society well-told oral storytelling events 
are rare. Of the events of oral storytelling that do occur the vast majority 
are mostly not at all transformatory but rather everyday and often to a 
greater or lesser extent boring in the manner of the first of second types of 
3 See BT 158 and FC 208. See also Buber 1970 pp. 80-81. See Taylor 1989 for a historical 
review of the concept of the self and Bruner 1990 for an overview of modem paradigm 
shifts. 
4 As before, being-with here includes Dasein-with. Ct. "By reason of this with-like ｂ･ｾﾭ
in-the-world, the world is always the one that I share with Others. The world of Dasean 
is a with-world. Being-in is Being-with Others. Their Being-in-themselves within-the-
world is Dasein-with." BT 155 See also BT 206 
S Champigny 1972 also approaches the question of narrative through time, and makes a 
Unk with meaning. However although his work is peppered with illuminating tqJerf;1lS it 
is too incoherent overall to be a useful resource. His attempt to resolve questions of 
structure, temporality, genre and ontology in the same thesis overwhelms the exegetic 
capadty of the text. . '
6 Similar transformation may occur for example in the theatre, and, an the non-narrative 
context, in emotional relationships. I cite Peter Brook's theatre as an example of the 
former but further possibilities mostly lie beyond the remit of this thesis. 
7 See BT 216-7 
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boredom. These are the narratives of everyday conversation which are so 
ubiquitous that we hardly ever advert to the fact that a story is being told. 
We notice stories as such more often not spoken face to face but when we 
come across them in books, films and other media. Narrative theorists 
have tended to believe that a story is a certain sort of entity or event which 
may by transmitted through various different media and yet remain the 
same sort of entity or event. I maintain however that there is a significant 
difference between orally-told stories and stories mediated through fixed 
forms such as texts or picture without the physical co-presence of teller 
and listener. 8 
Stories in such media are for three primary reasons mostly ontologically 
diminished simulacra of the lived event we will be examining. Firstly 
there is no feedback from audience to storyteller; secondly what is 
presented has no essential relationship to its context; and thirdly by virtue 
of being given a particular fixed form such stories are necessarily edited 
and hence diminished in potential and in terms of non-verbal 
communication. This is not to say such stories are not moving or exciting, 
but just that they lack the potential of a certain existentiell being-with. In 
so far as it is lacking Dasein may not take up a certain existential 
possibility. The reader should therefore constantly bear in mind whilst 
reading this chapter, that the successful oral storytelling event is not an 
everyday occurrence but a relatively rare (and notable) experience. My 
contention is that this experience is not a fluke event of nugatory 
expository value, nor an inexplicable epiphanic experience of the 
numinous, but an essential and explicable possibility of Dasein in which 
Dasein may understand its own being without recourse to philosophical 
concepts. It is not at all accidental that Heidegger cites an old story, the 
fable of Cura, to demonstrate pre-philosophical Dasein's pre-ontological 
understanding of its own being.9 The successful oral storytelling event is 
an experience wherein the phenomenologist may observe the temporally 
ecstatic nature of Dasein. Neither philosophy nor phenomenology can 
force Dasein to participate in, nor even acknowledge the significance of, 
such an event. As Heidegger puts it in The Fundamental Concepts: 
8 ''Communication is intersubjective. The media model is not. There is no adequate model in 
the physical universe for this operation of consciousness, which is distinctively human and 
which signals the capadty of human beings to form true communities wherein person shares 
with person interiorly, intersubjectively. Willingness to live with the 'media' model of 
communication shows chirographic conditioning." eng 1982, p.171 
9BT242 
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Ｂｱｵ･ｳｴｩｾｧ＠ will ｭＺｭｾ＠ US to ｾ･＠ brink .of possibility, the possibility 
?f ｲｾＡｯｲｭｧ＠ to ｉ＿｡ｳ･ｾ＠ Its actuality, that lS, Its existence . ... [But] Only 
IndivIdual action Itself can dislodge us from this brink of 
possibility into actuality, and this is the moment of vision. 
Philosophizing, on the other hand, can only lead us to the brink 
and always remains something penultimate in this respect. II (Fe 
173) 
In other words this thesis, as philosophizing, remains writing about 
Oasein's existentiell transformation, which can be discussed and disputed 
as information and theoretical assertions present-at-hand; the existentiell 
understanding itself is grasped in the moment of participation in the well-
told oral storytelling event. 
2 WHAT IS A STORY? 
From our review of the work of Havelock and Ong we may draw three 
points. Firstly, the thinking of a culture of primary orality differs from 
that of a literate culture. lO Secondly, historically a literate culture takes 
over and writes down what it has inherited from its oral precursor and in 
writing it down, changes its meaning.ll Whereas the meaning of a 
spoken word cannot ultimately be divorced from its context, the meaning 
of a written word cannot, ultimately, be entirely determined by its context. 
The reader of a written word in a literate print-based culture can appeal to 
a dictionary as the source of definitive meanings. In an oral culture words 
cannot be extracted from their context, and their meaning may be 
determined by it.l2 Thirdly, narrative is identified as a primary form of 
discourse in oral cultures and the paradigmatic means by which 
knowledge and values are preserved.l3 As we recognise stories existed 
before texts their existence cannot be determined by, nor dependent on 
textuality. If we attempt to understand narrative in terms of, or as a type 
10 See eng 1982, pp.37ff. 
11 "As speech written down becomes separated from him who has spoken it, so does the 
content of the statements made. These become objectified as thoughts, ideas, notions 
existing in their own right. Correspondingly, as separate entities, they seem to require a 
separate source, not a linguistic one associated with the speaker's tongue or mouth. but a 
mental one of a different order located in his consciousness." Havelock 1982, p.290 
12 "Whereas with written genres the setting in which one reads a text is often irrelevant to 
its interpretation, in oral genres the occasion of performance is clearly important and may 
be definitive of the audience's expectation." Tonkin, 1992, p.st 
13 "the preferred format for verbal storage in an oral culture will be the narrative of 
persons in action, and the syntax of the narrative will predominate." Havelock t982, p.t37 
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of, text we surely mistake its nature. Although the vast majority of 
theorists have done just this it is clear that they all, for this very reason, 
have fallen into error. In fact as Ong points out even texts, however de-
contextualized and ambiguous, in the end can never free themselves 
entirely from the primacy of the sounded word. 
"For a text to be intelligible, to deliver its message, it must be 
reconverted into sound, directly or indirectly, either really in the 
external world or in the auditory imagination. All verbal 
expression, whether put into writing, print, or the computer, is 
ineluctably bound to sound forever." (Ong in Baumann 1986 p.31) 
My claim is that the event of oral storytelling is the primary form of 
narrative or story, and all other phenomena analysed as narratives or 
stories ontologically are modifications or derivations of this primary form. 
This does not mean that every identified narrative, such as a cOmic-strip, 
was once spoken or described verbally by one person to another, but that 
the narrative event of storytelling and the process of listening to a story is 
the primordial comportment of Dasein that is modulated in the 
comprehension of any narrative such as the reading of a comic strip. 
Although a great deal of what I have to say could also be applied to 
narratives mediated by text, film or other media my primary aim is to 
clarify the nature of the event of oral storytelling. Therefore although I 
may refer to other mediated narratives, and some of my remarks will be 
applicable to them, we must remember that the focus of this analysis is the 
event of oral storytelling. It will be a task for future research to apply the 
findings of this thesis to mediated narratives. 
Heretofore I have used the word narrative both as noun and adjective, 
and without making a specific definition. As it is so broadly used I will 
not use it for my central definition, nor indeed will I use the word story. 
There is a particular problem with the word story. We may talk of the oral 
event of storytelling as "telling a story," and it seems as though we are 
describing an action (telling) done to, or with, an object (the story) as 
though "telling a story" was analogous to "driving a car." Theorists tend 
therefore to talk about "the story" as though it was something that exists 
when it is not being told, just as a car exists when it is not being driven. 
We may borrow from J. L. Austin's speech-act theory to demonstrate the 
fallaciousness of this analogy.14 If the event of oral storytelling involves a 
14 Austin 1976 I am indebted to Hermstein Smith's paper for a succinct reminder of the 
pertinence of speech act theory to narrative. 
170 
5 'DIE ESSENCE OF NARRATIVE AND DASPJN 
transformation of Dasein's way of being it is performative speech. It is 
more like promising than driving. If I make a promise the promise does 
not exist when I am not making it. This does not mean I have forgotten it, 
nor that I do not choose to be bound by it, but simply that it is an action, 
not the sort of thing that exists when I am not doing it. "Making a 
promise", or "promising" is an action. I can, of course write down "I 
promise to do x" - but this written sentence is not the promise as such, it is 
a record of the promise. IS Indeed I can write down "Bill promises to do x" 
but this is not a promise either unless Bill himself promises, that is, 
performs an illocutionary act.16 This, I submit, in spite of the libraries full 
of "stories" throughout the world, is the fundamental ontological state of 
affairs with stories. "Telling a story" is not primarily the verbal 
presentation of information but is a specific transformation of the mode of 
Being-with of Dasein, or in less Heideggerian terminology, of relating 
between human beings. When a story is well-told, that is non-boring, the 
listening Dasein is involved and affected in its being. Something is done, 
in Austin's terms, in "telling a story." Austin himself would perhaps not 
have wished his theory to be used in this way. He might have preferred to 
claim that telling a story is simply describing, reporting or saying that 
something is the case, albeit in certain cases falsely. After all, if telling a 
story is not a locutionary act, what is? Clearly on a Heideggerian view of 
language very little language use is purely locutionary. Our primary way 
of being in the world is concern, and in concern our language use is 
guided by the network of in-order-to's and for-the-sake-of which 
constitute the significance of the world in which we dwell.17 On this view 
the primordial form of language is illocutionary not locutionary.18 This 
philosophical view is supported at the socio-historical level by Ong's 
15 The act of writing could constitute the action of promising - in a letter for example. The 
point remains however that promising is a performative verb. 
16 "an 'illocutionary' act [is the] ... performance of an act in saying something" Austin 1976, 
p.99 
17 See BT Sections 15 and 16. As Dreyfus comments, 'The familiar movement from 
primordial to positive to privative, in which an 'assertion' is finally ｣ｵｾ＠ off ｦｲｯｾ＠ the 
context within which it refers, makes possible the move to the sort of assertion studied by 
traditional ontology." Dreyfus 1991, p.212 
18 In his later writing Heidegger refers to the phenomena I associate ｷｩｾ＠ the well-told 
oral storytelling event in relation to poetry, which as Ong shows, was onginally what I 
call an well-told oral story telling event; ''Poetry proper is never merely a higher mode of 
everyday language. It is rather the reverse: everyday language is a ｦｯｾｴｾ＠ and 
therefore used-up poem, from which there hardly resounds a call any longer. Heldegger 
1971, p.208 
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remarks on the primacy of performative language in primary oral 
societies: 
"chirographic cultures regard speech as more specifically 
informational ｴｾ｡ｮ＠ do oral cultures, where speech is more 
performance-oriented, more a way of doing something to 
someone" (Ong 1982 p.177) 
Herrnstein Smith uses Austin's speech act theory in her cogent attack on 
the dualism in the narratology of Structuralists such as Chatman although 
she does not make the connection to orality that I think her essay makes 
possible.t9 Structuralist theory argues that each narrative has a basic story 
and a narrative discourse wherein the basic story is realised as a version.20 
Hermstein Smith points out that every articulation of the supposed basic 
story is itself another version.21 She draws attention to the unanswered 
question of the ontological realm in which such a basic story might exist, 
and suggests ironically that it is akin to that of the Platonic form.22 Equally 
problematic is the testimony of a book which Hermstein Smith cites in 
which 345 variants of Cinderella are recorded.23 The versions are so 
disparate that it is not possible even to construct a basic story let alone 
discover one. Indeed she goes on to note how many different stories can 
be interpreted as versions of the same story - to the extent that, 
"[The author] intimated in the preface ... that if she had continued 
her labors long enough, all stories would have turned out to be 
versions of Cinderella - and [I had a] suspicion ... that Cinderella 
would tum out to be basically all stories." (Herrnstein Smith 1981, 
p.216) 
The closer one examines the notion of the basic story the more elusive it 
is. If a basic story, as opposed to a particular event of telling is so elusive, 
might it not be because the supposed basic story is not an entity at all but 
rather a record of an event like the record of a promise? Hermstein 
Smith seems to think so because she does go so far as to suggest that, "the 
very concept of 'the story of Cinderella' might be an artefact of folkloristic 
19 Herrnstein Smith 1981. Chatman's attempt at rebuttal of her points <Mitche111981, pp. 
258-265) is inadequate. . .. . 
20 See Chatman, Seymour Story and Discourse: Narrative Structure an Fiction and Film, 
Ithaca, New York, 1978 
21 Hermstein Smith 1981, p.214 
22 Hermstein Smith 1981, p.212. This is surely a case of many a true word written in ｾ＠ in 
view of Havelock's notion of the genesis of Platonic philosophy. The 'basic story' IS a 
concept (or as Chatman would rather have it a 'oonstructl ) that is made possible by text. 
23 Cox, M. R. Cirulerel"', British Folk-lore Society, London, 1893 
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assumptions and methodology."24 In undercutting the dualism that she 
feels runs through structuralist narratology she undermines the same 
dualism and dubious ontology which I believe is easily read into the 
commonplace phrase "telling a story." Stories are primarily et1ents of 
telling. Even reading a novel involves a telling or a virtual 
reconstruction of telling in the world of the reader.2S The reader is 
involved in a process we know to be different from, say, reading a bus 
timetable. 26 The fact that in countless phrases of everyday English we 
refer to stories, and we may talk about "the story of Dr Zhivago" or "the 
film of the story" supports the illusion that stories exist independently of 
their telling. Indeed at the level of physical existence the readable marks 
on paper suggest they do. But as many a schoolboy has joked one cannot 
hear a story by holding a book to one's ear, nor understand a theory by 
eating the paper on which it is printed. Even in the physical sense the 
essence of the story is not in the book in the way that milk is in a bottle. 
Where is the essence of the story? The clue to the answer lies on the first 
page of Division One of Being and Time. The essence, the "what" of a 
story, lies in its existence, "that it is told." Like Dasein, its essence lies in its 
existence. Primordial story is essentially a comportment of Dasein. Dasein 
always comports itself towards something.27 In storytelling Dasein 
comports itself towards itself as meaningful.28 For a story to be as such 
(and not a record of a story), it is told and heard (though not necessarily in 
words and not necessarily out loud) by Dasein. The writing down of 
stories has misled the common understanding to think of stories as things 
and the whole field of narratology to look for the deep structure or basic 
story in exactly the same manner that Havelock claims that writing led 
Plato to posit eternal forms beyond the words transformed into concrete 
entities by writing.29 This is why the notion of the continual becoming or 
24 Herrnstein Smith 1981, p.21S 
25 Turner 1986, p.90, puts a case for regarding reading as a performance. 
26 It is of course possible to imagine a episode of life in which the information in a bus 
timetable is fraught with existential Significance. We should note however that if we do 
ｩｾ＠ such an episode we are telling ourselves a story. 
27 See BTI61-2 and Heidegger 1982, p.64 
28 Duein is always meaningful of course and all discourse is based on this understanding but 
in story it is raised to the level of awareness, albeit not usually thematised. 
29 "all 'knowledge' in an oral culture is temporally conditioned, which is another way of 
saying that in such a culture 'knowledge' in our sense cannot exist. To this fundamental trait 
of the Homeric mind Plato and also the pre-Platonic philosophers address themselves, 
demanding that a discourse of 'becoming' that is of endless doings and events, be replaced by 
a discourse of 'being', that is of statements which are in modern jargon 'analytic',. are free 
from time-conditioning. The opposition between becoming and being in Greek PhiiOIOphy 
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showing of a story was supplanted by the re-ification "plot". The extent to 
which writing has distorted our understanding of story can be illustrated 
by comparing story with dance. Dances, like stories, can be recorded on 
paper but because it is obvious that in dancing one moves one's body we 
do not mistake the record of the dance for the dance itself. Rather than 
positing a "basic dance" or "deep structure" of the dance we recognise that 
although we can remember the dance or record it, the dance is fully a 
dance in performance. A dance is a physical comportment of Dasein. Its 
essence is in its existence. Its existence is performance, and every 
performance is an event. 
The non-boring oral storytelling event is the specific type of event upon 
which I wish to concentrate and which I will demonstrate is the primary 
event which gives rise to the re-ification "story" and its many variants. I 
therefore will clarify the particulars of this type of event of oral storytelling 
below and hereafter refer to it by the acronym WOSE, (Well-told Oral 
Storytelling Event.) The qualification "well-told" is both crucial and 
problematic, because the distinction between "well-told" and boring is not 
susceptible to external, objective proof, and yet it corresponds, as we have 
seen in the previous chapter, to a distinction between two different ways 
of being of Dasein. Just as the way of being of entities-within-the-world 
changes from ready-to-hand to present-at-hand if Dasein stops using them 
and contemplates them as 'objects' so the way-of-being of Dasein changes 
if it stops being bored and becomes engaged in a WOSE. When Dasein is 
bored it has own its time as standing or dragging. It takes its own self up 
in this temporally diminished form. Just as Dasein can be "lost in the 
they"30 it can be "held in limbo by time as it drags."31 When Dasein is 
engaged in a WOSE it is not bored and it has its time as ecstatic, ahead-of-
itself as having-been alongside what is presented in the WOSE. 
I define the well-told oral storytelling event or WOSE as the non-boring 
event of telling by one or more people to one or more people of the doings 
of one or more people or antbropomorphised agents.32 The event occurs. 
was not motivated in the first instance by those kinds of logical problems proper to a 
sophisticated speculation, still less was it prompted in the first instance by metaphysics or 
by mystidsm. It was simply a crystallisation of the demand that the Greek language and 
the Greek mind break with the poetic [narrative] inheritance, the rhythmically 
memorised flow of imagery, and substitute the syntax of scientific discourse, whether the 
adence be moral or physical." Havelock 1963 p.182 
30 O. BT Section 62 
31 PC 100 
32 This definition is broad, but not unusually so. See for comparison W.B. Gallie's 
definition of story in Philosophy lind the HistoriCilI UndmttJnding as paraphrased by 
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It has a certain duration. That duration does not necessarily correspond to 
the length of "a story", primarily because of the stipulation that a WOSE is 
non-boring. If a particular storytelling event falls into boredom it ceases, 
for the nonce, to be a WOSE. Thus it is factically the case that for most 
people their experience of WOSEs is as intermittent phases in a larger 
discourse. The WOSE is neither the wherewithal nor the residue of 
telling, such as pictures, memories or text. Telling here means 
communicating from one to another where both parties are physically 
present to one another. The typical form of this telling includes spoken 
words, but non-verbal (kinesic) communication between teller and 
listener(s) is also integral to a WOSE. This communication is by means of 
gesture, sound, eye contact, words and touch. A WOSE may be told by one 
or more people to one or more people. A WOSE is not necessarily an 
uninterrupted monologue; the actions and sayings of the listener(s) may 
be included in the story, there may be conversation between teller and 
listener(s) that forms part of the WOSE. A WOSE may even be 
accompanied by the sound of musical instruments, or the use of props, but 
such accompaniment is not at all essential to being-a-WOSE although it 
might be integral to a certain type of performance. 
This definition is intentionally as broad as possible. A WOSE could occur 
during a domestic conversation at supper-time wherein husband and wife 
tell each other what happened during the day, or during the recitation of 
an epic such as the Mahabarata which could take place during many 
evenings over several months. A WOSE can occur in any of the three 
situations of oral storytelling outlined in the previous chapter, that is in 
informal discourse, in a psychotherapeutic context or in overtly designated 
performance. In the case of the latter two situations, as we shall see, a 
WOSE is usually constitutive of a successful outcome of the whole 
Ricoeur: "A story describes a sequence of actions and experiences done or undergone by a 
certain number of people, whether real or imaginary." (Ricoeur, 1984, p.150) The 
definition continues, ''These people are presented either in situations that change or as 
reacting to such change. In tum, these changes reveal hidden aspects of the situation and 
the people involved, and engender a new predicament which calls for thought, action, or 
both. This response to the new situation leads the story towards its conclusion", (ibid.) and 
as Ricoeur notes, "this sketch of the notion of story is not far from what I have called 
emplotment." (ibid) I have already rejected Ricoeur's notion of emplotment as superfluous, 
and at this stage I am more cautious as to exactly what form is taken by the "changes" 
presented in a story, and indeed the form of their presentation. I am not alone in taking a 
broad view of what a story is. See also Hernnstein Smith's passing definition: "narrative 
discourse [consists of] verbal acts consisting of someone telling someone else that something 
happened." Hermstein Smith in Mitchell 1981, p.228 
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situation. As a matter of fact, in all three situations the discourse typically 
oscillates ontologically between a WOSE and everyday discourse. 
A WOSE could be a fleeting instant wherein a passer-by is transposed as 
attuned, alongside and futural just by overhearing a phrase such as "and 
just then ... "33 This is not to say it is not possible that a WOSE can be 
sustained as non-boring throughout a performance or telling, but Simply 
that often it is not, and therefore it falls into another modality of being-
with characterized to some degree by indifference. The qualification "of 
one or more people or anthropomorphised agents" is intended to 
differentiate the WOSE which tells of the doings of people, or things 
endowed by the teller with human-like qualities, from a report such as 
that of a mechanic inspecting a motor car. A technical report about the 
cause of an engine misfiring, for example, "The spark plugs are dirty and 
the timing is out" is not, on this definition, a WOSE. It could of course be 
presented as a WOSE or part of a WOSE if the mechanic was an eloquent 
and amusing storyteller. It is not totally impossible for a WOSE to be the 
speaking of a pre-written text, but it would be both unusual and difficult. 
The problem of rendering a text interesting in this sense of personal 
engagement is precisely what concerns Peter Brook and, sad to say, defeats 
very many modern theatrical directors. Finally I repeat by WOSE here I 
mean a well-told oral storytelling event. By well-told I mean told in such 
a manner that the audience understands the story,34 cares about the 
characters,35 and has a clear idea of the situation in which the events 
recounted unfold. The listeners enjoy the experience, they want to hear 
what happens next and they are touched or moved in some way.36 
Having made this definition as broad as possible in terms of genre and yet 
very narrow by restricting it to well-told oral storytelling events by one or 
more persons to one or more persons where all are physically present to 
each other we must underline three points made earlier. Firstly a 
33 A WOSE does not need even to reveal content as Dasein always projects a world (or 
storyworld) as a whole even without any specific details. See section on storyworld below. 
34 The phrase "understand the story" like tttell a story" appear to refer to an entity to 
which the audience responds by understanding. It is helpful to remember not only the 
comments made earlier about t'telling a storyt' but also that for Heidegger one who 
understands does not stand over against what is understood projects its being upon 
possibilities (BT 188ff.) 
35 By care about here I do not mean care for. The term is intended to include being repelled 
bv as well as being interested in. 
3& This need not be what is colloquially called 'moving' - an audience is moved if it is 
moved to laughter, just as much as if it is moved to tears. It is noteworthy in view of the 
discussion of transposition below that the word used for this is 'moving' - just as e-motion 
has its root in movement too. 
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moment of WOSE may occur in a telling, which then lapses into boring 
discourse. Thus the whole story in the sense of the account of events from 
designated beginning to designated end is neither all boring, nor totally 
non-boring. It had moments of both. Secondly by WOSE we mean a non-
boring, successful oral storytelling event and "boring" is not a qualification 
the application of which is always unequiVOCally unanimous. Hence this 
definition does not consist of a list of objectively verifiable characteristics 
which one could perceive in every case of non-boring storytelling. It 
defines an intersubjective phenomenon. Thirdly, although I mean by 
WOSE only an oral storytelling event amongst persons physically present 
to each other a great deal of what is true of WOSEs thus defined is also 
true, in part or totally, of other, mediated, narrative events. This should 
not tempt us to read them into the discussion of WOSEs as though 
different types of narrative events are all ontologically equivalent. 
Nevertheless the primordial event in terms of which we understand all of 
what are commonly called stories or narratives is the WOSE. 
What are the grounds for assert that the WOSE is the primordial form of 
narrative? Firstly, the historical argument cannot be lightly dismissed. 
Storytelling existed as a form of discourse, and stories were told and 
remembered, long before the invention of writing or other media of 
transcription or record. Secondly, as Ong points out, all ｴ･ｸｾ＠ and verbal 
expression however stored must be reconverted into sound "directly or 
indirectly, either really in the external world or in the auditory 
imagination" to be understood.37 If this is true of all text and verbal 
expression, it is necessarily true of verbal stories. A WOSE is an instance 
of speaking together, it is not at all the recitation of a monologue heedless 
of response. It is a dialogue, even if the audience remains factically 
silent.38 Discussing poetry in 1936 Heidegger placed speaking with one 
another at the centre of man's being, and considered it the essential form 
of language.39 
'We - people - are a dialogue. Man's being is rooted in lans.uage; 
but language really occurs only in dialogue. This, however, 1S not 
only a way that language comes to pass, but it is solely as dialogue 
that language is essential. Any other meaning given to ｬ｡ｮｧｵ｡ｧｾＬ＠
i.e. a store of words and of rules for the arrangment of words, 1S 
37 Ong in Baumann 1986, p31 
38 "Keeping silent authentically is possible only in genuine discoursing." BT 208 
39 Heidegger ascribes to poetry some of the characteristics that I approach through the 
WOSE. See Heidegger 1971, also section 8 below. 
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only a foreground of language." (HlJlderlin and the Essential 
Character of Poetry, quoted in Jakobson, ed. Pomorska, 1985 p.140) 
Thirdly I argue below that what allows us to understand a story as a whole 
(even if we do not hear the whole story), to be moved by it, and to listen 
expecting more to come until it comes to an end is a temporal structure 
which it borrows from Dasein. That structure is the non-boring openness 
to future possibilities and to having-been. We are attuned as transposed 
into the story by our having-been, and understand the significance of what 
is made present in the story through our own possibilities as transposed. I 
examine transposition in detail below. In boredom this having been and 
these possibilities are closed off and what is present is merely present, 
without meaning for us.40 We can of course (and do) come across boring 
stories, like broken-down motor-cars, but we understand them as stories 
by virtue of what they could be, however dimly we understand that, just 
as we understand motor-cars in terms of their ability to transport people. 41 
Therefore the essential form of story must be non-boring. The primary 
modality in which non-boringness is possible for Dasein as discourse is in 
the richest form of discourse which is the modality of being-with of 
physical co-presence. It is of course possible to be physically co-present 
with Dasein in a manner that denies our possibilities of being-open to one 
another, indeed Heidegger observes that this is our most common 
everyday comportment,42 but only in physical co-presence can we meet 
the fullness of Dasein's attuned understanding as articulated not just by 
words but by gesture, posture, and the full gamut of non-verbal 
communicative expression. We listen to stories and distinguish them 
ultimately from the exchange of information between persons indifferent 
to each other's being precisely because of this possibility, however hidden 
and rarely actualized, of being transposed, engaged and truly touched by 
the story. 
The relationship between the primordial non-boring form of story and 
what stories are commonly taken to be is analogous (and indeed related to) 
the relationship between primordial temporality and the everyday notion 
of time. Believing a story is made of events held together by a plot is like 
believing time is made up of instants which pass from the future to the 
40 FC 124-5 
41 I.e. our understanding is founded in possibilities even when they are not for the most part 
realized. Cf. BT 188ff. 
42FC208 
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past. Primordial temporality is what gives us access to public time in the 
first place. Similarly the narrative-structure of Dasein's primordial 
temporality allows us to understand stories as such, even in their 
derivative, boring form. The everyday understanding of story as an 
account of events which mayor may not be boring and which mIly be 
presented in many different sorts of media is a misundersfllnding deriwd 
from the miscomprehension of Dasein's temporal being. The everyday 
understanding of story, and Dasein's access to such stories, are derived 
from the primordial possibility of listening to a story in authentic being-
with. 
"Listening to ... is Dasein's existential way of Being-open as Being-
with for Others. Indeed, hearing constitutes the primary and 
authentic way in which Dasein is open for its ownmost 
potentiality-for-Being." (BT 206) 
One is not truly listening to a boring story in the above sense because it 
does not open Dasein for authentic engagement. 
This exposition points to what is primordial, what constitutes the original 
form of story on the basis of which so many other story-like events and 
mediated messages are understood. However it is significant that we all 
already have a fully functioning, non-thematic, non-conceptual 
understanding of story, so much so that MacIntyre could take it for 
granted.43 The situation with stories is rather like the situation Heidegger 
observes in our relationship to Being.44 Scholars are not at all in 
agreement as to the fundamental nature of narrative and each one makes 
his own ontological assumptions, yet in our everyday life we all operate 
with an understanding of what a story is.45 We have no trouble at all in 
recognising and understanding stories. Stories and the understanding of 
stories come naturally to us. Like the visitor from Elea considering Being, 
only when we think about what a story is as such do we "become 
perplexed."46 We understand when a story is being told, and what sort of 
discourse it is. We nearly always do so even if we have not heard the 
beginning of the story, and if we mistake the situation it is a simple matter 
to correct the mistake. Children understand stories and, although they 
may be confused as to whether the events recounted actually happened or 
43 See Chapter 3, Section 4. 
44 BT21-4 
45 Howard (1991) in a footnote (p.18n cites a study by Stein and Policastro which revealed 
no less that 20 different definitions of story. 
"BT 19 
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not, they do not have to be told what a story is.47 Indeed they seem to 
have a natural drive to narrative.48 By oontrast there does not seem to be 
a natural drive to logical or conceptual thinking.49 We appear to have 
priviledged access to and understanding of storytelling. We 1uroe this 
special access to stories because stories, like Being, play a part in our own 
being. We are those beings whose being is an issue for themselves, and we 
are also those beings whose being is the temporality which provides the 
essential primordial structure of story. In the ensuing analysis of the 
WOSE this primordial structure is laid out in detail. Our understanding 
of what we are (our essen tia) is illuminated through our 
phenomenological understanding of WOSE, and we understand how we 
are through particular stories. Equally we can understand better what 
stories are through our phenomenological understanding of ourselves 
because the primordial struture of story comes from the primordial 
temporal structure of Dasein. The "positive structure" that the "Being of 
consciousness"50 has is primordial narrative. 
3 BEING-WITH AND PRESENCE 
In a WOSE something is presented. At any moment during the 
storytelling the listener(s) is/are told of an event or situation, from which 
he/she/they is/are pointed towards the "What next?" or "How come?"51 
That situation is given in the WOSE. In a WOSE, which is itself an event 
another event is somehow made present. "Present" is a term laden with 
significance and burdened with much anal ysis in the Heideggerian 
oeuvre.52 Accordingly we will proceed cautiously in investigating the 
nature of this situation and the manner in which it is present. The term 
"present" is used here without assuming that it corresponds to 
47 See Mancuso in Sarbin 1986, also Bamberg 1987 
48 "as early as age two children are able to share narrative accounts of their lived or 
fantasized experiences" Goncalves 1994,p.111-2. See also Bruner 1990, CIt. 3 
49 Luria, ed. Cole 1976, p.133ff. 
SOBT487 
51 Hereafter I will, where possible, use the masculine third person singular in the indusive 
sense, not just of the feminine third person singular, but also of the third persons plural in 
order to promote clarity and ease of reading. No sexual bias should be inferred from this 
ｾＮ＠ . 
52 For the difficulties of understanding and translating Heidegger's sundry terms to do With 
present and presence see MacQuarrie and Robinson's footnote 2 on BT 47; for an exemplary 
commentary on Heidegger's notions of presence see Caputo 1987, esp. CIt. 3. 
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Heidegger's usage. The distinctions of presence in Being and Time are not 
all relevant here. One instance in which it does seem to correspond is in 
fact in a later work where he is writing of Greek art as "a revealing that 
brought forth and made present, and therefore belonged within poiesis."53 
Such a revealing could also be an instance of a WOSE. 
A WOSE tells of events which are not immediately present to us 
physically. It is obvious that if the teller of a WOSE mentions violins they 
do not become physically present in the room as he speaks. It is not 
however necessary that the entities referred to in the WOSE are not 
present. I could for example, pick up my violin and say, "This is my 
grandfather's fiddle - let me tell you how it made its way into my hands. 
Several years ago ... " But whether entities are present-at-hand or not, part 
of what makes the enSuing event a WOSE is the telling of events that are 
not manifest to the audience. A WOSE precisely brings us what is not 
given to us by the environing world around us or the entities that reveal 
themselves in it. In particular it seems definitive that it tells of events 
from a different time from that of the telling. 54 
Compare for example a WOSE about a visit to a racecourse last week with 
the speech of a man looking at a racecourse through a hole in a fence and 
saying what he can see to a group of friends around him whose view is 
obstructed by the fence. Although much that he says could be similar to 
the content of the WOSE one could hear about the visit to the racecourse 
last week, we do not immediately understand it as a WOSE, nor any sort of 
story, because it is a contemporaneous report of what is happening in the 
world. In our everyday understanding of the term "story" the temporal 
displacement is significant. Speech describing contemporaneous events is 
not understood to be a story, even if what is described is as a matter of fact 
invisible to the hearers of the speech. Our natural usage of story does 
cover the tale of how the violin I'm holding in my hand came into my 
possession, but does not cover the words of the man describing what he 
can see as he peeps through a hole in the fence to watch a race. The latter 
is a commentary, a contemporaneous account of an event which, as it 
happens, his friends are at that moment unable to see with their own eyes. 
53 Heidegger 1978 p.339 . 
54 In the case of mediated stories - texts, films and so on - this can apptrI1 to be a function of 
the medium: the text or whatever which 'freezes' the narrative and makes it possible to 
deliver it to another time and place. The fact that it is also true of oral stories indicates 
that it is a function of the story as such, which is the event of a particular way of Dasein 
taking up its possibility of being-with. 
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A WOSE makes present events which are other than what is directly 
manifest to the audience, and even if a WOSE is 'about' an object present 
at hand it tells of events in relation to that object which are not manifest 
to the audience. It appear that essential to a WOSE is the telling of doings 
and dealings which are neither manifest nor contemporaneous with the 
telling. Immediately one can see a possible objection. What of the 
storyteller who starts as follows? 
"Right now, as you are listening to me, in England there are 
professors reading academic theses, women driving buses and 
men digging holes in the road; and a long way away, in Turkestan, 
a little girl with dark brown eyes and coal black hair tied into two 
long plaits is opening a small, battered wooden box. As she lifts 
the lid her eyes shine with excitement because she can see ... " 
We need not be distracted by the issue of whether this is a case of the use 
of the historic present and we do not need to consider the issue of truth 
versus fiction. The claim of the storyteller about the girl in Turkestan is a 
stylistic device which has to do with manner is which he seeks to engage 
our attention and sympathy, it is not a veridical claim of simultaneity.55 
If for example the speaker of the above passage was relaying to his 
audience a description of a girl in Turkestan whom he was observing via a 
video-link we would not describe him as telling a story. His "story" would 
in fact be understood to be a commentary. Furthermore it is clear that it 
would be a freak event, consciously and artificially created or simply 
accidental, if the telling of a story corresponded exactly to the elapsed time 
of the event recounted. If the girl in the story takes the little wooden box 
to her grandfather's house the telling of her walk to her grandfather's 
house does not take as long as any such actual walk. The fact that many 
stories claim to be contemporaneous accounts does not defeat the original 
claim. In fact it shows clearly that the time taken to tell stories precisely 
does not correspond to the elapsed time claimed, overtly or implidtly for 
the events of the stories to occur. This is not a matter of speed of 
description, but rather of different sorts of ways in which Dasein has its 
time. 
As we have seen in the last chapter, when Dasein is bored it has its time as 
dragging. In the second form of boredom we are bored by "time in its 
55 This is not to say some commentaries cannot sound, or be described as, story-like. ｾｾ＠
the fact that one can say of a commentator, "He is so good because he makes a story of It is 
evidence of the difference between a story and a commentary, not their similarity. If aU 
commentaries were automatically understood as stories the comment would be tautological. 
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standing. "56 In profound boredom, a "constant possibility [which] ... lurks 
in the ground of Dasein",57 temporality tempora1izes itself in the 
particular form of "unarticulated unity" which the possibility of refusing 
Dasein's possibilities as a whole. 58 Dasein is thus entranced by time which 
shows Dasein the possibility of the moment of vision along with its 
possibility of refusing it. In so far as Dasein refuses this most essential 
possibility it is bored, which precludes precisely the engagement that is 
constitutive of storytelling. Hence the importance of establishing that 
what we are investigating is the well-told, non-boring oral storytelling 
event. 59 
The time of a WOSE is not boring time nor the public time by which the 
happenings of a day are measured.60 The time is different in at least two 
significant ways. Firstly it is a different sort of time from everyday 
measured clock-time, the sort of time we usually unreflectively consider 
ourselves to be dealing with. In a WOSE the teller may talk of any time he 
wishes and there is no necessary connection between the duration claimed 
for an event and the duration of the narration of the event.61 There are 
constraints upon the teller as to what time he says it is, and they arise from 
his relationship with his listeners.62 If for example, in the middle of a 
well-told event of professional storytelling, when an audience is deeply 
engrossed in a moving description of a pOignant moment of tender love 
56 PC 158 
57 PC 156-7 
S8FC 148 
59 I present here two comments about different ways that Dasein has its time, not because 
they even begin to exhaust these different ways, but because it is not posstble to explore all 
the avenues opened up by these observations. Apart from Being tmd Time in Heidegger's 
oeuvre The Fundamental Concepts offers a relatively clear starting point for further 
exploration of the ways Dasein has its time. Guignon 1983 and Caputo 1987 offer good 
commentaries and Ricoeur 1981 considers specifically the way Dasein has its time in 
stories, though not specifically oral stories. For a description of the event of man's 
different perceptions of time in the field of psychology see M.H. Erickson and L.F. Cooper, 
"Time distortion in Hypnosis" in Rossi 1980 Vol n and in the historical field see Mumford 
1934. 
60 For an introduction to the discussion amongst anthropologists of the temporality of 
stories in the oral tradition see Tonkin 1992, Ch. 4 
61 See Goodman in Mitchell, 1981 
62 teA narrator who is asked to narrate must consider the occasion, above all the petteived 
character, intentions and possible power of the audience - even when giving a ｭｯｾｯｬｯｧｵ･＠
which bears all the marks of a familiar rendition. Strictly even then the narrative is a 
kind of dialogue - and one whose structure is not reducible to the separate component 
contributions of different speakers. On these formal grounds alone the, ｳｴｲｵ｣ｴｵｾ＠ ｡ｬｾ＠
contributes to the meaning. ,.. the times in the narration are affected by times outside It; 
even the audience's interventions may direct and alter these times and the choice of 
representation through which they are effected." Tonkin 1992 p.67 
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recalled at the height of a great battle, the storyteller all of a sudden 
changes his style abruptly and says, "The hero died, the battle was lost, 
that's all," the audience would normally have a sense that the WOSE had 
not been finished properly and their relationship with the teller had been 
suddenly and prejudicially transformed. The event would in some sense 
be diminished, either as unfinished or as violated. The time of a WOSE, 
both its way of flowing and its ostensive chronology, is determined by the 
relationship between the storyteller and the audience. Similar constraints 
apply to WOSEs in domestic and psychotherapeutic contexts. We will 
look more closely at the latter in the next chapter. ThIlt on the basis of 
which the chronology of story events is proposed and accepted or rejected 
is that reckoning with time opened up by the being-with of the storyteller 
and his listener(s). 
WOSEs also present a different time in the sense that the events of the 
story are discontinuous with the events of the surrounding environing 
world of teller and audience. We have already noted that WOSEs tell of 
events that are not contemporaneous with the telling. The teller does not 
alter the flow of time, but tells of happenings which are not dated in the 
public time with the same date as the public time of the telling itself. The 
Dasein of the audience is primarily involved neither in the elapsed time 
measured by the clock, nor primarily in the public dated time ascribed by 
the teller to the happenings of which he tells, but rather in the time of the 
telling and listening. For example, if the storyteller tells of a heroine 
hiding in a bush holding her breath whilst villains search for her in the 
campsite the audience is affected by the mood of suspense for the duration 
of the telling of the hiding, and breathes a sigh of relief when the teller 
says that the villainous searchers move on without finding her. Of course 
a man with a stop-watch could measure the duration of the elapsed time 
of this part of the telling, but in so far as he does so he is not primarily 
listening to, and involved in the story, but has taken up his own 
possibility of transforming his way of being into the objective 
contemplation of present-at-hand events. A WOSE, which we must 
remember is an engaging event, is not primarily such an occurrence 
present at hand, nor the apprehension thereof, but rather a different 
comportment of Dasein. The listeners of a WOSE experience the time of 
the story as their own time. In a WOSE the two different events, of telling 
and of what is told, are made one as Dasein is brought alongside them 
both. Hence a storyteller can, and frequently will, incorporate a remark 
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about the events in the environment of the telling into his storytelling. 
The temporary violation of the temporal separateness of happenings 
recounted in the WOSE is used to generate the comic or ironic effect.63 It 
is made possible by the unity of the event of telling. What makes this 
unity? Where does it come from? How come we can experience the time 
of a WOSE as our own time? 
4 TRANSPOSITION 
We finished the last section with some pressing questions, and we have 
not yet solved the problem of the ontological nature of the present or 
presence of a WOSE. Let us for a moment therefore stop asking how or in 
what manner a WOSE presents things to us, and ask instead, is it possible 
that in a WOSE, rather than things being made present to us, we are ttdcen 
to them? In a WOSE are we, the audience, in fact not transposed into the 
presence of that which is presented to us? We have already established 
that it is misleading to think of a story as present-at-hand within the world 
of Dasein if we think in terms of container and contained. A WOSE as we 
have defined it is not a collection of assertions written down such as 
might constitute a book but is rather an event of telling. Listening to a 
WOSE I may forget about the factual world around me. I become absorbed 
in the WOSE.64 One might say that listening to a WOSE one was 'in 
another world'. In this colloquialism is a hint of the deeper ontological 
structure of the event of storytelling. One may be transposed into another 
world, and yet one does not leave the everyday world. Indeed it seems 
that Dasein, as teller or hearer, can be in many such worlds 
Simultaneously. If a comic makes a running gag of tripping over the 
microphone at moments of bathos in his performance he holds open with 
this possibility both the world of the events recounted, and the bathetic 
moments, and his world as a performer making a comment, ironic or 
63 Equally a storyteller can start with an inconsequential, conversational remark and 
without obvious demarcation segue into a tale perhaps quite fantastic or incredible. Once 
again the storyteller is attempting to enhance the enjoyment of the WOSE by the effect of 
this gradual transition from everyday discourse to WOSE. But if in fact he ､ｾ＠ not, 
however slyly, lead to talking about something other than the present at hand he 15 not 
understood to be "telling a story," and cannot therefore be telling a well-told story. 
64 The echo of Heidegger's description of Dasein as "absorbed in the world" (BT 80) is 
intentional. Dasein continually gives itself away either falling into the world or going 
along with the being with of another. As we shall see later, only if the particular other of 
the storyteller is authentic is Dasein returrl4d to itself. 
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slapstick, in apposition to them. What is the nature of a WOSE such that 
this is possible? We do not leave our own world by listening to a story. 
We still sit on the same chair during the WOSE as we sat on before it and 
sit on afterwards. Yet we somehow "enter" the story-world. How do we 
do so? If we are to transpose ourselves into a story-world our first 
question must concern not the story-world - whatever that may be - but 
the being of Dasein which is such that Dasein is the sort of being tlult ciln 
"transpose" itself. 
Heidegger carries over into The Fundamentlll Concepts the ontology he 
developed in Being and Time wherein he has posited Being-with as an 
existentiale.65 In the lecture course of 1927 he expresses this aspect of 
being-with as "transposition" and opposes it to the traditional 
philosophical notion of transcendence.66 In The Fundamentlll Concepts 
Heidegger was not addressing the issue of stories nor the event of oral 
storytelling but was considering Dasein's relation to other Dasein and to 
animals: 
"self-transposi tion does not mean the factical transference of one 
existing human being into the interior of another being. Nor does 
it mean the factical substitution of oneself for another being so as 
to take its place." (Fe 202) 
However it is a transposition - it is not an "'as if, ... in which we merely 
act as if we were the other being. "67 The other being does not get out of 
the way such that we can get in, nor do we become other than ourselves to 
'be' the other. The other must precisely "remain what it is and how it 
is"68 such that we can genuinely transpose ourselves into it - and equally 
we must not forget ourselves but precisely be ourselves such that it is we 
ourselves who are transposed. "There can be no going-along-with if the 
one who wishes and is meant to go along with the other relinquishes 
himself in advance. "69 Transposing oneself into another being must 
mean precisely "going along with what it is and with how it is. "70 
6S See BT Section 26 and, in particular, ttlwith' is something of the character of Dasein .•. 
'With' ... [is] to be understood existentudly, not categorially." BT 154-5 See also my 
Chapter One, section 3 
66 BP 161-2 
67 PC 202 
68 PC 202 
69 FC 203 
70FC 202 
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"Such going-along-with means directly learning how it is with this 
being, discovering what it is like to be this being with which we are 
going along in this way." (FC 202) 
If we remain fully ourselves and yet go along with the other as it is and 
how it is transposition cannot be an actual placing of oneself in the other 
nor can it be a "thought experiment. "71 Nor can it be made possible by 
some process in which we must first "feel our way into the other" - for 
then we would be caught up in the process of "feeling into" or 
empathising and not simply transposed into the other and going-along 
with his processes.72 To feel one's way into the consciousness of the other 
implies that one is in the first place ou tside. But the idealist view of 
human being in "solipsistic isolation"73 is precisely what Heidegger so 
powerfully attacked in Being and Time. Dasein is not an isolated being, 
rather Dasein is always Dasein-with. "Being-with belongs to the essence of 
man's existence, i.e., to the existence of every unique individual in each 
case. "74 For Heidegger therefore we do not do something to achieve the 
possibility of transposition, we are the sort of being for whom the 
possibility of transposition is constitutive. 
"[the possibility of transposing ourselves into others] already and 
originally belongs to man's own essence. Insofar as human beings 
exist at all, they already find themselves transposed in their 
existence into other human beings, even if there are factically no 
other human beings in the vicinity. Consequently the Da-sein of 
man, the Da-sein in man, means, not exclusively but amongst 
other things, being transposed into other human beings." (FC 205) 
The world in which we find ourselves is always already shaped by Dasein, 
and the tools, dwelling and footpaths of Dasein both structure the world 
and tell of the presence of Dasein that is other than us. Yet we understand 
the other Dasein that is shown in the world as like us. The other that is 
there too is as we are, thus we recognise the equipmentality of tools and 
the trodden-ness of paths and so on. "Thus in characterizing the 
encountering of Others, one is again still oriented by that Dasein which is 
in each case one's own." 7S I recognise these others because they are not 
7t PC 203 
72 PC 203 
73 PC 206 
74 PC 206 
75BTl54 
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everyone else but me but rather because they are those "from whom one 
does not distinguish oneself - those among whom one is too. "76 
"By reason of this with-like Being-in-the-world, the world is 
always the one that I share with Others. The world of Dasein is a 
with-world . . ｂｾｩｮｧＭｩｮ＠ is Bei?g-with Others. Their Being-in-
themselves wlthm-the-world IS Dasein-with." (BT 155) 
The transposition of our Dasein by which we are "drawn into the world of 
a story" is an ontological characteristic of our being. In so far as another 
individual Dasein tells us of its being we are alretUly there with it, in its 
situation.77 Heidegger's claim is that in our most essential being we 
always already do understand the other. We all know what it is like to 
feel, to expect, to perceive, to become absorbed, to fall asleep and to awake. 
Although for each us our own particular situation is unique, our way of 
being is shared. We all have, and we all know we have, the same way of 
being, including the possibility of turning away from that knowledge of 
ourselves. A WOSE is a case of what Heidegger refers to as 
communication "grasped in principle existentially."78 
"In this more general kind of communication, the Articulation of 
Being with one another understandingly is constituted. Through 
it a co-state-of-mind [Mitbefindlichkeit] gets 'shared', and so does 
the understanding of Being-with. Communication is never 
anything like a conveying of experiences, such as opinions or 
wishes, from the interior of one subject into the interior of 
another. Dasein-with is already essentially manifest in a co-state-
of-mind and a co-understanding. In discourse Being-with becomes 
'explicitly' shared; that is to say, it is already, but it is unshared as 
something that has not been taken hold of and appropriated." (BT 
205) 
By "more general" he must mean that primordial communication which 
is not the transmission of facts.79 Such communication is the authentic 
acknowledgement or raising to interpretation of being-with which he 
76BT 154 
77 We will see that this being already there with it can be authentic or inauthentic. In the 
latter case it is so ordinary as to remain mostly un-noticed, only in the case of the former, 
when the story is in fact well told do we become aware of a difference in our way of being at 
the moment of telling which we can analyse as the taking up of the possibility of 
transposition. 
78 BT 205 
79 We also note that he seems uses discourse in this passage to refer to an ontic existentiell 
event of communication. An instance of such could be a WOSE. 
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differentiates from giving information.80 Speech which is essentially 
giving information is delivering facts to listeners. WOSEs, by contrast are 
the delivering of listeners to events that are not the actions or movements 
of entities present-at, or ready-to, -hand. WOSEs, on this account, are in 
fact an ontolOgical possibility inherent in the articulation of Dasein's 
being-in-the-world as being-with. Boss's description of a particular 
occasion of the modulation of his Being-in-the-world can be used to 
illustrate this possibility quite well. 
"let us say I am relaxing in my garden, stretched out comfortably 
on a chaise lounge (sic) ... I am situated in the familiar confines of 
my own garden. At the same time I extend, as the open and 
perceptive realm I am, over the entire range of the world that is 
accessible to me. I permeate that world, existing as a world-
spanning responsiveness. While I lie in my garden, engaged in 
visualizing the topic of contemporary medicine, my being-in-the-
world extends through space at least as far as America and 
Indonesia, and through time ten years into my past. ... My 
reminiscence of things past ... is determined by a lecture I am to 
give this coming semester, in the future .... But suddenly ... myoid 
chaise lounge (sic) collapses under me ... and the ring finger of my 
right hand is jammed between the wooden slats of the chair. Gone 
in a flash is the wide expanse of my former, happy connection to 
the world ... The broad extension of my being-in-the-world into its 
past and future has suddenly shrunk, attuned as I am to a 
throbbing pain ... my future is limited to a plan for ending this 
awful pain as quickly as possible. ... What has been changed and 
reattuned is ... the perceptive openness of the being in space and 
time that is the essence of my Dasein." (Boss 1994, p.210) 
If Boss were the teller now of a WOSE describing this incident in the 
garden chair, and we, that is you, the reader, and I were his audience, we 
would be with him in the garden in this existential sense; indeed we 
might even be aware of the evidence of our lived experience of being with 
him by wincing as he tells us of the agonizing pain as his finger is trapped 
by the collapsing chair. Furthermore as he tells us of what he was musing 
on as he lay on the chair we would again be with him as he tells of being 
80 Walter Benjamin was well aware of the transformative effects of story, and the fad 
that what a story tells is not information, and cannot be reduced to infonnatiol\r but ｨ｡ｾ＠ a 
certain power to touch us: "The value of information does not survive the moment in which 
it was new. It lives only at that moment; it has to surrender to it completely and explain 
itself to it without losing any time. A story is different. It does not expend itsel.f. I! 
preserves and concentrates its strength and is capable of releasing it even after a long tune. 
(Benjamin 1970, p.89-90) 
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in America and Indonesia. 81 In the actual experience of the WOSE and 
feeling ourselves responding to that of which we are told we are with the 
Dasein of the teller - that is our Dasein is transposed into his, for we 
respond to what is there in his being-there. This is not simply a matter of 
freely imagining oneself in a different environment. In a WOSE we llTe 
transposed primarily into the Dasein of the storyteller whose 'Da' extends 
towards the entities and events recounted. It is through the Da of the 
storyteller as articulated, attuned possibility that we understand, and are 
moved and engaged by the story. Hence in listening to a WOSE one is not 
typically aware of undergoing an existential alienation, rather one has 
something of the opposite experience, one is brought to oneself. This 
explains why telling one's story is such an important part of 
psychotherapy, and also why mere grasping of the facts of some story is not 
therapeutically transformative. What matters in the psychotherapeutic 
dialogue is how a story is told and understood. We will return to this 
point in Chapter Six. This is also the reason that listening to a WOSE 
either in domestic or performance contexts is often experienced as relaxing 
and leaves the listener at one with himself, and with his fellow listeners. 
The transposition into the other of the storyteller is the existentiell 
revelation of an ontological condition which is for the most part covered 
over by the everyday way we have of "going apart from one another and 
... going against one another"82 which characterises our everyday 
understanding of ourselves. The commonplace understanding of 
ourselves as separate, isolated individuals, supported by Cartesian 
philosophy is undercut by the experience of a WOSE. In a WOSE we are 
not transposed into another world as distinct other physical environment, 
but into the authentic being-in-the-world of another, and hence we are 
returned to our own authentic possibilities. 
The Da of the storyteller is transposed into the WOSE as well as being 
alongside the listeners. Thus in a WOSE we are not in two separate 
worlds simultaneously but in two worlds that are not entirely separate.83 
81 There is an almost infinite possibility of stories within stories within stories. The inner 
story is in no way smaller than the frame story, for as we go in to the inner story, and 
perhaps from that into yet another, we do not squeeze into a yet smaller ｣ｯｮｾｮ･ｲ＠ ｢ｾｴ＠
rather go along with the storyteller in the manner of sojourning along with him in his 
being-with the situation, or world, of each story. The 'in' of one story 'in' another is an 
illusion of narrative structure. The being-in of being invol0e4 in a story is founded on the 
being-in of being-in-the-world. See BT Sections 12 and 13. 
82 Fe 206 
83 To a Jungian this is made manifest by the synchronidties that occur during storytellings. 
See Mindell 1985 (a) p.58-9 and Minde1l1985 (b) p.42-45 
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It is also important to note that the Da of the WOSE into which one is 
transposed is not equivalent to identifying with a character in the story. 
Just as in the everyday world one is normally absorbed in the world as 
concern and not aware of one's self as such,84 so in a WOSE one is 
primarily absorbed in the concern of the story. One is in the story-world 
not as a freelance observer but as one attuned by the concerns of that 
world. Hence one's engagement with the WOSE does not hop about from 
one character to another but is primarily in the openness, the Da, which 
lets the beings of the WOSE be revealed. Transposition is the existential 
phenomenon that lies beneath what literary theorists call identification. 
But whereas the theory of identification leads to perplexity as to how one 
can identify with several different characters in a story or drama 
simultaneously, in the transposition of a WOSE one's authentic being-
with others is raised to awareness in the case of every character who is 
presented. 
5 WORLD AND THE WOSE 
What justification is there for using the term "story-world"? Whenever 
we listen to a WOSE we have a sense that there is a time and a place where 
the events narrated take place. This is explicitly denoted in the traditional 
beginning of an English wondertale; "Once upon a time there was ... " In 
fact we cannot conceive of events without already understanding them 
within a time and a place. Heidegger approaches this same point, though 
he does so in terms of poetry not story, in his later work. At this stage of 
his thinking has moved on from the ontology developed in the major 
texts under consideration in this thesis and he understands man to be 
called by Being, rather than man determining the being of things, 
nonetheless he is clearly referring to the same dynamic of discourse. 
Writing on Trackl's poem "A Winter Evening" in Language he states, 
"The first stanza names not only things. It simultaneously names 
world." (Heidegger 1971, p.200) 
As soon as we hear a story we presume a world of the occurrence of the 
events recounted. In this sense every WOSE, and every story, has a world. 
That world, however exiguously described, is presumed as a whole - we do 
84 BT 149-152 
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not have a sense of holes in it which need filling in. Instead we have a 
sense of a whole which has not yet been described in detail. Stories do not 
and cannot include exhaustive descriptions of every person or place 
named and yet we don't experience gaps in our apprehension of the story. 
We grasp it as a whole, however vague. In The Fundamental Concepts 
Heidegger argues that every individual assertion is spoken out of a whole 
- this is true a fortiori of every assertion in a WOSE.85 We can call this as-
a-whole the world of the story, but we must beware of presuming too 
much of this world. The world of a story is always already the with-world 
(Mitwelt) of Dasein. What is presented in a WOSE is never just a non-
specific whole, but a human world, the with-world of Dasein. If a 
storyteller wishes to tell, for example, a science fiction story he or she must 
make a particular effort to denote an alien milieu, and even so the 
coherence of the events of the story is still based in Dasein's worldhood. 
The world of Dasein is constituted by the network of in-order-tos, which 
make up significance,86 and which point in the end to the for-the-sake-of 
of Dasein.87 The totality of involvements whereby we understand 
ourselves and each other is always automatically projected by a hearer of a 
WOSE and presumed by the teller. We always project worldhood even 
when what we understand is neither present- nor ready-to-hand, and we 
do so whether or not what is told is factually or historically true.88 A story 
which does not have characters which are humans is nonetheless shot 
through with Dasein's being and worldhood. If a story is not about Dasein 
or an anthropomorphised agent we simply would not recognise it as a 
story.89 Conversely we understand a WOSE in terms of the being of 
Dasein even if there are no humans mentioned. Heidegger seems to be 
8S "in every individual assertion, no matter how trivial or complicated, we always 
already speak out of beings that aTe manifest as a whole" (FC 345) 
868T120 
81 BT 116-7 
88 The essence of a WOSE, or a story, has nothing to do with 'factual' or ＧｨｩｳｴｯｾＧ＠ truth, 
hence the attempts to clarify the ontological status of narrative by separating fictional 
narrative from 'truth' or from history have been doomed from the very start (See Scholes 
and Kellogg 1966, p.I3-4, also Martin 1986, Mink in Mitchell 1981, and Hayden White, 
1987, Ch. 2.>. 
89 The complement holds true as well. We recognise Dasein because ｾｴ＠ is ｾｲｹｬｩｫ･Ｌ＠ tha! is 
we understand character by virtue of someone's doings or behaVlour an a story-bke 
situation. We do not deduce being human from their behaviour, it is their behaviour. 
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acknowledging this point in The Fundllmental Concepts when he remarks 
that "usually" we cannot transpose ourselves into a stone.90 He carries on, 
'1 say emphatically that we usually answer in this way because in 
fact there are ways and means belonging to human Dasein in 
ｷｨｩｾ＠ man ｾ･ｶ･ｲ＠ simply regards purely material things, or indeed 
technical things, as such but rather 'animates' them, as we might 
somewhat misleadingly put it. There are two fundamental ways 
in which this can happen: first when human Dasein is determined 
in its existence by myth, and second in the case of art. But it would 
be a fundamental mistake to try to dismiss such animation as an 
exception or even as a purely metaphOrical procedure which does 
not really correspond to the facts, as something phantastical based 
upon the imagination, or as mere illusion. What is at issue here is 
not the opposition between actual reality and illusory appearance, 
but the distinction between quite different kinds of possible truth." 
(FC 204) 
The animation of a stone by myth or art is the transposition of Dasein 
into stone not as stone but as a stone-with-Dasein, in other words the story 
of an anthropomorphised stone. The mention of myth is not without 
significance because the phenomenon of the WOSE is constitutive of 
primordial, oral myth, itself a primordial art of truth-transmission, before 
"art" was differentiated as such.91 A WOSE tells of Dasein through Dasein 
in the Da of the teller, and its truth is the truth of the revelation of 
Dasein's being to itself, not the truth of correspondence of assertion to fact. 
It is the tragedy of modernity that it has turned away from this kind of 
truth.92 The story world is an existential modification of the with-world 
of "everyday, average Being-with-one-another."93 It arises in a positive 
mode of solicitude wherein the teller and hearer of a WOSE "devote 
themselves to the same affair in common"94, i.e. the WOSE. Hence teller 
and hearer are brought back to themselves and "become authentically 
bound together."95 A badly-told story which does not engage the listener 
90 We cannot do so because "the stone as such does not admit of this possibility at all, offers 
no sphere intrinsically belonging to its being such that we could transpose ourselves into the 
stone." PC 204 
91 'We grasp truth articulately only in events. Articulated truth ｾｳ＠ no. pennanence. Full 
truth is deeper than articulation .... Primary oral culture ... keeps Its thinking close to ｾ＠
human life world, personalizing things and issues, and storing ｫｮｯｾｬ･､ｧ･＠ in stones. 
Categories are unstable mnemonically. Stories you can remember." Ong m Baumann 1986, 
P.2S See Chapter Four and also Havelock 1963 . . 
92 "The art of storytelling is reaching its end because the epiC Side of truth, Wisdom, is 
dvin2 out." Benjamin 1970, p.86 
93Bf158 
94BT159 
95BT159 
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perpetuates the sort of indifferent mode of Being-with-one-another in 
which being-with is taken simply to mean the mere Being-present-at-hand 
of several subjects and the story a mere offering of information. 
The world of Dasein is a with-world and yet it is not only a with-world. 
The network of in-order-tos and for-the-sake-ofs which constitute my 
world is founded in the with-world but is not limited to it. There are 
particular possibilities in my world which are unique to me, and in so far 
as I take them up, my world is unique to me. A story world is a possibility 
of the being-in-the-world of any Dasein that listens to a WOSE and the 
manner in which it takes up its understanding of that story will determine 
the extent to which the story world into which it is transposed is particular 
to itself. In so far as we have an average and vague understanding of the 
story the story world is vaguely and averagely similar for all listeners. In 
so far as I project my particular understanding I render the story world 
both more clear and more individual. Obviously each Dasein understands 
a story differently. If a client in psychotherapy describes a beautiful dark-
haired woman it is unlikely that the listening therapist's imagined image 
of the woman would be identical to the image in the client's memory. But 
this sort of disparity is also true to a greater or lesser extent of the 
environing world.96 Each of us sees and lives in the world slightly 
differently and hence understands it differently in so far as we take our 
ownmost possibilities seriously. However in taking over possibilities 
from the world of others and constituting ourselves as the 'they' we tend 
to overlook such differences. We thus live in both one and many 
worlds.97 The same is true of WOSEs. The world of a WOSE is both a 
with-world and potentially an individual, or better an authentic, world. 
Although all authentic worlds, story worlds or environing worlds, are 
different in detail they are different on the basis of a fundamental same-
ness: that is they are all worlds. Worldhood is an existentiale of Dasein, 
and the world of Dasein is first and foremost a with-world.98 Therefore in 
spite of interpretative differences the audience of a WOSE does normally 
understand, care about and become engaged together in the events 
recounted. When we talk of the story-world the as-a-whole-ness of the 
world of Dasein which Dasein understands non-thematically and pre-
reflectively has been raised to interpretation via a particular instantiation. 
96 "The surrounding world is different in a certain way for each of us, and notwithstanding 
that we move about in a common world." BP 164 
97 See Heidegger's third definition of 'world,' BT 93 
98BT 155 
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Because Dasein's world is primarily a with-world, as soon as a WOSE has 
begun we always already find ourselves thrown into the story-world 
which is constituted by the event of telling. 
6 THE WOSE, FUTURICITY AND FINITUDE 
The tone of voice in the very first phrase or word of a story, which may be 
a WOSE, or even simply the gesture of the teller constitutes a promise that 
we will be told of a happening.99 The WOSE continues to promise more 
until it reaches the end. And with the end of the WOSE, once again 
shown in the tone of voice or by gesture as much as by actual words, the 
WOSE is no more. For as long as a WOSE is, it promises more. This 
promise is the promise of more to come. In other words it is a sort of 
futuricity. This futuricity is constitutive of a WOSE. When there is no 
more to come, the WOSE is at an end. The futuricity of a WOSE is not 
simply the fact that the event takes time and hence there is a future of a 
certain amount of telling that we will have to sit through before the 
WOSE is finished. It is the presence of the future, or the future present as 
a promise of more to come and the telling of more to come that is 
constitutive of the WOSE as such. A WOSE involves the future in the 
present. If, during the telling of a story the audience becomes bored and 
disinterested in what is to come, and is no longer involved in it, this 
involvement with the future ceases, the WOSE ceases to happen and 
derivative discourse of a lesser form of narrative continues. In such a 
situation, not at all unusual, the audience still expects something more to 
happen but they are not involved in the expectation. Rather they expect, 
because of prior experience, that more will be recounted. Their mode of 
being is a distanced contemplation of the unfolding of a present-at-hand 
description of a sequence of events. Such expectation is conventional not 
existential, but it is founded on the prior possibility, however much it is 
ignored and forgotten, which is existential. The future of a WOSE is not 
the future in the sense of that part of a sequence of events which is being 
recounted which the storyteller claims happened at a time subsequent to 
the events recounted earlier. It is entirely possible, for example, to tell a 
99 "[verbal] examples are in English 'once upon a time' and in Swahili '%11"",,d' •••• When 
speakers of Syuwa, a Nepalese language, start a story, they begin it in 'the completive 
unwitnesaed second-hand mode'" Tonkin 1992, p.19 
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story in which the first event to be recounted is chronologically posterior 
to the last event recounted. lOO The chronology of the events recounted 
need have no relation to the ontological futuridty of a WOSE. Ricoeur, 
although not specifically talking about oral narrative, gives an account of 
the relationship between the time of the events recounted in a narrative 
and the time of a listener.tOl He shows that the time of a story is founded 
in the reckoning with time of concern.t02 It is as transposed into this 
concern that we become involved in the story, hence the futuridty of a 
WOSE is founded in its telling. 
The parallels between this account of a WOSE and the futuridty of Dasein 
are immediately obvious. For Dasein, as for a WOSE, the future is 
constitutive for its being.t03 We must remember that Dasein, like a WOSE 
is an event. Dasein is not man in the sense of his corporeal extension in 
space but man in the sense of living man as opposed to a corpse. And 
living man is an event. 
"There-being, rather than a mere synonym for man, is essentially a 
coming-to-pass that takes place in man." (Richardson 1963 p.45) 
The parallel with the WOSE is exact. A WOSE is not equivalent to a 
concrete thing, a text or any other sort of record, just as a man is not 
equivalent to a corpse.104 The eventhood of Dasein, its coming-to-pass 
means that Dasein is not a thing that can be frozen in a moment of time. 
100 For example see Jakobson: "narrative, espedally poetic, time can be unilinear as well as 
multilinear, direct as well as reversed, continuous as well as discontinuous; it can even be a 
combination of rectilinearity and circularity" Jakobson Ed. Pomorska, 1985 p.22 
101 "the heroes of stories reckon with time. They have or do not have time for this or that. 
The time of the story retains this reckoning at the threshold of measurement, at the point 
where it reveals our thrownness, by which we are abandoned to the changing of day into 
night. This time already includes the sort of reckoning used in dating events, but it is not yet 
the time in which the natural measure of 'days' is replaced by artificial measure, that is 
measure taken from physics and based on an instrumentation that follows the progress of 
the investigation of nature. In a narrative, the measuring of time is not yet released from 
time reckoning because this reckoning is still visibly rooted in preoccupation." Ricoeur 1981, 
p.171 
102 O. BT456-464 
103 'The future makes ontologicaUy possible an entity [Dasein] which is in such a way that 
it exists understandingly in its potentiality-for-Being." BT 385 
104 Richardson continues (1963, p.45-6) " ... There is an ｯｾｴｹＬ＠ then, .. : ｣ｯｾ＠ the 
relationship between There-being and man." Indeed there IS, and as ｈ･ｬｾ･ｧｧ･ｲ＠ did not 
elucidate the actual relationship between living Dasein and its body there IS a large field 
of research awaiting investigation. Similarly there is detailed research to be ､ｾｮ･＠ on the 
relationship between the WOSE and the experience of reading a novel, or watching a film. 
Nevertheless the obscurity of the being of such derivative forms must not be allowed to 
interfere with or obscure this seeking in the WOSE the essence of the primordial event from 
which other stories are derived. 
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Ossein's way of being, as we have seen in Chapter One has, indeed is, the 
sort of time that cannot be chopped up into instants. Dasein cannot be 
contained in such an instant for it is "essentially ahead of itself."lOS Any 
given WOSE entails of course an ontic instance of understanding, and 
hence is founded in the futuridty of the existentiale of understanding that 
makes it possible. A WOSE is an event, a comportment of Dasein.106 
Dasein exists as potentiality-for-being. H it ceases to do so it is no more and 
its corporeal residue has the present-at-hand way of being of a thing, a 
dead former-Dasein. A WOSE is always going on into the future, until it 
reaches its end and is no more. Even when a teller stops speaking in a 
moment of high tension in his telling, when his listeners are kept waiting 
for the revelation of a secret or .the denouement of a mystery, even then 
and precisely then above all, the event has not stopped but is pregnant, 
swollen with futuricity. That which makes that moment a moment of an 
event, and that which constitutes the event from that moment, is 
precisely that projecting forward, that stretching into the future that lends 
the potentiality of manifold possibilities to the present. It is the future as 
already-present-as-possibility which characterises a WOSE. We must 
remember to bear in mind continually that we are considering only a good 
telling, a successful, interesting, moving and engaging WOSE. H there is 
no tension in such a silent moment it is not on this definition strictly a 
WOSE, for the silence is not impregnated with futuridty. Both WOSEs 
and Dasein are no more when they no longer are the presence of the 
possibility of the future. Futuricity is constitutive of both. 
From the very beginning of a WOSE we are expecting it to come to an end. 
Even if facti cally we find ourselves wishing that it would never end our 
wishing is founded in our knowledge that it will. This knowing that a 
WOSE will come to an end is not necessarily thematised or conscious but 
it is constitutive of the WOSE. All the events recounted make sense in 
terms of an eventual end. The end may be postponed indefinitely, as in 
Sheherezade's 1,001 Nights, but the WOSE is always being-towards-an-
end. Indeed it is in order to hear the end of each story, and in the 
105 BT 386 
106 And at times, even Heideggerts describes Dasein itself like a very story-like event In 
his lecture course of 1925/6 he described Dasein thus: "I livt in the understanding of 
writing, lighting things up, walking in and out and the like. More precisely, I AI!' - as 
Dasein - speaking, walking, understanding, intelligible dealings lUmpng]. My Being in 
the world is nothing other than this being-in-motion [SichbttDt.gtn). that already 
understands in these modes of Being" Quoted in Guignon 1983 from Logik: Die Fr. nIIdI dtr 
Wllltrlteit. Gtstmtt.uspbt, vol.21 Frankfurt a. M.: Klostermann, 1976 p.146 
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expectation of it that the Sultan spares Sheherezade's life. The end is 
present as an unspoken promise in every moment of a WOSE. The end 
constitutes a WOSE because it is the ultimate horizon against which the 
understanding is projected and in the light of which events in the story 
are meaningful. As well as the attunement discussed below, it is in part 
because the world of a WOSE is Dasein's world the characters of a story 
(even a fictional story) also have finitude such that we care about a dying 
hero or a doomed love affair. Even if the hero miraculously revives or 
the storyteller by deus ex machina transforms the possibilities of the story 
our involvement and engagement and interest are sustained by finitude 
of lives and stories: if all stories could be instantly transformed and all 
deaths were non-deaths and all ends were non-ends all that constitutes 
WOSEs, (and other stories) as such would be vitiated. Finitude is 
constitutive of WOSEs as it is of Dasein. As a comportment a WOSE 
always being-towards-an-end just as authentic Dasein is being-towards-
death.107 
7 THE WOSE, A lTUNE ME NT AND MEANING 
In a WOSE if a funny situation is described the listener will be amused, if 
a happy event is revealed he will feel joy, if a tragedy unfolds he will be 
moved. This is not simply a matter of each listener reacting to 
information. The reaction is mainly determined by the manner of the 
telling.108 If the listener is unmoved by a story it is described as not well-
told. In the case of an audience of a professional performance which reacts 
heterogeneously the story will be understood as well-told by those who are 
caught up in it, and less well-told by those who are less involved. A 
'better' telling is one which opens the possibility of authentic 
transposition to more listeners. Dasein of course always has some mood 
or other,109 however during a WOSE its attunement is determined by the 
107 BT 277ff. 
108 This is not to say that the storyteller has total control over his Iistener(s) but rather 
that in the being-with of the telling his presentation of the story will determine if it 
moves the Iistener(s) or leaves them cold. His presentation is determined by how the 
storyteller makes use of the possibilities of engagement offered by the audience. The 
specific possibilities of the interaction of teller and listener or performer and audience vary 
with each and every telling, and are far too complex to analyse in detail, but ｷｾｴ･ｶ･ｲ＠
their particular ontic form, ontologically they are all manifestations of the articulation of 
the being-with of the Dasein in the situation. See Brook 1972 pp.25-29 
109 "in every case Dasein always has some mood" BT 173 
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WOSE. The mood is Dasein's own, and yet it springs from its 
involvement in the story. In listening to a WOSE, even if momentary or 
fragmented, a psychotherapist can "care" for and be-with his client. A 
WOSE is an ontic event of the articulation of care which makes possible 
the way of being-with which Boss noted was the essence of the 
psychotherapeutic relationship.ll0 
In a performance situation the mood of an audience can be authentic, that 
is grounded in their own-most possibilities, or inauthentic, taken over 
from the 'they'. Automatic responses such as sentimentality are for the 
most part inauthentic. The most important, though never totally 
determinative factor, in the nature of the mood of the audience is the 
mood of the teller. If that of which the teller tells has a meaning for him 
(as described in Chapter Two), if the teller has an authentic emotional 
involvement with that of which he speaks and he does not cover over his 
own being attuned in his telling he manifests the truth of his own being. 
Benjamin, in What is Epic Theatre? describes the actor's job in a similar 
way to the way I describe that of the storyteller.lll 
"The actor must show his subject, and he must show himself. Of 
course, he shows his subject by showing himself, and he shows 
himself by showing his subject." (Benjamin, 1970 p.150) 
In showing the being of the teller, the WOSE tells a truth although the 
dramatis personae and loci of the tale may be totally fictional. In so far as 
the teller shows this truth of his being as being-with he shows the truth of 
the Dasein of the audience as well, for Dasein is primarily being-with, and 
the truth of his Dasein is thus also the truth of Dasein as such.112 Any 
particular Dasein in the audience can of course turn away from such a 
showing, but if they do not do so they are brought in front of their own 
being-attuned and offered the possibility of authentically taking up their 
ownmost moodish possibility. Hence in the performance of a WOSE the 
audience is brought to its own authenticity. A well-told WOSE is an 
110 "in my first letter to [Heideggerll had expressly Signalled out page 122 of his book Sein 
UM Zeit (BTI58-9), and drawn his attention to the fact that under the title 'vorspringende 
Pilrsorge' he had described the ideal relationship between the psychoanalyst and his 
patient." Boss in Hoeller 1988, p.? 
111 The performance of an actor in certain circumstances has an existential similarity to 
that of a storyteller because fundamentally theatre is founded in Oasein's world-forming 
ability and hence the showing of Dasein itself, See PC Pt. II, Ch 6; Brook 1972; also 
Chapter Six below. 
112 "In so far as Dasein is its disclosedness essentially, and discloses and uncovers as 
IOmething disclosed to this extent it is essentially 'true', Dasein is 'in the truth'," BT 263 
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instantiation of more than one Dasein doing together what Heidegger 
analyses (apparently in terms of the individual) as the handing down of 
the heritage of Dasein.113 
For Heidegger authentic historicality is grounded in the authentic 
anticipation of death.114 As we have seen above the finitude of the story 
world is constitutive of WOSEs and within WOSEs Dasein is understood 
as mortal. Thus the finitude of and in WOSEs makes possible the 
authentic mood that draws Dasein to resoluteness just as the anticipation 
of death of one's own Dasein makes possible anticipatory resoluteness in 
other, non-storytelling situations. Dasein is never unmoved by a WOSE, 
for it is always attuned by the Da of the storyteller into which it is 
transposed. Equally if a Dasein telling a story fails to transpose himself 
into the being-with of the listener(s), that is constitutes himself as an 
"individual ego with its ego-sphere"115 separated from the attuned being 
of the audience, such a Dasein fails to create a well-told oral storytelling 
event, and he abandons the listener(s) to an account of events into which 
they can only transpose themselves as indifferent. In so far as any Dasein, 
teller or listener, turns away from such transposition and constitutes itself 
by the indifference of everyday being-alongside it does not participate in a 
WOSE. A story that does not engage us is a different sort of event. Dasein 
has one way of being in a WOSE, another when listening to a ''boring 
story". With reference to stories, boredom, and its opposite, are not 
objective characteristics of stories, nor subjective characteristics of Dasein, 
but determinations of the relationship of Dasein to itself and other Dasein. 
Nor is boredom a steady state. Boredom can flicker on and off, and in its 
profound form can lurk unremarked beneath everyday life. A WOSE 
breaks through all boredom but can be interrupted in an instant if teller or 
listener falls away from the authentic transposition. 
To talk of the plot of a WOSE is to interpret the WOSE in terms of a 
conceptual framework which stands back from the actual experience of the 
WOSE. In other words there is no such thing as "plot" discoverable in the 
actual event of Dasein's engagement with the telling. In a WOSE there is 
only Dasein as transposed into the Da of the teller. Ricoeur writes of plot 
or emplotment as though it was an agent, as though the plot is some way 
shapes or guides the story, but plot is not a constitutive building block of 
tt3 See BT Section 74 and the analysis of historizing in Chapter 3. 
114 BT 438 
11S PC 206 
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narrative it is an abstraction post hoc. The notion of plot arises at the 
same time as narrative begins to be written down. Aristotle's On the Art of 
Poetry dates from the age of Greek drama which was the fIrSt form of 
public narrative guided by text.116 Aristotle does not clearly distinguish 
the action of the drama from the representation, and he defines plot in 
two different ways viz: "The representation of the action is the plot of the 
tragedy" and, lithe ordered arrangement of the incidents is what I mean by 
plot."117 Ricoeur cites the first of these definitions,US but bases Time and 
Narrative on his adaptation of the second. The plot, rather than simply 
naming the "ordered arrangement of the incidents", becomes the agent 
which brings about the ordering.! 19 Ricoeur is admittedly concerned 
primarily with literature as he suggests that "mimesis2 ... opens up the 
world of the plot and institutes ... the literariness of the work of 
literature." l20 Rather than following Ricoeur, I suggest that the separation 
that Aristotle begins to make, but does not make completely, is the 
beginning of an erroneous view of the primordial form of story (although 
poSSibly a legitimate description of the mediated form of narrative that is 
constructed by a dramaturge). Essential to a well-told oral storytelling 
event is the transposition which primordially brings Oasein alongside the 
events of the story in the Oa of the teller. A well-told oral storytelling 
event is one, albeit complex, event.12l 
A narrative has a plot the way a building has a shadow. The shadow is not 
constitutive of the building, it is merely what is seen when one looks at 
the building in the light of the sun. Similarly a plot is not constitutive of 
a story, it is merely what is seen when one looks at a story in the light of 
theoretical analysis. Ricoeur might as well have said "guidance" guides 
the story, which is true but vacuous. The hanging together of a story, the 
relating of past events to future ones and all the other functions ascribed 
to plot actually arise from the being of Oasein. The revelatory as-a-
wholeness of story is given by the unity of the temporal horizons of 
Dasein's self-projection. Telling a WOSE is an existentiell modification of 
116 "Greek drama,though orally performed, was composed as a written text and in the west 
was the first verbal genre, and for centuries the only verbal genre, to be controlled 
completely by writing." (Ong 1982, p.142) 
117 Aristotle tr. Dorsch 1965, p.39 . 
118 "Plot, says, Aristotle, is the mimesis of an action" Riroeur 1984, p.Xl 
119 "the plot transforms the events into a story-- Ricoeur 1984, p.66. See whole section for 
full description and commentary in Chapter Three above. 
120 Ricoeur 1984, p.53 
121 See also Bakhtin quoted in Bauman 1986, p.112 
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Dasein in which entities have meaning for Dasein.J22 The coherence of 
the ｾｏｓｅＬ＠ and of any derivative form of story, is given by the unity of 
Daseln's temporal horizons which Heidegger calls the existentiale of 
meaning. The story-hood of a WOSE, that is its hanging together as a 
story, does not depend on the revelation of a plot or any other sequential 
or mechanical structure. It is given in an instant, the Augenbliclc, by 
Dasein. This is why we can grasp a story as a story even if we have not 
heard the beginning of a story or the end. That which makes a piece of 
discourse a story can be heard in a single phrase, or word, or even a 
silence. The phrase, "Once upon a time ... tI can already transpose us. On 
the other hand any silence, word, phrase, plot or entire story can leave us 
cold and be mere idle talk, the mere imitation of what is essential in a 
story. It is understood as a story only in and by the ascription of 
inauthentic emotions and involvement. 
8 LOGOS AND STORY 
I have claimed that a WOSE is an event which is a special and particular 
way of Dasein's being-with. That which is claimed for such storytelling is 
not typical of everyday speech. I have suggested that WOSEs make 
manifest Dasein's being, that they present Dasein's being non-conceptually 
as world-forming, attuned futuricity. Heidegger does not dwell upon 
storytelling as such as a particular form of discourse but he does consider 
the fact that there are many different forms of discourse.123 He dismisses 
the notion, which has been prevalent in metaphysics since Plato, that the 
primary form of language is the true statement.124 In The Fundamental 
122 BT 193 
123 Heidegger scarcely mentions narrative in his writings. His only reference to narration 
in The Fundamental Concepts is a reference to what I would call boring story. (PC 302) 
However when he was writing Being and Time he was more aware that narration could not 
necessarily be reduced to assertion without an essential loss. "Between the kind of 
interpretation which is still wholly wrapped up in concemful understanding and the 
extreme opposite case of a theoretical assertion about something present-at-hand, there are 
many intermediate gradations: assertions about the happenings in the environment, 
accounts of the ready-to-hand, 'reports on the Situation', the recording and fixing of the 
'facts of the case', the description of a state of affairs, the narration of something that has 
befallen. We cannot trace back these 'sentences' to theoretical statements without 
essentially perverting their meaning." 8T 201 
124 'We may neither advance the positive true judgement, nor any other fonn, as the !Ole 
privileged form of the logos and then take aU the others into account ｾｾｬｹ＠ : .. 
We have not yet attained the correct approach at all. The correct approach as nussang an 
Aristotle too" PC 336 
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Concepts he tries to show that all assertions are founded in a more 
primordial logos which is the articulation of man's existential nature as 
world-forming.125 In the analysis of logos in ancient philosophy in which 
he does this he lays bare many of the phenomena which I believe are 
gathered together and primarily manifest in the telling of a well-told 
story.126 Heidegger wishes to show that, even if later philosophers 
reduced logos in their understanding to reason or assertions, such 
reduction, and all writing and speech are only made possible on the 
grounds of a pre-logical openness for beings.127 He is showing that, even 
in Aristotle, logos cannot be the atemporal, eternal showing of what is 
true, but always comes forth from the openness for beings that is 
existentially grounded in the world-forming temporality of Dasein.t 28 
Heidegger's reading of the ancient Greek philosophers is idiosyncratic and 
he and many Heideggerian commentators often complicate the issue by 
equating logos with his particular expository term Rede (the 
existentiale).129 
It is clear that the interpretation of logos in Ancient Greek philosophy is 
riven with highly contentious debate.13o Eric Havelock, in his paper on 
the language of the Presocratics suggests that their thinking went along 
with an evolution of language.131 They were seeking to express the new 
thoughts made possible by writing and to reject the old way of thinking 
that sustained, and was sustained by, the still prevailing oral culture. 
Havelock metonymically equates the old oral culture with mythos and 
125 "The pre-logical being open for beings, out of which every logos must speak, has in 
advance always already completed beings in the direction of an 'lIS a whole.' By this 
completion we .. understand ... the prior forming of the 'lIS a whole' alretUly pref1fliling." 
FC348 
126 Heidegger looks at logos in ancient Greek philosophy as a whole. In so far as he 
concentrates in the 19205 on any philosopher in particular it is Aristotle, but the whole 
section can be read also in the knowledge that he was becoming increasingly interested in 
the pre-Socratics. Nonetheless "Heidegger's attitude to the Presocratics is fundamentally 
determined by his view of metaphysics proper, and this means Aristotle." Sadler 1996 p.37 
As we have seen according to Havelock the pre-Socratics were thinking on the very 
threshold of literacy. See BT55ff , BT 201ff; FC 288-9 and following sections. 
127 "logos is grounded in ... a pre-logical being open for beings." PC 344 . 
128 For a succinct but thorough treatment of Heidegger's complex reading of log. m 
Aristotle see Sadler 1996, pp.113-126 
129 See Biemel1972 pp.69-73 and Guignon 1983 p.112ff. Much writing in the ｈｾｾ＠
field takes over Heidegger's view of logos rather than debating its justification or 
coherence. 
130 See for a small sample of the issues in contention Kahn, Kirk, Havelock, Robb, and 
Moravcsik in Robb 1983. Heidegger himself acknowledges that, "In Plato ｾ＠ ｾ､･＠ the 
concept of the logos has many competing significations, with no baSIC sigmfication 
positively taking the lead." BT 55 
131 In Robb 1983 
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equates the logos of the Presocratics with the nascent abstract thinking 
potentiated by writing.132 Hence by the time Plato was writing logos 
became the repository of knowledge and its objectification had been 
achieved by writing, even though the practice of oral debate or dialogue 
continued.133 Heidegger does not contrast logos with the earlier mythos 
but with the later interpretation of logos as reason, judgement or 
assertion.134 Whilst not concerned with literacy as such, he dearly hears 
acoustic overtones in logos (which Havelock would apportion to mythos). 
Seidel in his commentary on Heidegger and the Presocratics is alert to the 
significance of oral speech in Heidegger's later writing on logos.t 35 I 
cannot here attempt a definitive reading of logos, either in Heidegger or 
ancient philosophy, but having made these caveats and connections, I 
want to draw out some of the phenomena Heidegger identifies in his 
analysis of logos and show that they demonstrate the ontological 
connection between the primordial showing of logos (of which I maintain 
that story-telling is historically and existentiell-Iy a primary instance) and 
the being of Dasein as temporally ecstatic and world-fOrming. 
In The Fundamental Concepts Heidegger notes that everyday Dasein 
believes things to be present-at-hand and correspondingly talks about 
them with, and considers the essence of talking to be, assertions such as "a 
is b")36 However even within this reduced understanding we are aware 
132 "one can say of the Presocratics that their whole linguistic enterprise stands poised 
between the word acoustically delivered and the word articulated, written, and visible. 
Competition between mythos and logos has begun." Havelock in Robb 1983, p.12 
133 "though oral, the Socratic dialogue depended upon the previous isolation of language in 
its written form as something separate from the person who uttered it. The person who used 
the language but was now separated from it became the 'personalitY who could now 
discover its existence. The language so discovered became that level of theoretic discourse 
denoted by logos. Within the logos resided knowledge of what was known, now separated 
from the personal knower - who could, however train himself to use it." Havelock t986 
p.114 
134 BT 55 
135 "Heidegger has come to favour expressions of hearing over those of seeing, sound over 
those of sight. In the case of seeing there is of necessity a subject differentiated off from 
that which is seen, namely, the object. In seeing one stands back and takes a look. . One 
stands off from that which is looked at. In hearing, on the other hand, the sound IS all 
around. One is in a vibrant field of sound. ("We set being in vibration when we question 
authentically" Was Heist Denken?, p.19) And this is why we hear, rather than see, being. 
Being vibrates. And one must listen; one must be in tune with the VIbrations of being, if one 
is to catch its message, if one is to hear being's voice. ... It is not merely a question of 
hearing, but of being attuned to the Logos. And if one truly listens to the Logos. one shaD be 
tuned in on being's wave frequency. ... This fact may at least in part explain the importance 
of the spoken delivery for Heidegger." Seidel 1964, p.tOl 
136 "The fundamental trait of everyday Dasein is that undifferentiated comportment 
toward beings pn!d8eIy as something present at hand. The ｣ｯｲｲ･ｳｰｯｾ＠ form of discoune 
in which such comportment at first and for the most part expresses Itself - whether in 
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there are different types of expression and he notes that in the sort of 
statement that expresses a human comportment (wishing, commanding, 
questioning) we articulate and distinguish them "through particular signs 
(the question mark, the exclamation mark, the full stop), but above all 
through a particular rhythm or tone. "137 Heidegger acknowledges here 
the significance of orality to express a comportment of Dasein, but he does 
not follow it up.138 Indeed his overlOOking of the plenitude of this 
significance (whether from lack of interest or insight we cannot judge) is 
clear from the fact that in the quotation above the parenthetical phrase 
refers to writing and the final phrase to oral discourse but he does not 
advert to the enormity of the difference between the two. Rhythm and 
tone are part of the non-verbal element of discourse which show forth the 
attunement of Dasein, and in speaking one always and inescapably 
manifests some rhythm and some tone. Even though there are 
chirographic devices (such as 'lines' of poetry) and qualifying adjectives 
which can be ad-juncted to suggest a certain rhythm or tone the suggestion 
or reproduction is utterly impoverished, virtually nugatory, compared to 
what is and what can be made manifest in the speaking voice. Written 
texts are anonymous and their ambiguity and emotional vagueness are 
beyond measure. The same poem can be read countless different ways, 
written adjectives describing a tone of voice raise the question as to what 
tone of voice they themselves should be read in and so on and so forth.139 
conversation, in narration, in reporting, in proclamation, or in scientific discussion - is this 
undifferentiated habitual form of assertion: la is bl." Fe 302 
137 Fe 301 
138 Or at least not for twenty years: "it was all of twenty years after my doctoral 
dissertation that I dared to discuss in a class the question of language." Heidegger 1971, p.8 
Even then he does not press this distinction hard enough even though he quotes von 
Humbolt approvingly; "Language, grasped in its actual essence, is perpetually and at every 
moment something transitory. Even its preservation through writing is always a merely 
incomplete preservation, a kind of mummification, which is necessary if we are to try to 
render once again the delivery of the written word. Language itsel! is not a work ＨｴｲｧｯｮｾＬ＠
but an activity (mergeitd. Its true definition can thus only be a genetiC one. For language 15 
the eternally self-repeating "'bor of spirit to make articulated sound capable of being an 
expression of thought. Taken strictly and directly, this is the definition of every instance 
of spe4king; but in the true and essential sense, one can also regard the ｴｯｾｕｴ＾Ｚ＠ of such 
speech only as an approximation to language." von Humbolt, On the Diversity of.the 
Structure of HUmJJn LangtUlge and Its Influence on the IntellectlUJl Development of Mllnkirul, 
(Berlin, 1936) in Heidegger 1971 (b) p.116-7 In pressing on into the relation of language to 
being and the effect of techne as a whole he apparently overlooks the part played by the 
effect on language of writing. . 
139 Thus the task Heidegger sets himself later (in Heidegger 1971 (a) and Ｈ｢Ｉｾ＠ of seeldng to 
understand poetry is rendered immensely complicated because he works Wlth the. ｾｴ＠ of 
poems and does not tum his attention to the myriad possibilities of the modahUes of 
encounter with text as sub-vocaIised or spoken and heard. 
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By contrast, in the modalities of rhythm and tone of the spoken word are 
shown or hidden immediately and unambiguously the way of being of the 
speaker which renders a story well-told or badly told. l40 Heidegger does 
note that in spite of the dominance of the Greek theory of the logos as 
propositional statement Aristotle attempted in his RhetoTic "the mighty 
task of submitting the forms and formations of non-thetic discourse to 
interpretationn141 but he does not unambiguously make the step from, or 
connection between, 'non-thetic' and oral so his analysis of logos remains 
trammelled by the obscurity of abstraction. In spite of the obscurity, the 
link can be made. He writes n[logos] means the fundamental faculty of 
being able to talk discursively, and accordingly, to Speak."142 Furthermore, 
"it is in the logos that man expresses what is most essential to him, so as 
in this very expression to place himself into the clarity, depth, and need 
pertaining to the essential possibilities of his action, of his existence.'t143 
In other words man expresses his essence in orality. Heidegger is not 
contrasting logos with writing as such, but with the way of thinking of 
later metaphysics. We, interpolating Havelock, can understand that the 
,misapprehensions of later metaphysical thinking lie in the illusions 
arising from literacy. Heidegger has an enormous struggle making sense 
of logos because although he understands that the nature of logos is not 
such that it can be merely present-at-hand he does not see the historical 
reason for the confusion and must therefore take a long detour through 
the exposition of the primordiality of world hood that makes possible logos 
and language. He takes words to be things, just as Plato did.144 Heidegger 
is sensitive to what is lost in such a grasping, though he writes of it in 
terms of poems rather than stories or WOSEs. He did not have at his 
disposal the scholarship of Havelock and Ong who both advance the claim 
140 In psychotherapy for example, is in listening to the way that a patient talks, often 
more than whllt he says, that the psychotherapist forms his judgement about the patients' 
way of being. We return to this point in Chapter Six. 
141 PC 303 
142 PC 305 
143 PC 303 
144 'When considered philosophically, the logos itself is an entity, and, according to the 
orientation of andent ontology, it is something present-at-hand. Words are proximally 
present-at-hand" BT 201 In The Fundllmental Concepts he is still struggling with the 
consequences of this misunderstanding, although its shortcomings are ｾｵ｣ｨ＠ dearer to him, 
see next quotation (PC 303) in text above. See earlier footnotes re hiS later approach to 
saying and poetry in 1971 (a) and (b). 
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that poetry only became separated from oral storytelling by the historical 
introduction of writing.t4S 
'When a poem is made the object of philological interpretation, 
ｴｨｾ＠ resources of grammar find themselves at a loss, and precisely 
W1th respect to the greatest creations of language." (FC 303) 
Heidegger is also sensitive to how discourse is originally the expression 
and articulation of being-with, which although he does not explicitly say 
so must refer to oral discourse rather than textually mediated 
communication.146 When reading, Dasein is withdrawn from other 
Dasein, even, and indeed most obviously, if one person is reading a text in 
the presence of another. If the reading is silent Dasein is absorbed in a 
private world, if the reading is out loud it is clear that the event is 
precisely not a speaking to from out of a being-with but a presenting of a 
text as a reading out of a script present-at-hand. 
Heidegger never completely clarifies his allusions to orality but he is clear 
that logos is not merely the notation of knowledge. We may note that just 
as the issue of truth and falsity is irrelevant to the event of a well-told 
story, Heidegger asserts of logos that its "essence ... consists precisely in its 
containing as such the possibility of 'either true or false', of 'both positive 
and negative' ."147 Logos is not knowledge as true and false, but that 
which includes it. It is the possibility of truth and falsehood, which are of 
course equally constitutive of WOSEs. Logos is "an ability for ... which 
intrinsically entails having a relating toward beings as such at one's 
disposal."148 In this sense Logos is clearly the ground of the possibility of 
any event of storytelling, which is a relating towards beings. Logos in 
Being and Time is not the exact equivalent of Rede,149 pace Guignon,lS0 
145 "the divorce between poem and context would be difficult to imagine in an oral culture ... 
The romantic quest for 'pure poetry' ... derives from the feel for autonomous utterance 
created by writing and, even more, the feel for closure created by print." Ong 1982, p.161 "a 
... cleavage opened up, between this theoretic disourse and the rhythmic narrative of 
oralism: the philosopher entered the lists against the poets:' Havelock 1986 p.ll4 
146 "all discursivity places us in the dimension of understandability; indeed, discourse and 
language constitutes precisely this dimension of understandability, of mutual ｾｩｯｮＬ＠
requesting, desiring, asking, telling. Discourse gives something to be understood and 
demands understanding. By its very essence it is turned toward the free comportment and 
activity of human beings among one another." PC 306 
147 FC 337 
148 FC 337 
149 See BT 55-58 
150 Guignon (1983, pp.112-3) seizes on one element of Heidegger's discussion of lop, but 
Heidegger's use of Rede is more tightly circumscribed than those meanings he various 
attributes to 'ogos. 
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and in The Fundamental Concepts the terminology of existentialia is not 
used. Nonetheless throughout the period 1926-30 Heidegger is thinldng of 
logos as an existential component of Dasein. Heidegger's writing on logos 
oscillates between the ontic and ontolOgical levels because logos is shown 
in the event of discourse and is also the possibility of the event of 
discourse and the event itself. I believe that in logos Heidegger is 
approaching the same phenomenon in the existential potentiality of 
Dasein that I have outlined in my analysis of the WOSE as founded in 
Dasein's temporal structure. Heidegger puts it as follows: 
"we are asking where the logos in general stands. We have to say 
that it is an essential manner of comportment belonging to man. 
We must therefore ask after the ground of the inner possibility of 
the logos in terms of the concealed essence of man." Fe 335 
The "concealed essence of man" he identifies as "world formation".151 It 
is indeed concealed from Western metaphysics but it is precisely what is 
shown in a WOSE. As noted earlier, for the most part WOSEs are 
intermittent events in the ontic act of telling a story, and therefore this 
"essential manner of comportment belonging to man" is often 
overlooked, or dismissed, un analysed as a numinous epiphanic moment. 
Nevertheless it is only because a WOSE is a possibility, however rare and 
obscured, that mankind wishes to listen to stories, and recognizes them as 
such. 
9 SUMMARY 
It follows from the claims above that in the case of a WOSE the 
relationship between the storyteller and the listener(s) is an existentiell 
modification of Dasein.t52 Man hears the echo of the possibility of this 
mode of self-transformation in every story, just as he hears the call of 
conscience even in the deepest inauthenticity. It has been suggested that 
in the event of storytelling the Dasein of the audience is transposed into 
the Dasein of the teller whose world extends to include the environing 
world and dramatis personae of the story. This transposition is a 
151 'What we here call world-formation is ultimately also the very grourul of tile inner 
possibility of the logo •. ••. what it is, is something we do not yet know." FC 335 . . 
152 "The question of existence never gets straightened out except Ｌｾｵｾ＠ ｾｳｴｩｮｧ＠ Itself. 
The understanding of oneself which leads along this WIly we call mstentielr BT 33 See 
also BP 279 
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particular modification of the transpoSition into the other that is 
existentially constitutive of Dasein.153 The mode in which Dasein is 
normally transposed is an indifferent going alongside.154 This is precisely 
what is modified in the event of a WOSE. A WOSE does not demand a 
specific effort of turning towards one's ownmost possibilities and taking 
up the stance of anticipatory resoluteness, it simply brings Dasein in front 
of its own possibilities of being, and any given Dasein is free to turn away 
again from that with which it has been presented.155 Dasein's "factical 
everyday understanding of itself [is al ... reflection from the things with 
which it is concerned. "156 In listening to a WOSE it attends to the Dasein 
in the WOSE, and accordingly understands itself. The WOSE is a 
reflection of Dasein's being, neither as caught up in its own concerns, nor 
self-consciously as reflecting upon itself as an entity or person, but simply 
through transposition into an articulation of being-in-the-world as care. 
We remember that the essence of the WOSE is precisely not the 
presentation of information, but the presenting of the existentiell 
dimension of the existentialia of Dasein in Being-with. As noted in 
Chapter Three Heidegger ascribes the phenomena which pertain to a 
WOSE to poetry. In Being and Time he writes, 
"In 'poetical' discourse, the communication of the existential 
possibilities of one's state-of-mind can become an aim in itself, and 
this amounts to a disclosing of existence. It (BT 205) 
Even more clearly in The Basic Problems he expresses the same thought 
before quoting from Rilke whose prose comes as close as is possible within 
the limits of text to the power of orality. 
"Poetry, creative literature, is nothing but the elementary 
emergence into words, the becoming-uncovered, of existence as 
153 "the possibility of our transposing ourselves into [other human beings] ... already and 
originally belongs to man's own essence. Insofar as human beings exist at all, they already 
find themselves transposed in their existence into other human beings, even if there are 
factically no other human beings in the vicinity." PC 205 
154 "the illusion of such isolation [that one would have to seek a bridge from one human 
being to another] arises from the circumstance that human ｢･ｩｮｾ＠ ｦ｡ｾ｣｡ｕｹ＠ ｭｯｾ＠ around in 
a peculiar form of being transposed into one another, one which 15 ｾ｣ｴ･ｲｩｺ･､＠ by an 
indifferent going alongside one another. This illusion of a prior separation ｾｴｷｾ＠ one 
human being and another is reinforced by the philosophical dogma that man 15 initially to 
be understood as subject and as consciousness, that he is primarily and most indubitably 
aiven to himself as consciousness for a subject. " PC 208 
rss "Authentic Being-one's-Sel/ does not rest upon an exceptional ｣ｯｮ､ｩｾｯｮ＠ ｾｦ＠ the ｾ｢ｊ･｣ｴＺ＠ a 
condition that has been detached from the 'they'; it is rather an UJStentiell motlifiattiort 
of thl 'tMy' - of the 'tiley' lIS an essentild uistentiale." BT 168 
Ｑｾ＠ BP 158 
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being-in-the-world. For the others who before it were blind the 
world first becomes visible by what is thus spoken." (BP 171-2)' 
This world which becomes visible is not the environing world as though 
men who were blind suddenly are enabled to see the objects that lie about 
them but the worldhood of the world, that is to say its meaningfulness as 
shot-through with the attuned, futural, articulated being of Dasein. 
What distinguishes a WOSE from a boring story and from mere 
information is that we care about it. Every WOSE articulates futuricity, 
world, finitude and attunement. As such it continually calls Dasein to its 
authentic possibilities.157 This is not simply a situation in which a 
storyteller, acting authentically, calls the inauthentic Dasein of his 
audience to become authentic - although in some cases this may 
happen. 158 What calls Dasein to its authenticity, both the Dasein of teller 
and of audience, is the possibility of authentic being-with, for a well told 
story is the evocation of Dasein's existentiell self-understanding.159 Such 
possibility is in fact surely an instance of the "call of conscience" which 
silently calls Dasein back from its lostness in the everyday understanding 
of itself to its ownmost possibilities. 
"When Dasein is resolute, it can become the 'conscience' of 
Others. Only by authentically Being-their-Selves in resoluteness 
can people authentically be with one another." (BT 344) 
The immediate communication of authentic attunement, futuricity and 
situatedness of a WOSE (which is not primarily constituted by words, nor 
by a 'plot', and which cannot be reduced to explanation) puts Dasein in 
front of itself as tutural, authentic and attuned. Such authentic self-
understanding is not primarily, and in fact is almost never, thematised 
philosophically let alone in terms of Heidegger's ontology of Dasein. It is 
157 This call is not a moralizing proclamation but like the call of conscience (BT 319-323) it 
is silent. It is the call of authentic Dasein to recognize itself through its understanding of 
its own being in being-with. 
158 Equally it could be that the storyteller has fallen into inauthentidty to be recalled by 
the authentic Dasein in his audience. 
159 "Dasein, as a Being-with which understands, can listen to Others. ｾｧ＠ itself in the 
publicness and the idle talk of the 'they', it /tlils to hell, its own Self in listening to the 
they-self. U Dasein is to be able to get brought back from this lostness of failing to hear 
it8elf, and if this is to be done through itself, then it must first be able to find itself - to find 
itself as something which has failed to hear itself, and which ｦ｡ｩＱｾ＠ to hear in that it 
listens flfDtly to the 'they.' This listening-away must get broken off; In ｯｾ＠ words, ｾ＠
possibility of another kind of hearing which will interrupt it, must be gtven by ｾｮ＠
itself. The possibility of its thus getting broken off lies in its being appealed to Wlthout 
mediation." BT ＳＱｾ＠
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the non-conceptual pre-ontological presentation to Dasein of being-
attuned, of world, and of futuridty. In so far as we know what a well-told 
story is, we have an understanding of what it is to be lifted out of the 
indifference of the 'they' and transposed into authentic being-with.l60 A 
WOSE has meaning for the Dasein that tells it and hears it. Thus in a 
WOSE we may say that entities are brought before us such that they have 
meaning for us, and our own being is revealed alongside the entities.161 
In a WOSE one senses oneself engaged in the dynamics of the story, as 
the way of being of Dasein of both teller and listener(s) is modified. This 
modification is a possibility that lies latent in the tradition of storytelling 
that can be handed down from one generation to another, but it becomes 
an existentiell modification of Dasein only in an actual event.162 Here I 
re-emphasise that this modification pertains to story as event, and 
primarily as WOSE, and not to any putative narrative structure or text. 
This thesis, notwithstanding the limitations imposed upon it by its form 
as literary text, goes some way towards explaining what makes a story wel.l-
told and the essential place of that modality to the being of stories.l63 It is 
because what is revealed in a WOSE is primarily Dasein's being that a 
WOSE cannot be boiled down to a single moral or meaning. The meaning 
of a WOSE, like the meaning of Dasein is the tessellation of relationships 
and temporal horizons against which beings, and the being of Dasein, is 
revealed. 
Any given WOSE is an existentiell modification of Dasein which 
transposes it into a manifestation of its own structure of being. The 
futuricity, mood, and world of a WOSE are all drawn from Dasein - indeed 
a WOSE has no other being than as a way of Oasein's being-with. Its 
being-a-WOSE is necessarily as a way of being of Dasein, so whatever 
constitutes a WOSE comes from Dasein. A WOSE is an instance of the 
"authentic repetition of a possibility of existence that has been"164 which is 
an "explicit handing down"165 of a possibility of existence that has come 
down to us. Because a WOSE is a comportment of Dasein whose structure 
160 "Knowing oneself is grounded in Being-with, which understands primordially." BT 161 
161 0. BT 192-3 and the special case of meaning discussed in Chapter Two. . 
162 Such an event can take place in informal conversation and in a ｊ＿ｓｙ｣ｨｾｴｨ･ｲ｡ｰ･ｵｴｩ｣＠
context as well. It is beyond the remit of this thesis to enumerate all poSSIble circumStanCeS 
and events of such existentiell modification. 
163 It also lays the foundations for an investigation of the being of stories of a fonn other 
than the WOSE. Such an investigation is a task for future research. 
164BT437 
165 BT437 
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is founded in authentic Dasein's temporality we can see Dasein's 
authentic temporal structure in a WOSE. We can thus say Dasein is 
"story-like" (strictly WOSE-like) and through the WOSE deepen our 
understanding of Dasein. The meaning of Dasein's being is tlult which 
articulates and is articulated in a WOSE. It is attuned, understanding 
being-in-the-world which cannot in principal be reduced to a verbal or 
theoretical statement. WOSEs and Dasein are both constituted by 
futuricity, by world and by mood, hence in the WOSE we can see Dasein's 
temporal structure. In a WOSE Dasein raises its understanding of itself to 
the level of interpretation. Dasein's awareness is turned towards its 
ownmost possibility of experiencing itself both as an individual and as 
being-with-others. Such WOSEs are Dasein's non-theoretical, non-
conceptual understanding of its own authentic possibilities of being. In 
WOSEs Dasein pre-ontologically shows itself to itself. 
In the final chapter we look at the application of this understanding of the 
potential of storytelling in the arenas of psychotherapy and make some 
brief comments on storytelling in performance. Chapter Six then 
concludes with a summary of the entire thesis highlighting the 
significance of the WOSE in different fields of theory and practice. 
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Chapter Six 
Conclusion: Meaning, Psychotherapy, 
Performance and the Well-told Oral 
Storytelling Event 
1 INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter the is concluded thesis by drawing out some of the 
implications of our findings. Emphasis is placed on the relevance of our 
phenomenological analysis to applied social issues. I make some 
connections between what has been uncovered in the philosophical realm 
with theory and practice in psychotherapy and performance. I cannot 
hope to make all the possible connections between this philosophical 
analysis of the well-told oral storytelling event and theory in these fields 
so I will concentrate on some considerations that arise directly from 
practice. In this chapter I will refer to just a few of the many authors 
writing on narrative, not necessarily because they are the best-known or 
the most influential, but because they touch on issues which have been 
illuminated by this research. In my discussion I will not draw attention to 
the differences between the many schools of psychotherapy for three main 
reasons. Firstly as Orner puts it "pluralism is not a de facto temporary state 
of affairs, but reflects the fundamental nature of psychotherapy."l A 
survey in 1990 found that 68% of psychotherapists claimed to be eclectic.2 
Secondly, like Gendlin,3 I am interested in processes that are therapeutic 
regardless of theoretical framework rather than the theories which have 
mostly been created by people attempting to teach or research those 
processes in academic institutions. Thirdly, outcome research on 
psychotherapy has shown there is little or no correlation betv .. 'een the 
theoretical orientation of the therapist and the outcome of treatment.4 
1 Orner 1993 (b) p.668 
2 Cited in Bergin and Garfield 1994, p.143 
3 Gt.'ndlin 1988 
4 Sec Bergin and Garfield 1994, p.161 and Spinelli 1994,pp.70-77 
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However research has shown a correlation between certain individual 
ｴｨ･ｲ｡ｾｩｳｴｳＬ＠ regardless of training, and successful outcome.s We may 
surmIse therefore that there is something about those therapists' WIlY of 
being and way of being-with that has a therapeutic effect, regardless of 
their training or theoretical approach. It is probable, although necessarily 
unproveable, that what characterises their way of being is a tendency 
towards authentic comportment including the facilitation, and possibly 
telling, of WOSEs.6 A WOSE is an instance of genuine discourse7 which 
makes possible a moment of vision, the augenblick.8 The moment of 
vision is not necessarily a moment of high drama, it is simply how Dasein 
sees when it is returned to its ownmost possibilities from out of the 'they'. 
That which makes Dasein's possibilities its own is its mode of taking them 
up, not the factical "ownership" or "location" of those possibilities. Thus 
Dasein transposed into the other can take over the possibilities of the 
Dasein of a story as its own in the moment of vision, and yet if it refuses 
the moment of vision in its factical life it can faU to take up possibilities 
that pertain to its own physical environment. A WOSE is not a technical 
achievement of a skilful teller, therapist or client, but rather an 
existentially honest moment, a revealing of the being of Dasein. In many 
cases a WOSE is the expression of the meaning that an entity has for 
Dasein. 9 Finally although I emphasise the place of the WOSE in 
psychotherapy not all psychotherapy relies on telling of WOSE-type 
stories.1o The experience of a WOSE is often a Significant element in 
therapy but it may be neither necessary nor sufficient. 
Stories, and WOSEs, long pre-date psychotherapy. Many issues that in 
modernity are brought to psychotherapy were addressed in societies of 
primary orality through stories. Traditional stories are not overtly 
instructive nor moralizing but, as folklorist Kirshenblatt-Gimblett points 
5 "The therapist factor, as a contributor to outcome, is looming large in the assessment of 
outcomes. Some therapists appear to be unusually effective." Bergin and Garfield 1994, 
p.182. See also Spinelli 1994 p.307 
6 It is unproveable because there can in principle be no objective measuremen! of 
authenticity. Authenticity cannot be verified by another because it.is rooted in ｾ･＠ sub;ecL 
Even the subject does not "know" themselves to be authentic, but SImply opens Itself to its 
ownmost possibilities. There may be agreement about a mutual experience of authenticity 
but never proof. Hence the concept of a WOSE does not lend itself to verification by 
standard psychological research methods. 
7 O. BT 2(8 and BT 438 
881376 
9 Cf. Chapter Two . . 
10 For example Cognitive Therapy, although clearly involving telling stones, may not be 
held to rely on a WCB!-type telling of stories. See Bums 1981 
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out, "like fables and proverbs, parables are a traditional technique for 
coping with problematic social Situations".11 She researches folldore "in 
its immediate context of use as a highly structured, integrated form of 
interpersonal behaviour"12 because as she notes, scholars have tended to 
look at stories only in semi-official or ritual contexts and not so much at 
how they crop up in everyday, non-narrative contexts)3 In effect 
Kirshenblatt-Gimblett investigates the praxis of the moral instruction that 
MacIntyre believes characterises classical cultures)4 We are now in a 
position to understand the mechanism of such instruction. At its best, 
storytelling takes the form of a WOSE. In a WOSE the listener is 
transposed into the Da of the story and takes over the attunement and 
possibilities of the Dasein of the story as his own. Thus the listener is 
acquainted with the emotions and possibilities entailed in an action 
directly. Something has emotional or existential significance in a story 
only on the grounds of Dasein's authentic possibilities. The listener, and 
indeed the teller, of a story are thus confronted with a moral dilemma as 
their own, and put in front of themselves as the one who must choose. 
This shows us directly that morality is grounded in personal choice and 
not in objectively codified rules. Transposed into a WOSE we cannot help 
but face the dilemma of the Dasein in the story, and face it on the grounds 
of our ownmost having-been. At the same time as we are transposed, we 
take over the possibilities of that Dasein. They are handed down to us.1S 
We are confronted with the responsibility of our authentic situation and 
must choose for ourselves in the light of our having-been, futuridty and 
being-with others. Stories teach us fundamentally not by the ttansmission 
of facts, nor by example, but by "handing-down ... the possibilities of the 
Dasein that has-been-there. "16 Because a WOSE is essentially 
transposition it cannot in principle be equated to factual or fictional 
information, description and a moral. The meaning of a WOSE cannot be 
abstracted by analysis.17 It is essentially existential. 
11 Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 1975, p.107 
12 Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 1975, p.107 . . 
13 "scholars have tended to neglect the type of narrative performance 10 which a narrator 
embeds a tale in a stretch of non-narrative discourse." Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 1975, p.107 
14 AV 114 
150. BT 438 
16BT437 
17 This is true also of any story which reveals an existential aspect of human dilemmas, yet 
commentators do not hesitate to impose their own interpretations of the "meaning" of such 
stories. Benjamin notes the differing interpretations by commentators of the story ｾ＠
Herodotus of Psammenitus witnessing the triumph of Cambyses and comments, "From this 
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When we turn to the WOSE in performance I emphasise the significance 
of the non-boring telling of a story. The story can be told by one person, by 
a group of persons in a ritual or even by a group of actors. Since Hymes' 
paper, Breakthrough into Performance, folklorists have acknowledged the 
significance of the difference between performance and text; my brief 
treatment of performance in this thesis emphasises the importance of the 
modalities of boring and non-boringness in performance.18 Although I 
concentrate on designated performances, WOSEs can and do occur in any 
number of informal situations. The significance of our poSsibility of 
engagement in WOSEs is not at all confined to entertainment. As 
Bauman puts it, "in exploring the social nexus of oral storytelling we 
explore one of the most fundamental and potent foundations of our 
existence as social beings. "19 
In the final section of this chapter I review the findings of the whole thesis 
and point ahead to implications for practice and areas for further research. 
2 MEANING IN PSYCHOTHERAPY 
When Victor Frankl enlarged and republished From Death Camp to 
Existentialism he re-titled it Man's Search for Meaning. In it he 
expounded his "therapeutic doctrine" of logotherapy.2o "Logotherapy" he 
wrote, "regards its assignment as that of assisting the patient to find 
meaning in his life. tt2l Yalom sees clients' requests in a similar light: 
"Many clinicians have noted that, with ｡｣｣･ｾ･ｲ｡ｴｩｮｧ＠ ｦＡ･ｱｵ･ｮｾＬ＠
patients come in for therapy because of complatnts asSOCIated WIth 
lack of a sense of meaning in life." (Yalom, 1980, p.447) 
story it may be seen what the nature of true storytelling is. The value of information does 
not survive the moment in which it was new. It lives only at that moment; it has ｾ＠
surrender to it completely and explain itself to it without losing any time. A story 15 
diHerent. It does not expend itself. It preserves and concenb'ates its strength and is capable 
of releasing it even after a long time." Benjamin 1970, p.89-90 
18 Hymes 1975 
19 Bauman 1986 p.114 
20 Frankl 1964, p.97 nfined within 
21 Frankl 1964, p.1OS. Frankl felt that the search for meaning was no! co t" 
psychotherapy, but dominated man's entire life; "striving to find a mearung in one s life 15 
the primary motivational force in man" (Frankl, 1964 p.99) 
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Yalom links meaninglessness to the increased leisure made possible by 
modern living.22 If one is preoccupied with survival one does not worry 
about the meaning of one's life. Eagle, writing in the psychoanalytic 
tradition, observes the same symptom in the modern client. 
"prob!ems of self and .of object ｲ･ｬｾｴｩｯｮｳ＠ - experienced as feelings of 
ｭ･｡ｮｬｮｾｬ･ｾｳｮ･ｾｳＬ＠ feelings of emptiness, pervasive depression, lack 
of sustalnlng mterests, goals, ideals and values, and feelings of 
unrelatedness - are the overwhemingly predominant symptoms 
in today's modal patient." (Eagle, 1984, p.73) 
Many other therapists have made similar claims,23 but in the light of our 
foregoing analysis we must insist however that the problem is mis-stated. 
No one can be meaningless. The conditions for the possibility of the 
understandability of something are what one is; so one is continually faced 
with the conditions for the possibility of understanding which in tum 
makes the demand that one does make some interpretation. The 
interpretation, "this has no meaning" does not silence the question arising 
from this unavoidable structure of our being. Everything we encounter, 
we encounter 'for-something', and the network of significations points 
eventually back to ourselves.24 Incessantly we are offered the possibility of 
interpreting.25 Not to take up the challenge of this possibility, or to mis-
interpret the meaning we live, is to become a candidate for psychotherapy. 
In the psychopathology referred to as "meaninglessness" by Frankl, Yalom, 
Eagle and others we meet not "no meaning" but a deficient form of 
meaning. That is, what is called meaninglessness is a continual letting fall 
of an existential demand or possibility. It is precisely for this reason that 
w ha t is called "no meaning" is experienced as a deficiency or lack. 
Whereas no car, no mortgage, no snow, or no flowers can all be 
experienced indifferently, positively or negatively according to the whim 
or disposition of the individual, no meaning strikes at the heart of the 
existence of the individual. "No meaning" is a meaningful interpretation 
of the self. It means the nihilation of one's meaningfulness, which is 
22 "meaninglessness is intricately interwoven with leisure and ｷｩｾ＠ disengagement. the 
more one is engaged with the everyday process of living and SUrviVIng, the less does the 
issue arise." Yalom 1980 p.447 
23 E.g. Spinelli 1994, p.294; Bettleheim 1991, p.3; van Deurzen Smith, 1988, pol; 
Polkinghome 1988, p.154 ; May 1983, p.60; and many others. 
24 BT 118-9 • 
2S "The projecting of the understanding has its own possibility - that of developing itself. 
BT188 
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constitutive of one's own being-in-the-world. Its meaning is that one has 
no values, purpose or worth. 
A common response to this interpretation is for the person to give up the 
individual self which is thus threatened and retreat into acting a social 
role; in Heideggerian terms the 'they-self' whose meaning is apparently 
guaranteed by the 'they'. As one of the 'they' one is not touched by 
anything in particular and has merely conventional responses to 
whatever happens. As one of the 'they' one is cut off from one's own 
having-been, one's ownmost futuricity, indeed one's own life. The result 
is, as May puts it, "One's own meaning becomes meaningless because it is 
borrowed from somebody else's meaning."26 Strictly speaking one's own 
meaning is alienated and one experiences one's meaning as reduced, for it 
lacks grounding in the ownmost possibilities and having-been of one's 
authentic temporality, that is one's ownmost being. The problem with 
borrowing one's meaning from the 'they' is that no personal motivation 
can arise from such borrowed meaning and one is haunted by the very 
issues Heidegger raises at the beginning of Being and Time, viz. 
"mineness" and the fact that one's being is always an issue for oneself.27 
We continually have to keep choosing how to be, and even if we choose to 
be just as the other is, we cannot escape the existential condition of being 
forced continually individually to choose. 
If one ceases for a moment to throw oneself fully into the concerns of the 
role one has chosen from amongst those offered by the 'they,' one is 
threatened by the possibility of taking one's ownmost possibilities 
seriously again or moving yet further from one's ownmost possibilities, 
into apathy. If we reject both the meaning of the they-self and of the 
authentic self the boredom of 'it is boring for one' that lurks in the ground 
of our Dasein can take us over. 28 
"Apathy is frequently experienced as the only alternative when the 
world seems to propose nothing of great interest. Detachment 
becomes the only remedy when nothing in the wor.ld seems 
meaningful or worth the effort." (van Deurzen Smith, 1988, 
pp.1So-1) 
This apathy is an example of the occurrence of the third form of boredom, 
the experience of oneself as modified by the temporality of the "mere 
26 May, 1983, poll 
21 BT 67-8 
2B PC 156-7 
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t tl 29 ''N tho . h pres en . 0 Ing m t e world seems meaningful" because of the 
"telling refusal on the part of beings as a whole". 30 One becomes detached 
because even the possibilities of the 'they' do not appeal. If one continues 
to turn away from one's ownmost attunement one may live this 
detachment as cynicism, but if one acknowledges one's attunement it 
manifests as depression.31 In depreSSion although the client complains of 
meaninglessness, the fact that they complain, rather than accept their 
situation betrays the fact that their situation does have meaning which is 
negatively connoted. 
3 THE PSYCHOTHERAPEUTIC ENCOUNTER 
In psychotherapy clients seek a meaning that is in some way positive. It is 
not however the sort of meaning that can be simply stated in writing, or 
even necessarily in words. It is not a meaning that can be expressed in an 
assertion of the form, "The meaning of my life is ... ". It can be readily 
observed that those who do not complain of lack of meaning in their lives 
cannot necessarily sum up the meaning of their lives in a few sentences. 
In the light of our analysis of meaning in Chapter Two we can see that this 
meaning is a modification of an element constitutive of one's way of 
being, not an item of knowledge. What is more, existential meaning is 
that on the basis of which particular entities are meaningful for us and 
reciprocally reflect to us something of our own way of being.32 This is not 
done merely by talking about things, hence May warns against 
"intellectualizing tendencies" in existential psychotherapy and emphasises 
that "the important thing is to be existential. "33 Mair, a clinical 
psychologist who moved into psychotherapy, writes of the differences 
between the modi operandi of the two practices and makes the same point, 
although not in the terminology of existential psychotherapy; "knowing 
has to be Ii ved and owned and undertaken as our own if it is to help us 
change".34 But how exactly is this to be done? How does one "live" 
29FC 124 
30FC 139 
31 "[In a major depressive episode] loss of interest or pleasure is nearly always present ... 
Individuals may report ... 'not caring anymore'", A.P.A. 1994 p.321 
32 See Chapter Two, conclusion 
33 May 1983, p.170 
34 Mair 1989, p.22 
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meaning in the therapeutic hour? What is the difference between merel 
talking about things and "owning" one's knowledge? The last quesoo! 
echoes Heidegger's distinction between idle talk and "genuine 
discoursing. "35 Before answering it we must raise some more questions. 
Mair says of the sort of knowing that he advocates in psychotherapy, 
"If you are to ｣ｯｭｾ＠ to know personally, it means starting from and 
repeatedly returnmg to your own ways of experiencing, rather 
than resting content with some more conventionally constructed 
position .... in reaching towards personal knowing these lived 
'templates' need to be both owned and questioned." (Mair 1989, 
p.l2) 
Mair is clearly prioritizing the personal over the conventional, in 
Heideggerian terms authentic knowing over idle talk. Scott puts the same 
point in Heideggerian terms. 
"Anything short of an understanding of the openness of man with 
the disclosures of beings, i.e., of the perceptive world-openness, 
promises to reflect a pathology of human thought in which the 
theoretician has not yet fulfilled the possibilities of his own 
temporal, immediate awareness which grounds his 
interpretations. In such a case, the equally dangerous madness of 
ignorance in the guise of intelligence will dominate, a domination 
in which the person repeatedly falls prey to his own interpretive 
creations and suffers, as a result, a closure from the world in the 
way he makes his interpretations of the world." (Scott 1984, p.155) 
Both Mair and Scott are clear about the importance of their 
recommendations, but as practical instructions for how to do 
psychotherapy neither offers precise directives. How does a person, 
therapist or client, come to an "understanding of the openness of man 
with the disclosures of beings"? How exactly does one own one's lived 
templates? How exactly does one return to one's own ways of 
experiencing? Therapists mainly agree that a simple theoretical 
explanation will not do. May quotes approvingly the words of Frieda 
Fromm-Reichmann; "The patient needs an experience, not an 
explanation. "36 What e:mctly, we must ask, is the necessary experience? 
Almost every therapist since Freud has emphasised the importance of the 
relationship between the client and therapist, but theorists have differed 
about exactly what is essentially important in that relationship. Bergin 
35BT208 
36 May 1983, p.158 
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and Garfield, in their review of the whole range of psychotherapies 
conclude, 
:'Helping ｾ･ｯｰｬ･＠ deal with depression, inadequacy, anxiety and 
mner conflicts, as well as helpmg them form viable relationships 
and meaningful directions for their lives, can be greatly facilitated 
in a therapeutic relationship that is characterised by trust, warmth 
acceptance, and human wisdom" (Bergin and Garfield 1994, p.18l) , 
Although this is undoubtedly true it raises more questions about the 
therapeutic relationship than it answers. What exactly brings about "trust, 
warmth, acceptance and human wisdom"? 
May uses the term "encounter" to describe the sort of intense relationship 
that can arise in the meeting between therapist and client, and in spite of 
his own study and erudition acknowledges that, "the phenomenon of 
encounter very much needs to be studied, for it seems clear that much 
more is going on than almost any of us has realized."37 van Deurzen 
Smith writes of a "moment of merging", a "unity momentarily 
experienced ... when the work is progressing towards an honest appraisal 
of the client's aspirations."38 How does this merging happen? van 
Deurzen Smith and May both seem to be inspired by Buber for whom "the 
relation to the You is unmediated. "39 Buber identifies two modalities of 
relationship, I-You and I-It which he believes are simply given ways of 
being. Whenever a man says "I" he is always saying either the "I" of I-It or 
the "I" of I-You. In I-It a human being constitutes himself as an observer 
separated from the observed. For Buber I-You occurs "only where all 
means have disintegrated".40 Buber is lyrical, even mystical, about the 1-
You relationship but does not undertake a rigorous ontology. 
Nonetheless I-You clearly has parallels with Heidegger's authentic being-
wi th and his emphasis on the engagemen t with the other parallels the 
engagement that has been highlighted in our analysis of the WOSE. It is 
this element of engagement that May and van Deurzen Smith are picking 
up on. 
Boss, under the direct influence of Heidegger, writes of the importance of 
the client-therapist relationship and even recognises the significance of 
physical position. The face-to-face posture of everyday conversation can 
inhibit the disclosure of infantile ways of being and yet the couch can 
37 May 1983, p.22 
38 van Deurzen Smith 1988, p.209 
39 Buber 1910, p.62 
40 Buber 1910, p.63 
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promote it.41 All these writers are clearly pointing towards the happenin 
of a particular form of relationship. Orlinsky and Howard in a ｭ･ｴ｡ｾ＠
analysis of over one thousand outcome studies singled out the bond 
between therapist and client as the crucial factor in the success of 
therapy.42 Aebi cites as the main "non-specific factor" in successful therapy 
the therapeutic relationship itself.43 What exactly happens in a successful 
psychotherapeutic relationship? 
Another set of questions are raised by conSidering stories in 
psychotherapy. Polkinghome and many others believe that narrative and 
narrative discourse play an important part in psychotherapy.« But wlult 
part exactly does narrative play in psychotherapy? As mentioned earlier, 
many therapists believe that telling stories to clients can be therapeutic.45 
Such stories may be created for each particular client,46 or drawn from 
traditional oral folklore. 47 Some theorists believe that psychotherapy 
entails the therapist helping the client to tell their own story in a different 
way.48 For Freud all clients' stories were variations of the Oedipus and 
Electra myths.49 Some believe that it is important to acknowledge that 
narrative explanations are of a different order from scientific explanations 
and come closer to describing the human life-world that is the area of 
concern of psychotherapy. 50 Hence narrative epistemology has been 
advocated as a improvement over scientific epistemology in psychology 
and psychotherapy by Bruner, Polkinghorne and others.51 As 
Polkinghome puts it; "explanation by means of narrative is contextually 
related and is therefore different in form from formal science 
explanation."52 He believes that; 
41 Boss 1994, p.258ff. 
42 In Bergin and Garfield 1994 .. 
43 Aebi, J., ''Nonspecific and specific factors in therapeutic change among different 
approaches to counselling", Counselling Psychology Review, Vol. 8, No.3, 1993. Discussed 
in Spinelli 1994, pp.86-90 
44 Polkinghome pp.178ff, also Schafer 1980, Spence 1982, Efran 1994, Goncalves 1994, 
Mcleod 1996(a), Mcleod 1996(b), Orner 1993(a), Rennie 1994, White and Epston 1990 and 
many more. 
4S Chapter Four, section 3 
46 See Orner 1993 (b), White and Epston 1990, Gordon 1978 
47 See Peseschkian 1986 and Franzke 1989. 
48 See for example Goncalves 1994, Russell and van den Broek 1992, polkinghorne 1988 and 
Spence 1982 
49 See Heaton, 1996 p.88-9, and Peseschkian 1986 p.lO . .. . 
so Hence Mair writes his approach is "narrative rather than computational Malf 1989, 
ｦｩＱＺｾｮ･ｲ＠ 1986 and 1990, Polkinghome 1988, Sarbin 1986, Howard 1991, May 1993 and 
Goncalves 1994 
52 Polldnghome 1988 p.21 
222 
tlnarrative is a scheme by means of which human hem . 
. t th· . gs gtve ｭ･ｾｧ＠ 0 .ell experience of temporality and personal actions. 
... It 15 the prlDlary scheme by means of which human expen' 
. d ed . gfu1 ence IS ren er meanm . ... [Therefore] the study of human hem 
by the human sciences needs to focus on the realm of meanin ｾ＠
general, and on narrative meaning in particular:' (Polkingh:me 
1988, p.ll) 
We have done in this thesis exactly what Polkinghome believes is 
necessary, but in doing so have reached conclusions slightly different from 
him. Polkinghorne believes that the plot of the patient's story is 
transformed in psychoanalysis. 
"The patient comes to the analyst with a story to tell, a story that is 
ｮｯｾ＠ so much false - since it does in some manner signify the truth _ 
ｾｳ＠ ｉｮ｣ｾｭｰｬ･ｴ･＠ and untherapeutic. Psychoanalysis is not merely the 
hstenlng to an analysand's story, however. It is a dialogue 
through which the story is transformed. The plot brought by the 
analysand lacks the dynamic necessary to create a sequence, or 
design, that integrates and explains. The fuller plot constructed by 
the analytic work leads to a more dynamic, and thus more useful, 
plot which serves as a more powerful shaping and connective 
force. The new story must above all be hermeneutically forceful 
and must carry the power of conviction for both its teller and its 
listeners." (Polkinghorne 1988, p.179) 
The term "plot" here, as in Ricoeur's analysis examined earlier, seems to 
explain but in fact is confusing. Polkinghorne does not seem to be 
suggesting that the client should simply make up the story they would 
rather know about themselves, in lieu of the one they do know. 
Nonetheless he claims it is the plot that must be transformed, so by plot he 
must mean the articulation of the events, not the actual events 
themselves.53 Does he in fact mean by plot not "what happens" in the 
story but how "what happens" is told? Even if we read him thus, he has 
not really put his finger on what characterises a better telling. 
Polkinghorne does not make clear why a more "forceful" story is 
therapeutic - might it not be an even greater cause for woe? Is a story 
better just because it "integrates and explains"? All therapists are familiar 
with the client, often a serial client, who has a very well constructed story 
with a plot which both integrates and explains their situation but which 
does nothing to alleviate their distress. Indeed it is often a highly 
53 U we gloss him thus we move one step away from the abstraction 'plot' and one step 
towards seeing that the articulation of events in a story arises in Oasein. 
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coherent, plausible and forceful explanation of why they are presenting 
themselves for psychotherapy. Of course one also meets clients who have 
a very fragmented and incoherent life story, but by the same token there 
are many reasonably happy non-clients who have incoherent, fragmented 
but non-painful life stories. A dynamic, forceful, explanatory plot for the 
client's life story is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for 
psychotherapeutic cure. 
Schafer pays more attention to the process of telling,54 but nevertheless 
believes one works towards a "redescription of reality";55 in effect a 
different story. For Goncalves, "life is a narrative and human beings are 
themselves narrators ... psychotherapy can be seen as the experiential 
atelier for the construction and deconstruction of clients' narratives. "56 
Spence also believes that the structure of narrative is a highly significant 
variable; 
"There seems no doubt but that a well-constructed story possesses 
a kind of narrative truth that is real and immediate and carries an 
important significance for the process of therapeutic change." 
(Spence 1982, p.21) 
He believes that in analysis one seeks not necessarily historical but 
"narrative" truth. Nevertheless neither Schafer nor Goncalves nor 
Spence appear to be advocating downright falsification or fabrication. 
"Narrative truth can be defined as the criterion we use to decide 
when a certain experience has been captured to our satisfaction; it 
depends on continuity and closure and the extent to which the fit 
of the pieces takes on an aesthetic finality. Narrative truth is what 
we have in mind when we say that such and such is a good story, 
that a given explanation carries conviction, that one solution to a 
mystery must be true." (Spence 1982, p.31) 
Spence is striving towards something important here, but he does not 
manage to express it clearly. What exactly is it that makes a story a 'good' 
story? What makes one story better than another? What makes a story 
therapeutic? Mcleod moves one step closer to clarifying what is going on. 
"Narrative therapy depends, like most ｾｴｨｾｲ＠ therapie.s, on an 
appreciation of, and an ability to operate WIthin, the relational and 
emotional world of the client." (Mcleod 1996 (b), p.198) 
54 "the analyst takes the telling as performance as well as content" Schafer 1981, p.35 
55 Schafer 1981, p.46 
S6Goncalves 1994, p.113 
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This sounds clearer, but again we can ask how eXllCtly does " 
. .. ' one -opera-te 
Within the relational and emotional world of the client"? In one sense of 
course if one is in the presence of another one is "operating within the 
relational and emotional world" of the other, but Mcleod cannot mean 
simply this. He implies that a specific way of operating or being is 
necessary. How does one operate properly? And, equally importantly, 
how could one tell if one was or was not doing so? 
4 THE WOSE IN PSYCHOTHERAPY 
We now have a fine collection of questions about meaning, narrative and 
relationship in psychotherapy. How does one live meaning in the 
therapeutic hour? What is the difference between merely talking about 
things and owning one's knowledge? How does one own one's lived 
templates? How exactly does one return to one's own ways of 
experiencing? What brings about trust, warmth, acceptance and human 
wisdom? How does the merging of momentarily experienced unity 
happen? What exactly happens in a successful psychotherapeutic 
relationship? What part does narrative play in psychotherapy? What 
exactly is it that makes a story a good story? What makes one story better 
than another? What makes a story therapeutic? How exactly does one 
operate properly within the relational and emotional world of the client? 
And, how could one tell if one was or was not doing so? 
The answer to the last question is that overtly or covertly one who is not 
operating properly within the relational and emotional world of the client 
will be experiencing one of the three forms of boredom analysed in 
Chapter Four. The answer to all the other questions lies, in part or whole, 
in the well-told oral storytelling event. This will come as no surprise as it 
is to some extent already clear from the earlier chapters. Nor should it be a 
surprise to other theorists. As one psychoanalyst remarks when asked to 
write on the 'new' theories of narrative in psychotherapy, "psychoanalysts 
have known all along that we are dealing in stories and with stories all the 
time "57 The purpose of clarifying the nature of the WOSE is to make clear 
why storytelling is important, how it can be useful or useless and the 
importance of our own inner criteria of boredom to guide us in telling and 
57 Wyatt 1986, p.193 
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listening to stories authentically. Further clarification is contained in 
what follows. I have listed these questions again in order to emphasis 
how much is not known about the process of psychotherapy, in spite of 
the huge amount of publishing on the subject. This is not in fact 
surprising given the limitations, discussed in Chapter Four, of text as a 
medium for the expression of existential knowledge. Nonetheless, even 
within these limitations we can usefully explain the place of the WOSE in 
psychotherapy. That is not to say it is either a necessary or suffident 
element in successful psychotherapy, in part because the problems 
presented in psychotherapy are so diverse, but in many cases some of the 
most important changes that occur in the psychotherapeutic meeting 
occur during a WOSE.58 
A WOSE is a mode of relationship and a specific mode of narrative muI an 
expression of existential meaning. We must recall that a WOSE is not 
necessarily a whole story with a recognisable beginning, middle and end. 
It is an event of telling in which teller and listener comport themselves 
authentically towards Dasein as living-in-the-world. Both are transposed 
into the Da of the story and take up the possibilities of the story as their 
own. Listener and hearer are with each other, in the same attunement, in 
the light of the story taken over as their own having-been. As I put it in 
the previous chapter, "in a WOSE we are transposed primarily into the 
Dasein of the storyteller whose 'Oat extends towards the entities and 
events recounted. It is through the Oa of the storyteller as articulated, 
attuned possibility that we understand, and are moved and engaged by the 
story. Hence in listening to a WOSE one is not typically aware of 
undergoing an existential alienation, rather one has something of the 
opposite experience, one is brought to oneself."59 Oasein can always 
strive, and is always called, towards authenticity, hence psychotherapy 
arises in those societies where face-to-face oral storytelling has fallen into 
decline.60 There is surely an inverse relationship in any society between 
58 Milton H. Erickson was notorious for telling stories both in psychotherapy and in the 
instruction of psychotherapists, see Rossi 1980. His. mode of ｳｾｾｕｩｮｧ＠ was so powerful 
that it is normally interpreted as hypnosis. For an mterpretation In terms of ｲｨ･ｴｯｾ｣＠ see 
Wlllbourn 1988. Alternatively one could interpret hypnosis as a particular modulatiOn of 
transposition in which the subject is turned away from their own world and entirely ｾ＠ in 
the Da of the story, in a manner analogous to that in which Heidegger says Dasein is 
"benommen" by the world. See BT 61 &: 344. This topic invites more detailed mearch than 
can be undertaken here. 
59 Chapter Ave, Section 4 erN i MacIntyre 
60 Hence the psychotherapist is one of the typical characters of mod ty n 
1981. 
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the number of traditional oral storytellers and the number of 
psychotherapists. 
A client presents for psychotherapy because some event or process in their 
life is causing them distress and they have not managed to sort it out on 
their own. Often a problem of human relationship is the immediate cause 
of presentation. The problem is thus one of behaviour or understanding 
or, normally, both. The client wishes not to feel distress, either by 
changing his behaviour or accepting it. To know what to do, or to accept 
what cannot be changed, the client needs to find the problematic events 
meaningful in a new way.61 For a new meaning to be useful and effective, 
as the therapists quoted above and many others have asserted, it is rarely 
enough that it is an intellectual re-ordering. The meaning needed is not 
theoretical but existential. It must be in Mair's terminology "lived 
knowledge", which is in Heideggerian terms not merely theoretical but 
attuned and articulated and understood in terms of the understander's 
ownmost possibilities. This is the precisely the sort of meaning one 
experiences in a WOSE. This meaning is not just that on the grounds of 
which we can name or discuss entities theoretically but that on the 
grounds of which we care about them and feel their presence in our lives 
and their effect and place in our future. It is constituted by authentic 
mood, possibility and presence. To tell, and indeed listen to a WOSE, is to 
"own" one's knowledge, as Mair would have us do. Because of the 
transposition in a WOSE of the teller and listener into the Da of the 
story,62 to articulate one's own existentiell knowledge in a WOSE is also to 
make it the listener's. This existentiell knowledge is exactly what is 
destroyed if an attempt is made to translate it into a "moral" or abstracted 
summary. The essential meaning of a story cannot be reduced to 
assertions.63 Furthermore because we all fall into inauthenticity and yet 
always have the possibility of constituting ourselves authentically every 
individual articulation of authenticity in a WOSE recalls each listener to 
their own possibility of authenticity, hence Rogers' dictum, "when we 
speak most personally, we speak most generally tOO."64 
61 A new meaning does not have to make everything 'make sense'. It could simply be the 
recognition that one does not have to strive to make sense of oneself or of a significant other 
and one can gratefully abandon the attempt to do so. 
62 "as soon as a WOSE has begun we always already find ourselves thrown into the story-
world which is constituted by the event of telling." Chapter Fi.ve, Section 4 free from 
63 Benjamin understood this well: "it is half the art of storyteUmg to keep a story 
ｾｬ｡ｮ｡ｴｩｯｮ＠ as one reproduces it:' Benjamin 1970, p.89 
64 Oted In Malr, 1989 p.xiii 
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For each Dasein its own authentic possibilities are called b th 
the .. f Y e au ntiClty a the Dasein of the teller into which one is ｴｲＮｦｴｾ＠ as 
O · . h 65 Thi - ...... ｾ＠aseln-Wl t . s call, from Dasein's authenticity to Dasein's 
authenticity, arises from the ontological condition of the telling of a non-
boring story. In the particular event of a WOSE the Dasein which usuall 
calls is the Dasein of the teller, and the Dasein which hears the call is ｢ｯｴｾ＠
the Dasein of the teller and the Dasein of the hearer(s). For a story to be a 
WOSE the actual story-event told is significant not because of its historical 
or veridical status, (although these may often be important for other 
reasons) but because of its existential possibility. H one is genuinely 
moved by and alongside what is told of, and take over the possibilities and 
finitude of the story as one's own, a WOSE happens. Heidegger expresses 
the essence of the same point in terms of authenticity in general. 
"It is not necessary that in resoluteness one should explicitly know 
the origins of the possibilities upon which that resoluteness 
projects itself. It is rather in Dasein's temporality, and there only, 
that there lies any possibility that the existentiell potentiality-for-
Being upon which it projects itself can be gleaned explicitly from 
the way in which Dasein has been traditionally understood. The 
resoluteness which comes back to itself and hands itself down, 
then becomes the repetition of a possibility of existence that has 
come down to us. Repeating is handing down explicitly that is to 
say, going back into the possibilities of the Dasein that has-been-
there." (BT 437) 
When a teller and a listener repeat "a possibility of existence" together in a 
WOSE they "merge" into the unity that van Deurzen Smith writes about, 
by transposition into the Da of the storyteller. It is because of the particular 
existential modification of the WOSE that the listener and teller feel the 
same thing.66 A WOSE is an instance of Buber's I-You relationship in 
which I and You are not distinct because we are transposed into each 
other.67 The distinction between I-You and I-It is very close to the 
distinction between authentic and inauthentic being-with. In a WOSE 
65 BT 319 
66 Spinelli, (1994, pp.314-41) with his Husserlian rather than Heideggerian framework 
misses this point in his description of being-with, and hence still ｳｴｲｵｾ･ｳ＠ with ｾ＠ .. ue of 
getting access to the other. In a WOSE, and indeed any ｡Ｎｵｴｨ･ｮｾ｣＠ being-WIth ur: are 
td,.,y transposed into the other, though we may hide from It, or hide it from 0 YeS, 
by discursive analysis or verbal "clarification". and 
67 'The basic word I-You can only be spoken with one's whole being. The ooncentration 
fusion into a whole being can never be accomplished by me, car; :: : Ｚｲｯｾ＠
without me. I require a You to become; becoming I, I say You. AI 
Buber 1970 p.62 
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teller and listener are brought into authentic being-with and are brought 
back to their ownmost possibilities. This is the ontological situation that 
underlies May's assertion; 
"in ｴｾ･ｲ｡ｰｹＬ＠ granted adequate clarification of the therapist, it is not 
pOSSIble for one person to have a feeling without the other hIlving 
it to some degree also." (May 1983, p.22-3) 
So the sort of knowing that occurs in a WOSE is not the appropriation of a 
certain piece of factual knowledge but the revelation of a way of being by 
virtue of being transposed into it.68 In a WOSE one expresses one's 
attunement. May's statement describes the ontological situation as it is, 
and how it can be seen when the therapist is open to the truth of his own 
being, which is always necessarily being-with. As Heidegger emphasised, 
"Attunement is not some being that appears in the soul as an experience, 
but the way of our being there with another."69 In telling a WOSE one 
modulates one's way of being and such truth as is revealed pertains 
primarily to one's existentiell possibilities, not necessarily one's ontic 
situation. Authenticity, telling a WOSE, and living a satisfying life are not 
matters of extreme, innovative creativity or making something utterly 
individual and unique but rather a matter of engaging with what is 
present on the basis of one's own particular being-in-the-world. 
We have said that a client presents for psychotherapy because some event 
or process in their life is causing them distress. In essence the client's way 
of being is causing them distress. Even if the physical cause of distress is 
external, for example an abusive husband, the distress becomes the sort of 
problem that is presented in psychotherapy (rather than being a traumatic 
episode that passes) because of the client's response to the abuse.10 The 
client's way of being-in-the-world is constitutive of the problem. Hence 
the way of being-in-the-world is to be investigated, and changed. Telling a 
WOSE can do both of these things, although not necessarily thematically 
or conceptually.11 In every WOSE teller and listener are brought back to 
their own authentic possibilities, and their way of being is modified in this 
68 Heidegger adverts to this different showing.of ｾｴｨ＠ in The ｆｵｾｭｦＴｬＮｃｯｮ｣･ｰｴｳ＠ ｷｾ･ｮ＠
in a rare reference to myth he notes that "what IS at ISSUe ... is ... different kinds of possable 
truth." PC 204 
69 FC66 
10 For example suffering abuse and continuing to live with the abuser and not setting about 
the <often huge) task of changing or ending the relationship. 
71 In fact a WOSE by definition affects the being-with of teller and listener, but not 
necessarily permanently. The after-effect depends on how each individual takes up the 
possibilities that are offered to them. 
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process.72 This is actually true of any WOSE whether it is a story of a 
client's actual historical life, or a story of the having-been of Dasein 
handed down by Dasein through the tradition of storytelling. The 
existentiell effect of a WOSE is not confined to the psychotherapeutic 
encounter. It does not matter whether the particular cases of Dasein 
within the story into whom the listener is transposed are the unnamed 
protagonists of traditional wonder-tales or particular named historical or 
fictional figures. A WOSE is constituted by the authentic possibilities of 
Dasein, and its truth relies neither on historical fact nor verisimilitude to 
everyday, ontic, contingent variables. Hence in traditional tales, which in 
their fullest actualizations are WOSEs, the protagonists are anonymous in 
order to facilitate the transposition of listeners.73 Bettleheim realized that 
anonymized fairy tales could be a means whereby his patients could reach 
their own meaning, although he did not phrase his insight in 
Heideggerian terminology, nor did he use a concept like WOSE because he 
took it for granted that the tale would be well-enough told for the patient 
to be interested or touched by it in the first place.74 
"The fairy tale is therapeutic because the patient finds his ow n 
solutions, through contemplating what the story seems to imply 
about him and his inner conflicts at this moment in his life." 
(Bettleheim 1991, p.2S) 
More accurately it is not merely "through contemplating" but rather 
through transposition that the story affects the patient. In fact if 
contemplation is taken to mean intellectual cognition, reflection and 
analysis the story may not be therapeutic at all for such intellectual activity 
red uces and objectifies the very immediate experience that is 
transformative. 
Not all stories told in therapy are WOSEs. By virtue of their nature there 
can be no prescription that will guarantee a WOSE, nor determine 
72 Hence "the activity of telling a story is often more powerful than its representation in 
[transcribed] dialogue would suggest." Rennie 1994, p.234 
73 "The fairy tale ... tells about everyman. ... If names appear, it is quite dear that these 
are not proper names, but general or descriptive ones. , .. when the hero is given a name ... 
the use of very common names makes them generic terms... This is further stressed by the 
fact that in fairy stories nobody else has a name" Bettleheim 1991, p.40 
74 Elsewhere, in the context of child-rearing, he shows an appreciation of some of the 
significance of oral rather that textual storytelling; "reading is not the same as being told 
the story, because while reading alone the child may think that only some stranger - the 
person who wrote the story or arranged the book - approves of outwitting and cutting down 
the giant. But when his parents tell him the story, a child can be sure, ｾｴ＠ they approve of 
his retaliating in fantasy for the threat which adult dominance entails. Bettlehetm 1991, 
p.28 O. also Franzke 1989 and Peseschkian 1986, 
230 
, MEANINC, PSYOiOlHERAPY, I'FRR>RMANcE AND TIiE WOSE 
whether or not a story was well-told. Only those involved, by paying 
attention to the quality of their involvement can tell to what extent a story 
is or was a WOSE. Experience, not theory is the mode of access to such 
knowledge. Stories are created between the therapist and client.7S The 
therapist must help the client to tell the story by becoming the appropriate 
audience. His way of being must be to be open to the client, in the sense of 
being willing to understand and take over his experience, but also the 
therapist must be true to himself. H he is not touched immediately he 
must not pretend. Equally if he does not understand immediately he 
must not interpose his intellectual interpretation to "help" him to do so. 
By owning his ownmost possibilities of attunement and understanding 
and rejecting the prefabricated diagnoses of the 'they' the therapist calls 
the client to their own authenticity, and "healing happens with a 
profound countenancing of [the client's] 'truth', his standing out in the 
uncoveredness of beings, and of the claims that make up his particular 
way of being. "76 The therapist may appear to be doing very little, but to be 
effective, "when ... [he] appears to be passively listening he has actively 
opened his perception to the patient, allowing him to appear, to come to 
being in the light of his healing understanding and behaviour".77 
It is clear that one of the more useful ways to pass the therapeutic hour is 
in the telling of WOSEs. Research has shown that telling one's story is 
therapeutic regardless of context or manner of telling.78 Participating in a 
WOSE is an especially therapeutic and transformative experience because 
the participant transposes into the Da of the story by taking over as his 
own the having-been of the story and hence the futuricity as possibility 
which is founded in that having-been. If a story told in psychotherapy is 
the client's own story, some part or meaning of which they have in the 
past denied, then in telling it as a WOSE they take over their ownmost 
having-been from which they had been turning away. In taking it over 
they free for themselves the possibilities that are founded in it. In such a 
WOSE the client's existence is revealed.79 If the story is not the client's 
own they take over a possibility from Dasein that has been before them. 
7S "stories or narrative are somehow jointly produced, and not by the patient alone, as it 
might appear on first glance; but between patient and therapist through a subtle and 
elusive interaction of the two." Wyatt 1986, p.195 
76 Scott 1984, p.l54 
77 Boss 1994, p.213 
78 Pennebaker 1988 
79 In fact such a WOSE is the achievement of what Groth claims is ''The primary goal of 
existential therapy [which] is to reveal the patient's existence," Groth 1997 p.68 
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When the client does tell a story of their own life the more WOSEs, that is 
moments of WOSE, in their telling the more they acknowledge they 
experience their ownmost feelings and free themselves to take up their 
ownmost possibilities. This acknowledgement amounts to the freeing of 
possibilities. Clients tell their story in order to become true to themselves. 
Above all, they need to tell their story from their ownmost feelings and 
point of view. When they do so they are free from interpreting 
themselves as one does and, because they speak from their own 
possibilities and having-been, the way they have their time and the way 
the therapist has his time as the transposed listener is non-boring.80 A 
therapist should therefore strive to assist the client to articulate honestly 
and openly their own having-been and their own being-in-the-world. 
When the client does so the therapist will find that they are interested and 
moved by the client's account. 
It is not surprising therefore that a study found that the therapist's interest 
in the client was cited as a variable of major importance in 
psychotherapy.81 Jung believed that it was Freud's interest and kindness, 
not his techniques or theories that were therapeutic.82 The therapist'S 
interest, if genuine, is a result of the client's process of gaining insight into 
their being-in-the-world. If the therapist is not interested or moved the 
clien t is not telling a WOSE. Erich Fromm remarked on this 
phenomenon in psychoanalysis; 
"No amount of psychoanalytic interpretation will have an effect if 
the therapeutic atmosphere is heavy, unalive and boring." 
(Fromm 1978, pp.42-3) 
This does not mean that either therapist or client has to be a polished 
performer, far from it. What matters is the articulation of the mood and 
understanding that is grounded in authentic temporality. In practical 
terms, this means that the telling of a WOSE may entail copious 
expressions searching for words, repetitions correcting tonality and much 
gesture and modification in response to non-verbal questioning and eye-
contact ascertaining the degree to which the listener grasps or fails to grasp 
80 'When I become true to what really matters to me I become passionate, I am no longer 
bored, because I no longer go along with what the crowd expects; I create my own meaning" 
van Deurzen-Smith 1990 p.S 
81 Kline, F., Adrian, A. &t Spevak, M., "Patients evaluate therapiSts" in A,chit1ts 0/ 
General Psychi4try 31:113-6, 1974 dted in Spinelli, 1994 . 
82 "Freud was kind to people and gave them his interest, that was what cured and that IS 
what always cures - the human contact" Jung quoted in Bennett 1985, p22-3 
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the meaning of the story being unfolded.83 Gendlin's paper, 
Befindlichkeit: Heidgger and the Philosophy of Psychology,84 offers a 
micro-analysis of the process of the client articulating what I have termed 
a WOSE. Gendlin notes that, 
Ｂｄｵｲｩｮｾ＠ a psychotherapy interview the patient quite often says 
something, then stops, senses inwardly for half a minute or a 
minute, then says: 'No, what I said isn't quite right. I can't say 
how it feels, yet, but it's different than I said.'" (Gendlin 1988, p.49) 
Further to their verbal statement, "the patient has something else there 
which is felt directly, and that cannot yet be said."85 As the patient strives 
to articulate honestly their own feelings they are effectively telling their 
own story as a WOSE. The WOSE is the raising to the level of 
interpretation of the client's own having-been and futuricity. Gendlin 
calls this process of expressing what is first manifest non-verbally as a 
feeling, "lifting out." 
"feeling must be understood as implicitly meaningful, and as 
changing when there are steps of 'lifting out', steps of explication 
or articulation. To articulate is to live further. To go back into 
how one has been living is a forward-moving step." (Gendlin 1988, 
p.52) 
Gendlin uses the term "articulate" in its colloquial sense here, meaning 
"put into words", not in Heidegger's existential sense. Gendlin's 
"articulation" is closer to Heidegger's "interpretation".86 As the client 
expresses their feeling they themselves hear it and understand it as the 
feeling which they are living. As Gendlin reminds us Befindlichkeit is 
"how we find ourselves" and it is our own immediate, non-theoretical 
apprehension of our own being.87 In understanding how we feel through 
articulation in a WOSE, we discover that "a feeling" is not a fixed 
disposition but rather a process. As we learned from Heidegger every 
attunement has its understanding,88 so each moment of feeling has its 
own understanding, that is its own possibilities, and as we 'lift out' and 
83 These characteristics are typical of much oral storytelling in all contexts, precisely 
because they are the means by which the potential-for-meaning of face-to-face discourse is 
fully realized when 'Ie mot juste' cannot be found. See 500011992, pp. 70 &it 15 and Ong 1982 
p.37ff. 
84 In Hoeller, 1988. Hereafter cited as Gendlin 1988 
8S Gendlin 1988, p.49 
86 BT 188-9 
ffl Gendlin 1988, p.44 
88 BT 182 
233 
6 MEANING, PSYOIO'IHERAPY, PERR>RMANcE AND mE WOSE 
understand each moment of feeling, it reveals further possibilities of 
feeling and understanding.89 In so far as we articulate our authentic 
possibilities of feeling further we tell a WOSE and the process is 
therapeutic by virtue of bringing us in front of our ownmost way of 
being.90 Such articulation is not confined to words. An eloquent story can 
be told by gesture, and in the meeting and avoiding of eye-contact.91 If, 
however, we take up inauthentic possibilities, such as learned, 
stereotypical responses, conventional judgments or sentimentality we 
cease to tell a WOSE and cease, for the while, to progress therapeutically. 
Taking up the authentic possibilities of understanding that come along 
with our authentic feelings however gives rise to the very understanding 
that clients are seeking in psychotherapy: not theoretical but lived and 
owned knowledge. The grasping of such understanding in turn changes 
how we feel so ·"when feeling ... leads to this 'lifting out' there is a directly 
felt changing of the feeling at each step."92 Hence Gendlin claims 
"patients who engage in the[sel kind of steps ... are successful in 
psychotherapy, while those who usually do not work in this way fail."93 It 
is important that this process of articulation is lived and owned 
knowledge, that is to say that each statement is attuned and contextualized 
within the patients own past and possibilities, for if the attunement is 
merely considered objectively as an instance of a universal phenomenon 
it is destroyed as a lived experience.94 Heidegger acknowledges this point 
in his discussion of awakening an attunement. 
"If ... we make an attunement conscious, come to know of it and 
explicitly make the attunement itself into an object of knowledge, 
89 Arnold Mindell describes the same process of articulating and moving through one's own 
feelings as bringing 'secondary processes' to consciousness, which he calls 'primary process'. 
Mindell's techniques are not simply verbal, he uses the full gamut of non-verbal expressions 
of the field of being-with. When a feeling is raised to interpretation one's being is not 
exhausted. Another 'secondary process' will manifest and be available for interpretation. 
Mindell, 1987, p.31-33 
90 Wyatt is alive to the importance of the ongoing reshaping of stories in the light of what 
we learn from them: "stories in psychoanalysis are on the way to becoming authentic, as 
long as they continue to transcend themselves and recast themselves in the light of every 
new step of self-discovery." Wyatt 1986, p.207 . . . 
91 Hence Boss remarks, "It is ... necessary that the phySICIan pay close attention to the 
meaning of how the patient relates bodily at each moment of therapy." Boss 1994, p.259 
92 Gendlin 1988, p.52 
93 Gendlin 1988, p.53 Gendlin cites, in support of his assertion, ｇｾ､ｬｩｮＬ＠ Beebe, ｾＬ＠
Klein and Oberlander, "Focusing Ability in Psychotherapy, Personality ｾ､＠ ｃｲ･｡ｴｩｾｾ＠ m 
Rt!SeIlrch in PsychothtrllJ1Y, ed. Schlien, J., Vol.3, American Psychologacal Assooation, 
Washington OC. 1967 " 
94 O. Mair on using stories to articulate "the felt-for world I sense but do not clearly know 
Mair 1989, p.259 
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we achieve the contrary of an awakening. The attunement is 
thereby precisely destroyed, or at least not intensified, but 
weakened and altered." (Fe 61) 
Mere intellectual cOgnition changes nothing for the client, and drives out 
the attuned understanding that is therapeutic, hence the emphasis by Boss, 
Mair, Scott and others on the importance of authentic being-with the 
client. The therapist should be able to tell if truly owned knowledge is 
being expressed, not just by the form of speech but more directly because, 
as the audience of the client's WOSE he will also necessarily be affected by 
it. Hence Jung's assertion, 
"in effective therapy a change occurs in both the therapist and the 
patient; unless the therapist is open to change the patient will not 
be either." (Quoted in May 1983, p.22) 
Not every instance of what Gendlin calls "lifting out" would necessarily be 
identifiable as a story in everyday parlance and some would not constitute 
WOSEs if, for example, what the client "lifted out" was an articulation of 
their own understanding of the present relationship with the therapist. 
Finally we can also note that in analysis the 'Freudian slip' is typically a 
precursor to a WOSE. The analyst is alerted by it and draws it to the 
analysand's attention thereby eliciting the repressed, affect-laden story of 
the analysand's trauma.95 
5 THE WOSE AND THE 'POETRY OF EXPERIENCE' 
Because narrative theory is dominated by the analysis of literary textual 
crea tions it cannot explain the particular powerful emotional and 
interpersonal conditions and effects of a WOSE. As a result they are are 
ascribed to poetry or a "poetics of experlence",96 although writers are well 
aware that mere versification is adequate neither to explain nor to cause 
95 More research can be done in this area. It must be remembered that in psychotherapy 
WOSEs are far from deliberate or polished performances. They are a primordial form of 
being-with which can arise at any moment, without, and often precisely because of, the 
lack of any deliberation. The 'Freudian slip' itself makes manifest the n:a' concerns of the 
client which give shape to his authentic narrative which he is covenng over with his 
sanitized, inauthentic account. 
96 Mair 1989, Ch. 6 
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the emotional intensity they are considering.97 Snyder spells out the 
limitations of the type of narrative therapy that simply promotes "re-
authoring" of the client's life story and draws attention to the importance 
of "poetic intelligence".98 Drawing on Bateson's notion of the immanent 
self, she writes,99 
"Th[e] concept of mind as immanent (vs. transcendent) in 
continually creative and interacting feedback loops is immensely 
useful in clarifying the distinction between self-authoring in the 
context of poetic intelligence and self-authoring within the 
traditional formulation of the self. In the latter case the human 
being perceives him/herself as acting on the world. In the former 
the experience is rather one of giving oneself over attentively and 
actively to a participatory process which is trustworthily intelligent 
and creative." (Snyder 1996, p.344) 
In listening to a WOSE, or in telling one, a person is "given over 
attentively to a partiCipatory process" rather than standing back as an 
objective observer. Snyder's exegesis is a exposition in psychological terms 
of the engaged aspect of the WOSE, and the ontological condition of being-
with that makes it pOSSible, that we have laid out above.10o She attempts 
to clarify the phenomena in terms of literary concepts and makes no 
reference to Heidegger. She writes of permeable selves which can have 
"experience of shared and co-created meanings flowing through the 
interactive process ... of a relational, participatory existence"101 and quotes 
not Heidegger but Tom Anderson's statement that "the center of the 
person is not in the person, but outside - in the conversation and 
connection. "102 Mair also talks of the same phenomena in terms of 
"poetics" . 
"the essentials of our deeper lives, are only to be reached and 
shared in a poetic expression. A poetics of experience, perhaps. A 
poetics requires that you are deeply attentive to yourself and 
others, so that you become the meeting place of messages spoken 
97 "we need a poetic concern with our experiencing, our awareness of ourselves and the 
world, and not just a prosaic concern with experiencing. I'm not referrin& here to poetJy. in a 
'wmaJ sense·" Mair 1989, p.63 (My underlining). 
Snyder 1996 
99 In "The cybernetics of self' in Bateson 1972 . . 
100 Bateson's cybernetic understanding of the self (Bateson 1972) containS lDteresting 
parallels with Heidegger's notion of being-in-the-world; however the differences between 
the axioms and jargon of the systems within which each writes makes an exact oorrelation 
too great a task to attempt in this context. 
101 Snyder 1996,pJ49 
102 Snyder 1996, p.348 Tom Anderson is not identified further I nor the source of his remark. 
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and unspoken, the place of transformation of what is moving 
between and amongst you. ... You have to listen to the lilt and 
ｲｾｹｴｨｭＬ＠ to the use of words and phrases, the telling metaphor, the 
stlence, and the moving spaces in between .... So much, almost 
everything, in psychotherapy (that deeper meeting between us) is 
in this poetic realm" (Mair 1989, p.63) 
He also attempts to describe the felt-experience of what a Heideggerian 
would call consciousness of being-with. He is sensitive to the volatility of 
our authentic being-with, and how we can move from sharing (as in a 
WOSE) to rejecting or closing (as in boredom or inauthenticity). In spite of 
his training as a psychologist his language, in attempting to convey this 
understanding is lyrical rather than scientific. That of which he writes 
does not of its nature lend itself to the language of objectivity for it is 
essentially rooted in personal, and interpersonal experience. 
"Th[e] realm of the between seems to me to be of such powerful 
importance in therapy. And it is such a curious realm. It is 
intangible, invisible, moving, disappearing, expanding, softening, 
hardening, opening, welcoming, freezing over, clamming shut -
you will know the feeling as the relationship between you and 
someone else changes. Somehow the atmosphere allows things at 
one moment that it doesn't allow at all the next. It's as if 
something had trapped shut. The realm of the between is in 
motion. Meaning in motion is the nature of the between. 
Moving patterns of intention. It is very different from statistical 
association, which is how we deal with the between in almost all 
of our formal science of psychology. It concerns entering inside 
relationships, inside whatever is going on, and is sensed as going 
on, between us." (Mair 1989 p.65) 
Mair does not limit himself to poetics but also explains his position in 
terms of narrative and implicitly, although he does not emphasize the 
point, oral narrative. t03 He emphasises the importance of speaking, and 
paying attention to how we speak. He asserts, like Polkinghome, the 
importance of the non-scientific knowledge gained through stories.to. He 
even moves towards a description of the practice necessary to promote the 
kind of interaction he believes to be therapeutic. His notion of 
"imaginative participation" describes well the type of listening and 
t03 "the approach I am concerned with is 1III""tioe rather than compufIJtiorud. It involves 
soealdn2 together and telling of what we ｫｮｯｷＮｾ＠ Mair 1989 p.197 .. . 
104 "I ｾ｡ｮｴ＠ to make as strong a claim as poSSIble for the recogrution m Ｎｰｳｾｯｬｯｧｹ＠ of a 
story-mode to complement the more familiar statistical-mode of knoWIng. Mair 1989, 
p.256 Cf. Polkinghome 1988 
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willingness on the part of the therapist that is conducive to the telling of a 
WOSE by a client. 
"Imaginative participation seems, therefore to be fundamentally 
important for psychotherapy and any other' personal knowing. It 
involves really entering into the feel and sense of the body the 
person, beside you." (Mair 1989 p.66) , 
Although Mair does not use Heideggerian language it is clear that for a 
therapist to elicit, and indeed tell, WOSEs he must be prepared to face or be 
brought into anticipatory resoluteness. Any attempt to maintain a 
professional persona which keeps an "objective" distance would be 
antithetical to this form of psychotherapy. It is also clear that the WOSE is 
a form of discourse well suited ,to psychotherapy precisely because the 
WOSE manifests a mode of the very same structure that we as Dasein are. 
Hence we most accurately express ourselves in stories, any theoretical 
abstracted self-definition is a diminished version of self-understanding. 
Telling a WOSE is a way of being of Dasein in which its being can become 
transparent to itself. In a WOSE Dasein can see the temporal structure of 
itself as care. One must not collapse the differences between the two 
however; a WOSE is a passing event of telling whereas Dasein continues 
as a living entity, and Dasein is not thrown into the world of a WOSE as it 
is into the contingent world. Nevertheless, it is helpful to understand a 
client as more like a story than an object and to know that many 
wonderful stories can contain appalling and tragic incidents. lOS We can 
see that for the individual person a frame story can be the basis for the 
positive meaning of such incidents.106 The key variable in such 
existential meaning is not the content of the story but how it is told. 
6 THE WOSE IN PERFORMANCE 
Since Malinkowski anthropologists have been aware of the significance of 
performance and context in interpreting narrative.101 The importance of 
105 "All sorrows can be borne if you put them into a story or tell a story about them." Isak 
Dinesen quoted by in Arendt 1958 p.175 . 
106 Polkinghome also draws story and meaning together, "The whole of an andividual 
human existence is articulated in the narrative plot; it is much more than a simple 
chronicle listing of life occurrences. The self, then, is a meaning rather than a substance or a 
ｾＮＢ＠ Polkinghorne 1988 p.152 . . 
101 ''The text, of course, is extremely important, but Without the context, It ｲ･ｭ｡ｩｾ＠ lifeless. 
As we have seen, the interest of the story is vastly enhanced and it IS given Its proper 
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the concept of the WOSE for performance is to emphasise firstly that a 
good or non-boring performance is not simply the same thing as a boring 
performance only slightly better presented, but is an existentially distinct 
occurrence. A boring performance is ontologically more akin to watching 
paint dry than it is to a WOSE. A WOSE is a specific revelatory manner of 
being-with, in which what is primarily revealed is the being of Dasein. 
Those societies which lose sight of what it is to tell a story well lose sight of 
that particular path of authentic being-with. It can of course be retrieved 
as we always have the possibilities of discovering, or rediscovering more 
possibilities, but mostly and increasingly in fact we retain and retell the 
skeletons of stories without an awareness of the full possibilities of telling 
them well.108 In part because of the dominance of theoretical discourse in 
education few writers on the practice of performance have concerned 
themselves with the significance of boredom.l09 
All participants in a WOSE are brought to their ownmost possibilities 
wherever the WOSE occurs. In a WOSE being-with is raised to the level of 
interpretation, not as verbally articulated but at the level of awareness of 
mood. This is the phenomenon of moments of non-discursive knowing 
in psychotherapy, and of co-attunement of audiences at public 
performances of WOSEs. It is by virtue of this phenomenon that stories, if 
they are well-told create and sustain communities. Equally well-told 
stories sustain the individuals within societies by calling them back to 
their ownmost possibilities. For this reason storytelling is prophylactic not 
just because it instructs people in the ways of society and the dangers and 
character by the manner in which it is told. The whole nature of the performance, the 
voice and the mimicry, the stimulus and the response of the audience mean as much to the 
natives as the text; and the sociologist should take his cue from the natives. The 
performance, again, has to be placed in its proper time setting - the hour of the day, and the 
season, with the background of the sprouting gardens awaiting future work, and slightly 
influenced by the magic of the fairy tales. We must also bear in mind the ｾｯｾ｣｡ｬ＠
context of private ownership, the sociable function and the cultural role of amusmg fiction. 
All these elements are equally relevant; all must be studied as well as the text. The stories 
live in native life and not on paper, and when a scholar jots them down ｷｩｴｨｯｾｴ＠ being ｾ･＠
to evoke the atmosphere in which they flourish he has given us but a mutilated bit of 
reality." Malinkowski 1926 p.29-30 . . 
108 In this sense modem 'revivalist' storytellers are like the pseudO-SCientists of 
MacIntyre's moral fable (AV 2), they play with the fragmented and ｭｵ､､ｬｾ＠ shards of a 
broken whole which they no longer understand. Haggarty (1996) makes an unpusioned 
plea for the recognition and remedy of this situation. 
109 Brook 1972 and 1991 and Haggarty 1996 are rare exceptions. 
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difficulties of human existence but because the very process of listening to 
a well-told story creates a lived experience of community.110 
Society and individuals are poorly served by the narrowness of an 
excessively rational discourse but in modernity the 'they' values what can 
be measured and discussed objectively above the knowing of experience. 
"the art of storytelling is coming to an end. Less and less 
frequently do we encounter people with the ability to tell a tale 
properly. More and more often there is embarassment all around 
when the ｷｩｾｨ＠ ｴｾ＠ hear a story is expressed. It is as if something 
that seemed inalienable to us, the securest among our possessions, 
were taken from us: the ability to exchange experiences. One 
reason for this phenomenon is obvious: experience has fallen in 
value." (Benjamin 1970, p.83) 
Despite the modern tendency towards the impoverishment of experience, 
from time to time we are profoundly moved, deeply influenced and 
modified in our being by a WOSE and our authentic being is evoked. 
Petzet records an occasion on which Heidegger, removed from his usual 
environment of well-schooled students, turns to story to express what his 
audience had not grasped in his philosophical delivery. After the first 
delivery of Yom Wesen der Wahrheit in Bremen in 1930, the discussion 
after the lecture at the house of H. Kellner threatened to fall into 
"senseless psychologizing talk". Heidegger called for the Parables of 
Chuang-tsu. 
"Heidegger began to recite the legend of the joy of the fishes and 
the joy felt by the one who stands on the bridge above the brook 
and watches the play of the minnows in the water. The deep 
meaning of the legend cast a spell on all who were present. With 
the interpretation he offered of that legend, Heidegger 
unexpectedly drew closer to them than he had with his difficult 
110 Berry writes lyrically of the relationship between community and story: 'The tobacco 
cutting is the most protracted social occasion of our year. Neighbors work together; they 
are together all day every day for weeks. ... The crew to which I belong is the product of 
Idnships and friendships going far back; my own earliest associations with it occurred 
nearly forty years ago. And so as we work we have before us not only the present crop and 
the present fields, but other crops and other fields that are remembered. The tobacco 
cutting is a sort of ritual of rememberance. Old stories are re-told; the dead and the absent 
are remembered. Some of the best talk I have ever listened to I have heard during these 
times, and I am espedally moved to think of the care that is sometimes taken to speak well 
- that is fittingly - of the dead and the absent. The conversation, one feels, is ancient. Such 
talk in barns and at row ends must go back without interruption to the first farmers. How 
long it may continue is now an uneasy question; not much longer perhaps but we ､ｾ＠ not know. 
We only know that while it lasts it can carry us deeply into our shared Ide and the 
happiness of farming." <Berry 1990 p.142) 
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lecture, which remained inaccessible to most of them." (Petzet 
1993, p.lS) 
The very numinosity of the experience of a WOSE renders it refractory to 
description and analysis, and theorizing and literacy-based research and 
pedagogy have been of their nature antipathetic to attempts to study what 
makes a story well-told. Such study as there is comes from the world of 
praxis, not theoria. The structural importance of authenticity in the 
WOSE explains the paradox that actors and storytellers speak of needing to 
be truthful when performing, even when they perform a fictional tale. It 
is rare for a WOSE to be the speaking of a script, but it is not impossible. It 
is rare because it is far too easy merely to read, and extraordinarily difficult 
to make written words authentically one's own. Yet, in a few wonderful 
cases it can be done. Peter Brook's company achieve this feat more often 
than most, as is witnessed by the reviews of his work.111 His company 
searches for a way to be authentic, to be truthful to their being and to the 
play that has been handed down to them.112 In a WOSE the tellers are 
being-with the audience - thus they take over their possibilities and 
experience the feedback of their response to the tale, and the possibilities of 
telling opened or closed thereby.113 This is why there can be no definitive 
form of a WOSE, or of a play.114 Even if the script of a play remains the 
same each performance will be different. Indeed the fixity of form of 
scripted or choreographed theatre is a huge problem of which Brook is 
well aware.11S The essence of theatre is not the fixed text. 
111 See WiUbourn 1985, and Roose-Evans 1984 for further citations. Brook has based many 
of his productions on tales from the oral tradition, e.g. The Mahabarata. and The 
Conference of the Birds. 
112 See Brook 1988 pp. 180-185 
113 See Brook 1972 pp.27-9 for a description of an experiment demonstrating the 
relationship of audience to actor and a discussion thereof. 
114 'The theme in oral poetry exists at one and the same time in and for itself and for the 
whole song. This can be said both for the theme in general and also for any individual 
singer's forms of it. His task is to adapt and adjust it to the particular song that he is re-
creating. It does not have a single 'pure' fonn either for the individual singer or for the 
tradition as a whole. Its form is ever changing in the singer's mind, because the theme is in 
reality protean; in the singer's mind it has many shapes, aU the fonns. in ｾｨｩｾ＠ he ｾｳ＠
ever sung it, although his latest rendering of it will naturally be freshest In hIS mind. It 15 
not a static entity, but a living, changing, adaptable artistic creation. Yet it ｾ＠ for the 
sake of the song. And the shapes that it has taken in the past have been SUitable for the 
ｳｯｾ＠ of the moment," (Lord 1960 p.94) 
115 "A performance gets set and usually has to be repeated - and repeated as well and 
accurately as possible - but from the day it is set something invisible is beginning to die,-
Brook 1972 p.18 
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"La vraie forme. n'arrive qu'au dernier moment, parfois ｭｾ･＠
au-dela du derruer moment. C'est un naissance. La vraie forme 
n'est pas comme la construction d'un bltiment la suite d'une 
serie d'actions constructives et 10giques. Au co'ntraire, Ie vraie 
ｰｲｯ｣･ｳＮｳｾｳ＠ de construction est en ｭｾｭ･＠ temps une sorte de 
demolition. Cela veut dire que l'on s'achemine de plus en plus 
vers la peur, comme toute demolition. On cree un vide" (Brook 
1991, p.34)116 ' 
At the same time as accepting the volatility and protean quality of truly 
engaging performance Brook points out that he is creating "un vide" - an 
empty space. This empty space is what is filled in our being-with; if one 
dares to leap from Heideggerian terminology to the praxis of theatre one 
may say it is the opening of the Da of the story. It would be entirely 
appropriate to hear in this "vide" also a resonance with Heidegger's use of 
the term "dearing".117 What is shared in a WOSE is not fundamentally 
factual information but the way of being of Dasein which is open to being. 
Authentic story-telling in the oral tradition is a very special case of what 
Heidegger talks about when he talks of Dasein handing itself down to 
itself.IIS In story Dasein shows itself to itself. In an earlier epoch of Being, 
when Dasein was pre-literate, no story could be told without the living 
presence of a particular Dasein, hence every telling was already attuned. 
The significance of showing of attunement in speech has been overlooked 
as we have become more and more used to reading, and to hearing speech 
that is in fact mere reading aloud.119 Reading allows us to "understand" 
stories, just as it allows us to know information without attunement. 
This would not formerly have been possible. Traditional wisdom is 
attuned understanding, so the meaning of a statement is always affected by 
the being of the speaker. Brook, working on one of the two great Hindu 
epics, was sensitive to this truth. 
"In the thinking behind The Mahabarata you find that the word 
appears from a person with a different value depending of the 
quality of the person - so exactly the same statement coming out of 
116 "The true form arrives only at the last moment, sometimes even after the last ｭｯｾｴＮ＠
It is a birth. The true form is not like the construction of a building, the outcome of a senes 
of lOgical, construction moves. On the contrary the real process of constructio.n is ｾｬｹ＠ a 
sort of demolition. That is to say you head closer and closer to fear - JUst hke all 
demolition. You make a space." 
117 BT 401-2 
118 BT 435-8 
119 "In literature cultures the illusion is widespread that if one has the exact words 
someone has uttered, one has by that very fact his exact meaning. This is not true." Ong 
1967, pol2 
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the mouth of a dishonour able man has a different value coming 
out of the mouth of an honourable man." (Brook interviewed in 
Willbourn, 1985, p.36) 
The same point can be put in Heideggerian terms. The Dasein of the 
speaker provides the unified temporal horizon of the story-world into 
which the audience transposes itself. If the speaker holds open that world 
in anticipatory resoluteness, that is with a more profound understanding 
of his own being, world and other Dasein, there is more meaning in his 
words for the audience, of which each member takes according to his own 
being and ability.120 And for each one, that ability is expanded to the 
extent that he lets himself be further opened by his being transposed into 
the story. If he truly is transposed his own unified temporal horizon is 
expanded such that a deeper understanding is possible. This is the actual, 
living process which is referred to in Heidegger's text but is somewhat 
obscured by the density of his writing. What is handed down is not 
essentially the story itself as a plot that is learned by heart, but the way of 
being shown in, and in the showing of, the story. In becoming authentic, 
individual Dasein steps into the authentic Being-with-one-another of co-
historizing that is determinative for the destiny of its people. Hence 
Heidegger writes, and I repeat the quotation; 
"Only in communicating and in struggling does the power of 
destiny become free. Dasein's fateful destiny in and with its 
'generation' goes to make up the full authentic historizing of 
Dasein." (BT 436) 
Telling a story well is thus inseparably tied up with struggling towards 
authentic being-with. Hence the professional art of good storytelling 
cannot be learned merely by the accumulation of technical skills, but only 
by a willingness to undergo a transformation in one's way of being.121 
This is why traditionally the art of storytelling was learned by 
apprenticeship.122 It cannot in principle be learned by the cognizing of 
factual information, however detailed. There is thus a limited value in 
attempting to write further about the details of the performance of a 
120 Meaning is affected by the hearer as well as the speaker. Cf. Lepper: "the recipient of 
an utterance cannot be discounted when considering the meaning of that utterance." Lepper 
1996, p.226 . . 
121 And indeed in many traditional societies storytelling events are aSSOCIated ｗＱｾ＠
existentially transformative rituals, and the tellers are considered to have shamamc 
r:roperties. See Eliade 1972 
22 Haggarty 1996, p.16 
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WOSE, it is important rather to acknowledge the limitations of textual 
description and didacticism. Theoretical, textJUlI discourse is precisely 
what covers over what is essential in storytelling even as it attempts to 
describe it. 
7 CONCLUSION 
Any attempt to summarize the path of this thesis is in danger of falling 
into the trap of purporting to reduce understanding to information that 
can simply be listed, recorded and delivered unambiguously. I am 
mindful of the perils of misinterpretation to which text is liable,123 and 
the peril of too grand a design.124 In view of the emphasis that has been 
placed on orality we must agree with Plato that "any writer ... who claims 
that clear and permanently valid truth is to be found in a written speech 
lays himself open to reproach. "125 There is an irony in explicating the 
importance of oral face-to-face discourse in a written text. The essence of 
the topic of this thesis is not captured on these pages, they merely point 
towards it. Nevertheless we can usefully review some key points. 
This is in a sense a phenomenology of oral storytelling. In Chapter One 
we explored Heidegger's ontology of Dasein, the nature of being-in-the-
world and the existentialia. We went on to explore the temporal 
dimensions of those existentialia. In Chapter Two we looked in detail at 
the existentiale of meaning. We followed Heidegger's separation of 
meaning from signs as such. He shows that signs are not the origin of 
meaning but are made possible by Dasein's meaning. We rejected 
Caputo's notion that Heidegger was thinking ''beyond Being" in favour of 
a reading of Heidegger as trying to think Being ever deeper.126 We 
highlighted the importance of the special case of meaning wherein we say 
entities have meaning and the being of Dasein is revealed simultaneously. 
123 "once a thing is committed to writing it circulates equally among those who understand 
the subject and those who have no business with iti a writing cannot distinguish between 
suitable and unsuitable readers. And if it is ill-treated or unfairly abused it always needs 
its parent to come to its rescue; it is quite incapable of defending or helping itself." Plato 
1913,#275 
124 Champigny's text is a pertinent warning: his topiC is the ontology of narrative, but it is 
doubtful whether one can extract a coherent analysiS or conclusion from his text. 
Champigny 1972 
125 Plato 1913 #277 
126 In so doing he eventually moves beyond the ontology of Dasein and beyond considering 
the existential dimension of meaning, but not beyond Being itself. 
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Heidegger moves from this type of meaning to the existentiale of meaning 
without a clear differentiation in the text. It was suggested that a rhetorical 
antithesis revealed by an oral reading made possible a coherent 
interpretation of the notoriously difficult key passage.127 Meaning is 
existentially Dasein's access to being, and hence it was shown that it is not 
ultimately separable from the worldhood of the world. Recognising a 
particular entity as having meaning reveals Dasein's being as alongside 
the entity, attuned and understanding; in other words as care. At the same 
time we showed that when we say something has meaning we mean that 
it has meaning for us as attuned beings, i.e. that it matters to us. This is in 
accordance with Heidegger's later remark that by "care" he meant to 
indicate the way that being "gets to me")28 We looked at structural 
metaphors of meaning in Being and Time and concluded that they are the 
exegetical forerunners of the exposition of temporality as ecstatic. After 
Heidegger has laid out his ecstatic phenomenology of time and Dasein's 
temporality he no longer uses the term "meaning" as an existentiale. We 
suggested that Heidegger used the term "meaning" qua existentiale to 
attempt to capture Dasein's temporal as-a-wholeness. Meaning qua 
existentiale does not of course have a separate existence from Dasein but is 
precisely constitutive of Dasein's existence. It was proposed that the as-a-
wholeness of an act of narrative is derived from the as-a-wholeness of 
Dasein, and that hence we can understand Dasein's as-a-wholeness by 
means of the term narrative, which in turn illuminates what Heidegger 
meant by "meaning" qua existentiale. 
Our pre-ontological understanding of narrative is thus also a means of 
access to the concept of ecstatic temporality. At the same time it was 
proposed that the essence of narrative is nothing other than Dasein's 
ecstatic temporality. In other words the hanging together of a story is not 
brought about by an agent such as a plot, but is rather given to the story by 
Dasein as transposed into the Da of the story. To orient this claim within 
narrative theory we reviewed the work of Ricoeur, Macintyre and others 
and highlighted the ontological vagueness of the concept of plot, and the 
significance of the fact that an understanding of narrative is taken for 
granted. Much of the erroneous thinking on the nature of narrative was 
ascribed to the primacy given by theorists to text in the being of narrative. 
127 BT 192-3 
128 Dreyfus 1991 p.239 
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It was proposed that the essence of narrative lies in oral ftllTTative. We 
reviewed the work of the orality theorists Ong and Havelock to bring out 
the significance of this claim. Just as Heidegger showed that Dasein is 
always attuned, so too all speech betrays attunement. That which 
differentiates a story from a mere listing of events is our attuned 
understanding being alongside what is recounted. This is our 
transposition into the story. This is possible to the extent that we take up 
our authentic possibilities of ecstatic temporality. Our ecstatic temporality 
is also the grounds of the possibility of the inauthentic transposition into 
fascination or titillation by events recounted.t29 If we have our time as 
the mere passing of instants or as one long now cut off from our ownmost 
having been and futuricity we cannot fully take over the authentic 
futuricity and attunement of the Da of the story. We are on such occasions 
more or less bored although we may cover it over by passing the time. 
Therefore the next part of our approach to the essence of narrative looked 
at boredom. 
In the first instance this was done through a commentary of Heidegger's 
analysis of boredom in The Fundamental Concepts. The commentary 
provides access to the complex thinking of the original. Heidegger 
interprets boredom in terms of temporality. In boredom Dasein takes up 
its own temporality as closed down and cut off from its ownmost past and 
future. In such boredom one could not be fully engaged in a story, one is 
not immediately touched, moved or excited. In other words a story which 
bores is not well-told. The analysis of boredom was used to show that we 
must understand that the essential form of narrative is non-boring and 
gets its essential structure from Dasein's ecstatic temporality. 
This was verified in our close analysis of story in Chapter Five. The 
primordial form of story was shown to be the WOSE. It was noted that a 
WOSE is an existentiell transformation of Dasein that may be a 
momentary episode and may not last throughout the telling of a tale from 
beginning to end. One can be transposed into authentic being-with simply 
in a moment of overhearing "and then ... ".130 Equally one can remain 
129 We can be transposed into mere fascination or concern but the coherence of a story as a 
whole is ultimately grounded in and given by the openness and the unity of the temporal 
horizons of our authentic possibilities. ., .
130 The degree to which a story is constituted by our authentic transposition can be 
demonstrated by the curious phenomenon that it is possible to hear of the slaughter of 
thousands of people on television news and remain indifferent and unmoved, and yet be 
moved almost to tears by a tale of a child distressed by undeserved chastisement. In the 
former case neither newsreader nor television viewer is transposed into a WOSE, in the 
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unmoved and indifferent throughout an entire epic.131 In so far as we are 
bored by a story its story-hood is diminished. The as-a-wholeness and 
coherence of a story is given by the Dasein of the teller and of the listener. 
In Chapter Six we have looked briefly at some practical implications of our 
philosophical findings. We noted the recurrent presentation of the issue 
of "meaninglessness" in psychotherapy and noted that its status as 
complaint was grounded in its meaning as a nihilation of one's being-in-
the-world. This nihilation is an ontological possibility, but its on tic 
realization was identified as a particular complaint of modernity. In a 
brief review of writing on the psychotherapeutic encounter we drew 
attention to the emphasis placed on the emotional and personal 
relationship of client and therapist. We suggested that the WOSE was a 
paradigm for a successful form of psychotherapeutic engagement. 
A WOSE is not necessarily overtly therapeutic nor necessarily a mode of 
dyadic discourse. We therefore applied the analysis of the WOSE to 
storytelling in performance and traditional storytelling. It was shown that 
the WOSE enables us to understand why it is that a storyteller or actor 
telling a fictional story must nonetheless be true to themselves. Also the 
phenomenon of an audience united in response to a story can be 
understood in terms of transposition into authentic co-attunement. These 
brief excursions into the practical arenas of psychotherapy and 
performance are no more than indications of the possibility of application 
of the results of this research. Serious consideration and application must 
be undertaken in further interdisciplinary research and practice. 
MacIntyre, Taylor, Benjamin, Bettleheim and Berry all regret the passing 
of a society which was characterised by oral storytelling.132 Heidegger 
believed that "contemporary man" was attuned by profound boredom,133 
and in the Beitrlige he identified boredom as "the concealed destination of 
modernity in the scientific era."134 Durkheim, some thirty years before 
the publication of Being and Time had identified the problem of anomy 
arising from the de-structuring of society by unbounded technological and 
material advancement.135 This analysis of the essence and significance of 
latter tener and hearer are transposed, even if only for a moment, and take over the child's 
attunement as their own. 
131 Strictly speaking one is always transposed, but in indifference one is transposed as 
indifferent open neither to one's ownmost possibilities nor the others. 
132 Madntyre 1981, Taylor 1989, Benjamin 1970, Bettleheim 1991, Berry 1990 
133 PC 166 
134 Heidegger 1989 p.157 
135 Durkheim 1952 
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the well-told oral storytelling event is a positive response to the concerns 
these thinkers have expressed. It points towards the WOSE as a 
phenomenon which liberates man from his reductionist engagement with 
text. Alphabetic writing is technology, one of the earliest forms of the 
technology that has come to dominate Dasein.136 There is a great deal of 
work to be done on the sociology of interpersonal dynamics in a society 
whose members no longer tell stories and spend up to twenty-four hours 
per week watching television.137 Current research does not add up to 
grounds for optimism.138 The WOSE is not mere entertainment of 
comparable value and effect to other leisure activites, nor can the effect of 
existentiell transformation it brings about be replaced by intellectual 
discursive knowledge. It is a mode of being-with the lack of which 
impoverishes our human possibilities. If we wish to sustain our way of 
being as caring for others we would do well to encourage well-told oral 
storytelling, not just in psychotherapy or performance, but throughout 
society. Such encouragement is not best done by technical manuals or 
text-based instruction but by the immediate process of telling and listening 
to stories.139 
This analysis also points to the need for research and hard work in the 
praxis of professional storytelling, above all in emphasising that the 
elusive quality of excellence is of paramount significance. The Western 
audience is not only addicted to sensationalism, it is also deeply, 
profoundly bored and for the most part, as Brook has observed, does not 
know what it is missing.1 40 The greatest challenge to contemporary 
storytellers is to raise the expectations of its audience back to the level of 
authentic engagement, and then to meet those expectations. 
There is also a challenge to contemporary theories of narrative in this 
thesis. It has been shown that the coherence of the primordial form of 
story arises from the as-a-wholeness given to a story by Dasein. The 
136 See Heidegger 1951 and 1978. The extent to which contemporary man is unaware of the 
impact of technology on his way of being is an ｩｮ､ｩｾ｡ｴｩｾｮ＠ of its ｾ｡ｳｩｶ･ｮ･ｳｳＮ＠ As Sisson 
remarked prophetically, ''The ease of technology Will, 10 ｾｹ＠ ｾ｡ｳ･Ｌ＠ 10 the end ｰｾｵ｣･＠ a 
race of diminishing consciousness, for whom the only pel'SWlSlon IS by force. ｾ＠ triumph of 
technology would be to leave people with so little consciousness that they dId not notice 
the change. It Sisson 1978 p.212 
137 It has been started by Postman 1986 
138 See Putnam 1996 
139 The hegemony of text-based education in Britain, and its ｣ｯｮｳ･ｱｾ･ｮ｣･ｳＬ＠ are both 
illustrated by the fact that at the time of writing, March 1997, ｂｲｩｾｳｨ＠ ｔ･ｾ･｣ｯｭ＠ has 
produced a booklet, which has been very popular, entitled Talkworlcs. It IS a vmtten guide 
to the art of having conversations. 
140 Brook 1912, Ch.l 
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notion of plot is a re-ification arising from mistaking the essential form of 
story to be text. Likewise the agency of the plot is a misattribution of the 
dynamics of attunement and understanding in Dasein.141 Strictly 
speaking we should say that there is a primordial form of story which 
collapses into a different sort of event, a mere sequence of assertions, 
when it falls into boringness. Stories mediated by texts, films and other 
media are closer to the primordial form of story the more they allow the 
viewer, reader, or listener to tranpose themselves authentically into the 
story. To the extent that the Dasein of the teller and listener takes up its 
authentic possibilities in transposition the story reveals the truth of 
Dasein.142 To the extent that Dasein transposes itself into inauthenticity 
the story falls into the titillation of idle talk, and to a greater or lesser 
extent a version of the passing the time of the second form of boredom. 
There is much research to be done to draw out the implications of this 
understanding of narrative for theorists in many different fields. 
The challenge to psychotherapy is to allow theoretical discourse and 
analysis to be augmented by the wisdom of Dasein's authentic revelation 
of its own being. The significance of (pre-ontological) existential meaning 
revealed and available in WOSEs is not transcribable so the medical model 
of 'symptoms', 'diagnoses' and 'cures' all identifiable and transcribable is 
not always appropriate. Theoretical knowledge encourages interpretation 
and judgement which is often inappropriate in psychotherapy. Perhaps 
recognising the significance of our stories is the route to recognising that 
mental health is a result of showing to ourselves and one another the 
truth of our attuned, understanding being and accepting it. In so doing we 
may hand down to each other and our children the wisdom about life that 
is revealed in stories that truly touch us. 
The challenge to philosophers is to pay heed to the existentiell 
transformation of boredom and to recognise the significance of the 
untranscribable meaning of oral discourse. It is timely, in view of the 
problems caused by excessive academic publishing, that academics should 
141 Many other 'elements' of stories can be re-assessed on the basis of this insighL 
Emotional tension, for example, is the attunement that arises from the 'not' at the heart of 
the projection of possibilities arising from our having-been. Possibilities are presented 
which may not happen but which have meaning. for us in so far as we are ｾ＠ into 
the Dasein of the story and take over its havmg-been. As some possibilities will be 
nihUated our own being as transposed is threatened. 
142 This offers itself as a fruitful basis for a theory of the narrative work of art. There is 
great potential for research to be done in aesthetics relating this ｵｮ､･ｲｾｮ､ｩｮｧ＠ of the 
transposition of Dasein in WOSEs to Heidegger's later writing on art <e.g. In Krell 1978) 
and to other writers on truth and art, notably Gadamer 1919. 
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recognise the limits of text-based discourse and revitalize oral pedagogic 
dialogue. This revival would entail a rapprochment of philosophy and 
rhetoric which were driven apart by the sophistry originally made possible 
by the ambiguity and abstraction visited upon language by 
alphabetisation.143 Thinking would once again be served by text and not 
overwhelmed by it. In talking and being-with one another the existential 
meaning of our attunement would be honoured and the potential of 
storytelling to transform and enlighten human being would once again be 
realised.144 
143 See Vickers 1989 for a stout defence of the virtues of rhetoric and a plea for a recognition 
of its relevance in modernity. Tit 
144 It is said in India that a man who knows by heart the great oral epic poem " 
MtlluJbtlrtlftl is enlightened. In the light of our analysis we can understand how thiS 
ancient saying could be true. 
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